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WILSON PRICHARD 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
TAXATION, RESPONSIVENESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis explores the argument that the need for governments to raise tax revenue, as 
opposed to relying on resource rents or other sources of non-tax revenue, may increase the 
likelihood that they will be responsive and accountable to their citizens.  It employs a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, first testing the relationship between 
tax reliance and accountability econometrically using cross-country data and then turning to 
detailed case studies from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  The econometric results conclude 
that while existing data is consistent with the argument that tax reliance contributes to 
greater responsiveness and accountability, it is not possible to establish causality due to a 
combination of data limitations and the complexity of the underlying causal processes.  
This ambiguous finding provides motivation for the detailed case studies that follow.  The 
causal model developed here proposes that the need for governments to rely on taxation 
may strengthen taxpayer demands for responsiveness and accountability, owing to the 
possibility of tax resistance and the role of taxation as a catalyst for collective action.  
Consistent with this model, the case study chapters present detailed historical narratives that 
capture significant examples from each of the three countries in which the need for taxation 
has contributed significantly to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  As 
importantly, the case study evidence provides a nuanced understanding of the nature of the 
connections between taxation, responsiveness and accountability, highlighting three distinct 
types of causal processes at work, as well as the most significant social, political and 
economic contextual factors that shape the potential for tax bargaining.  These lessons point 
toward important policy implications for foreign aid and tax reform more broadly. 
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1. Taxation, Revenue and Development: An Introduction 
In 1918 Joseph Schumpeter (1991 [1918]: 101), a pioneer in the field of fiscal sociology, 
wrote that, “public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of 
society, especially although not exclusively of its political life.”  Central to his argument 
was the belief that the way that governments were funded was fundamental to 
understanding the way that society was organized and governed.  A government that was 
forced to rely on its citizens to for revenue through taxation was likely to rule very 
differently, and to face very different political pressures, than one which could draw on 
independent resources to finance its activities.1 
 
This basic insight has been borne out by accounts of state formation in early modern 
Europe, many of which have traced the emergence of representative political institutions in 
part to conflicts between citizens and governments over taxation.  In some states monarchs 
were forced to cede rights and political power to taxpayers in order to secure compliance 
with taxation.  In others conflict over taxation became a catalyst for broader public 
mobilization and political conflict, thus providing a spark for profound political changes.  
While the need for taxation did not prompt such political changes everywhere, it is widely 
accepted that in a significant number of cases the need for governments to raise tax revenue 
strengthened taxpayers demands for greater political responsiveness and accountability 
(Tilly 1990). 
 
Despite the centrality of taxation to accounts of state formation and political change in early 
modern Europe, questions about taxation have historically figured much less prominently in 
the study of politics in the developing world (Moore 1998).  This, though, has begun to 
change, as research focused on the connections between revenue and politics in the 
developing world has gained greater prominence over the past decade in particular.   Most 
of this comparatively recent work has centred on the broad argument that states that rely 
heavily on non-tax sources of revenue are more likely to be autocratic and corrupt, while 
                                                
1 Equally central to the evolution of scholarship in this field was the work of Rudolf Goldscheid.  
Unfortunately, little of that work has been translated into English, though it is summarized in Schumpeter 
(1991 [1918]) (Moore 2001: 399-400). 
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those that are more reliant on tax revenue are more likely to be responsive and accountable 
to their citizens.  In simpler terms, a significant body of research has proposed the existence 
of a “resource curse,” with access to extensive natural resource wealth leading to 
deteriorating governance and development outcomes.  These ideas initially emerged largely 
from the experience of so-called Rentier states in the Middle East and North Africa, where 
the discovery of significant oil resources was accompanied by the spread of autocratic rule 
and the weakening of many state institutions (Mahdavy 1970, Chaudhry 1997, Vandewalle 
1998).  More recently, scholarly attention has also turned to sub-Saharan Africa, where 
resource rich nations have frequently suffered from autocracy, high levels of corruption, 
low levels of economic growth and devastating episodes of civil war (Guyer 1992, Yates 
1996, Herbst 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Bates 2001).  
 
The proliferation of studies in this area has yielded broad agreement that access to 
significant resource wealth can pose a significant risk to the quality of governance and to 
broader development outcomes (Ross 2001).  However, while there has been broad 
agreement on this general message, scholars have offered a comparatively diverse array of 
explanations for this connection.  For some the problem lies in the tendency of resource 
wealth to encourage aggressive competition for control of the state, often through armed 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2009).  For others the central issue is that resource 
wealth offers extensive opportunities for corruption, and thus tends to reinforce political 
strategies based on patronage and rent-seeking (Kolstad and Wiig 2009).  For still others, 
the key issue is that resource wealth reinforces the power of the central state, allowing 
governments to purchase political support and punish political opposition through 
repression (Morrison 2009). 
 
While these explanations are diverse, they share a primary focus on the potentially negative 
consequences of resource wealth, through its ability to distort political incentives and 
political competition.  An alternative tradition, which motivates this thesis, has argued that 
access to extensive non-tax revenue may reduce the quality of governance by reducing the 
need for governments to collect tax revenue from their citizens.  This possibility rests on the 
belief that the need for governments to collect tax revenue can strengthen their dependence 
 15 
on their citizens, thus generating positive incentives for governments to build strong state 
institutions, to provide conditions conducive to economic growth, and, perhaps most 
importantly, to be more responsive and accountable to taxpayers (Levi 1988, Moore 1998, 
Bates 2001).  
 
In recent years arguments about the importance of tax reliance to the emergence of effective 
governance have become increasingly accepted, even being taken for granted in at least 
some popular writing on development.  For example, Paul Collier, who has emerged as one 
of the best-known voices in the field, has written that (2009:126): 
 
It is also evident why natural resources might increase proneness to violence.  
They provide a ready source of finance for rebel groups, they provide a honey 
pot to fight over, and they enable the government to function without taxing 
the incomes of citizens, which gradually detaches it from what citizens want 
[my emphasis]. 
 
This argument has also increasingly appeared in debates about foreign aid, with growing 
concerns that foreign aid may reduce the need for domestic taxation, and thus inadvertently 
undermine domestic pressure for the emergence of responsive and accountable governance.  
Thus, in a recent review article Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006:14) propose that: 
 
Large aid flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability 
because governing elites no longer need to ensure the support of their publics 
and the assent of their legislatures when they do not need to raise revenues 
from the local economy, as long as they keep the donors happy and willing to 
provide alternative sources of funding. 
 
Thus, after a long period of neglect, the importance of taxation to state-society relations and 
broader governance outcomes in the developing world has begun to gain attention in both 
academic and policy debates.   
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However, despite this increasing attention, the empirical basis for these claims has 
remained surprisingly underdeveloped.  Empirical support for the existence of a positive 
relationship between taxation and broader governance gains continues to be based primarily 
on the well-accepted importance of tax conflicts to state formation and political reform in 
early modern Europe (Tilly 1990), and on the absence of responsiveness and accountability 
in many resource dependent states (Ross 2001, 2004).  This evidence is certainly suggestive 
of a relationship between the need for taxation and improved governance in contemporary 
developing countries, but it ultimately remains highly incomplete.  Historical evidence, 
while it offers valuable conceptual guidance, is far from constituting proof that similar 
processes are likely in the vastly different context of contemporary developing countries 
(Moore 1998, 2008).  Meanwhile, the absence of good governance in many resource 
dependent countries is consistent with the argument that the need for taxation strengthens 
incentives for good governance, but may equally reflect the many other channels through 
which resource wealth may shape political outcomes.  Finally, cross-country econometric 
studies by Ross (2004) and Mahon (2005) are perhaps the best-known evidence cited in 
favour of a connection between taxation and accountability in the contemporary developing 
world, but there are major questions about the econometric robustness of these results 
(Haber and Menaldo 2009).   
 
More glaring than questions about the robustness of existing evidence is the simple absence 
of systematic qualitative evidence exploring the role of taxation as a spur to broader 
governance gains at the country level.  This is particularly striking given that historical 
evidence of a relationship between taxation and political reform in early modern Europe is 
based almost entirely on narrative accounts of conflicts over taxation in individual 
countries.  Such qualitative accounts are essential for at least three reasons.  First, they are 
the most effective means to capture the specific impact of the need for taxation on the 
quality of governance, as distinct from other pathways through which alternative sources of 
government revenue may shape the state and political outcomes.  Second, they are able to 
capture the potential diversity of political processes linking taxation to improvements in 
governance.  Finally, they can provide the type of detailed evidence necessary to inform 
policy debates aimed at strengthening linkages between taxation and improved governance. 
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Given the various limitations of existing evidence, this thesis empirically investigates one 
aspect of the relationship between the need for taxation and broader improvements in 
governance, focusing on the relationship between taxation and the emergence of 
responsiveness and accountability in three countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana, Kenya 
and Ethiopia.  It thus explores the argument that the need to rely on tax revenue may lead 
governments to enter into ”tax bargains” with citizens, conceding greater responsiveness 
and accountability in order to secure acceptance of, and compliance with, taxation (Moore 
2008:36).  Put slightly differently, it explores the possibility that the need for governments 
to collect tax revenue may strengthen the ability of citizens to make successful demands for 
responsiveness and accountability.  This argument, in turn, reflects two interrelated causal 
logics:  first, governments that are forced to rely on tax revenue may face stronger 
incentives to make governing concessions to citizens in order to improve tax compliance 
and collection; second, citizens that are subject to taxation may take a more active interest 
in how that revenue is spent, and thus make more active demands for reciprocal 
concessions from government.   
 
The thesis ultimately has three broad goals.  First, it asks whether there is evidence that the 
need for governments to tax their citizens has, in fact, contributed significantly to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  This marks 
the first sustained effort to explore the empirical validity of arguments about tax bargaining 
at the country level in the developing world. 
 
The second goal is to better understand the specific pathways through which the need for 
taxation may shape political interactions and outcomes at the country level.  Rather than 
focusing on general claims about taxation, responsiveness and accountability, this thesis 
aims to understand how, precisely, taxation has contributed to political change in practice.  
Such specificity is not only of academic interest, but is indispensable in order to eventually 
translate general lessons into specific policy implications. 
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Finally, the third goal of the thesis is to highlight the most important contextual factors that 
have shaped the relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  This is 
particularly important, as the thesis does not claim that the need for taxation will always 
result in improved responsiveness and accountability, but, rather, seeks to demonstrate the 
more modest empirical claim that the need for taxation has contributed to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability in a significant number of specific instances.  As such, 
there is substantial value in highlighting the specific circumstances under which the need 
for taxation is, or is not, likely to become a catalyst for broader governance gains. 
 
In pursuit of these goals, the thesis begins by proposing a detailed theoretical model linking 
taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  While the model developed 
in this thesis draws on existing models of tax bargaining, it expands upon earlier work in 
two important ways.  First, while earlier models have treated tax bargaining as a quite 
distinct political process (Gehlbach 2008), the model developed here seeks to integrate the 
study of taxation with broader models of political change and reform.  Second, the model 
developed in this thesis is more expansive than existing formal models, and is 
correspondingly able to capture a broader variety of outcomes.   
 
Specifically, this thesis argues that the political relevance of taxation is best understood 
through the lens of political power.  The need for governments to rely on taxation can be 
understood as effectively increasing the political power wielded by citizens, and 
consequently their ability to make demands on governments for responsiveness and 
accountability.  In framing the issue in this way, this thesis aligns itself with more general 
theories of politics that view political outcomes largely as the result of political contestation 
between citizens and those elites who control the state (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 
Moore 2007).  Having adopted this general framing, the model developed here moves 
beyond earlier works by explicitly identifying multiple alternative causal processes by 
which the need for taxation may contribute to the broader expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  It argues that the need for taxation may increase the political power wielded 
by citizens by allowing them to gain political leverage over the government through tax 
resistance, and by encouraging and strengthening political engagement and collective 
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action.  These political actions by taxpayers may, in turn, lead governments to make 
explicit governance concessions (termed direct tax bargaining), or may have a more 
indirect and long-term effect on the likelihood of political reform by weakening unpopular 
incumbents and strengthening political engagement (indirect tax bargaining). 
 
With this theoretical model in place, the empirical analysis proceeds in two parts.  The first 
part replicates and expands upon existing cross-country econometric evidence.  This is an 
important first step, as econometric evidence has played a prominent role in shaping 
existing understanding of the issues being examined here, but is also subject to significant 
scepticism resulting from highly uncertain data and methods (Haber and Menaldo 2009).  In 
line with these critiques, the analysis presented here concludes that while available data is 
consistent with the belief that taxation can be a catalyst for the expansion of accountability, 
it does not provide a sufficient basis for conclusively establishing the existence of a causal 
relationship.  As importantly, such econometric evidence is unable to capture the specifics 
of how reliance on tax revenue shapes broader governance outcomes, and is thus unable to 
distinguish between multiple competing causal arguments. 
 
The uncertainty of available econometric results sets the stage for the primary contribution 
of the thesis, which lies in developing case study analyses of the relationship between 
taxation and political reform in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.   Consistent with studies of 
early modern Europe, the analysis is based on the construction of detailed analytical 
narratives of taxation and political change in each of the case study countries.   
 
Ultimately, the thesis argues that there is substantial evidence across the three cases that the 
need for taxation has contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability by 
effectively strengthening the political power wielded by taxpayers.  This evidence is 
captured in political narratives, both big and small, that speak to the potential centrality of 
taxation to political change.  In one case, a former military government in Ghana introduced 
a new goods and services tax in the mid-1990s and was confronted by mass political 
protests.  These protests resulted in the repeal of the tax and, more importantly, catalyzed 
popular demands for political liberalization and aided the emergence of more genuinely 
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democratic governance.  In a quite different episode in Kenya taxpayers responded to the 
corruption and undemocratic behaviour of an incumbent government through purposeful 
tax resistance and evasion, which helped to weaken the fiscal position of the government.  
This revenue pressure eventually contributed to a change of government, and dramatic 
governance reforms. Collectively, these and other examples suggest that an important 
explanation for political developments in these countries may be found in the efforts of 
governments to extract tax revenue from their citizens. 
 
While the thesis thus highlights the importance of tax reliance to broader political 
developments in each of the three countries, it equally makes clear that the relationship 
between taxation and political reform is far from automatic.  For every instance in which 
the need for taxation has contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability, 
there are other cases in which increased taxation has been imposed coercively, without 
resulting in any meaningful concessions from governments.  Thus an important part of the 
research contribution lies in highlighting the specifics features of country-level processes 
linking taxation, responsiveness and accountability, as well as the contextual factors that 
have shape particular outcomes.  While country-level processes have sometimes involved 
relatively explicit tax bargaining between taxpayers and governments, taxation has just as 
often shaped political outcomes through relatively implicit and indirect processes.  
Meanwhile, particular processes and outcomes have been shaped by a diverse set of 
contextual variables, ranging from broad political and economic factors to more specific 
issues related to public policy and the activities of civil society.  These latter factors are of 
particular interest because they point towards potential strategies for strengthening the links 
between taxation, responsiveness and accountability in the contemporary developing world. 
 
Having laid out the broad argument of the thesis, the remainder of this introductory chapter 
is organized as follows.  The next section situates this research with respect to broader 
research about politics and governance in the developing world.  The section that follows 
then positions this research within the context of broader studies of the relationship between 
alternative sources of government revenue and governance outcomes.  This is followed by a 
more detailed review of existing research dealing with the relationship between taxation, 
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responsiveness and accountability, thus highlighting the specific research contribution made 
by this thesis.  Finally, the chapter concludes by introducing the research methodology and 
presenting a full outline of the thesis. 
1.1. Politics, Institutions and Development 
 
Despite growing interest in the relationship between taxation and governance outcomes, 
research in this area remains in its infancy, and detailed attention to tax and revenue issues 
remains the exception, rather than the rule, in broader discussions of governance and 
political reform in the developing world.  This reflects, at least in part, the tendency of 
much development research to focus on identifying those policies and institutions most 
conducive to development, while paying comparatively less attention to state-society 
relationships and the underlying political processes that ultimately shape policies and 
institutions.   
 
Historically, development research frequently focused on the realm of policy, reflecting a 
belief that rapid development would result from ‘getting policies right’.  In sub-Saharan 
Africa this tendency has been reflected in the policy prescriptions associated with structural 
adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the general convergence of economic and social 
policies over time.  While interest in policy remains significant, the past two decades have 
witnessed a progressive shift away from a narrow focus on policy and towards a greater 
attention to the importance of the state and of institutions in shaping development 
outcomes.  This shift has reflected a growing recognition that simply getting policy right 
was insufficient for achieving rapid economic development where states were not genuinely 
committed to pursuing developmental outcomes, and capable of delivering on that 
commitment.  This view is clearly captured by Atul Kohli (2004: 12), who writes on the 
question of economic development that, 
 
The nearly exclusive focus in the literature on appropriate policy choices is 
incomplete, even misleading.  Policy choices matter, of course, but these 
choices must be explained.  More important, the impact of the same policy 
applied in two different settings may vary because of the contextual 
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differences … the contextual difference that deserves emphasis … concerns 
the varying political and institutional conditions in which economic policies 
are chosen and pursued.  
 
The result of this shift in emphasis has been the proliferation of studies arguing that 
political and economic institutions are the crucial determinants of development outcomes.  
As one leading scholar in the field has put it, “the most convincing theory of comparative 
economic development asserts that it is institutions that are the fundamental cause of 
countries’ development or underdevelopment” (Robinson 2002: 510). 
 
Within the realm of politics, research has tended to focus on the implications of particular 
formal and informal political institutions for state behaviour and development outcomes.  
This has yielded studies of relatively formal political institutions including elections, 
parliaments, decentralization and political party systems (Lindberg 2006, Crook and Manor 
1998, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  It has also yielded broader consideration of informal 
rules and norms governing bureaucratic practices and the exercise of political power 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1994, 1997).   
 
Collectively, this literature has made a powerful case for the importance of political 
institutions to broader development outcomes, and has pointed towards the need for 
research to explain the origins of these institutions.  To a greater degree than in other 
regions, explanations of the origins of political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa have 
tended to focus on history, and particularly on the legacy of colonial rule.  In simplified 
terms, such studies have generally argued that difference in the nature of colonial rule 
produced unique institutional legacies, which have, in turn, yielded differing development 
trajectories (Mamdani 1996, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Kohli 2004, Lange 
2009).  These studies of the historical origins of contemporary institutions have immensely 
enriched our understanding of politics in the region, but the focus on the importance of 
colonial rule, however justified, has implied comparatively less attention to those other 
forces that have shaped states, state-society relations and political systems. 
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It is correspondingly useful to turn to consider the vast literature that has sought to explain 
the origins of political institutions, and particularly democracy, more broadly.2  While this 
literature encompasses significant diversity, much of it implicitly or explicitly rests on a 
simple model of politics in which political reform results from conflicts between citizens 
and elites, as those outside of government seek to gain greater control over the state 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  While the details of particular processes of political 
liberalization are likely to reflect specific elite conflicts and strategic decision-making 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Haggard and Kaufman 1997), in broader terms the 
expansion of accountability is expected to turn on the ability of citizens to make effective 
demands on governments.  While some theories have emphasized the particular importance 
of the middle class to such processes (e.g. Moore 1966), and others have stressed the 
importance of more broadly based political mobilization (e.g. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephen 1992), it is in both cases concerted and organized political demands that generate 
the need for political reform.  In the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 29): 
“Democracy is usually not given by the elites because its values have changed.  It is 
demanded by the disenfranchised as a way to obtain political power and thus secure a larger 
share of the economic benefits of the system.”  Viewed through this lens, the long-term 
strengthening of institutions that promote responsiveness and accountability is expected to 
depend on processes that increase the political power wielded by citizens.  This basic logic 
lies behind arguments that variously emphasize the importance of economic growth, 
industrialization, globalization or the increasing organization of civil society to long term 
political transformations.  There is thus a rich literature that views the emergence of 
political institutions that promote responsiveness and accountability as the outcome of 
increasingly effective demands by citizen groups outside of government.  These accounts, 
in turn, have frequently argued that shifting social and economic conditions have been 
integral to strengthening the effectiveness of popular demands.   
 
                                                
2 These studies have often paid remarkably little attention to experiences in sub-Saharan Africa.  While this 
undoubtedly owes largely to the relatively brief recent history of democracy in the region, it is nonetheless 
noteworthy. In the highly influential recent work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example, there is 
virtually no attention paid to recent experiences in sub-Saharan Africa (outside of South Africa), while much 
of the most widely cited literature on democracy in the developing is based heavily on Latin American 
experience. 
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While this tradition thus offers a valuable framework for understanding political change, a 
slightly different intellectual tradition has instead sought to explain the emergence of 
political institutions as part of broader processes of state formation and state building.  
Broadly speaking, research in this tradition proposes that the emergence of political 
institutions is best understood as the outcome of efforts by states to address the most 
fundamental requirements of statehood: controlling violence, waging war and raising 
revenue.3  Best known within this tradition are works that have traced the evolution of 
political institutions to the efforts of states to respond to the external threat of war.  These 
works have argued that meeting the threat of war required dramatic improvements in state 
capacity and forced domestic groups to arrive at new political compromises.  In many 
cases, the threat of war thus led governments to become more responsive and accountable, 
primarily to elites, in order to secure the resources and support necessary for waging war.  
The broad logic of these studies is captured in Tilly’s (1975: 42) oft-quoted claim that “war 
made the state and the state made war.”  However, while studies in this tradition have 
played a major role in shaping our understanding the history of political change in the 
developed world, they have generally played only a secondary role in the study of politics 
in the developing world (Centeno 1997, Doner, Ritchie and Slater 2005).  This approach is 
nonetheless reflected, for example, in a small number of studies that have traced the 
weakness of states in sub-Saharan Africa to the absence of the threat of interstate warfare 
(Jackson 1991, Herbst 2000).  
 
Of particular interest within this broad intellectual tradition is the work of Charles Tilly 
(1990), who has linked the broad influence of war to a detailed consideration of the 
importance of government revenue to the development of the state and political institutions.  
Focusing on experiences in early modern Europe, he has argued that the escalating costs of 
                                                
3 A recent contribution within this broad tradition, which is not addressed in detail here, comes from North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2009).  They argue that the basic problem facing states is the need to limit violence 
among competing claimants to power.  Thus, the political institutions that emerge represent an elite bargain 
capable of limiting violence and promoting social order.  Within this framework, the emergence of political 
institutions that foster responsiveness and accountability (what they term the emergence of “open access 
orders”) occurs when such a development serves the interests of elites, and proves to be an effective means to 
limit violence and sustain social order.  While compelling, this framework has not as yet been directly 
employed to explain contemporary processes of political change, and thus offers limited guidance as to 
specific forces that may make the emergence of responsive and accountable governance more likely. 
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warfare forced states throughout Europe to increase the taxation of their populations, with 
major consequences for political institutions and the broader character of states.  In some 
cases, and most famously in England, the need for tax revenue led states to enter into ‘tax 
bargains’ with citizens, as taxpayers accepted significantly expanded taxation in exchange 
for the strengthening of representative institutions and other checks on the power of 
monarchs.  While similar outcomes were by no means universal, important links between 
taxation and political reform were also evident elsewhere in Europe - most notably among 
the Dutch and the French - and this broad narrative has correspondingly found significant 
support amongst scholars (Ertman 1997, Daunton 2001, Levi 1998, North and Weingast 
1989).   
 
While Tilly’s work has thus emphasized the importance of taxation to the character of the 
state and political institutions, his account nonetheless maintains a strong emphasis on the 
centrality of warfare to processes of political change.  By contrast, Schumpeter (1991 
[1918]), and others within the broad tradition known as fiscal sociology have proposed 
significantly more general claims about the centrality of government revenue to the 
evolution of politics and the state.  Studies within this tradition have argued that, 
independent of the threat of warfare, how governments are financed is likely to have 
important implications for how they are governed.  Most centrally to this study, they have 
argued that the need for states to raise tax revenue is likely to make them more dependent 
on their citizens and thus more likely to be responsive and accountable (Moore 2001). 
 
This study falls squarely within this broad tradition, while drawing heavily on the model of 
‘tax bargaining’ that emerges most clearly from Tilly’s work.  At the same time, an 
important contribution of this work lies in linking the analysis, grounded in fiscal 
sociology, relatively explicitly to more conventional models of contestation and political 
change in the developing world.  Thus, this thesis understands the emergence of institutions 
of responsiveness and accountability as the outcome of contestation between citizens and 
states, but is explicitly focused on the impact of the need for taxation on the political power 
wielded by taxpayers, and on their consequent ability to demand responsiveness and 
accountability from governments. 
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1.2. Revenue and Governance 
The preceding discussion has aimed to situate this study within the broader context of 
research on governance in sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world more generally.   
Having thus framed this research in very broad terms, this section is focused on situating 
this thesis within the more specific context of research dealing with the connections 
between government revenue and governance across the developing world.  While this 
thesis is concerned specifically with the possibility that the need for taxation may contribute 
to the expansion of levels of responsiveness and accountability, this is only one of many 
pathways through which alternative sources of government revenue may shape the state, 
institutions and political outcomes.  It is correspondingly important to understand where the 
research questions being posed here fits in relation to this broader field of inquiry. 
 
Research addressing the connections between revenue and governance has overwhelmingly 
focused on the broad argument that governments that are more reliant on tax revenue are 
more likely to be effective, responsive and accountable, while those that rely heavily on 
non-tax sources of revenue are more likely to be autocratic and corrupt.  In this context the 
term ‘tax reliance’ refers to the share of tax revenue in total government revenue, and is 
thus determined by both levels of tax collection and the extent of non-tax revenue (Ross 
2004).  All else being equal, tax reliance declines when either the level of tax collection 
declines or the level of non-tax revenue increases.   
 
This definition of tax reliance provides a useful basis for comparing multiple political units, 
and for asking whether those that are more tax reliant tend to experience greater state 
capacity, responsiveness and accountability.  Unfortunately, because the concept of tax 
reliance encompasses two distinct elements - levels of tax collection and the extent of non-
tax revenue - it is somewhat ambiguous if our goal is to explain why certain governments 
are more capable, responsive and accountable than others.  Most importantly, is poor 
governance primarily the result of high levels of non-tax revenue or of low levels of 
taxation?  More specifically, how does access to significant non-tax revenue shape political 
behaviour and outcomes?   Likewise, how, specifically, does the need for taxation shape 
government behaviour?  There are multiple pathways through which tax reliance may be 
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linked to governance outcomes, and these differing possibilities carry with them potentially 
distinct policy implications.  It is consequently very useful to divide the broad argument 
that states that are more reliant on taxation are more likely to be capable, responsive and 
accountable into a set of more specific arguments linking alternative sources of government 
revenue to particular governance outcomes.  Doing so is not only conceptually important, 
but provides a firmer basis for detailed and rigorous empirical investigation of these issues.  
 
While there are potentially multiple ways of organizing this broad literature, the approach 
adopted here is laid out in Figure 1.1.  This categorization divides existing explanations into 
three broad categories, each of which, in turn, encompasses two or three specifics causal 
pathways linking revenue to governance outcomes.  
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Figure 1.1: Pathways Linking Reduced Tax Reliance to Weak Governance 
 
 
 
The first category encompasses explanations centred on the idea that access to non-tax 
revenue is likely to increase total government revenue, and thus contribute to entrenching 
governments’ political authority and weakening demands for responsiveness and 
accountability.  There are three primary variants of this argument, as states may be able to 
reduce pressure for political reform by expanding public spending, patronage or repression.  
The ‘public spending effect’ captures the possibility that states with abundant resource 
wealth may be able to expand public services and thus reduce public demands for political 
accountability.  The ‘patronage effect’ is based on the possibility that states with access to 
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extensive natural resource revenue may be able to dispense sufficient patronage to political 
rivals to reduce the risk of sustained political challenges.  Finally, the ‘repression effect’ 
captures the possibility that states with access to significant non-tax revenue may be able to 
invest heavily in the security apparatus in order to block pressures for political reform (Ross 
2001, Morrison 2009).4 
 
The second category of explanations focuses on the impact of non-tax revenue on the 
likelihood of destructive forms of competition for state resources.  These explanations 
centre on the argument that the disproportionate economic importance of natural resource 
wealth may lead to destructive forms of political competition as competing groups seek to 
control the benefits of resource wealth, thus undermining the quality of governance.   The 
more modest form of this argument can be termed the “corruption effect”, as resource 
wealth may open up myriad opportunities for large-scale corruption.  Aside from the simple 
loss of public resources, the expansion of corruption is likely to draw public officials away 
from focusing on more productive tasks and create disincentives for reforms aimed at 
increasing transparency and governmental accountability.  More insidiously, the scale of 
the resources available through corruption may shape political competition such that 
dispensing personal patronage through corruption becomes an unavoidable prerequisite for 
securing effective political support (Kolstad and Wiig 2008).   
 
A more dramatic possibility is a “conflict effect”, as extensive natural resource wealth may 
generate a heightened risk of armed conflict, as armed groups compete for control over 
resource wealth.  In simplified terms, centrally controlled resources are expected to increase 
the value of controlling the state, and may thus increase the likelihood that opposition 
groups will seek to seize control of the state by force.  At the same time, geographically 
dispersed resource wealth may increase the risk of secessionist conflict in resource rich 
                                                
4 The discussion in Ross (2001: 332-37), which is also summarized in Dunning (2008: 54), motivates parts of 
this summary. He argues that states that are more reliant on non-tax revenue are less likely to be responsive 
and accountable owing to a “rentier effect”, a “repression effect” and a “modernization effect”.  I draw on the 
term “repression effect” here, while his “rentier effect” roughly encompasses what I have termed the “public 
spending” and “patronage” effects, as I find this finer distinction useful.  I do not focus on the “modernization 
effect”, which he employs to capture the possibility that resource based growth will not lead to broader 
economic modernization, as this possibility has received comparatively little attention in the relevant 
literature. 
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areas, while providing financing for civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2009).  Needless 
to say, both coups and civil wars are likely to undermine the overall quality of governance 
and development outcomes more generally. 
 
Finally, the third category of explanations focuses on the potential governance 
consequences of a reduced need to raise tax revenue.  These arguments follow the broad 
logic that the need for states to raise tax revenue from their citizens may create positive 
incentives for improved governance, while access to natural resource wealth is likely to 
reduce the need for such governance-enhancing taxation.  In a slightly broader sense, these 
explanations can be usefully thought of as focusing on the positive political implications of 
reliance of taxation, whereas the preceding explanations are focused on the directly 
negative implications of access to non-tax revenue.   
 
While explanations within this third category all focus on the positive governance 
incentives that may be generated by the need for taxation, there are at least three distinct 
ways in which greater taxation may contribute to improved governance.  The first 
possibility is a “state capacity effect”, as the need for taxation may create pressure for the 
strengthening of the state apparatus.  Collecting taxes requires the development of a 
complex and intrusive bureaucratic apparatus, which may become the leading edge of 
broader improvements in public administration (Brewer 1989, Tilly 1990, Chaudhry 1997, 
Brautigam 2008, Prichard and Leonard 2010).5  The second possibility is an “economic 
policy effect”, as tax reliance may lead governments to more actively seek to create 
conditions conducive to economic growth.  Quite simply, governments that are reliant on 
tax revenue have a common interest in promoting the prosperity of taxpayers in order to 
maximize levels of tax revenue.  As Bates (2001: 69) has written of early modern Europe, 
“governments pursued policies that promoted the development of the economy not because 
they wanted to but because they had to, the better to secure the resources with which to 
fight”.  
                                                
5 This possibility has been well document in early modern Europe (Brewer 1989, Tilly 1990), while a 
growing body of research has also pointed to the importance of taxation to the development of broader 
administrative capacity in contemporary developing countries (Chaudhry 1997, Brautigam 2008, Prichard and 
Leonard 2010). 
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Finally, the need for governments to raise tax revenue may induce a “responsiveness and 
accountability effect” by strengthening incentives for governments to concede 
responsiveness and accountability to taxpayers.  It is this possibility that is the focus of this 
research, which, while interested in the broad relationship between tax reliance and 
governance outcomes, focuses on the specific possibility that the need for tax revenue may 
strengthen the ability of taxpayers to make demands on government.  In broad terms, this 
possibility reflects two mechanisms.  The first revolves around the potential for tax 
resistance: the ability of taxpayers to resist taxation may generate positive incentives for 
governments to become more responsive and accountable in order to encourage greater 
compliance with taxes.  The second revolves around the potential for taxation to catalyze 
collective action: the experience of being taxed may lead taxpayers to take a more active 
interest in overseeing the use of government revenue, and thus to make collective demands 
for responsiveness and accountability. 
 
Before moving on, it is worth concluding by noting that while most of the literature on this 
topic has emphasized the potential governance costs of reliance on natural resource wealth, 
a smaller number of recent studies have argued that in some cases reduced tax reliance may 
actually contribute to improved governance.  Morrison (2009) has proposed that by 
increasing the ability of states to purchase political support and repress dissent, access to 
natural resource wealth may increase political stability, which may, in turn, carry 
governance benefits.  Herb (2005) has argued that, alongside many of the processes noted 
here, access to natural resource wealth may also generate positive pressure for political 
liberalization by promoting a measure of economic growth.  Finally, Dunning (2008) has 
proposed the most direct alternative to the argument being explored here, arguing that by 
reducing the need for taxation access to resource wealth may reduce redistributive conflict, 
and thus increase the likelihood that elites will embrace democracy.  This thesis does not 
directly address these various propositions, but they are a further reminder that there are 
many pathways through which resource wealth may shape political outcomes, many of 
which may be simultaneously relevant.  This research is focused on only one such pathway, 
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albeit one that has been particularly central to historical accounts of state building in the 
developed world. 
1.3. Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability 
Having broadly contextualized the focus of this research, this section turns to reviewing the 
comparatively limited body of research that deals directly with the questions being explored 
by this thesis.  This is necessary both in order to lay the foundation for the analysis to 
follow and in order to highlight the particular research contribution being made by this 
thesis.  This section is divided into three parts.  The first reviews the historical literature 
linking taxation to improvements in governance in early modern Europe and the United 
States, as this literature has motivated much of the work in this field.  The second reviews 
the quality of the existing evidence of a relationship between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability in contemporary developing countries.  The third then highlights the 
limitations of this evidence, and the specific justification for this research. 
1.3.1. Taxation and the History of State-Building 
The argument being explored by this thesis has its roots in a particular reading of the 
history of state formation in early modern Europe and the United States, which holds that 
the need for taxation brought governments into conflict with taxpayers and ultimately 
contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  This often resulted from 
explicit or implicit ‘tax bargains’ that saw taxpayers agree to comply with new taxes in 
exchange for the extension of governmental accountability, through the expansion of 
representation, the strengthening of the rule of law and the protection of private property 
rights (Tilly 1990, North and Weingast 1989).  In simplest terms, the need for taxation 
became a catalyst for profound changes in the way that states were governed.  This stylized 
narrative captures important similarities across a range of historical cases, but also disguises 
significant differences, even among the small number of cases that are commonly held up 
as exemplars of this relationship.  What follows presents simplified sketches of the 
historical experiences of England, France and the United States, as these cases highlight the 
centrality of taxation to political change, but also reveal significant diversity in the 
particular causal processes at work. 
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The experience of 17th century England epitomizes the ideal of relatively explicit ‘tax 
bargaining’, as tax compliance was willingly exchanged for the expansion of 
accountability.  By the beginning of the 17th century Britain had established an independent 
court system to defend the rule of law and a parliament with legal control over taxation.  
Yet despite the legal status of parliament and the courts, the ambitions of the monarchy and 
the escalating costs of war led successive kings to defy both parliament and the courts in 
resorting to unilateral revenue raising strategies, which included new customs charges, 
forced loans, the sale of monopolies, property seizures and the sale of peerages (North and 
Weingast 1989, Tilly 1990).  Over time these abuses by the Crown contributed to growing 
anger among taxpayers and parliamentarians and, eventually, to civil war and the overthrow 
of the monarchy in 1641.  The decision to re-install the monarchy in 1660 was only taken 
on the condition that it “confirmed the power of Parliament within the British state, 
especially when it came to revenues and expenditures” (Tilly 1990: 157). 
 
Despite this apparent agreement, it was not long before conflicts between parliament and 
the monarchy re-emerged, thus contributing to a second overthrow of the Crown in 1688, 
dubbed the Glorious Revolution.  That same year parliament elected to offer the Crown to 
the future King William, but did so only after a further institutional revolution, which 
strengthened the position of parliament and the courts, and shifted the locus of effective 
power away from the monarchy. This represented a classic tax bargain, as taxpayers agreed 
to accept increased tax collection in exchange for the institutionalized expansion of 
governmental accountability.  This tax bargain, in turn, figured centrally in the flourishing 
of the British state, as it facilitated an increase in the level and stability of tax revenue, a 
correspondingly increased capacity to borrow abroad and the construction of a more 
sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus (Brewer 1989, Tilly 1990). 
 
A century later in France the need for tax revenue to meet the escalating costs of warfare 
and debt repayment similarly sparked a period of political conflict that ended with the 
establishment of a more capable, responsive and accountable government.  That said, this 
outcome lacked the relatively explicit ‘tax bargaining’ of the English case, and instead 
emerged from revolution and an extended period of political upheaval.   
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By the second half of the 18th Century the escalating costs of war had led the French state to 
the brink of bankruptcy.  At the time France relied on an inefficient feudal tax system in 
which the clergy and nobility largely avoided taxation, while the greatest burden fell on 
agricultural producers and a growing bourgeoisie.  Efforts to increase the share of revenue 
collected by the central state proved both ineffective and unpopular, and led to increasing 
conflict between the state and taxpayers.  By 1789 the fiscal situation had become 
sufficiently desperate that the king was compelled to summon the Estates General, 
comprised of the clergy, the nobility and the more broadly representative Third Estate, in 
order to debate a new fiscal regime.  Yet unlike in the British case, this meeting failed to 
yield a tax bargain in which increased revenue was exchanged for greater accountability.  
Instead, the summoning of the Estates General, which had not occurred since 1614, 
catalyzed the coalescing of a much wider array of grievances among the members of the 
Third Estate, who had soon declared themselves the new National Assembly. 
 
The initial phase of the French Revolution lasted until Napoleon seized power in 1799, and 
yielded two new constitutions during a complex period of political upheaval and conflict.  
By the end of the process the feudal system of rural relations had been largely eliminated 
and replaced by a powerful and centralized bureaucratic state, with a much-expanded role 
for the emerging bourgeoisie.  Moreover, while the revolutionary government was 
overthrown after only a decade, it nonetheless introduced the tradition of republican 
government and thus contributed to the long-term expansion of accountability.   Thus the 
Revolution, which was precipitated by a fiscal crisis, gave rise to dramatic political 
changes.  However, the path from tax conflict to political change did not rely on bargaining 
in the relatively explicit sense of English experience.  Instead it was persistent and 
unresolved resistance to taxation that precipitated a national crisis and generated pressure 
for dramatic change through a long, complex and often violent process (Tilly 1990). 
 
A final, and again dramatically different, example emerges from the role of taxation in the 
genesis of the American Revolution, which gave rise to the oft-quote revolutionary slogan 
“no taxation without representation”.  Throughout the latter half of the 18th century there 
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had been a debate in the American colony over whether the British parliament had the right 
to impose taxes.  The Americans and their allies argued that under British law they could 
only be taxed by their own representatives.  During the 1760s this objection led to the 
repeal of various taxes, including the stamp tax, but the British maintained a tax on tea.  
This was both a symbolic assertion of power and a means to raise revenue to pay the 
salaries of various colonial officials, in order to reaffirm their loyalty to Britain.  In 1773 
the issue came to a head when the British government passed the Tea Act to strengthen the 
legal standing of the tax on tea.   This prompted the so-called Boston Tea Party during 
which protesters not only refused to allow a shipload of taxed tea to be unloaded, but also 
destroyed it by throwing it overboard.  While this episode was of relatively modest practical 
importance it became a symbolic flashpoint for the independence movement, as it 
highlighted questions about the autonomy and rights of the colony and became a catalyst 
for popular mobilization. 
 
Once again conflict over taxation was an essential component of the eventual expansion of 
responsive and accountable government, achieved though revolution, but in a manner 
unlike that which prevailed in either England or France.  The process in Britain relied on an 
explicit tax bargain between taxpayers and the government in the face of a fiscal crisis, 
while the process in France saw resistance to taxation precipitate a fiscal crisis that opened 
the door to dramatic and tumultuous political changes.  By contrast, the tax conflict that 
helped spark the American Revolution did not spring primarily from fiscal crisis, but 
instead revealed the ability of debates about taxation to catalyze political action around 
broader political grievances (Bailyn 1967, Morgan and Morgan 1953, Adams 1998). 
 
These cases are remarkable in that they all point unambiguously to the centrality of taxation 
to generating pressure for responsive and accountable government, but they also represent 
three related, but ultimately profoundly different, causal pathways linking taxation to 
political change.  It is this combination – a compelling argument for the centrality of 
taxation to political change and a striking diversity of potential causal processes and 
outcomes – that is a central justification for this research project. 
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1.3.2. Contemporary Research 
 
These historical narratives provide substantial evidence that the need for states to raise 
taxes was an important driver of expanded responsiveness and accountability in early 
modern Europe and the United States.  This historical literature has, in turn, contributed to 
the emergence of a small, but rich, theoretical literature detailing the possible connections 
between taxation, responsiveness and accountability in contemporary developing countries.  
Within the rational choice tradition, Margaret Levi (1988) has proposed perhaps the best-
known model, which captures the logic according to which a revenue-maximizing ruler 
may decide to make governing concessions to taxpayers in order to encourage “quasi-
voluntary compliance” with taxation.  Bates and Lien (1985) have developed a similar 
model in which governments are expected to make governing concessions specifically in 
order to secure tax compliance from difficult-to-tax owners of mobile capital.  More 
recently, Mick Moore (1998, 2007, 2008) has explored the historical literature from early 
modern Europe in greater depth in order to derive specific predictions about the likely 
implications of tax reliance for governance in contemporary developing countries.  
 
This historical and theoretical literature provides a provocative and engaging starting point 
for research in this area, but it has yet to inspire the emergence of an equally persuasive 
body of empirical research from contemporary developing countries.  Instead, 
contemporary empirical support for the existence of a relationship between taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability comes largely in the form of partial evidence from 
multiple different research traditions.  The first source of indirect support is behavioural 
research that confirms the tendency of tax compliance decisions to be shaped by trust in 
government and satisfaction with government performance (Scholz and Lubell 1998, 
Torgler 2002, Feld and Frey 2002).   While this behavioural research is overwhelmingly 
from the United States, those studies that have been carried out in developing countries 
have generally confirmed the basic result (Cummings et al. 2005, Alm, Sanchez and De 
Juan 1995, Bosco and Mittone 1997).  Moreover, survey based studies from Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Africa conform to this basic prediction as well (Berenson 2006, 
Bergman 2002, 2003, Torgler 2005, Levi and Sacks 2005), while work by Lieberman 
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(2002) presents a detailed account of the connections between the nature of the political 
community and levels of tax compliance and collection in Brazil and South Africa.  While 
these studies do not directly test the claim that taxation has been a catalyst for the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability, evidence that willingness to pay taxes is shaped by 
state performance is an important behavioural foundation for the broader claim. 
 
Turning to country level research, weak governance in many resource dependent states is 
perhaps the most frequently cited evidence for the claim that taxation is important to the 
strengthening of responsiveness and accountability (Ross 2001, Herb 2005).  However, 
while this evidence is consistent with claims about taxation and governance, it generally 
does not isolate the political consequences of the need to raise tax revenue from the various 
other ways in which access to natural resource wealth may shape political outcomes.  That 
said, a small number of studies have focused relatively more explicitly on the implications 
of the absence of taxation for governance outcomes, and thus offer somewhat more 
persuasive evidence.  Looking to history, Drelichman and Voth (2008) argue that in early 
modern Spain access to substantial resource wealth from the silver trade in the New World 
reduced the need for taxation and thus weakened institutions of accountability and 
contributed to political and economic decline.  Turning to more contemporary cases, 
Chaudhry (1997) looks at the impact of non-tax revenue on the state in Saudi Arabia (oil 
revenue) and Yemen (remittances), and provides significant evidence that reductions in 
taxation contributed to the broader decay of public administration, and, consequently, the 
overall responsiveness of government.  Crystal (1990) arrives at similar conclusions in her 
case studies of Kuwait and Qatar, where she argues that the merchant classes relinquished 
some of their political claims after the discovery of oil and the elimination of taxation.  In 
an African context, Guyer (1992) notes the connection between expanded oil revenues and 
the broad weakening of local taxation and local government in Nigeria, though without 
providing a systematic body of empirical evidence.  Overall, studies of governance in 
resource dependent states thus offer some support to the claim that the need for taxation can 
strengthen demands for responsiveness and accountability, but they generally fail to 
systematically focus on the importance of taxation as distinct from other possible 
explanations for observed outcomes.  
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Alternative evidence comes from several recent studies that have sought to econometrically 
test the argument that states that are more heavily reliant on tax revenue are more likely to 
be responsive and accountable.  Ross (2004) finds that countries that are more heavily 
reliant on tax revenue, as a share of total revenue, are more likely to become more 
democratic in subsequent years.  This result is echoed by Mahon (2005), though with 
significant additional caveats with respect to methodological and data challenges.  
Timmons (2005) provides an interesting alternative approach to the same question, looking 
for evidence of “fiscal contracts” in the spending patterns of different states.  Consistent 
with his hypothesis, he reports that those taxpayer groups that pay more taxes also receive 
greater benefits from governments.  In a variant of the resource dependence hypothesis, 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) consider the impact of foreign aid on tax collection and the 
quality of governance.  They independently test the impact of foreign aid on both the 
quality of governance and levels of tax collection, and, finding that both relationships are 
negative, propose that the fall in tax collection may partially explain broader declines in the 
quality of governance.  Finally, a pair of particularly interesting sub-national studies offer 
support to these cross-country findings.  Gervasoni (2010) finds superior government 
performance in regions of Argentina in which the level of reliance on local taxation, as 
opposed to natural resource revenue or central government fiscal transfers, is higher.  
Hoffman and Gibson (2005) arrive at a similar finding in a study of regional governments 
in Tanzania and Zambia, as a higher share of local revenue is allocated to program budgets, 
as opposed to salaries, where reliance on aid and transfers is lower. 
 
Ultimately, these studies provide valuable support for the existence of a relationship 
between tax reliance and governance, but they also face significant challenges that call for a 
degree of scepticism.  At a general level, many of these studies again suffer from an 
inability to distinguish the specific impact of the need for taxation on governance outcomes 
from the broader ways in which access to non-tax revenue may shape political outcomes.  
That is, they are able to say little about specific causal mechanisms and processes.  More 
importantly, there are serious questions about the robustness of the econometric results.  
This is particularly true of the cross-country studies, which are plagued by major problems 
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with the quality of available data and questions about their ability to effectively capture the 
relationships of interest using comparatively simple econometric models.  While the results 
are thus indicative of the existence of a relationship, they are not entirely convincing on 
their own (these issues are addressed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis).  Finally, existing 
sub-national studies, while not as fully subject to these risks, must nonetheless be treated 
with caution given the limits of available data, the difficulty of specifying a compelling 
causal model and the challenges inherent in measuring government performance at the sub-
national level.  In broad terms, while these studies are encouraging, there remains a need for 
significantly stronger and more nuanced evidence. 
 
Given these limitations, case study evidence holds the potential to shed significant 
additional light on the research question, but in practice detailed studies have been rare.  
Looking to history, Brautigam (2008b) provides evidence that conflict over taxation played 
an important role in the institutionalization of greater domestic control over politics in 
Mauritius during the period of British colonial rule.  In a more contemporary setting, Brand 
(1992) argues that a sharp reduction in foreign aid and remittances forced the Jordanian 
government to increase taxes, which, in turn, became a catalyst for political liberalization.  
In a comparison of Poland and Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, Easter (2008) 
argues that the need for the Polish state to rely heavily on new taxes on income forced it to 
bargain with citizens and that this contributed to the emergence of more accountable 
government.  Finally, Eubank (2010) argues that in Somaliland the absence of foreign aid 
forced the nascent government in the early 1990s into conflict with rival groups over major 
sources of tax revenue and that this contributed to a democratic bargain between the 
government and its rivals.  All of these studies provide important support for the research 
hypothesis, but capture comparatively isolated examples, and thus lack either a strong 
comparative dimension or a robust theoretical framework.  
 
A number of additional qualitative works touch on the topic, though without presenting 
systematic empirical evidence.  Looking to history, Herbst (2000) has argued that the 
absence of broad based direct taxation in sub-Saharan Africa, owing largely to the absence 
of interstate conflict and the presence of foreign aid, has undermined broader processes of 
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state building.  In a contemporary context, Chile is sometimes cited as evidence of a 
connection between taxation and governance because an inclusive fiscal pact, detailing the 
outlines of tax and expenditure policy, was central to the establishment of a broader 
democratic bargain during the transition from autocratic rule at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Bergman 2002, 2003, Weyland 1997, Boylan 1996).  Yet these studies, while provocative 
and suggestive, do not present specific empirical evidence of the causal importance of 
taxation to broader governance outcomes.   
 
Finally, while acknowledging these positive examples, it is important to note that a number 
of recent case studies have argued that the relevance of tax bargaining may be limited in 
many low-income contexts owing to the highly coercive nature of existing systems of tax 
collection (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001, Fjeldstad 2001, Juul 2006, Fjeldstad and 
Therkildsen 2008).  While these studies do not systematically explore the relationship 
between taxation and governance, they offer an important reminder that any such 
relationship is likely to be highly context specific, thus implicitly arguing for a comparative 
and historically grounded research strategy.  
1.3.3. Establishing Causation and Understanding Context 
 
There is thus a meaningful body of theoretical and empirical evidence that offers at least 
suggestive support for the argument that the need for taxation can increase pressure and 
incentives for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in developing nations.  
However, this body of research remains incomplete.  While the preceding discussion has 
noted the particular limitations of many of these existing studies, two more general issues 
appear to be particularly significant: first, the relative absence a detailed model of causation 
and, second, the lack of careful attention to the contextual factors that are likely to shape 
particular outcomes.  Much of the contribution of this thesis correspondingly lies in 
focusing on specific causal processes, and on the contextual factors shaping those 
processes, and it is thus useful to briefly consider existing research addressing these issues. 
1.3.3.1. The Absence of a Detailed Model of Causation 
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The most basic limitation of existing research lies in the absence of a sufficiently detailed 
model of causation.  The theoretical models developed by Levi (1988) and Bates and Lien 
(1985) argue that the need for tax revenue strengthens incentives for governments to make 
concessions to taxpayers in order to secure tax compliance, and this important insight has 
framed much of the work in this field.  Yet, there is a clear need to translate this rather 
general insight into an understanding of the concrete political processes through which the 
need for taxation is likely shape broader political outcomes.   Moreover, there is a need to 
ask whether ‘tax bargaining’ as described in these models is the only way in which the need 
for taxation is likely to shape political outcomes, or whether there might also be alternative, 
less direct, pathways linking taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  
These questions are particularly important given that existing models draw overwhelmingly 
on a small number of historical examples, and in doing so risk overlooking the profoundly 
different modern context, and the consequent likelihood of alternative causal pathways. 
 
In addressing the likely differences between historical and contemporary experiences, 
Moore (2007: 16) proposes that ‘tax bargaining’, in the broad sense, is likely to comprise 
three elements: a) government efforts to tax citizens, b) the response of taxpayers to those 
efforts and c) the interaction of the two to produce specific outcomes.  Building on this 
basic observation, he contends that, “contemporary revenue bargaining is both more diverse 
and, in most cases, less overt than in seventeenth century Britain” (Moore 2008: 63), 
relying to a much greater degree on “indirect strategic interaction and mutual behaviour 
adjustment without direct negotiation” (37-38).  While these observations remain relatively 
generally, they point towards the need for detailed evidence of specific causal processes at 
work in contemporary settings, while also emphasizing that particular outcomes are likely 
to be extremely varied. 
 
Unfortunately, existing empirical evidence largely fails to capture this expected complexity.  
This reflects the fact that most existing studies from the developing world have been either 
too isolated or too general to produce insights that are detailed but also more broadly 
applicable.  Herbst’s (2000) work, which cites the absence of direct taxation as a long-term 
determinant of patterns of state building in sub-Saharan Africa, is provocative, but the 
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scope of the work is too broad to allow him to cite detailed country level evidence of those 
processes at work.  Other studies, while provocative, have captured relatively isolated 
events, and have thus struggled to draw broader conclusions.  Case studies in Mauritius 
(Brautigam 2008b), Jordan (Brand 1992), and Somaliland (Eubank 2010) have been 
focused on individual countries, and primarily on a single political episode in each country, 
and have thus not been in a position to comment effectively on the diversity of possible 
processes and outcomes or the importance of contextual factors.  While several studies have 
taken on two-country comparisons, they too have struggled to draw more broadly relevant 
conclusions (Easter 2008, Bergman 2002, 2003, Crystal 1990, Chaudhry 1997). 
1.3.3.2. The Importance of Context 
 
Just as existing research says little about specific causal processes, it offers few insights 
into the contextual factors that are likely to make positive linkages between taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability more likely.  This is particularly troubling given that 
context is absolutely central to historical accounts from early modern Europe (Tilly 1990), 
while there are suggestions in recent work that the highly coercive nature of taxation in 
much of the developing world may restrict the scope for tax bargaining (Moore 2008, 
Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). 
 
Moore (2008: 51) has done the most in recent years to generate concrete predictions about 
the importance of context to the likelihood of successful tax bargaining.  He proposes that 
tax bargaining is most likely when a) governments have long time horizons, limited access 
to non-tax revenues and pressing revenue needs, b) citizens enjoy “many of the conditions 
conducive to collective action”, including shared interests and an understanding of the tax 
system, and, c) the state is sufficiently well established and effective to provide incentives 
for citizens to engage with government.  He goes on to suggest that, consistent with limited 
case study evidence, coercive taxation is particularly likely at the local government level, 
where incomes are limited, tax systems are complex and poorly regulated, and the state is 
frequently weak and poorly institutionalized (44). 
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Unfortunately, while these predictions are theoretically compelling they are only supported 
by a very limited body of contemporary empirical evidence.  In fact, these predictions draw 
attention to several aspects of the sub-Saharan African context that might be expected to 
weaken any potential connection between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  The 
first, and most obvious, issue is that countries in the region are disproportionately poor and 
agrarian, and these are precisely the conditions that are expected to discourage tax 
bargaining.  Second, almost all countries in the region are heavily reliant on non-tax 
revenue.  A large number of countries have access to large natural resource rents, including 
several countries with budgets dominated by oil revenues, while remaining countries almost 
all receive high levels of foreign aid.  Thus, this thesis is exploring the importance of tax 
reliance and tax bargaining in a region that is generally relatively weakly reliant on tax 
revenue (Moore 2008). 
 
Third, the history of taxation in the region has been characterized by conflict and 
illegitimacy, as tax systems in the region are overwhelmingly modelled on their colonial 
antecedents (Young 1986, Mamdani 1996).  Prior to the arrival of colonial rule 
predominant forms of taxation were very different, operating as an overlapping system of 
tribute payments and trade taxes within a state system that lacked well defined borders 
(Herbst 2000).  The arrival of the ‘modern’ colonial tax systems that remain in place today 
was both externally driven and highly coercive, representing a major break with earlier 
practices.  As much as raising revenue, taxation was about "the recognition of allegiance 
and...inculcation of habits of work" (Pim 1948: 232, quoted in Guyer 1992: 43), and thus 
not surprisingly was met with hostility and derision amongst the local population.  This led 
to periodic tax revolts and, in some cases, to tax resistance becoming intertwined with 
broader independence movements (Guyer 1992, Nyangira 1987, Simensen 1974, Bush and 
Maltby 2004).  While poorly documented, there is evidence that this history has continued 
to shape perceptions of taxation, particularly at the local level, where poll taxes, the 
hallmark of colonial taxation, have been a lightning rod for controversy (Guyer 1992, 
Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008).  Thus, the historically coercive nature of taxation in the 
region, and the lack of trust that has accompanied that history, seems likely to act as a 
further hurdle to tax bargaining. 
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Finally, tax bargaining assumes that citizens have strong incentives to bargain with an 
integral state, but the reality in many African nations is very different.  For one, tax 
collection, particularly at the local level, is often fragmented, with multiple government 
bodies, and sometimes non-governmental entities as well, involved in collecting taxes and 
levies from citizens (Iversen et al. 2006, Fjeldstad, Katera and Ngalewa 2009).  In such 
circumstances citizens are likely to lack both the ability, and the inclination, to bargain 
constructively with the state.  There is also evidence that, again particularly at the local 
level, citizens frequently contribute more to voluntary community projects and 
organizations than they pay in taxes.  This suggests that rather than bargaining with the 
state over taxation, citizens often prefer to circumvent it by supporting community self-help 
projects, religious organizations and similar efforts (Guyer 1992, Chazan 1988, Barkan and 
Chege 1989).  In both cases the broad message is that tax evasion and avoidance may be 
more attractive to citizens than tax bargaining (Juul 2006). Collectively these stylized 
observations highlight the importance of context to the likelihood of tax bargaining and 
suggest that for a combination of social, economic, political and historical reasons 
conditions in sub-Saharan Africa may present significant barriers to taxation emerging as a 
catalyst for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  This provides an important 
impetus to both the research focus and research methodology adopted in this thesis.  
1.4. The Research Agenda: Methodology, Scope and 
Limitations 
The research agenda that has been defined so far is relatively broad and ambitious.  The 
thesis has three goals: first, to asks whether there is evidence that the need for governments 
in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia to tax their citizens has contributed significantly to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability by strengthening the ability of taxpayers to 
make political demands on government; second, to develop a more complete model of 
causality through which to understand this relationship, and; third, to understand the key 
contextual factors that have shaped particular outcomes.  While it is tempting to pursue a 
more narrowly focused research agenda, the limited state of existing empirical research 
argues strongly for a relatively broad, exploratory, study of the major causal processes at 
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work.  This study can, in turn, help to frame more focused studies in the future.  The 
breadth of the research agenda implies the need to: put in place a careful and robust 
research methodology, carefully define the scope of the project and transparently 
acknowledge the consequent limitations of the research.  While each of these issues is 
addressed more fully over the course of the thesis, what follows provides an overview of 
the most important issues. 
1.4.1. Methodology 
The basic methodological challenge faced by this study is straightforward: the claim that 
the need for taxation increases the ability of taxpayers to make successful demands for 
responsiveness and accountability implicitly rests on the assumption that if there was less 
taxation taxpayers would be less able to successfully make such demands.  Unfortunately, 
that counterfactual is impossible to observe.  The conventional solution to such problems is 
to rely on cross-country econometric tests.  This approach makes it possible to ask, all else 
being equal, whether states that are more tax reliant are more responsive and accountable 
and whether individual states become more responsive and accountable when they become 
more tax reliant.  
 
In principle, adopting an econometric approach is thus very methodologically appealing, 
and this research correspondingly adopts such an approach in chapter 4.  Unfortunately, in 
practice this approach faces three major limitations.  The first is conceptual, as such an 
approach does not allow for distinguishing between alternative explanations for the 
econometric results.  As has already been noted, it may be that more tax reliant states are 
more responsive and accountable due to pressures resulting from the need to raise tax 
revenue, but it is equally possible that such an empirical pattern may reflect the direct 
political consequences of access to significant non-tax revenue.  These two alternative 
possibilities are related, but ultimately distinct.  The second limitation is pragmatic, as 
cross-country econometric studies are largely unable to provide a detailed picture of the 
specific causal processes at work or of the contextual variables that shape outcomes.  Yet 
such information is essential to translating broad conclusions into concrete messages for 
policy and practice.  The third limitation is econometric, as there are major challenges in 
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establishing the existence of a causal relationship between tax reliance and accountability at 
even a quite general level.  Cross-country data indicates that countries that are more reliant 
on taxation are, indeed, more likely to be responsive and accountable, but this correlation 
alone is insufficient to establish that tax reliance is the cause of greater responsiveness and 
accountability.  Tax reliance may motivate the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability, but it may equally be that more responsive and accountable governments are 
simply more able, or inclined, to raise tax revenue.  To date researchers have been unable to 
persuasively untangle these two competing possibilities.  
 
While econometric analysis thus remains a valuable starting point, these limitations point to 
the need for case study evidence that can capture the details of political processes linking 
tax reliance to broader governance outcomes.  Following this logic, the larger part of this 
research is based on detailed case study evidence from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  In 
broad terms, the case studies ask whether there is evidence that the reliance of governments 
on taxation has strengthened the ability of taxpayers to implicitly and explicitly make 
demands for responsiveness and accountability.  The analysis focuses particularly on 
whether changes in, and conflicts over, taxation have observably contributed to broader 
changes in responsiveness and accountability.  
 
The case studies each cover extended historical periods, owing both to the suspicion that 
processes of tax bargaining may occur over long periods and the desire to increase the 
number of discrete tax episodes to be studied in each country.  Despite their obvious appeal, 
the case studies confront a basic challenge, which has been ably summarized by Moore 
(2008: 38):  “To the extent that revenue bargaining is indirect, taking the form of strategic 
interaction and mutual behaviour adjustment, rather than public haggling and agreements, 
how do we know it is taking place?  Like some other types of political action, this one is not 
always easily observable.”   
 
The thesis responds to this challenge in two ways.  First, chapter 2 lays out a detailed causal 
model and theoretical framework, which identifies particular observable causal processes 
that are expected to link the need for taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and 
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accountability.  While this model may not capture every process through which taxation 
may shape levels of responsiveness and accountability, it translates a comparatively vague 
research question into a set of observable possibilities.  Second, the case study methodology 
is targeted specifically at the need to capture relatively complex and variable political 
processes.  In simplified terms, the case studies are based on constructing analytical 
narratives of the history and politics of taxation, with a focus on understanding the 
motivations and actions of those most directly involved in tax debates and controversies.  
From these narratives it has then been possible to discern whether or not specific political 
outcomes have been motivated by tax concerns.  
 
The primary challenge in implementing this strategy has been the absence of existing 
research dealing with the political economy of taxation in sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
consistent with the more general absence of academic attention to tax issues in the region.  
The absence of evidence from secondary sources has necessitated a heavy reliance on 
primary field research, which included eleven months of continuous field research across 
the three countries over the course of 2008, as well as subsequent trips to Kenya and Ghana 
in 2009.  Along with gathering documentary evidence and tax data, the research relied 
heavily on interviews with key stakeholder, drawn primarily from among former and 
current politicians, civil servants and leading members of civil society.  This included 120 
formal interviews, generally lasting between one and two hours, as well as a wide array of 
more informal conversations and meetings with stakeholders.  Interviews with long serving 
members of the civil service were frequently of particular importance in reconstructing the 
historical record, and identifying key developments and political controversies.  The 
interviews were all semi-structured, with interviewees first asked to identify the most 
important tax episodes with which they had been involved and to describe the politics 
surrounding these episodes in their own terms.  In order guard against the answers being 
shaped by preconceived assumptions, it was only after interviewees had described key tax 
episode in their own terms that further questions were posed in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of specific issues that were raised. 
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1.4.2. Scope 
The decision to adopt a three-country comparative study reflects the breadth of the research 
question itself, the absence of existing empirical research and the value of comparison in 
generating new insights.  There has been a consequent need for case selection criteria 
capable of limiting the scope sufficiently to make the research manageable while also 
offering sufficient variation to make the findings more broadly relevant.  The case selection 
methodology is taken up in greater detail in chapter 5, but is briefly introduced here. 
 
An initial decision was taken to focus on central and regional government taxation rather 
than local government taxation.  This reflects the simple fact that in sub-Saharan Africa, 
more than any other region in the world, national and regional taxes comprise the 
overwhelming majority of revenue.  While available data is of a very poor quality, it 
appears safe to say that local government tax collection generally comprises less than 5% of 
total tax revenue, and sometimes significantly less (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998, Mogues, 
Benin and Cudjoe 2009).  While there are undoubtedly important reasons for studying local 
government taxation, led by the fact that the majority of low-income citizens are most 
directly affected by such taxes, there is a strong case for first looking at the national picture, 
and the bulk of tax revenue. 
 
Beyond this basic distinction, the selection of Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia has been 
motivated by four primary factors, which combine theoretical and practical considerations.  
First, the research is focused on countries that have experienced at least moderate levels of 
tax collection since the end of colonial rule.  The most important consequence of this 
decision is that the research does not look at the experience of highly resource dependent 
states.  This decision reflects the fact that the research methodology is based on attempting 
to observe the positive role of taxation in shaping political outcomes, particularly during 
periods of change in, and conflict over, taxation.  Where levels of tax collection are 
extremely low there are likely to be few opportunities to observe the impact of taxation on 
politics. 
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Second, the research is focused on countries that have experienced significant changes in 
tax collection over time.   This again reflects practical considerations, as periods during 
which there have been significant changes in taxation appear more likely to yield insights 
into the broader political relevance of taxation.  While taxation may be equally likely to 
shape political outcomes in countries where tax collection has been extremely stable over 
time, that impact is less likely to be observable due to the absence of periods of change.  
Such periods of change make it possible to observe the political priorities and motivations 
of competing groups, as well as the particular political outcomes resulting from conflicts 
over taxation or changes in levels of tax collection. 
 
Third, case selection has been aimed at selecting countries in which both levels of aid 
dependence and the apparent relationship between aid and taxation vary.  This reflects 
recent scholarship arguing that aid dependence may reduce incentives for domestic tax 
collection, and thus reduce the scope for taxation and tax bargaining to spur broader 
governance gains.   More generally, aid donors have played a prominent role in shaping 
both taxation and political incentives more generally in much of Africa, raising the 
possibility that political dynamics surrounding taxation may differ markedly where aid 
plays a large role.  Across the three case study countries, aid dependence is relatively low in 
Kenya, moderate in Ghana and high in Ethiopia.  Meanwhile macroeconomic data suggests 
that aid may have discouraged tax collection in Ethiopia, and possibly Kenya as well, while 
precisely the opposite appears to have been true in Ghana. 
 
Finally, case selection has been aimed at maximizing remaining variation along political 
and economic variables, as historical evidence suggests that these variables are likely to 
have powerful implications for the nature of links between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability.  In this effort to maximize diversity three issues have been given priority: 
the extent of political representation, the level of economic development and the socio-
historical context for taxation.  With respect to political representation, Ethiopia has long 
been a very closed political environment, Kenya has been among the more consistently 
democratic countries in the region since independence and Ghana underwent a dramatic 
transition from military to democratic rule in the early 1990s.  Turning to levels of 
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economic development we see a similar pattern, as Ethiopia is among the poorest countries 
in the world, Kenya has been among the most consistently successful economies in the 
region and Ghana has experienced impressive economic gains since the early 1980s 
following a period of acute economic crisis.  Finally, the three cases offer diverse histories 
of taxation, as Ethiopia is unique in having never experienced full-fledged colonial rule, 
while taxation in Kenya has been shaped by the legacy of being a settler colony, and 
particularly by the prominent economic role of White and Asian controlled businesses.  
Given the exploratory nature of this research, this variation is extremely valuable, as it 
increases the likelihood of capturing both the diverse ways in which taxation may affect 
governance and the various contextual factors that may shape particular outcomes. 
1.4.3. Limitations 
These decisions about methodology and scope imply various limitations as to the 
conclusions and broader generalizations that can be drawn from the evidence presented 
here, and the two most important issues warrant acknowledgement even at this early stage. 
 
As with any study that is heavily reliant on case study evidence, the most basic limitations 
relate to external validity.  The case study countries have all experienced at least moderate 
levels of tax collection and important changes in tax collection over time.  While they are 
reasonably representative of economic, political and historical diversity in sub-Saharan 
Africa, they share significant commonalities when compared to countries in other regions.  
There are thus inevitably questions about the relevance of these findings in other contexts.  
Is increased taxation likely to prompt tax bargaining in highly resource or aid dependent 
states, given low levels of tax reliance?  Is there significant scope for tax bargaining in 
extremely weak states?  Where states are particularly strong are governments likely to be 
able to rely more heavily on coercion, thus avoiding the need for tax bargaining?  It is, 
unfortunately, impossible for a single study to cover all of these dimensions of comparison, 
and while this study can provide an important guide to likely processes and outcomes in 
these settings, research in other contexts would undoubtedly be valuable. 
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Second, this thesis does not aspire to address all of the many different ways in which tax 
reliance may shape the state, institutions and political outcomes.  As has already been 
repeatedly noted, there are multiple pathways through which taxation may shape 
governance outcomes, while this thesis is focused on the specific possibility that the need 
for taxation may strengthen the ability of citizens to make implicit and explicit demands for 
responsiveness and accountability.  Moreover, this thesis largely limits its empirical focus 
to a subset of relatively observable propositions, rather than seeking to address all of the 
difficult to observe ways in which taxation may shape outcomes.  This is a pragmatic 
decision, driven by the belief that it would simply be impossible for a single study to 
meaningfully capture all of the ways that taxation may shape politics, along with all of the 
contextual factors shaping particular outcomes (Moore 2008: 49-51).  There is nonetheless 
good reason to believe that this study is able to capture the most significant political 
processes and contextual factors at work, and thus provides a reasonably complete picture 
of the relationship of interest. 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
This introduction has presented the broad contours of the argument, and has laid out the 
research agenda.  What remains is to outline what lies ahead. 
 
Chapter 2 delves into the existing literature in order to develop a more nuanced and refined 
theoretical framework for investigating the links between tax reliance, responsiveness and 
accountability.  It presents a detailed and observable causal model and lays out the research 
methodology in detail.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the role of taxation in the broader process of state building in Ethiopia 
from 1855-1970, highlighting commonalities between the experience of historical Ethiopia 
and early modern Europe.  It thus provides an empirical basis for the claim that historical 
processes linking taxation to broader state building outcomes are not unique to a particular 
historical and cultural context. 
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Chapter 4 begins the contemporary analysis by directly testing the relationship between tax 
reliance and accountability using cross-country econometric methods.  It concludes that 
while available data is consistent with the research hypothesis, available data and methods 
are insufficient to persuasively establish a causal relationship between tax reliance and the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  This sets the stage for the case studies to 
follow.   
 
Chapter 5 presents an extended discussion of case selection, while chapters 6, 7 and 8 then 
present the case study evidence from contemporary Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  Each 
chapter presents a detailed analytical narrative of the history and politics of taxation over at 
least a quarter of a century in order to clearly capture connections between taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability, as well as the contextual factors that have shaped 
particular outcomes. 
 
Having thus presented three largely independent case studies, chapters 9, 10 and 11 draw 
broader conclusions.  Chapter 9 focuses on the big picture, asking whether the accumulated 
evidence provides support for the argument that taxation has been a catalyst for the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability and, if so, what particular causal processes 
have driven that relationship.  Chapter 10 then turns to exploring the contextual factors that 
have made positive linkages between taxation, responsiveness and accountability most 
likely.  Chapter 11 concludes the substantive analysis by stepping back from the particular 
country narratives to consider the broad role of foreign aid in shaping the potential for 
taxation to drive the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. Finally, the 
conclusions in chapter 12 summarize what has been learned and point toward opportunities 
for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Causal Model 
The argument that the need for governments to rely on taxation may contribute to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability through processes of tax bargaining is both 
intuitively appealing and elegant in its simplicity.  Unfortunately, the sheer attractiveness of 
the general idea appears to have contributed to a lack of specificity in defining and 
empirically exploring the specific causal processes through which tax reliance may 
contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Important work by Levi 
(1988), Moore (2008) and others has provided detailed theoretical and historical accounts 
of the processes that may link tax reliance to broader governance gains, but this work 
provides only partial guidance in developing a concrete agenda for empirically driven 
research. 
  
This chapter correspondingly has two intertwined goals.  The first is to present a detailed 
theoretical framework and model through which to understand the relationship between tax 
reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  The second is to translate 
an existing body of theoretical and historical literature into a more concrete agenda for 
empirical research in contemporary developing countries.  In pursuing these two goals the 
chapter proceeds in six parts.  The first section presents a detailed account of the historical 
model of taxation and state building that has motivated much of the work in this field.  
Drawing on insights from that historical model, the second section specifies the research 
question, distinguishing it from alternative possibilities and defining the key outcomes of 
interest.  The third section turns to theory in order to present a detailed theoretical model of 
tax bargaining.  Section four translates insights from that theoretical model into a concrete 
research agenda, presenting three specific, and observable, causal processes that are 
expected to link taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in 
contemporary developing countries.  Section five takes a step back and discusses those 
contextual factors that are likely to vary across cases and significantly affect outcomes.  
Finally, section six lays out the detailed research methodology. 
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2.1. A Model of Taxation and State Building in Early Modern 
Europe 
While the goal of this chapter is to present a detailed, pragmatic and forward looking 
research agenda relevant to contemporary developing countries, it begins by exploring the 
basic concepts, propositions and insights that emerge from the literature on taxation and 
state building in early modern Europe. 
 
The work of Charles Tilly (1990) has provided a valuable foundation for much of the recent 
work in this area.  In simplified form, he argues that the increasing costs of warfare forced 
states to extract an increasingly heavy tax burden from taxpayers, and that this process was 
essential to shaping the character of states and of political power.  In England the need for 
taxation led to conflicts between taxpayers and governments, and eventually resulted in tax 
bargains that granted taxpayers greater representation and legal protection in exchange for 
higher taxes.  However, this example captures only one part of a much larger continuum of 
potential outcomes. 
 
Tilly argues that states differed in the extent to which they were characterized by two 
elements: capital and coercion.  Capital-intensive states were home to powerful commercial 
classes that controlled access to significant and mobile economic resources.  Coercion-
intensive states, by contrast, were largely agrarian and lacked a large commercial class of 
significant influence or wealth.   
 
In capital-intensive states the primary tax challenge was to gain access to the mobile 
economic resources controlled by capitalists.  This was achieved by ceding institutionalized 
political power to capitalists, in exchange for their willingness to contribute tax revenue.  
Such bargaining was necessary because capitalists were otherwise able to resist taxation by 
force or, more simply, through tax evasion facilitated by the mobility and secrecy of their 
assets.  The tax bargains that resulted fragmented political power and limited the need for 
the construction of powerful central states.  This was exemplified by the city-states of Italy, 
where councils of merchants and capitalists governed and the central state remained weak.  
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By contrast, states without access to the taxation of capital tended to turn towards coercion 
in order to extract a small surplus from the rural poor.  These states generally relied on a 
bargain between central states and the landowning elite, by which the central state granted 
land and power to elites in exchange for the ability to extract tax revenue from a peasantry 
that was both immobile and weak.  This system of revenue mobilization was coercive and 
unequal but nonetheless gave rise to powerful central bureaucracies capable of extracting 
significant revenue.  This model extended throughout much of Eastern Europe and 
Scandinavia, and was exemplified by experience in Russia, where an increasingly powerful 
central state gradually extended its coercive power over the landed nobility and the 
subjugated peasantry. 
 
The most successful tax bargains, as in the English case, occurred where the relative power 
of capitalists and of coercive states was most balanced.  The strength of capitalists provided 
strong incentives for the state to reach a revenue enhancing compromise, while states were 
strong enough to establish themselves as the central political actors.  However, such 
inclusive tax bargains only emerged in a small number of states, under relatively ideal 
conditions.  Other states either profited through continued and often brutal coercion, or, in 
myriad other cases, were wiped off the map as a result of their failure to raise revenue 
effectively.  Even in France profound changes in the state and in the nature of government 
emerged not from consensual bargaining between taxpayers and governments but from 
fiscal crisis and the outbreak of the French Revolution. 
 
In contrast to the comparatively straightforward example of tax bargaining in early modern 
England, this broader reading of historical evidence highlights the complexity and 
contingency of the relationship between taxation and state building.  For the purposes of 
this research three lessons are particularly important. 
 
First, the need for taxation had multiple consequences for state building that extended 
beyond the simple expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  While the need for tax 
revenue led to tax bargains that shaped the responsiveness and accountability of 
governments, it also influenced the growth of the central state and the organization of 
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economic activity.  Most evidently, the need to increase taxation promoted the growth of 
central state bureaucracies.  In Russia, the system of rural taxation gave rise to an extensive 
and coercive bureaucratic state, while in France one of the most important outcomes of the 
French Revolution was the extension of direct rule and bureaucratic government (Tilly 
1990: 139-140, 107-109).  Tax bargains also reflected and shaped the organization of 
economic activity, as tax bargains in capital-intensive states created the conditions for 
continued commercial expansion, while tax bargains in Eastern Europe and Russia 
entrenched patterns of feudal agricultural production (North and Weingast 1989, Tilly 
1990: 139-140). 
 
Second, processes of tax bargaining were multidimensional and relatively complex.  The 
tax bargains captured by Tilly range from the granting of expanded representation and the 
strengthening of the rule of law, as in England, to the many cases in which monarchs ceded 
local autonomy to powerful landed elites in order to secure a share of the punitive taxation 
imposed on a vulnerable peasantry.  It was thus only particular types of tax bargaining that 
contributed directly to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
 
Finally, context played a decisive role in shaping the relationship between taxation and 
broader state building outcomes.  Tilly’s model is based on the distinction between states 
that were home to mobile capital and those that were not, with profound consequences for 
the evolution of politics and the state.  Alongside this distinction Tilly further emphasizes 
the importance of particular types of economic resources, of pre-existing political 
institutions and of factors that facilitated collective political action (Moore 2008, Herb 
2003). 
 
These three insights frame the organization of the remainder of this chapter.  The next 
section addresses the multiple potential consequences of the need for states to raise tax 
revenue, and carefully defines the outcomes of interest here: responsiveness and 
accountability.  The two sections that follow address the complexity of the concept of tax 
bargaining and of the causal processes that are likely to link tax reliance to the expansion of 
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responsiveness and accountability.  The remaining section then addresses those contextual 
factors that lie outside of the core causal model but are likely to shape particular outcomes. 
2.2. Specifying the Research Question 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the fact that the need for taxation historically 
shaped governance in multiple ways, and it is thus important to distinguish those outcomes 
that are of particular interest to this study.  As was noted in the previous chapter, it is useful 
to think of the potential consequences of tax reliance in terms of three types of effects: the 
strengthening of the state apparatus, the promotion of economic growth and the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability.  
 
The first possibility is that tax reliance may contribute to the strengthening of the state 
apparatus.  This reflects the fact that collecting taxes requires the development of a complex 
and intrusive bureaucratic apparatus, which can become the leading edge of broader 
improvements in public administration.  This possibility has been well documented in early 
modern Europe (Tilly 1990, Brewer 1989), while a growing body of research has also 
pointed to the importance of taxation to the development of broader administrative capacity 
in contemporary developing countries (Brautigam 2008, Prichard and Leonard 2010, 
Chaudhry 1997). 
 
A second possibility is that tax reliance may lead governments to more actively seek to 
provide conditions conducive to economic growth.  This possibility derives from the fact 
that governments that are reliant on tax revenue have a common interest in promoting the 
prosperity of taxpayers in order to maximize levels of tax revenue.  While such processes 
are inherently difficult to observe, Gehlbach (2008) has provided evidence from the former 
Soviet Union that governments there have invested heavily in promoting the success of 
those industries most likely to contribute tax revenue to the state.  The common interest of 
governments in promoting the prosperity of taxpayers may result in the broader expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability, but only in so far as this contributes to increasing 
economic growth. 
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Finally, this research is focused on processes by which tax reliance may contribute directly 
to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Within the existing literature, such 
governance gains are expected to emerge from processes of implicit and explicit tax 
bargaining between taxpayers and governments.  Taxpayers are expected to wield political 
leverage through their potential for collective action and their ability to resist taxation, 
while governments will have incentives to respond to taxpayer demands in order to enhance 
tax compliance, sustain state revenues and limit public resistance.  Of course, while tax 
bargaining may result in broad based expansions of accountability, it may equally result in 
the granting of special privileges to a narrow elite.  Levi (1988:64) has argued that in order 
to secure tax revenue governments may provide selective benefits (“side payments”) to 
large mobile taxpayers, rather than providing relatively universal benefits to larger groups 
of taxpayers.  Such ‘narrow’ tax bargaining over selective benefits is undoubtedly of 
interest in principle, but it is not the focus of this research.  Instead, this research is focused 
on ‘broad’ tax bargaining that results in more general improvements in the responsiveness 
and accountability of governments. 
 
The choice of responsiveness and accountability as the outcomes of interest poses obvious 
risks, as both are very broad concepts, and various authors have thus chosen to focus on 
more specific outcomes.  Some have argued for a focus on representation and democracy 
(Ross 2004), while others have focused on the strengthening of property rights, the rule of 
law and other constraints on the power of the state (North and Weingast 1989, Brautigam 
2008a, Mahon 2005).  However, attention to a relatively broad set of potential outcomes is 
justified by the fact that recent research has both highlighted a wide range of possible 
outcomes and convincingly argued that links between taxation and formal democracy are 
likely to be relatively indirect (Moore 2008, Levi 1988, 1999, Herb 2003).  This has led 
Moore, for example, to define the outcome of interest as “institutionalized influence over 
public policy”, but even this focus risks being excessively narrow in focusing on changes in 
institutions but paying little attention to simple changes in government behaviour.  While a 
focus on institutions may be theoretically attractive, in an empirical setting political 
influence is often embodied in informal institutions that are difficult to observe.  As a 
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result, changes in government behaviour (responsiveness) are likely to sometimes be the 
clearest indication of the political influence exercised by taxpayers. 
 
Having justified the focus on responsiveness and accountability there remains a need for 
clear definitions in order to guard against a lack of precision in the use of these concepts 
(Lindberg 2009).  Of the two terms, responsiveness is the more straightforward and is here 
taken to refer broadly to the substance of government action.  Manin, Przeworski and 
Stokes (1999: 9) propose simply that, “A government is ‘responsive’ if it adopts policies 
that are signalled as preferred by citizens.”  Thus responsiveness captures the range of 
concrete actions that governments may take in order to respond to the interests and 
preferences of citizens, which may be expressed in both explicit and implicit ways. 
 
The term accountability demands greater caution, as it is often used loosely to refer to the 
ability of one set of actors to exercise control over others in pursuit of a huge variety of 
outcomes.  Such usage often comes to encompass both outcomes and processes and has led 
to ambiguity and excessive overlap between the concepts of accountability and 
responsiveness.  Andreas Schedler (1999: 13) has written that, “accountability represents an 
underexplored concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and 
whose internal structure is confusing.”  More recently, Lindberg (2009: 2) has warned of 
the “inherent dangers of a byzantine conceptual nightmare leading not only to stretching but 
to severe confusion about what the core meaning of accountability is.” 
 
Accountability is taken here to refer broadly to institutionalized processes that shape 
government action and state-society relationships.  Schedler (1999:14) provides a relatively 
standard and widely accepted definition of accountability: “The notion of political 
accountability carries two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation of public 
officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity 
of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public 
duties.”  Thus accountability is defined in terms of the relationship between principles, who 
demand accountability, and agents, who are held to account.  Thus, “A is accountable to B 
when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify 
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them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct” (17).  Institutions of 
accountability are thus those formal and informal mechanisms that provide for the dual 
requirements of answerability and sanction.  Accountability relationships may be of three 
broad types: Vertical-upward, vertical-downward or horizontal (Lindberg 2009).  This 
research is essentially concerned with vertical-downward accountability, which focuses on 
the ability of citizens to hold politicians and the state to account, as well as on the ability of 
parliaments to hold the executive to account. 
 
Of course, there is also a question of degrees of accountability.  To what extent, and in what 
degree of detail, are agents compelled to explain and justify their actions?  Are principles 
able to sanction the failure to provide a justification, or also the content of the actions 
taken?  How powerful and effective are the sanctions that are available to principles 
(Lindberg 2009: 28-29)?  Defining and recognizing differing degrees of accountability is 
unavoidably complex, and fraught with a degree of imprecision.  To partially address this 
challenge, this research distinguishes between formal institutions of accountability, defined 
by the law, and informal institutions, which are normalized relationships and modes of 
decision-making that are not formally defined by law.  Most systems of accountability rely 
on both formal and informal elements.  While formal institutions of accountability may be 
more or less demanding, they invariably need to be complemented by widely accepted 
norms of behaviour in order to be effective.  It is the importance of informal accountability 
that accounts for wide differences in the actual degree of accountability across states with 
nominally similar formal institutions. 
 
The importance of informal institutions is captured in part by Grant and Keohane 
(2005:31), who propose that, “Information and sanctions are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for accountability.  They presuppose norms of legitimacy that establish not only 
the standards by which the use of power can be judged, but also who is authorized to wield 
power and who is properly entitled to call the power-wielders to account.”  In a broader 
sense, formal institutions of accountability are only likely to be effective when supported by 
informal norms that lead those in power to fully abide by the letter and spirit of the law. 
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Framing the concept of accountability in terms of processes and institutions creates a clear 
distinction between it and the concept of responsiveness, which is concerned with the 
substance of government action.  This should not, however, obscure the fact that the two 
concepts are very closely related in practice.  Responsiveness may frequently be a precursor 
to the creation of institutions of accountability in so far as short-term responsiveness creates 
pressure for the institutionalization of that behaviour.  This, in turn, reflects the fact that the 
primary purpose of institutions of accountability is frequently to guarantee that 
governments will be responsive.  Lindberg (2009: 36-27) writes that, “The sought after fact 
[of accountability] is to make agents be responsive to the wishes and interests of the 
principals”.  But, he continues, “Responsiveness should not be understood as integral to 
accountability itself.” 
2.3. The Logic of Tax Bargaining 
We turn now to the presentation of a detailed causal model linking tax reliance to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  This section engages this challenge at the 
level of theory and focuses on the broad forces that may link taxation to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability.  The section that follows then shifts from the relatively 
abstract discussion here to a concrete model encompassing specific, and observable, causal 
processes through which tax reliance is likely to contribute to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability in practice. 
 
Existing research addressing the relationship between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability has generally focused on the concept of tax (or revenue) bargaining.  
Drawing on studies from early modern Europe, Moore (2008:36-37) provides an initial 
definition, proposing that tax bargaining is “the exchange of tax revenues (for the state) for 
institutionalised influence over public policy (for citizens).”  He goes on to propose that 
“bargaining ranges from (a) direct and explicit haggling and agreement to (b) indirect 
strategic interaction and mutual behaviour adjustment without direct negotiation.”   
 
This definition provides a valuable starting point, but is also problematic, as it frames tax 
bargaining as a very particular kind of political process, centred on explicit or implicit 
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exchange. This framing implies, intentionally or not, that tax bargaining is to some extent 
distinct from other political processes that contribute to the expansion of responsiveness 
and accountability.  This tendency to see tax bargaining as a distinct kind of political 
process is reflected in recent work by Gehlbach (2008), which explicitly positions theories 
of tax bargaining as an alternative to theories of collective action as an explanation for 
political outcomes. 
 
More productive is to approach the political implications of taxation within the context of 
broader theories of political contestation and change.  As was noted in the previous chapter, 
much recent scholarship rests either implicitly or explicitly on a simplified model of politics 
in which political outcomes are the result of contestation and conflict between citizens and 
governing elites.  Within this model, the expansion of responsiveness and accountability 
results when citizens are able to wield sufficient political power to demand concessions 
from governments.   Building on the logic of this simplified model, tax reliance can be 
understood as contributing to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability by 
increasing taxpayers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis governments and the state.6   
 
This approach has two advantages over comparatively more narrow conceptions of tax 
bargaining.  First, it makes it possible to capture a wide array of ways in which the need for 
governments to raise tax revenue may directly and indirectly strengthen the ability of 
taxpayers to press for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Second, it 
emphasizes the fact that conflicts over taxation are best understood not as distinct and 
independent political processes, but as being interwoven with a broader range of processes 
contributing to political change. 
 
Ultimately, the need for governments to rely on tax revenue can be understood as 
increasing the political bargaining power wielded by citizens through two broad channels:  
First, by giving citizens the ability to control the fiscal resources available to the state 
                                                
6 While Moore’s most recent work has focused on the definition of tax bargaining noted above, his earlier 
work has noted the possibility of understanding tax bargaining in terms of the broader model of political 
conflict between citizens and governments described here.  He does not, however, pursue that logic in detail 
(Moore 2007: 14-15). 
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through their ability to engage in tax resistance; and, second, by encouraging public 
engagement and collective action among taxpayers interested in ensuring that their tax 
payments are employed in their interests.  What follows explores each of these possibilities 
in turn. 
2.3.1. Potential for Tax Resistance by Taxpayers 
Existing models linking taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability 
have focused on the possibility that governments may make governing concessions in order 
to secure greater tax compliance.  The most influential such model is that of Margaret Levi 
(1988), who proposes that tax compliance, and thus the ability of governments to raise 
revenue, depends on three factors: coercion, ideology and quasi-voluntary compliance.  
Coercion refers to the use of force to compel unwilling citizens to pay taxes, ideology refers 
to social norms and ideals that provide a normative commitment to tax compliance and 
quasi-voluntary compliance captures the fact that citizens will be more likely to comply 
when the government is perceived to be responsive and accountable, and when other 
citizens comply as well.  Within this framework, governments have incentives to become 
more responsive and accountable in order to increase quasi-voluntary compliance, and thus 
tax revenue.  The same logic underpins the model developed by Bates and Lien (1985).  
They argue that governments will be most willing to make concessions in order to secure 
the tax compliance of those who would otherwise be most able to engage in tax evasion and 
avoidance.  They thus conclude that tax bargaining is most likely when taxpayers own 
mobile wealth, which offers greater potential for evasion. 
 
These models focus on the incentives faced by governments, and on identifying the 
conditions under which governments are likely to concede greater responsiveness and 
accountability to taxpayers in order to secure tax compliance.  The argument of these 
models can be summarized as follows: ‘governments that are reliant on tax revenue will 
have stronger incentives to expand responsiveness and accountability in order to secure 
increased tax compliance.’  By contrast, the model presented here approaches the question 
from the perspective of taxpayers, focusing on the extent to which taxpayers’ ability to 
resist and evade taxes allows them to increase pressure for political reform.  Thus, the 
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model presented here proposes that ‘the reliance of governments on tax revenue increases 
the bargaining power wielded by taxpayers by offering them opportunities to engage in tax 
resistance’. 
 
In most cases these two approaches are effectively equivalent, presenting alternative 
framings of the same political process.  However, approaching the question from the 
perspective of taxpayers offers two important advantages.  First, it focuses attention on the 
decision by taxpayers to engage in more or less aggressive tax resistance and evasion.  
State-centric models largely assume that taxpayers will engage in tax resistance when 
governments are less responsive and accountable, however, in practice, taxpayer responses 
to taxation are likely to be shaped by a variety of factors that warrant careful empirical 
attention.  Second, the approach adopted here captures a potentially wider variety of 
outcomes.  State-centric approaches capture cases in which governments choose to make 
concessions in order to secure tax compliance, but implicitly ignore cases in which citizens 
engage in tax resistance but governments refuse to make corresponding concessions.  Yet, 
tax resistance is likely to have important political implications even when governments 
choose not to make corresponding concessions to citizens.  The model adopted here is able 
to capture such cases, thus broadening our understanding of the political implications of 
reliance on tax revenue. 
2.3.2. Public Engagement and Collective Action Among 
Taxpayers 
While tax reliance may give taxpayers bargaining power through the potential for tax 
resistance, it may also encourage public engagement and collective action.  This likelihood 
stems from the simple idea that “people take more interest in what they have to pay for and 
are hence more likely to be interested in ensuring that they get value for their contributions" 
(Bird and Vaillancourt 1998: 10-11).  To be more explicit, the burden of taxation may lead 
groups of taxpayers to become politically organized in order to make positive demands for 
responsiveness and accountability.  This may, in turn, lead governments to make 
concessions to those taxpayers in order to prevent further resistance to taxation and more 
broadly to quell the mobilization of citizen opposition.  
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While collective action is difficult and often subject to narrow benefit seeking by small 
groups (Olson 1965), the basic logic described here is readily apparent in historical 
narratives of taxation and state building (Tilly 1990).  To take a single example, in France 
conflict over taxation did not result in explicit tax bargaining, but instead catalyzed the 
political mobilization of the Third Estate, and the consequent onset of Revolution.  What is 
surprising is that the role of taxation as a catalyst for public engagement and mobilization 
has nonetheless received comparatively little explicit attention in the state-centric models of 
tax bargaining described earlier (Levi 1988, Bates and Lien 1985).  Because these models 
have sought to understand the political consequences of tax reliance from the perspective of 
the state, they have focused disproportionately on the importance of government efforts to 
encourage tax compliance through explicit tax bargaining.  While such tax bargaining is 
clearly important, these models have paid insufficient attention to the additional possibility 
that the presence of taxation may shift broader political dynamics by encouraging political 
action by citizens.  This again speaks to the value of developing a model that focuses on the 
impact of the need for taxation on the political power wielded by citizens. 
2.4. From Theory to Practice: Causal Processes and 
Outcomes 
Having laid out the general logic linking taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability, the next challenge is to shift from a relatively theoretical approach to 
defining a concrete model and practical research strategy.  The central challenge in making 
this transition is that the impact of taxation on broader political dynamics, while relatively 
clear in theory, is likely to be difficult to observe in practice.  Drawing on Moore’s 
(2008:37) terminology, much tax bargaining is likely to rely on subtle “mutual behaviour 
adjustment” among taxpayers and governments.  While large-scale tax protests are very 
visible, it is not difficult to imagine examples of tax bargaining that are much more hidden 
from view.  Taxpayers may engage in quiet tax evasion, in the spirit of Scott’s (1985) 
“weapons of the weak,” and thus create subtle incentives for governments to make 
concessions in order to improve compliance.  Taxation may likewise prompt taxpayers to 
become increasingly organized, and to make demands on government, but in so doing 
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generate general pressure for reform rather than prompting specific and observable 
government concessions. 
 
Given the potential difficulty of observing these political processes, it is useful to identify a 
subset of clearly defined, and observable, causal processes around which to organize the 
empirical case study analysis.  These specific causal processes are unlikely to encompass all 
of the ways in which taxation may shape political outcomes; instead, they reflect an effort 
to balance the need to capture a diverse set of outcomes against the practical constraints 
imposed by the difficulty of observing certain types of political processes.  With this in 
mind, what follows divides the specific causal processes of interest into two broad 
categories: direct tax bargaining and indirect tax bargaining.   
 
Following Moore (2008:37), direct tax bargaining is taken to refer to the exchange of tax 
revenues (for the state) for expanded responsiveness and accountability (for citizens).  
While direct tax bargaining may not take the form of explicit negotiation between taxpayers 
and governments, it is expected to involve a discernible element of exchange, with 
governments making certain concession specifically in order to curtail tax-related public 
mobilization and/or increase tax compliance.  Thus, the concept of direct tax bargaining 
most closely reflects existing research and theoretical models addressing the relationship 
between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  
 
By contrast, the concept of indirect tax bargaining captures those processes that have 
generally been overlooked by standard models of tax bargaining.  In simplified terms direct 
tax bargaining captures cases in which citizens act, either through tax resistance or 
collective action, and governments respond by making governing concessions.  By contrast, 
indirect tax bargaining captures cases in which taxpayers engage in tax resistance or 
collective action, but governments refuse to make governing concession in return.  In these 
cases there is little or no explicit element of exchange between taxpayers and governments, 
but taxpayer actions may nonetheless contribute to longer-term political changes.  As is 
described in more detail below, tax resistance may contribute to destabilizing unpopular 
governments, while collective action may have long-term positive effects on levels of 
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organization and engagement within civil society.  There are thus likely to be important 
political processes that do not fit the traditional definition of tax bargaining, but which 
nonetheless link taxation to increased pressure for the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.   
 
We can thus define indirect tax bargaining as capturing processes through which tax 
reliance increases the political bargaining power wielded by taxpayers, resulting in indirect 
pressure for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in the long-term.  Some 
readers may disagree with the use of the term ‘tax bargaining’ here, owing to the absence of 
clear-cut exchange between taxpayers and governments.  This terminology is nonetheless 
adopted here because indirect tax bargaining relies on the same causal logic as direct tax 
bargaining, namely the role of tax reliance in expanding the bargaining power of taxpayers 
by expanding opportunities for tax resistance and collective action.  Given this 
commonality, there is significant value in linking these concepts explicitly. 
 
With the distinction between direct and indirect tax bargaining thus established, what 
follows outlines three specific causal processes that may observably link taxation to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  The first is simply termed direct tax 
bargaining and captures cases in which governments make relatively explicit concessions 
to taxpayers in order to reduce tax-related public mobilization and secure increased tax 
collection.  The second and third causal processes are both examples of indirect tax 
bargaining.  The first is termed tax resistance and changes in government and captures 
situations in which taxpayers aggressively and successfully resist taxation, thus contributing 
to changes in government and subsequent reform.  The second is termed strengthened 
political capabilities of taxpayers and captures cases in which increased taxation 
contributes to reform by catalyzing sustained political engagement and organization among 
taxpayers.  These three causal processes most likely do not capture the entire range of 
difficult to observe processes through which taxation may shape the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability.  What they do provide is a set of observable propositions 
about the relationship between taxation and broader political outcomes.  They are thus a 
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firm basis upon which to draw conclusions about the relevance of tax bargaining to the 
emergence of responsive and accountable government within the case study countries. 
2.4.1. Direct Tax Bargaining 
Direct tax bargaining captures cases in which governments make relatively explicit 
concessions to taxpayers in order to secure increased tax compliance and reduce public 
opposition prompted by tax related concerns.  In broad terms direct tax bargaining is likely 
to proceed in one of two ways.  First, taxpayers may respond to new or existing taxation 
through collective action or tax resistance, prompting subsequent concessions from 
governments seeking to restore political order and tax compliance.  Second, the threat of 
collective action or tax resistance by taxpayers may lead governments to make pre-emptive 
concessions to taxpayers in order to prevent future conflict when taxation is increased.  In 
both cases it is the reality or threat of conflict over taxation that drives change. 
 
In cases of direct tax bargaining it should be possible to observe (a) government efforts to 
tax, (b) taxpayer responses and (c) their interaction and subsequent outcomes.  The 
outcomes of interest are responsiveness and accountability, but in an empirical setting it is 
useful to focus on a subset of more specific outcomes that are captured by these broad 
concepts.  Thus three particular types of outcomes are defined below: improved provision 
of public services, changes in tax policy and administration and broad expansions of 
accountability. 
2.4.1.1. Improved Provision of Public Services 
The government may provide improved public services to citizens in order to secure 
acceptance of, or compliance with, taxation.  This focus on public services follows the work 
of Timmons (2005), Fjeldstad and Semboja (2001) and others who have argued that popular 
demands are often aimed narrowly at the provision of public services (responsiveness), 
rather than at the fundamental reform of institutions of accountability.  This reflects the fact 
that public services including health, education, water and electricity are highly visible and 
among the most basic necessities for the majority of citizens in developing countries. 
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These outcomes can be further distinguished by the extent to which improvements in public 
service provision are persistent and institutionalized.  At one end of this spectrum lie cases 
in which governments provide one-time improvements in the provision of public services, 
but in which these gains are neither institutionalized nor sustained over time.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are cases in which governments not only increase the quality 
of public services, but also institutionalize those changes, through such things as oversight 
committees, boards of directors or legislation to enforce funding commitments.  These latter 
cases constitute not only the expansion of responsiveness, but also a broader element of 
accountability.  In practice, most cases are likely to lie somewhere in the middle, and 
analysis needs to pay attention to the persistence and institutionalization of any outcomes. 
2.4.1.2. Changes in Tax Policy and Administration 
An alternative possibility is that in order to secure acceptance of taxation the government 
may reform the tax system itself by increasing transparency, equity and consultation in tax 
policy and administration.  This might entail simple improvements in administrative 
performance or changes in the distribution of the tax burden, both of which are broadly 
consistent with the concept of responsiveness.  Alternatively, the government may expand 
institutionalized accountability around taxation through, for example, the elimination of 
discretionary tax policies, increased transparency or the creation of dedicated tax tribunals, 
consultative bodies or oversight committees. 
 
While such changes are relatively narrow in their scope, they are nonetheless potentially 
significant.  First, more equitable and transparent tax policy and administration may have 
large revenue and welfare implications, as new taxpayers are brought into the tax net, thus 
increasing public revenue and reducing the burden on existing taxpayers.  Second, 
improvements in the performance of tax administration may become a catalyst for broader 
administrative gains across government, with the potential to thus improve government 
performance (Brautigam 2008, Chaudhry 1997, Prichard and Leonard 2010).  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, greater consultation and transparency around taxation may 
expand public access to information on public spending and enhance expectations of 
reciprocity, thus encouraging long-term public engagement and broader demands on 
government. 
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2.4.1.3. Broad Expansions of Accountability 
Finally, the government may institute broad-based expansions of political accountability in 
order to improve acceptance of, and compliance with, taxation.   These outcomes most 
closely mirror the outcomes that emerge from the historical literature on this topic, as they 
represent fundamental changes in the broad rules of the game.  It is useful to distinguish 
specific categories of outcomes, all of which may be more or less formal or informal: first, 
the creation of new institutions of accountability; second, the strengthening of existing 
institutions of accountability, and; third, the strengthening of the rule of law and of private 
property rights which, while not institutions of accountability as such, restrict the arbitrary 
power of government and are likely to provide a valuable foundation for future 
accountability (Mahon 2005, North and Weingast 1989, Brautigam 2002). 
2.4.2. Tax Resistance and Changes in Government 
Confronted with the threat of taxation, taxpayers have three general options: accept the new 
taxes, engage in collective action to demand reciprocal concessions from government or 
resist the new taxes.  Collective action, while attractive in principle, is difficult to achieve, 
may involve significant risks for those involved and may be unattractive if taxpayers do not 
trust the ability of government to provide reciprocal benefits (Olson 1965).  As such, the 
most common response to taxation is simple resistance and evasion. In terms of the classic 
decision between exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970), simple exit may frequently be 
preferable to, or more feasible than, the exercise of political voice. 
 
In some cases tax resistance alone may lead to direct tax bargaining, as governments makes 
concessions in order to reduce resistance to taxation.  But what of cases in which tax 
resistance does not prompt explicit concessions from government, but simply results in 
reduced levels of tax revenue collection?  Might tax resistance nonetheless indirectly 
contribute to the emergence of responsive and accountable government?  It certainly 
appears to be possible.  In stylized fashion, resistance to taxation has the potential to 
weaken the fiscal base of an incumbent government, create pressure for a change in 
government and provide positive incentives for an incoming government to make 
concessions in order to improve tax collection in the future.  In these cases any governance 
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reforms that are ultimately undertaken by an incoming government do not result from a 
recognizable process of bargaining, but from an extended period of unresolved conflict over 
taxation.  As importantly, in this process tax resistance does not contribute to a single, 
visible, outcome, but is, instead, a factor contributing to a much larger process of political 
change. 
 
While this process may initially appear convoluted, it is in fact highly consistent with 
historical experience.  In the cases of tax bargaining in 17th century England the 
strengthening of parliament and the rule of law came at the end of decades of armed 
conflict and tax resistance, as taxpayers sought to limit the fiscal capacity of the monarchy.  
More generally, while the image of the reformist government responding to citizen 
demands is attractive in the abstract, historical experience suggests that major governance 
changes often occur only through changes in government.  The suggestion that tax 
resistance may contribute to changes in government, and thus to reform, is supported at the 
macro level by evidence that unpopular governments in Africa have often experienced 
declining revenue (Bates 2008), while new regimes have frequently been particularly 
successful in pursuing tax reform (Ascher 1989, Bates 1989). 
 
Of course, simple tax resistance is not sufficient to ensure political change.  The claim that 
tax resistance can be an important catalyst for the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability by contributing to changes in government must rest on evidence that (a) tax 
resistance contributed to the change in government, (b) the change in government brought 
important improvements in governance and (c) fiscal issues were a meaningful priority for 
the new government.  In practice, therefore, outcomes are likely to fall into three categories.  
First, cases in which tax resistance leads to a reduced revenue stalemate, but there is no 
change in government.  Second, cases in which tax resistance contributes to a change in 
government, but in which the new government does not expand responsiveness or 
accountability.  Third, cases in which tax resistance contributes to a change in government, 
the new government is more responsive and accountable and tax compliance subsequently 
improves.  Outcomes that fall within this final category would offer evidence that tax 
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resistance has, in fact, been an important indirect catalyst for expanded responsiveness and 
accountability. 
2.4.3. Strengthened Political Capabilities of Taxpayers 
The final causal process focuses on the long-term impact of taxation on the political 
capabilities of taxpayers.  This term is drawn from Whitehead and Gray-Molina (2003:32) 
who define political capabilities as, “the institutional and organizational resources as well 
as the collective ideas available for effective political action.” 
 
The prediction that tax reliance will contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability results to a significant degree from the possibility that taxation may lead 
citizens to make political demands on government.  As was noted earlier, this reflects both 
the simple fact that taxation is unpopular and the broader expectation that when citizens are 
forced to pay for government they are more likely to be concerned with ensuring that they 
receive valued services and political influence in return.  However, while taxation may 
encourage public engagement, achieving politically effective collective action is both 
challenging and potentially risky.  Taxpayers may fail to coordinate effective collective 
action despite widespread public anger, or may succeed but then find their demands 
rebuffed by the government.  In these cases taxpayers will have failed to secure specific 
concessions from governments, but these processes may nonetheless contribute to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability by enhancing the political capabilities of 
taxpayers in the long-term. 
 
One way that this may happen is by altering popular expectations, with positive 
consequences for political engagement and collective action in the long-term.  There is a 
long body of research arguing that norms and expectations are essential to shaping levels of 
political engagement, as they prescribe the demands that citizens believe that they can, and 
should, make on government (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, Grant and Keohane 2005, Newell 
and Wheeler 2006, Moehler 2008, Chazan 1983).  It has equally long been believed, 
particularly among supporters of fiscal decentralization, that the payment of taxes may lead 
taxpayers to develop new expectations of government and to feel a greater sense of 
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ownership over government activities (Bird and Vaillancourt 1998, Juul 2006).  By thus 
changing expectations and levels of engagement, taxation may strengthen long-term 
demands for responsiveness and accountability. 
 
While the impact of taxation on norms and expectations is thus likely to be an important 
part of the story, these abstract concepts are difficult to observe in practice.  As such this 
research is focused on two related, but much more concrete, ways in which taxation may 
strengthen the political capabilities of taxpayers.  First, taxation may lead to the 
strengthening of civil society organizations or other relevant forms of political organization.  
Second, collective action in response to taxation may open up new spaces for political 
engagement, including the legitimization of new forms of political action and mobilization.  
These processes may not yield direct tax bargains in the short-term, but in the long term are 
likely to contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
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Figure 2.1: Tax Reliance and the Expansion of Responsiveness and Accountability 
 
2.4.4. Tracing the Logic of the Model 
Having laid out the various components of the model, it is summarized graphically in 
Figure 2.1.  What follows traces the logic of the model from beginning to end.   
 
The model begins with a government that is forced to rely on raising tax revenue to finance 
its activities.  The second level of the model reflects the potential for taxpayers to respond 
to taxation in one of three ways:  First, they may simply accept taxes without overt 
complaint; second, they may engage in tax resistance, either through collective political 
action to resist new taxes or through increasingly aggressive tax evasion and avoidance; 
and, third, taxation may encourage public engagement, acting as a catalyst for taxpayers to 
engage in broad-based collective action aimed at demanding improved responsiveness and 
accountability from government.   The latter two possibilities may contribute to the 
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expansion of responsiveness and accountability, and are reflected in the two alternative 
branches of the model. 
 
The third level of the model is shaped by the need for the government to decide how to 
respond to taxpayer actions.  One option is for the government to respond to the reality or 
threat of tax resistance and collective action by making concessions to taxpayers in order to 
increase tax compliance and reduce public mobilization.  In this case the result will be 
direct tax bargaining in which citizens exchange acceptance of taxation for improvements 
in responsiveness and accountability.  The arrows in Figure 1.1 linking both tax resistance 
and collective action to direct tax bargaining capture this possibility.   
 
Alternatively, the government may refuse to make concessions to taxpayers, but taxpayers’ 
actions may nonetheless generate indirect pressure for political reform (indirect tax 
bargaining).  If citizens are engaged in tax resistance, and the government refuses to make 
concessions, then reduced tax revenue is the most likely result.  This may, in turn, weaken 
the overall position of the government, thus increasing the likelihood of a change in 
government and of subsequent governance reforms (tax resistance and changes in 
government).  Similarly, if citizens engage in collective action the government may elect to 
respond with either indifference or active repression, thus preventing any reciprocal 
improvements in governance over the short-term.  However, taxpayer protests, while 
unrequited in the short-term, may contribute to strengthening the political capabilities of 
taxpayers in the long-term, as new civil society groupings become institutionalized or 
heightened levels of political engagement are sustained. 
 
This model is attractive in large part because it captures a more diverse set of possibilities 
than earlier models of tax bargaining.  Whereas these earlier models focused largely on 
direct tax bargaining resulting from the threat of tax resistance, this model captures multiple 
causal processes reflecting differences in (a) government efforts to impose taxation, (b) 
taxpayer responses and (c) the interaction between those two groups.  More specifically, the 
model includes two ‘decision points’ at which alternative outcomes emerge as a result of 
different strategic choices by taxpayers and governments.   
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The first ‘decision point’ surrounds the question of whether or not taxpayers respond to 
taxation and, if so, whether they do so primarily through tax resistance or collective action.  
As is discussed in greater detail below, this decision is likely to be shaped by contextual 
factors including initial political and economic conditions, the existing strength of civil 
society and particular characteristics of the tax system.  The second ‘decision point’ occurs 
when governments decide whether to respond to taxpayer actions by making concessions, 
or through indifference and repression.  Again, that decision is likely to be shaped by the 
contextual factors discussed in the next section, among which the question of revenue 
pressure is likely to be particularly important.   
 
The term revenue pressure captures the simple idea that governments are more likely to 
make concessions to taxpayers when they face a more urgent need for additional revenue.  
By contrast, governments facing little revenue pressure are more likely to forgo 
concessions, counting on the fact that they can weather the challenge posed by reduced 
revenue or by civil society mobilization.  Notably, governments that are more reliant on tax 
revenue (as opposed to large non-tax revenue sources) are, on average, more likely to face 
acute revenue pressure, and thus to be vulnerable to the need to make political concessions 
to taxpayers. 
2.4.5. Taxation and the Absence of Tax Bargaining 
Having presented the model, it is worth concluding this section with a word of caution 
about the interpretation of case study evidence.  Even if tax bargaining is significant to 
long-term political outcomes there are still likely to be many cases in which individual 
episodes of increased taxation yield little or no evidence of direct or indirect tax bargaining.  
In even the best circumstances taxation remains a fundamentally coercive act, and it is often 
only with a longer-term view that conflicts over taxation may come to be seen as part of 
larger processes of bargaining and political transformation.  As Ross (2004: 234) has noted, 
“many people dislike paying taxes, and some will cause trouble when governments raise 
them.  But democracy is only one possible outcome of these conflicts. Historically, people 
have borne crushingly high tax rates with few rebellions; when they do revolt, they have 
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often been met with intensified repression, not democratic concessions.”  The question is 
thus not whether there will be episodes of what are here termed tax increases without 
bargaining, as there certainly will be.  Instead, the question is whether those episodes will 
be so frequent, or so lacking in any evidence of public engagement and mobilization, as to 
outweigh competing evidence of a positive relationship between taxation, responsiveness 
and accountability.  This, of course, is a question to be answered empirically. 
2.5. Contextual Factors Affecting Tax Bargaining 
Within the preceding model the central importance of context is explicit, as contextual 
factors are expected to shapes both citizen responses to taxation and the corresponding 
actions of governments.  In some contexts taxpayers will be significantly more likely to 
respond to taxation through collective action, while in others reliance of quieter forms of 
tax resistance will be more likely.  Likewise, in some contexts governments will be strongly 
inclined to bargain with taxpayers in order to secure tax compliance, while in others 
governments are likely to rely heavily on repression, thus shifting the analytical emphasis 
towards the possibility of more conflictual and long-term political outcomes.  In more 
general terms, the model is based on the premise that the need for taxation can contribute to 
the expansion of responsiveness and accountability by altering the relative bargaining 
power of taxpayers and governments.  As such, particular outcomes will depend to at least 
some extent on the myriad factors that shape the bargaining power of these competing 
groups.   
 
This importance of context has received comparatively little explicit attention in recent 
research, but is central to Tilly’s (1990) historical account of taxation and state building in 
early modern Europe.  In his model, it is the balance between coercion and capital in 
individual states that lies at the centre of the causal model, determining whether the need 
for taxation results in consensual tax bargaining or simply in the expansion of coercion.  
However, whereas Tilly’s goal was to develop an encompassing theory of state formation 
and state building, this study has the more modest goal of highlighting the particular 
importance of taxation to processes of political change.  The approach to dealing with the 
importance of contextual factors is correspondingly also more modest.  The first goal is to 
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provide a general analysis of the importance of broad structural factors in shaping the 
potential for, and character of, tax bargaining.  These factors include existing political 
institutions, the character of economies and the many factors that shape the potential for 
collective action in diverse contexts.  The second goal is to provide a detailed analysis of 
the importance of contextual factors that are relatively more specific to the issue of tax 
bargaining, and which are subject to policy influence, including the importance of foreign 
aid, tax types and tax administration.   
 
In pursuing these goals this research draws on propositions derived from a combination of 
historical examples, broad theoretical arguments and a small body of existing case study 
research (Moore 2008: 51).  The range of potentially important contextual factors is 
extensive and ranges from the relatively broad to the very specific, so no effort is made here 
to summarize all of these possibilities.  Instead, this section briefly highlights six factors 
that existing research suggests are likely to be particularly important in shaping processes 
and outcomes.  A more detailed discussion of contextual variables is reserved for the 
concluding chapters, by which point it will be possible to draw on the empirical evidence to 
come. 
 
The first contextual factor of interest is the importance of access to non-tax revenue.  This 
is explicit in the model, as access to non-tax revenue is expected to lead to reduced levels of 
taxation, and thus reduced opportunities for direct and indirect tax bargaining.   Equally 
important are the more subtle implications of the fact that access to non-tax revenue by 
definition reduces the share of domestic tax collection in total government revenue.  As a 
result, even where levels of domestic tax collection remain constant, access to significant 
non-tax revenue is expected to reduce the potential for taxation to become a catalyst for 
broader governance gains.  This largely reflects the importance of revenue pressure, as 
governments with access to non-tax revenue will, in general, have weaker incentives to 
bargain with, and make concession to, taxpayers, as they are better able to tolerate 
reductions in tax revenue. Moreover, governments with access to substantial non-tax 
revenue may be less vulnerable to collective action motivated by tax concerns owing to 
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their capacity for repression or the use of targeted patronage to reduce opposition (the 
‘public spending’, ‘patronage’ and ‘repression’ effects described in Chapter 1). 
 
The second factor of interest is the role of foreign aid.  The basic question here is whether 
foreign aid may reduce the likelihood of tax bargaining in much the same way as other 
sources of non-tax revenue (Moore 1998).   The answer is far from obvious, as aid is a 
possible alternative to domestic taxation, but is also more politically complex than other 
types of non-tax revenue, as it is generally accompanied by technical assistance and 
external conditionality (Collier 2006).  Gaining a deeper understanding of this question is of 
significant policy relevance but empirical research has been both limited and quite general 
(Brautigam and Knack 2004, Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006).  As a result this 
issue is given special attention throughout the empirical chapters to follow, and is addressed 
in detail in chapter 11. 
 
The third factor is economic context, and particularly the strength and mobility of the 
private sector.  In Tilly’s (1990) model economic structure and the strength of the private 
sector is the decisive determinant of whether the need for taxation will lead to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability or simply to the intensification of coercion.  
In his model, where there was a strong and mobile capitalist class tax bargaining was more 
likely, as the bargaining power of taxpayers was enhanced and the government was forced 
to bargain in order to secure access to those income sources.  In more recent work these 
insights have been boiled down to the more specific prediction that where the owners of 
capital are highly mobile, and thus difficult to tax coercively, tax bargaining will be more 
likely (Bates and Lien 1985).  At a more general level, a more powerful private sector and 
middle class is likely to enjoy a range of political resources valuable to efforts to bargain 
with government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Moore 1966). 
 
The fourth factor is the nature of existing political institutions and the extent of political 
openness.  At the most basic level, where the existing government is firmly entrenched in 
power it will have few incentives to bargain with citizens, while a powerfully repressive 
government is likely to be able to prevent collective action and explicit demands for 
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responsiveness and accountability.  More generally, it is almost certain that existing 
political institutions will shape opportunities for tax bargaining and the form that that tax 
bargaining takes.  This notion draws on the “polity approach” popularized by Skocpol 
(1992:41), which “understands political activities, where carried on by politicians or by 
social groups, as conditioned by the institutional configuration of governments.”  This 
broad proposition has been given specific meaning by studies of tax bargaining that have 
argued that institutions of representation are likely to facilitate relatively direct tax 
bargaining, while more conflictual and indirect forms of bargaining are likely when existing 
institutions are relatively weak (Levi 1988, North and Weingast 1989). 
 
The fifth contextual factor of interest encompasses a variety of related factors that facilitate 
collective political action.  While this topic has already been discussed at some length, it is 
useful to return to Tilly’s (1990: 101) account, where he writes that general unhappiness 
with taxation was likely to become “mass rebellion chiefly when (1) the state’s demands 
and actions offended citizens’ standards of justice or attacked their primary collective 
identities, (2) the people touched by offensive state actions were already connected by 
durable social ties, (3) ordinary people had powerful allies inside or outside the state, and 
(4) the state’s recent actions or interactions revealed that it was vulnerable to attack.”  
Similar considerations seem likely to shape outcomes in the contemporary context. 
 
Finally, the types of processes that emerge, and their outcomes, are likely to be shaped by 
the types of taxes involved, and the nature of tax administration.  While taxation has so far 
been treated as a single variable, in practice aggregate government tax revenue is composed 
of an array of taxes with vastly different characteristics.  These differences can usefully be 
captured by considering the incidence of the tax (who is paying), the visibility of the tax 
(how aware taxpayers are of the tax) and the potential for tax evasion.  In broadest terms, 
received theory suggests that tax bargaining is most likely when the visibility of taxes is 
high, thus making political conflict and mobilization more likely (Martin and Gabay 2007), 
and when the potential for evasion is high, thus giving citizens greater bargaining power 
(Bates and Lien 1985, Hoffman and Gibson 2005).  Meanwhile, the incidence of taxes is 
likely to shape what groups are involved in tax bargaining, and what types of outcomes are 
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thus given priority (Timmons 2005).  Finally, it is essential to recall that the visibility and 
incidence of taxes, as well as the potential for tax evasion, are likely to reflect not only 
formal tax laws, but also the nature and effectiveness of tax administration. 
 
In addition to these six factors, a note is warranted about the general importance of 
domestic political context in shaping the types of outcomes that may emerge from tax 
bargaining.  Any outcome, be it the expansion of public services or the creation of new 
institutions, is likely to be shaped by the demands of taxpayers, but also by the preferences 
of governments. Quite simply, governments are likely to make concessions that fit most 
comfortably within their overall governing strategies.  Margaret Levi (1999) adopts a strong 
form of this argument, suggesting that “secure and relatively powerful rulers will [enter into 
broad tax bargain, while] insecure rulers will grant exemptions to those whose alliance is 
necessary to protect power” (115).  A more modest conceptualization suggests that 
confronted with the same pressure from taxpayers different governments are likely to adopt 
differing responses, owing to their differing governing strategies and priorities. 
2.6. Methodology 
To recap, this chapter has (a) clarified the research question, (b) developed an analytical 
framework for understanding the relationship between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability, (c) proposed a concrete set of political processes, and outcomes, that might 
result from increased taxation and (d) outlined a series of contextual factors that are likely 
to shape outcomes.  Together these elements shape both the econometric tests to follow, 
and the organization and interpretation of the case study evidence.  The final challenge, 
before turning to the empirical evidence itself, is to present a more detailed discussion of 
methodology.  What follows proceeds in three sections: a broad overview of the 
methodological approach, a detailed presentation of the case study methodology and a 
consideration of limitations. 
2.6.1. Mixed Methods and Case Selection 
Econometric studies have recently played a prominent role in shaping understanding of the 
relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability (Ross 2004, Timmons 
2005, Mahon 2005, Gervasoni 2010, Hoffman and Gibson 2005).  This is unsurprising, 
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given that the research question is, in principle, ideally suited to cross-country comparison 
and the tracing of changes in revenue and governmental performance over time.  On the 
other hand, these quantitative studies face significant methodological challenges, and have 
trouble identifying the particular causal processes at work or the contextual factors that 
shape outcomes.  As a result, this research begins with econometric analysis before moving 
on to adopt a case study methodology that provides a more nuanced and detailed view of 
the processes of interest. 
 
The specific mixed-methods strategy that is adopted here roughly follows Evan 
Lieberman’s (2005) model of “nested-analysis.”  This approach calls for beginning with 
econometric tests of the research hypothesis, and then allowing the results of those tests to 
motivate subsequent case selection and methodological choices.  If the econometric 
evidence supports the research hypothesis, then he proposes a “model-testing” analysis, 
which entails selecting cases that appear to fit the model in order to confirm the existence of 
the hypothesized causal processes.   Alternatively, if the econometric evidence is 
inconclusive, he proposes a “model-building” approach, which implies selecting cases that 
are particularly likely to enhance our understanding of the relevant causal processes.  While 
such purposeful case selection is ‘biased’ in the econometric sense, it is fully justified if the 
goal is to identify and understand underlying causal processes (Collier and Mahoney 1996). 
 
In practice, the econometric results presented in chapter 4 are inconclusive, and the case 
studies thus follow a “model-building” logic.  While there is significant existing evidence 
that is suggestive of a relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability, this 
model-building approach remains justified, and necessary, given the weakness of the 
econometric tests and the current absence of carefully theorized, empirically driven, case 
study evidence.  As was described at length in the previous chapter, the basic logic of case 
selection has thus been to select cases that are likely to offer significant opportunities to 
observe the presence, or conspicuous absence, of a relationship between taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability.  It is such cases that are expected to be most useful in 
illuminating the underlying causal processes at work. 
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2.6.2. Case Study Methodology: Episodes, Processes and 
Outcomes 
Turning to the case studies, the major challenge lies in seeking to establish causality despite 
the fact that the processes involved are likely to be relatively diverse, challenging to isolate 
from broader political processes and generally difficult to observe.  The case study 
methodology consequently relies on a four-part process. 
 
First, each case study relies on the construction of an extended historical narrative of the 
political economy of taxation.  This reliance on extended historical narratives reflects the 
fact that taxation is highly path dependent, and is thus best understood in historical context 
(Lieberman 2002, Mahon 2004, Bird and Zolt 2005, Levi 1988, Scholz and Lubell 1998, 
Torgler 2005).  A longer narrative also holds the potential to capture a greater diversity of 
outcomes and to accommodate the likelihood that some processes of tax bargaining are 
likely to play out over multiple years or even longer. 
 
Second, having constructed broad analytical narratives of taxation, each case study focuses 
on a subset of key tax episodes, centred on changes in levels of tax collection, tax policy or 
tax administration.  These tax episodes ground the case study analysis, and can be usefully 
thought of as a subset of interconnected observations, thus expanding the number of ‘cases’ 
from three countries to a much larger number of tax episodes. 
 
Third, after identifying these tax episodes the analysis traces the political interactions and 
outcomes that have surrounded changes in, and debates about, taxation.  This approach 
draws on Moore’s (2007: 16) insight that, “Any realistic understanding of the processes 
requires that we go beyond the initial reactions to taxation of each type of actor, and take 
into account the ways in which they then interact, whether conflictually, cooperatively, or 
in more complex ways.”  Thus, for each tax episode the analysis effectively answers four 
questions.  First, what were the technical details of the change in tax collection, policy or 
administration?  Second, what political economy factors explain the timing and details of 
the change?  Third, how did taxpayers and/or government react to the change?  And, 
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finally, what subsequent interactions occurred between taxpayers and government, and 
what were the outcomes? 
 
Having presented this analysis, the final step has been to assess whether these narratives, 
surrounding individual tax episodes, constitute significant evidence of the existence of a 
causal relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  This has been 
accompanied by efforts to also draw conclusions about the character of the most important 
causal processes involved, and about the contextual factors that have shaped outcomes 
across contexts.  Each of the individual case studies provides partial answers, while 
chapters 9 and 10 evaluate the entirety of the evidence, and thus arrive at more robust 
conclusions. 
 
The analytical narratives, and the conclusions that emerge from them, rely on a 
combination of secondary literature, primary documents and, most importantly, interviews.  
Reliance on interviews was dictated in part by the absence of relevant secondary literature, 
as even the basic history of tax collection and tax reform has been poorly documented in 
each of the three countries.  The more important justification lies in the heavy reliance of 
the cases studies on causal process observations, which seek to capture direct evidence of 
intent and causality (Bennett and Elman 2006), in order to establish the existence of a 
causal relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  The coexistence 
of changes in taxation and in government behaviour (correlation in econometric terms) is 
simply not sufficient to establish the existence of a causal relationship.  It has thus been 
necessary to rely on the stated motivations of political actors themselves to establish that 
taxation was central to observed political outcomes.  Thus, the majority of the causal claims 
in the case studies are based on explicit statements by public officials and stakeholders 
explaining that their actions were motivated by tax concerns, and that outcomes can be 
reasonably understood in those terms. 
 
Of course, such heavy reliance on interviews involves significant risks.  These risks include 
the possibilities that: (a) those interviewed may provide inaccurate responses in order to 
reflect their own interests, (b) the interviewer may lead those interviewed to provide only 
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confirmatory evidence, and (c) selectivity in those who are interviewed may provide an 
incomplete view of reality, particularly given the use of a snowballing sampling 
methodology.  While these risks should always be borne in mind they have been minimized 
by interviewing diverse individuals, with conflicting political interests, and by only 
reporting claims that could be verified from multiple sources.  Perhaps most important has 
been the interview methodology itself, which has been based on open ended discussions in 
which respondents were asked to recount broad political narratives of taxation in their own 
terms.  Those interviewed thus had full control over the identification of key tax episodes 
and key political actors, with the interviewer primarily encouraging them to expand on their 
own narratives or asking them to comment on broad topics raised in other interviews.  
Finally, the results presented here have been previously shared with key informants in each 
of the case study countries in order to verify the general credibility of the accounts.  A full 
list of those interviewed is presented at the end of the thesis, though there is no attribution 
of specific information, as promises of confidentiality were important to the willingness of 
informants to speak openly about potentially sensitive topics.  
2.6.3. Assessing the Conclusions 
Before concluding it is important to transparently acknowledge the limits and risks of this 
methodological approach.  While there are a number of issues that could plausibly be 
raised, what follows focuses on two: the difficulty of observing certain processes and the 
need to establish a falsifiable standard of proof by which to evaluate the research findings. 
 
The first issue is that the three specific causal processes around which the analysis is 
focused are unlikely to capture more subtle, and less observable, processes by which tax 
reliance may encourage greater responsiveness and accountability (Moore 2008: 38).  Most 
obviously, it is likely to be difficult to observe the long-term impact of taxation on 
taxpayers’ expectations and levels of political engagement.  It is possible to observe cases 
in which new taxes lead to the formation of new civil society organizations, but if the 
experience of paying taxes subtly shifts expectations and levels of engagement over several 
years, or even decades, those changes will not be captured by the methodology adopted 
here.  Similarly, it is impossible to observe the possibility that the desire to increase tax 
compliance may subtly encourage governments to be more responsive and accountable over 
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the long-term.  That is, the desire to encourage tax compliance may modestly increase the 
likelihood that government will behave responsively and accountability in any given 
context.  Yet, if tax considerations function at the margin of decision making they are likely 
to appear politically insignificant in isolation even though they may have a quietly 
significant impact over time.  Given the difficulty of observing these processes, we are left 
with the likelihood that the existence of highly visible political processes may be indicative 
of the existence of additional, less visible, processes as well. 
 
The second methodological concern is the need to establish a reasonable standard of proof 
in order to either accept or reject the claim that the need for governments to collect taxes 
has contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in the case study 
countries.  Addressing this concern centres on the need to be clear about what constitutes 
‘sufficient’ evidence.  The argument that taxation can be a catalyst for the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability is a probabilistic, rather than absolute, proposition.  We 
do not expect that increased taxation will always lead to tax bargaining, and thus the 
absence of tax bargaining in some cases is not sufficient to reject the broader argument.  At 
the same time, it is a virtual certainty that taxation will occasionally be met by public 
resistance, but an occasional impact is insufficient to claim that taxation is a significant 
contributor to the emergence of responsive and accountable government.  
 
Assessing the political significance of tax bargaining is particularly difficult because it is 
necessary to take account of the frequency of tax bargaining, the relative importance of 
particular outcomes and the reality that indirect tax bargaining is likely to be impossible to 
observe in some cases.  The only available recourse is to a subjective standard by which to 
judge empirical significance.  The standard adopted here is the following: standard political 
accounts in the case study countries can be meaningfully enhanced by the inclusion of tax 
bargaining as an explanatory process.  While a failure to meet this standard would not be 
decisive proof of the absence of a relationship, given the difficulty of observing some types 
of processes, it would certainly constitute grounds for serious scepticism.  More 
optimistically, if the case study evidence does attain this standard of proof, there will be 
every reason to believe that additional, harder to observe, processes are relevant as well. 
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2.7. Conclusions 
Over the past decade there has been growing attention to the argument that the need for 
developing country governments to rely on taxation may increase the likelihood that they 
will be responsive and accountable to their citizens.  This chapter has explored this 
possibility in detail, arguing that this simple argument, while compelling, disguises 
significant complexity, which existing theoretical and empirical research has frequently 
failed to fully address.  This chapter consequently set out to develop a detailed theoretical 
framework and causal model linking taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  
 
The causal model can be summarized as follows.  The need for taxation can contribute to 
the expansion of responsiveness and accountability by increasing the bargaining power of 
taxpayers vis-à-vis the government.  The need for taxation may increase the relative 
bargaining power of taxpayers through the potential for tax resistance and collective action.  
Following this basic logic, taxpayer responses to taxation may give rise to processes of 
direct and indirect tax bargaining that contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  This model is attractive because it identifies both the general factors that 
can lead to tax bargaining (tax resistance and collective action) and a specific set of 
observable causal processes that may directly link taxation to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability. 
 
What remains is to apply this model in the quantitative and case study chapters to follow.  
This effort begins in chapter 3 with a case study of the relationship between taxation and 
state building in Ethiopia from 1855-1974.  This chapter provides evidence that the broad 
processes linking taxation and state building in early modern Europe were equally relevant 
to the experience of early modern Ethiopia.  This provides support for the contention that 
the processes under investigation here are not unique to the historical and cultural context 
of early modern Europe.  Chapter 4 moves to explicitly test the relationship between tax 
reliance and accountability in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa using cross-country 
econometric tests.  The results confirm that cross-country data is consistent with the 
existence of such a relationship.  However, the chapter argues that for both technical and 
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conceptual reasons standard econometric models are unable to capture the complexity of 
the causal processes at work and thus to provide compelling evidence of a causal 
relationship between taxation and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  This 
sets the stage for presenting the case study evidence, which generates the most important 
new insights.  A relatively brief Chapter 5 presents the case selection methodology and 
important background data, while the case study evidence from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia 
is presented in chapters 6 through 8. 
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3. Taxation and State Building in Imperial Ethiopia 
 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to determine whether historical processes linking 
increased taxation to broader processes of state building in early modern Europe are equally 
relevant to understanding political development in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
effort involves applying a model of political development derived from the experience of 
early modern Europe to new, and distinct, contexts, with unique social, economic and 
political characteristics.  In doing so, it confronts the risk that existing hypotheses about 
taxation and state building may be highly context specific, and only truly applicable to the 
particular historical and cultural context of early modern Europe and closely linked 
countries like the United States.   
 
Given the potential risk of too readily applying the lessons of European history to a hugely 
different context, it would strengthen the analysis significantly if there were evidence of 
similar processes at work in historical Africa.  While such evidence would not provide 
proof of the relevance of tax bargaining to contemporary countries in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
would minimally make clear that political processes linking taxation and state building are 
not unique to European experience.  Unfortunately, for most of sub-Saharan Africa it does 
not make sense to even explore the question, as material and political conditions were so 
different as to make reasonable comparison impossible.  The pre-colonial state system in 
most of the region had little in common with contemporary systems of nation-states.  
Owing in large part to low population densities, the region lacked both regular inter-state 
warfare and centralized bureaucratic tax systems7, the two key elements driving the 
experience of tax bargaining in early modern Europe.  Adding to these fundamental 
differences, the development of states and politics were fundamentally shaped by the arrival 
of colonial rule, which saw external powers establish national boundaries and national tax 
systems, thus suppressing the potential for domestically driven tax bargaining (Herbst 
2000). 
                                                
7 This is not, of course, to suggest that there was no warfare in historical sub-Saharan Africa, but, rather, that 
warfare revolved around loosely defined empires that competed to exercise control over dispersed territories, 
and thus exact tribute.  This stands in contrast to the European experience of reasonably well-defined borders 
and centralized militaries engaged in inter-states wars of conquest. 
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The one exception to both of these observations is Ethiopia, particularly during the modern 
Imperial period from 1855-1974.  Ethiopia largely avoided colonial rule and had a great 
deal in common with historical Europe.  The Ethiopian state had high population densities, 
reasonably well-defined borders and faced external military threats that necessitated 
revenue raising through increasingly bureaucratized forms of taxation.  It had a highly 
institutionalized religion, a unique language and highly elaborated and relatively stable 
social hierarchies.  Economically Ethiopia was reliant on intensive plough agriculture 
organized along recognizably feudal lines, with control over land, and agricultural surplus, 
dictated by established social hierarchies.  Political organization correspondingly rested on 
large landholders exercising regional power, while granting allegiance to the Emperor in 
exchange for recognized privileges (Bahru Zewde 2002).  Imperial Ethiopia was thus not 
only recognizable with respect to European experience, but particularly had much in 
common with the most powerful civilizations of Eastern Europe and Russia. 
 
Given these parallels, Ethiopia presents a unique opportunity to explore the importance of 
taxation to broader processes of state building in a non-western context, and thus to 
substantiate the claim that such political processes are not unique to a particular historical 
or cultural context but are, instead, shaped by social, political and economic conditions.  
The analysis is in two parts.  The first presents an extended historical narrative of the 
centrality of taxation to broader processes of state building in Imperial Ethiopia.  The 
second draws on this historical narrative to propose specific conclusions.  At the micro-
level, the analysis highlights important episodes of conflict and compromise around 
taxation, consistent with the model of tax bargaining developed in the previous chapter.  At 
the macro-level, it highlights clear parallels between the experiences of Imperial Ethiopia 
and early modern Europe in the broad relationship between taxation and state building over 
more than a century.  While these findings say little about the importance of tax bargaining 
in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, they provide an empirical foundation for exploring the 
importance of tax bargaining in a non-western context and significantly expand our 
understanding of the political processes involved. 
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3.1. State-Building and Taxation in Imperial Ethiopia 
Since at least the 1st century the Ethiopian highlands have been host to conflicts between 
rulers with centralizing ambitions and local power holders seeking to retain their autonomy.   
This has given rise to powerful empires as well as to prolonged periods of uncertainty and 
conflict.   The so-called modern period, which culminated in the formation of the Ethiopian 
state as it is now recognized, began in 1855 and witnessed the progressive strengthening of 
central state authority in conflict with the local nobility and large landowners.   Throughout 
this period internal conflict and external threats pressed the central government to expand 
its authority.  Taxation lay at the heart of this effort, not only because revenue was essential 
to the strength of the central state, but also because it became a major site of political 
conflict for both practical and symbolic reasons. 
3.1.1. The Origins of the Modern Imperial State 
Most historians trace the origins of the modern Ethiopian state to 1855 and the coming to 
power of Emperor Tewodoros.  His rise followed a period of political fragmentation from 
1769 to 1855, which came to be known as the Zamana Masafent, ‘the era of the Princes’.  
Emperor Tewodoros had methodically defeated his most powerful opponents, thus 
progressively centralizing power and ushering in the modern period of Imperial rule 
throughout the Ethiopian highlands.    
 
Efforts by powerful leaders to unify the Ethiopian highlands were not new, but Tewodoros’ 
effort had gained added urgency owing to the growing external threats posed by the 
expanding Egyptian empire and growing European interest in the region.  In the face of 
these external threats unification was essential, as the empire remained essentially feudal: a 
powerful local nobility ruled over an almost entirely rural, peasant, society and owed only 
relatively indirect allegiance to the Emperor.  The central government lacked an established 
bureaucracy or administration, and still relied heavily on the personal resources of the 
Emperor to sustain its activities.   In times of war the Emperor remained beholden to the 
nobility, who were called upon to mobilize both resources and troops. 
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The basic revenue system, which remained largely in place until the 1940s, was based on 
tribute payments and the provision of surplus labour by the peasantry, or gabbar.  These 
tributes were paid to local landowners, who in turn provided a share of the surplus to the 
Emperor.  Landowners themselves generally did not pay tribute on their own production 
and land.  Given the personalized nature of these payments there was little distinction 
between the notions of tax and tribute, which shared a single Amharic word, geber.  
 
The system of tribute was built upon a complex system of land tenure that shared broad 
characteristics throughout the highlands despite significant variation in the specifics. 
Peasants farmed most of the land, and their access to land was governed by a communal 
system of land rights known as rist.  They, in turn, paid tribute to whatever noble held 
tributary rights to the land.  Rist-gult and siso-gult were the dominant forms of tributary 
rights and allowed the landlord to collect tribute, of which a small share was remitted to the 
Emperor.  Rist-gult derived from land grants from the Emperor, while siso-gult reflected 
traditional landholding by local rulers.  Samon lands similarly granted tributary rights to the 
Orthodox Church, which was exempt from paying tribute to the central government (Bahru 
Zewde 2002, Schwab 1972).  
 
Under all three forms of tenure peasants were expected to provide various forms of tribute.  
The first eventually came to be known as the land tax and was generally paid based on total 
land area and the level of cultivation of the land.   The second was the tithe, or asrat.  It was 
historically grounded in religion, but was also paid to landlords, and constituted ten percent 
of the harvest of the individual gabbar, which was frequently estimated from the amount of 
land under cultivation.   The third type of tribute, which was in practice the most 
burdensome, was an array of feudal responsibilities towards local rulers.  These included 
the provision of surplus labour, supporting local notables and militaries passing through the 
region, and the delivery of goods such as firewood and honey.  The aggregate burden on the 
peasantry was substantial, leading to periodic resistance, and, in the 20th century, growing 
condemnation from Ethiopian intellectuals and political leaders (Bahru Zewde 2002).  
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3.1.2. Centralization and Resistance 
Recognizing the relative weakness of the central government, Tewodoros gained his 
reputation as the first modernizing ruler of Ethiopia through his efforts to create a more 
centralized state, with its own financial resources and army.   The creation of a strong army 
controlled by the central government inevitably implied a search for new revenues, and this 
could only be achieved by curtailing the privileges of the nobility and church by taxing 
their production and assets and increasing the share of tribute flowing to the central 
government. 
 
In practice his aggressive efforts to achieve this goal led him into almost perpetual conflict 
with local rulers, and this was a recurring theme as successive Ethiopian Emperors sought 
to extend state power.  Most problematic, and controversial, were his efforts to tax the 
Church, which was not only exempt from direct taxation but retained unfettered control 
over a huge share of the land of the Empire, traditionally estimated at one-third of the total.  
Tewodoros attempted to nationalize control over part of existing church lands, but this led 
him into an ultimately crippling conflict with the Church.  Markakis (1974: 36) notes that, 
“Hard-pressed for funds needed to maintain his large army in the interminable campaigns 
he was forced to wage, he sought to curtail the privilege of tax exemption enjoyed by 
church lands.”  Placing this conflict in larger historical context, Bahru Zewde (2002: 35) 
argues that, “Like all modernizing rulers, Tewodoros realized that introducing far-reaching 
reforms was impossible without a secure financial base.  It was in an effort to solve this 
problem that he came into collision with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.  That ultimately 
proved his undoing.”   
 
Thus, the challenge of centralizing state power, and of resisting external opposition, 
demanded a strong and centralized army, which in turn required the effective taxation of the 
Church and the landed elite.  In attempting to do this Tewodoros inflamed resistance 
without securing the hoped for revenues.  This escalating conflict lay at the heart of his 
defeat in 1868. 
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After the fall of Tewodoros, his rival Emperor Yohannes IV rose to power.  Under his rule 
the centralizing thrust pursued by Tewodoros was more muted, as Yohannes focused much 
of his energy on establishing doctrinal unity within the Orthodox Church, while granting 
greater independence to feudal lords.  According to Bahru Zewde (2002: 44),  
 
In place of Tewodoros’s head-on collision with regionalism, Yohannes followed 
a more cautious approach, which amounted to a conscious toleration of it.  
While this more realistic approach had the merit of recognizing the objective 
impediments to establishing a unitary state, it had the disadvantage of 
encouraging the latent centrifugal tendencies of the Ethiopian polity. 
 
The one area in which Yohannes sought to exert more direct influence was in the north.  
Bahru Zewde (2002: 47) explains that, “while Yohannes was content to exercise only 
indirect control in Gojjam and Shawa, he could not afford to pursue a similar policy in the 
area most threatened by foreign intrusions.”  Thus Yohannes’ rule reflects an acceptance of 
a limited central state, but also reinforces the fact that external threats remained a catalyst 
for efforts at greater centralization. 
3.1.3. Emperor Menelik and the Expansion of Central Control  
During the period of Yohannes’s reign, the future Emperor Menelik II was building a 
power base in the south.   His rise to power eventually reinvigorated the drive for central 
control, while further highlighting the primacy of the revenue imperative and of external 
threats in shaping the state building process. 
 
Menelik had initially challenged Yohannes for power in the highlands, but when he was 
defeated he turned his attention southward.  This territory, which is now southern Ethiopia, 
had not been a part of previous Ethiopian empires but proved to be a major source of power 
for Menelik, as he gained control over the fertile, coffee producing, areas in the south-west, 
as well as important long-distance trade posts, providing him with a powerful fiscal base.  
Bahru Zewde (2002:62) explains that, “the incorporation of the South-West had more than 
regional significance.  It ensured Menelik a steady source of revenue to strengthen his 
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political and military position in his ultimate bid for the throne.  In short, [it] made Menelik 
the only serious candidate for the succession to Emperor Yohannes IV.” 
 
Menelik ultimately became Emperor in 1889, and quickly embarked on efforts to centralize 
authority and to establish Ethiopia’s permanent borders in the face of European 
encroachment.  The southern territories figured prominently in this effort, as Menelik 
sought to formalize Ethiopian claims to the new territories.  In those regions that peacefully 
accepted Menelik’s rule, he granted significant local autonomy, in exchange for regular 
tribute to the central government.  In the majority of territories, though, he largely 
transplanted the feudal system of the north on to the communal land holding patterns that 
had previously existed in the south.  He granted major landholdings to his generals and 
closest allies from the southern conquests, and they, in turn, inherited the right to collect 
tribute from the local peasantry.  In this way he not only secured his control over the 
territory, but also the allegiance of military and political elites. 
 
In the years that followed, Menelik continued with his centralizing agenda.  This effort 
rested on systematically expanding his military strength while subjugating his rivals, both 
of which were facilitated by the growing fiscal strength of the state and the possibility of 
purchasing loyalty with land grants.  Equally important were plans to undertake land 
measurement throughout the country, as a precursor to the centralization of taxation.  But 
while Menelik enjoyed some success in the south, where conquest had weakened resistance 
to central initiatives, the north remained powerfully resistant to change. His final 
centralizing initiative was the introduction of a Ministerial system of government in 1907, 
apparently with the dual goals of creating greater continuity in government, and of 
impressing foreign interests.  While the Ministerial system remained weak, and feudal 
relations remained dominant, Menelik’s effort was a precursor to what would come later. 
 
Throughout his rule Menelik also continued his efforts to firmly establish Ethiopia’s 
borders, and in this he was more successful. According to Bahru Zewde (2002:61), “In 
April 1891, in an effort to forestall the expansion of the colonial powers from their 
possessions adjoining Ethiopia, he defined in a well-publicized circular to European rulers 
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what he considered to be the legitimate boundaries of the country.”  This slowed the 
European advance, but did not stop an Italian invasion in 1896.  The Italian invasion 
culminated in the battle of Adwa, at which the Ethiopians decisively defeated the colonial 
army.  In some sense this battle exemplified Menelik’s broader agenda: successful 
centralization which allowed him to mobilize an effective military force armed with 
European weapons purchased by virtue of the growing fiscal strength of the state. 
 
One of Menelik’s key legacies was the impact he had on economic conditions in the south.  
Through conquest Menelik profoundly changed land tenure in the region, replacing existing 
communal systems with the system of feudal holdings transplanted from the north.  He 
followed this by instituting a process of land measurement designed to strengthen tax 
collection.  While the system of land measurement improved tax collection, as intended, 
one consequence was that a growing number of peasants who were either unable or 
unwilling to pay those taxes were evicted from their land.  This created a class of tenant 
farmers who were exceptionally vulnerable to the exactions of taxation, rent and tribute by 
landlords.  This process continued throughout the decades that followed and became a stark 
example of the exploitative conditions that continued to prevail in rural areas (Bahru Zewde 
2002: 87, Markakis 2006:154-164). 
3.1.4. Emperor Haile Selassie: Modernization and Autocracy 
Menelik’s reign was cut short by a series of increasingly debilitating strokes, the first of 
which occurred in 1906 just as his plan for a Ministerial government began to take shape.   
His illness and death were followed by a succession struggle that eventually brought 
Emperor Haile Selassie I to power.  He was initially named regent in 1916, next to Empress 
Zewditu, and by 1930 was named Emperor after having defeated all challengers.  
Throughout this period he established his identity as a reformer, in that he sought to reform 
the traditional base of feudal power, but also as an absolutist, who gradually eliminated 
opponents, including all but one Minister in 1918, and built a cult of authority around 
himself. 
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Upon becoming Emperor he adopted a more aggressively modernizing agenda than his 
predecessors.  He quickly moved to create a new constitution, motivated, like Menelik, by 
the need to establish a more centralized structure of government, and to cultivate a positive 
image with the international community.  The new constitution continued the trend of 
vesting increasing power in a meritocratic bureaucracy, and created a bi-cameral 
parliament.  The Emperor appointed members of the Senate, while electors drawn 
overwhelmingly from the landed elite elected the Chamber of Deputies.   
 
The broad goal of the new constitution was to sharply curtail the powers of the traditional 
nobility.  While the nobility would retain local authority, in matters of State the power of 
the Emperor was to be absolute.  These areas included, “appointments and dismissals, the 
rendering of justice, the declaration and termination of wars, and the granting of land and 
honours” (Bahru Zewde 2002:143).  The nobility was granted control of the Chamber of 
Deputies as a form of compromise; by formally engaging the nobility in the process 
lawmaking would gain greater legitimacy despite power remaining effectively with the 
Emperor.  In the words of the author of the constitution, “we wanted to speak to the people 
of Ethiopia through these personalities” (quoted in Bahru Zewde 2002:143).  While existing 
sources are not explicit on this point, it certainly appears that the Emperor decided to make 
this early concession in order to smooth the implementation of his modernizing agenda, in 
which expanded taxation figured very prominently. 
 
By 1936 the new Emperor had fundamentally reshaped the formal institutions of 
government, and had established himself as the undisputed centre of power in the country.  
He seemed poised to take on the task of challenging the more closely guarded privileges of 
the nobility, among which the right to collect tribute from the gabbar figured prominently.  
But before he could embark on this effort the Italians again invaded the country from their 
colony in Eritrea, ultimately seizing power and forcing the Emperor into exile. 
3.1.5. The Impact of the Occupation 
While the Italian occupation lasted only from 1936 until 1941, it had a significant impact on 
the infrastructure and institutions of the country, and meaningfully altered the challenges 
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facing the Emperor upon his return to power.   Politically, the conquest was evidence of the 
continued limited strength of the central government.  During the Italian invasion the 
central government had relied on support from the regions, and the failure of some such 
support was pivotal to the Italian victory.  Moreover, the tenuousness of regional support 
for the central government was further exacerbated by the conflict itself, as the Emperor’s 
decision to go into exile cost him legitimacy in those regions that continued the resistance 
in his absence.  This remained a source of political conflict long after the Italians had been 
driven out (Bahru Zewdu 1991: 209-211).   
 
In more tangible terms, the Italian presence dramatically expanded infrastructure in the 
country.  Most notable was the expansion of the road network, which enhanced the ability 
of the central government to project its power throughout the country (Gebru Tareke 1991, 
Eshetu Chole 1994).  The expansion of the road network was accompanied by other forms 
of infrastructure spending, which both changed expectations in the country and demanded 
effective maintenance after the Italians had been driven out.  Yet, just as Italian investment 
in infrastructure created new expectations and fiscal commitments, the new government 
officially abolished many taxes on the peasantry, apparently as a way of gaining popularity 
and out of a belief that the taxes were exploitative.  This action had the desired effect, as 
was reflected in a common expression of peasant gratitude: “[My big brother], the Italian, 
with a golden belt, [is] shepherd of the poor and eats only what is his” (Gebru Tareke 1991: 
192). 
 
With the onset of World War II, the Italians were driven out of Ethiopia in 1941 by a 
combined force of British and Ethiopian troops.  Haile Selassie was returned to the throne 
but this did not eliminate the European threat, posed most acutely by the British.  The 
British had thinly veiled hopes of annexing the Muslim areas of Eritrea to Sudan, and of 
annexing the Ogaden, in southern Ethiopia, to their Somali territories.  Moreover, they 
demanded enormous privileges and powers within Ethiopia in the aftermath of the victory 
over the Italians.  Thanks to strategic diplomatic manoeuvring, and particularly a 
blossoming relationship with the United States, the Ethiopian government succeeded in 
getting the British to renounce their claims to the Ogaden in 1954, and in securing 
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federation with Eritrea in 1952.  More generally, the Emperor gradually succeeded in 
weakening the special privileges granted to the British in 1941, and in re-asserting Ethiopia 
independence. 
 
Ultimately, the Italian occupation had important implications for the governing strategy that 
Emperor Selassie would adopt upon his return to the throne.  The military defeat, coupled 
with the legitimacy lost through his abdication, called for major investment in strengthening 
the military and security forces of the state.  The continuing threat from the British 
demanded an active diplomatic policy, which in turn almost certainly depended on 
Selassie’s efforts to project a modernizing image to the rest of the world.  Finally, the 
infrastructure investments made by the Italians created pressure for the Emperor to expand 
the social role of the state.  All of these new challenges required an acceleration of the 
project of modernization, centralization and revenue enhancement that had been initiated 
before the war. 
3.1.6. Accelerated Reform After 1936 
Confronted with the need for modernization and centralization, as well as a desire to 
establish total political control, Selassie embarked on a period of accelerated reform in the 
years immediately following his return.  The first group of reforms centred on the continued 
transformation of the core institutions of the state in the direction of centralized 
bureaucratic control and military power.  The second area of reform, which largely 
underpinned the first, was enhanced revenue mobilization. 
 
The first reforms focused on creating an institutionalized central government.  This began 
with a decision to re-empower government Ministers by granting them a greater role in 
decision-making.  This was expanded by a decision in 1941 to pay all government 
employees a monthly salary, “thus ending the ancient system of compensating officials 
through granting of rights to collect and appropriate the tribute from the gabbars” 
(Markakis 1974: 152, Levine 1965: 57).  The re-empowerment of the Ministers marked an 
attempt to create an alternative power block to the traditional nobility, while the 
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introduction of salaries was part of a broader effort to eliminate intermediaries in the tax 
collection process, thus centralizing all revenue collection. 
 
The process of transforming feudal forms of land tenure into private land ownership, which 
had begun with Menelik’s land measurement efforts, was also accelerated.  This was aimed 
at minimizing feudal exactions imposed on the peasantry and at further reducing the 
political clout of the nobility.  But while it achieved some success on both counts, it also 
accelerated the process of land alienation, by which peasants lost their customary land 
claims and were forced into exploitative tenancy agreements, particularly in the south.  
While it is thus debatable whether these early efforts to eliminate feudal privilege left 
peasants better off in a material sense, Bahru Zewde (1991: 192) concludes optimistically 
that, “the term gabbar lost its exploitative associations and assumed the more respectable 
connotation of taxpayer.” 
 
A third area of reform focused on the more complete centralization of the security 
apparatus, in response to the fragmentation that had doomed the military in the 1936 war 
against the Italians.   This included the centralization of the army, as well as the 
strengthening of the police forces, and, most notably, the Imperial Bodyguard, which 
became the country’s elite fighting force (Bahru Zewde 1991: 207-208).  Finally, while it 
had lower priority, the period also saw a dramatic expansion of education (albeit from an 
exceptionally low base), and of higher education in particular. This transformation, which 
was meant to support the task of modernizing the central government, ultimately laid the 
foundation for profound political changes in the years to come. 
3.1.7. The Revenue Basis of Reform 
The new reform agenda was both dependent on, and intertwined with, efforts to 
dramatically increase central government tax collection.  Additional revenue was 
particularly needed in order to expand the security apparatus, as budgetary allocations to the 
Ministries of the Interior and Defence comprised fully 35% of national expenditure in 1967, 
and had been even higher in previous decades.  Other activities that relied on additional 
revenue included maintaining and expanding infrastructure built by the Italians, making 
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social investments in pursuit of modernization and supporting patronage networks to 
purchase political loyalty.  As importantly, tax reform was given priority because the 
political challenge of reforming revenue collection was intimately tied to broader reform of 
the feudal structure. 
 
The government reinstituted the pre-war tax on land in 1941, but initially did so at half of 
the rate that had existed before the war.  This lower rate reflected the risk of popular 
resistance given that the Italians had previously abolished the tax.  Just as important, and 
consistent with both political considerations and the modernizing agenda of the 
government, the new law abolished various feudal labour service requirements.  While 
changes in practice were initially limited, the new law significantly improved the legal 
position of the peasantry relative to the pre-war period. 
 
The government implemented a more systematic tax reform beginning in 1942.  The reform 
established uniform rates of rural taxation based on land type, and introduced the 
requirement that a receipt be given for all tax payments.  This latter policy was aimed at 
curbing abuse by tax collectors and strengthening the land claims of peasants.  This reform 
was followed by a further proclamation in 1944, which adjusted the land tax rates, 
introduced a “tax in lieu of tithe” to replace the existing tithe, and abolished remaining 
feudal requirements on the peasantry.  Finally, in 1951 the government introduced a 
proclamation aimed at improving tax assessment on unmeasured land in the north, as the 
landed elite had long prevented land measurement as a means to avoid taxation. 
 
The government also introduced various new taxes during the period.  An education tax 
was introduced in 1947, followed by a health tax in 1959, and both were levied on land, at 
rates roughly equivalent to prevailing land tax rates.  The government also introduced 
significant new taxes on goods and services, all of which had significant implications for 
revenue.  These taxes included an Excise Tax on Alcohol in 1943, a Motor Fuel Tax in 
1948, a Salt Tax in 1954, new excise taxes on sugar, cotton yarn and textile fabrics in 1955, 
a Transaction Tax on imports, exports, local manufacturing and trade in 1956, and new 
Stamp Duties in 1957. Despite their importance to revenue these goods and services taxes 
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generated limited political controversy, apparently because they had a narrow incidence that 
was limited primarily to wealthy foreigners (Eshetu Chole 1982: 17-18). 
 
It is impossible to precisely calculate the relative growth in tax revenue during the period 
due to the unavailability of GDP data prior to 1960.  In the absence of data the calculations 
that follow assume an annual growth rate of nominal GDP of 5.5%, which is what prevailed 
during the decade 1960-69.  Bahru Zewde (1991: 208) reports that total government 
revenue in 1944-45 was 38 million Birr, while a data set compiled by Wogene Yirko (1994) 
shows that this had grown to 66.7 million by 1950 and to 145.2 million in 1959, with over 
80% of the total in both years coming from tax revenue.  Assuming 5.5% nominal growth 
in GDP per annum from 1945-1959, central government revenue grew from 3.2% of GDP 
in 1945 to 6.2% of GDP in 1959.  While these were extremely low levels of revenue 
collection in comparative perspective (Eshetu Chole 1994), this was nonetheless a prolific 
rate of increase in government revenue, although it had reached a plateau by the late 1950s. 
 
Despite these increases in revenue, the application of official tax policy remained highly 
imperfect, and what was achieved involved significant conflict.  To a large extent this 
conflict did not emerge from the burden of taxation as such but resulted from the broader 
societal transformation that underpinned these changes.  As had been the case almost a 
century earlier, the church successfully resisted many of the changes and defended their 
autonomy.  While the 1944 proclamation had abolished many traditional forms of tributary 
rights enjoyed by landowners and the church, the government issued a new proclamation in 
1947 clarifying that many exactions made by the church would still be permitted. 
 
The more general application of the new tax laws was also much less complete than had 
been hoped, particularly in areas in the north in which traditional forms of land tenure and 
authority remained strong.  While these areas were not exempted from land measurement 
and taxation, in practice these efforts were extremely unsuccessful.  The extent of this 
conflict was exemplified by the outbreak of the Weyane rebellion in the northern province 
of Tigray in 1943.  Gebru Tareke (1991: 92) explains that, “the Italians had cancelled all 
levies except the tithe and of that they collected little.  The re-imposition of tax, which was 
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publicized as a guarantee of tenure, turned out to be an unpopular act, and taxation, which 
was inefficiently and indiscriminately administered, was resisted by the greater part of the 
peasantry… The method of tax collection was as unendurable as the taxes” (92).  Weyane 
was a full-scale rebellion and continues to figure prominently in popular histories of the 
region, and while taxation was by no means the only cause of the conflict, it figured 
prominently.  This is reflected in the fact that one of the outcomes of the conflict was a 
government commitment to maintain taxation at pre-war levels, despite increases that were 
being implemented elsewhere. 
 
Most importantly, even under the reformed laws landlords themselves remained largely 
exempt from taxation, and were simply required to remit a share of the taxes paid by the 
gabbar.  Markakis (1976: 153) explains that, “According to the principles of the complex 
taxation system, as it existed until 1967, the landholding class was not being taxed on either 
its holdings or the revenue derived from them.  On the contrary, the landholding class 
continued to appropriate part of the tax revenue, though not as large as previously.  The 
political power of this class guaranteed its exemption from taxation.”   While land tax was 
only one of the many components of tax revenue during the period, weak implementation 
was almost certainly an important factor in the stagnation of public revenue in the late 
1950s. 
3.1.8. Political Crisis and Decline 
By the 1950s the pace of reform appeared to be slowing, but this changed abruptly in 1960 
when a group of military officers staged an unsuccessful coup attempt.  While the coup 
attempt itself was not particularly remarkable, it fundamentally changed the tone of politics, 
and placed major new fiscal pressures on the government.  Bahru Zewde (1991: 209) 
explains that, “Before the coup, opposition tended to be conspiratorial and elitist; after it, 
opposition was more open and mass-based.”  As a result of increasingly public opposition, 
the Emperor moved to consolidate his personal power, and continued to expand the security 
apparatus.  Meanwhile, he came increasingly into conflict with both the landed elite and the 
new urban intelligentsia.   
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Conflict with the landed elite emanated from the Emperor’s continuing efforts to centralize 
government power, to weaken the feudal system in the countryside and to extract greater 
revenue.  The conflict over revenue stemmed directly from changed circumstances after the 
coup attempt.  One of the earliest consequences of the coup attempt had been fiscal, as the 
Emperor made promises of significant rewards to those who had remained loyal.  This 
included increased salaries for the military and an acceleration of land grants to his 
supporters.  More generally, the coup had convinced the Emperor that he needed to 
dramatically increase government revenues and spending in order to strengthen the security 
apparatus, expand social services to meet growing demand and secure sufficient resources 
to buy political loyalty through patronage.  These revenue needs implied that he would need 
to come directly into conflict with the landholding elite who had until then resisted the 
implementation of many of the government’s reforms.   
 
While the landed elite accused Selassie of being too aggressive in seeking to increase 
taxation and attack their traditional privileges, the growing urban intelligentsia accused him 
of precisely the opposite.  These young intellectuals were largely the product of the 
government’s investment in education after 1941, and were joined by a small but influential 
group who had been able to travel abroad for their education.  Armed with an awareness of 
the outside world in a country that had historically remained very insular, these young 
intellectuals came to see the country as being tragically backward, and, after 1960, began to 
call publicly for modernization.  No aspect of the Ethiopian situation was more offensive to 
this urban elite than the persistence of exploitative feudal relations in the countryside, and 
many of the young intelligentsia took on the language and ideas of socialism in their calls 
for fundamental reform. 
 
These tensions progressively escalated, and Selassie’s government was quite suddenly 
overthrown in 1974.  Most authors trace this overthrow to the inherent contradiction of 
Ethiopian society: A growing urban intellectual class demanding rapid modernization 
juxtaposed with a countryside that remained in the grips of a feudal landowning class.  
These authors argue that in this context Selassie had few options, as any action was likely 
to be condemned from both the right and the left.  Selassie’s overthrow in 1974 came as a 
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surprise to most observers, as he had retained the appearance of total power and control 
while becoming a fixture in international diplomatic circles.  Yet the reality was that his 
base of support had been progressively eroded, and his overthrow proved a relatively 
straightforward affair, with most of the subsequent violence erupting between rival groups 
claiming power (Bahru Zewde 2002).   While there is clearly much more that can be said 
about these episodes, it is beyond the scope of this research.  Instead, the following section 
considers the important role of conflict over taxation during this period, as taxation was 
both an important contributor to the process and a microcosm of broader political realities 
in Ethiopia after 1960. 
3.1.9. Tax Conflicts and the end of Empire 
Increased fiscal demands on the state after 1960 are reflected in the rapid growth of 
expenditure, which increased from 8.5% of GDP in 1961 to 14% in 1973.  While this 
burden was relieved somewhat by the introduction of foreign aid in 1964, it was primarily 
met by the very rapid growth of tax revenue.   Revenue rose from 6.5% of GDP in 1959 to 
9.4% in 1966 and to 11% in 1973, and these gains cut across all major tax types. 
 
Until 1966, revenue growth occurred in the absence of any major tax policy reforms, and 
reflected the increasingly assertive collection of existing taxes, along with some escalation 
in customs duties.  The increased collection of non-agricultural taxes, despite comprising 
the largest share of revenue, seems to have prompted relatively little public response, 
presumably owing to the narrow, frequently expatriate, tax base.  By contrast, increasingly 
assertive efforts to collect agricultural taxes spurred meaningful conflict.  
 
The conflict caused by more aggressive tax collection was exemplified by the Bale 
rebellion in the south, which began in 1963.  Gebru Tareke (1991) explains that conflict 
emerged when the aggressive implementation of the policy of land measurement led to a 
sharp increase in the level of tax assessments on many peasants.  When a large share of the 
peasantry either could not, or would not, pay, the government confiscated large tracts of 
land and forced former residents into tenancy.  The government simultaneously sought to 
increase tax collection from notoriously difficult to tax pastoral groups, through the Cattle 
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Tax and grazing fees.  In so doing the government imposed increasing restrictions on the 
movement of pastoralists, which further fed the conflict.  Coupled with additional local 
grievances, these tax conflicts gave rise to an extended period of armed conflict in the 
region. 
 
With increasingly aggressive collection already spurring conflict, the most dramatic tax 
events of the period came in 1966 and 1967 with the introduction of the Land Tax 
(Amendment) Proclamation and the introduction of an agricultural income tax.  Both taxes 
aimed at increasing existing tax collection, dismantling the feudal system of land tenancy 
and fully taxing the landed elite.  This put the government on a collision course with 
landowners.  Yet this was perceived as a necessary risk given the need for revenue in order 
to sustain the rule of the Emperor.  As a palace official interviewed by journalist Ryszard 
Kapuscinski (1978: 96) put it: “Since the cost of loyalty was going up, there was an urgent 
need to increase income, and that’s why the Finance Ministry ordered the [new] taxes.” 
 
The Land Tax Proclamation formally abolished rist gult and siso gult landholding, by 
legislating that both gabbars and landlords would pay tax directly to the central government 
based on their individual landholdings.  Gult holding landlords would claim a certain part 
of that land as their personal, private, holding, while the remainder of the land would 
become the property of the tiller.  This implied a profound change in the position of the 
gabbar, and a major step towards the abolition of feudal structures.  Yet while the 
legislation was passed with little conflict it appears that implementation was very limited.  
Bahru Zewde (1991: 193), among others, argues that, “in practice, the holders of such 
rights, particularly of the resta [rist] gult, were too well entrenched and too close to the 
centre of power to allow the full implementation of the decree.  Measures to terminate the 
church’s gult were not even considered.” 
 
Given weak implementation, an agricultural income tax was proposed in 1967 in pursuit of 
very similar goals, as part of the Income Tax (Amendment) Proclamation.  It called for the 
traditional tithe to be replaced by a graduated tax on agricultural income, which would 
apply to all sources of income, including rent, and be paid by landlords and gabbar alike.  It 
 107 
also called for the implementation of a new tax on unutilized land, which was 
overwhelmingly held by large landlords.  Finally, in order to achieve these goals, it called 
for land measurement and the deployment of tax assessors throughout the country. 
 
This new legislation quickly became the source of a major political conflict that 
successfully undermined many of the provisions of the law and had far-reaching political 
consequences.  The initial conflict emerged in the Chamber of Deputies, which was 
dominated by large landowners with a strong interest in watering down the legislation.  The 
previously docile Chamber forced several revisions to the bill.  Most notably, tax 
assessment was vested in local Tax Assessment Committees rather than the Ministry of 
Finance, ensuring local control over assessments, while proposed taxes on unutilized land 
and livestock sales were eliminated. 
 
Once the watered down legislation made it through parliament, it was plagued by the non-
compliance of large landlords throughout the country, who largely refused to allow the 
measurement of land or the effective assessment of their incomes.  Quoting Schwab (1972: 
146-47): “Tax assessors dare not approach very large landholders because of their political 
or economic position.  The Ministry of Finance, having no knowledge of the amount of 
land owned by these individuals, can do little to rectify the situation, and continues to lose a 
vast amount of revenue from such untapped sources.”  Most strikingly, the landlords 
continued to collect the tithe, despite the fact that it had been abolished, but were now able 
to avoid remitting a share to the government.  There is evidence, however, that the law did 
have some impact, though much smaller than hoped.  There were noticeable increases in tax 
revenue, peasants came to feel a greater sense of control over their land, and the Tax 
Assessment Committees became an important part of the local bureaucratic infrastructure 
after 1967 (Schwab 1972).  
 
The final, and most dramatic, evidence of the politicization of agricultural taxation was the 
emergence of armed rebellion against the tax in the north-central province of Gojjam.  The 
rebellion began when groups of farmers refused to pay the new tax and began attacking tax 
collectors.  Over time, the rebellion extended to include attacks on a broader range of 
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government buildings and officials, and came to include ever-larger sections of the 
province, as rebel leaders enlisted the support of neighbouring areas (Schwab 1970).  The 
proximate explanation for the hostile reaction among peasants lay in the strength of 
communal forms of landholding.  According to Gebru Tareke (1991: 166), “since the 
collective payment of land tax has traditionally been regarded as the sole evidence of 
‘communal’ ownership, it was widely but erroneously believed that taxational changes were 
inevitably bound up with alterations in land use.  To reject land measurement and tax 
reform was, therefore, to defend the integrity of rist, even though this would mean 
perpetuating the tributary system.  What the tillers wanted to avoid was the dreadful fate of 
their southern counterparts.”  Thus the fear of entirely losing their land claims led the 
peasantry, with their fears stoked by local elites, to violently oppose a tax that was intended 
to lessen the tributary burden.   
 
Beyond this proximate issue, the roots of the conflict also lay in historical enmity between 
the region and the central government.  Gojjam had long been very independent, as it was 
geographically isolated by large rivers and had been the site of major resistance to the 
Italian occupation.  The Emperor had nonetheless appointed a corrupt and brutal outsider, 
Tsehayu Enque Selassie, as Governor in the wake of the occupation, and this incursion on 
local autonomy had bred enormous resentment despite the equal brutality of his local 
predecessor.  Thus, the tax conflict became a catalyst for the outpouring of grievances 
against the governor and the central government, and this was reflected in the outcomes of 
the rebellion when it was resolved over a year later.  The government made significant tax 
concessions, as the agricultural income tax was suspended indefinitely and the Emperor 
cancelled all tax arrears for the previous nineteen years.  Yet the demands of the rebels 
were much broader, encompassing concerns including health, education, transport and the 
removal of unpopular public officials.  Tellingly, it was a decision by the central 
government to remove the most unpopular public officials, including the governor, which 
appears to have been most crucial to calming the rebellion (Gebru Tareke 1991). 
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3.2. Taxation, Accountability and a Failed Fiscal Contract 
The preceding narrative leaves little doubt about the importance of conflicts over taxation 
to the state building process in Imperial Ethiopia.  That said, two questions remain to be 
answered.  First, to what extent was experience in Imperial Ethiopia consistent with the 
political processes that linked taxation to broader processes of state building in early 
modern Europe?  Second, to what extent was tax reliance a factor that specifically 
contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability?  
 
In order to answer these questions it is most useful to begin by returning to Tilly’s (1990) 
model of state building and state formation.  His model focuses on the complex interaction 
between external threats, domestic taxation and particular material conditions in producing 
specific political outcomes.  He argues that when external threats necessitated increased 
domestic taxation, states were forced to bargain with taxpayers, and that this yielded 
particular political bargains that reflected underlying economic structures.   
 
In England, where the capitalist class was relatively powerful, the need for greater taxation 
resulted in a relatively inclusive tax bargain between elites and the monarchy that created 
stronger institutions of representation and buttressed the rule of law and property rights.  By 
contrast, the strength of the monarchy and of landed elites far exceeded that of the capitalist 
classes in most of Eastern Europe, including Russia, where agricultural production 
remained the primary economic activity.  Given this balance of power, the need for taxation 
did not yield tax bargains that expanded representation and the rule of law, but instead gave 
rise to tax bargains between monarchs and landed elites that entrenched the coercive 
taxation of the peasantry.  Landed elites retained local authority to extract revenue from a 
subjugated peasantry, while a share of those extractions was reserved for the central 
government.  This model of state building generated significant revenue, and spurred the 
growth of powerful central bureaucracies, but did not produce meaningful institutions of 
broad based accountability. 
 
In material terms Imperial Ethiopia most closely resembles the model that predominated in 
Eastern Europe and Russia: the economy rested on a feudal system of intensive agriculture, 
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with the peasantry subject to heavy taxation and control by a powerful landed nobility allied 
with the Emperor.  As such, it is instructive to explore Tilly’s (1990) account of 
experiences in Eastern Europe and Russia in slightly more detail, in order to frame the 
analysis of the Ethiopian case.  Russia presents an exemplary case, as it was ruled for 
centuries by changing constellations of tribute-taking powers that exerted little direct 
control over the landlords and peasants within their territory.  During the 15th century a 
period of consolidation began as tsar Ivan the Great (1462-1505) succeeded in subjugating 
competing landlords to his power.  The rule of the tsars nonetheless remained indirect, as 
landlords and the church exercised authority at the local level and continued to constrain the 
power of the tsar.  While the pressure created by successive external wars compelled the 
tsars to strengthen the central state and army, this involved further entrenching the power of 
feudal landowners, who were granted land and local authority in return for their military 
support. 
 
The external threat posed by the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th century accelerated the 
strengthening of the central bureaucracy, including the tax administration, as the tsar was 
slowly forced to take on the power of landed elites.  By the late 19th century Russia had 
emerged as a powerful autocratic state, with a highly developed bureaucracy to organize the 
extraction of resources from the peasantry, but the tsar nonetheless remained “totally 
dependent on the cooperation of landlords” (Tilly 1990: 160).  While the system in place 
was thus able to sustain the state, it masked lingering tensions: reform of the profoundly 
coercive and exploitative character of rural relations was halting and slow, while the tsar 
remained beholden to landed elites despite the emergence of a growing capitalist class.  
While this is an exceptionally simplified picture of Russian history, it captures the basic 
nature of the tax bargain that underpinned the state, but which also left important tensions 
unresolved.  These tensions eventually contributed to the Russian Revolution of 1917 (Tilly 
1990, Pipes 1995). 
 
While the Russian case is, of course, unique, the basic model of a coercive, and ultimately 
untenable, tax bargain between the monarchy and landed elites is not.  In France, the fiscal 
basis of the monarchy lay in a not dissimilar accommodation, as landed elites were granted 
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regional power and extracted tax revenue from a relatively powerless peasantry.  There too 
this tax bargain generated significant tax revenue up to a point, but also led to high levels of 
exploitation in the countryside while failing to accommodate the demands of the growing 
capitalist class.  Far from being resolved through a more inclusive tax bargain to expand 
accountability, these factors figured prominently in the eventual outbreak of the French 
Revolution. 
 
What, then, can this tell us about the experience of Imperial Ethiopia?  If these general 
insights about taxation and state building in early modern Europe are relevant to 
understanding state building in a broader range of contexts, then we would expect the 
Ethiopian experience to reflect broadly similar patterns.  While every context is certain to 
be unique, we would specifically expect to observe three broad patterns that are relatively 
common features of the tax narratives from Russia, France and much of Eastern Europe: 
first, that external threats created incentives for strengthening the central bureaucracy in 
order to increase tax revenue collection and establish central government authority; second, 
that conflict over taxation led to important processes of tax bargaining between the 
government and taxpayers, and particularly elites, through which the government succeeded 
in meeting its revenue needs; and, third, that while periodic tax bargains succeeded in 
meeting revenue challenges, the continued failure of the government and landed elites to 
arrive at a more inclusive tax bargain contributed to eventual crisis. 
 
In practice, the experience of Imperial Ethiopia conforms quite closely to these three broad 
expectations, and what follows summarizes the evidence for each one in turn.  Taken in its 
entirety the evidence supports the contention that political processes linking taxation and 
state building are not particular to Western experience, but have broader relevance.   It is 
also a reminder that while the need for governments to raise tax revenue can contribute to 
the expansion of responsiveness and accountability such positive outcomes are far from 
guaranteed;  tax bargaining is shaped by the broader social, economic and political context 
and may equally result in the granting of privileges to elites.  We return to this issue in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
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3.2.1. External Threats, Tax Revenue and the State 
The connection between external threats and taxation is central to historical research about 
taxation and state building.  In early modern Europe external threats were central to 
generating incentives for increased tax collection and the extension of central government 
authority, both of which required significant strengthening of central bureaucratic 
structures.  Yet the historical role of external threats in motivating increased taxation, and 
corresponding administrative gains, has been less studied, and more contentious, in the 
developing world.  Centeno (1997) has explicitly argued that war did not contribute to 
institution building in Latin America owing to a combination of the availability of external 
resources, the limits of state organizational capacity and the weakness of social bonds 
within states.  Meanwhile, while accepting the importance of external threats in principle, 
Jackson (1991) and Herbst (2000) have argued that in most of sub-Saharan Africa external 
threats were not essential to shaping the growth of states, owing to historically low levels of 
inter-state warfare.  They see this absence of external threats as a key explanation for the 
limited administrative capacity, territorial control and accountability exhibited by many 
African states to the present. 
 
In contrast to this earlier research, external threats and warfare were an important catalyst 
for the expansion of state authority and the strengthening of administrative capacity in 
Imperial Ethiopia.  During the 19th Century it was the rise of external threats from Egypt 
and Europe that played a central role in prompting processes of centralization under 
Tewodoros, Yohannes and, most importantly, Menelik.  Whereas Ethiopia was long 
governed by shifting constellations of regional elites, responding to these external threats 
required an increasingly centralized, and well resourced, central government.  Throughout 
this period the extension of taxation was thus both an explicit effort to increase government 
revenue and an implicit means to signal the spread of central government authority. 
 
The importance of revenue considerations in shaping the centralizing activities of 
successive Emperors is clearly apparent.  Early on it was conflict with the Church for 
control of significant tax revenue bases that figured prominently in Emperor Tewodoros’ 
loss of power.  Even more striking was the centrality of revenue considerations to 
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Menelik’s efforts to expand the borders of the Ethiopian state.  His control over new 
revenue sources, achieved through his conquest of the south-west, was central to his 
emergence as Emperor and later to his ability to rebuff the Italian invasion of 1896.  While 
Ethiopia increasingly took on the characteristics of a modern state under Emperor Haile 
Selassie, external threats, and the consequent need for increased central government 
revenue, remained a central concern.  Most notably, the Ethiopian defeat at the hands of the 
Italians in 1936 emerged as an important catalyst for the rapid tax reforms of the 1940s, and 
for the political conflicts that these engendered.  Thus a careful reading of history makes 
clear that increasing external threats created strong incentives for the central government to 
expand taxation in order to increase central government revenue and more generally 
establish central government authority.  These efforts, in turn, required major new 
investments in strengthening the bureaucratic capacity of the state.   
 
While the importance of external threats to the broader evolution of taxation and public 
administration in Ethiopia is thus evident in studying the historical record, it is equally 
apparent in the unique characteristics of the contemporary Ethiopian state.  A defining 
feature of most sub-Saharan African states is their limited ability to effectively project 
power in rural areas, reflected most glaringly in the weakness of taxation, and state capacity 
more generally, at the local government level.  By contrast, the contemporary Ethiopian 
state has an impressive ability to implement policy, and collect taxes, in even relatively 
remote areas, and this capacity appears to have strong roots in the unique history of state 
building in the country (Stahl 1989). 
 
The system of land taxation provides a particularly insightful perspective on the unusually 
broad reach of the Ethiopian state.  In most of sub-Saharan Africa local taxation is 
extremely weak, and the systematic taxation of land and property particularly rare, despite 
the fact that such taxation exists in law.8  By contrast, Ethiopian governments from the 
Imperial period to the present have doggedly pursued the collection of agricultural taxes 
                                                
8 Detailed data on the share of rural land taxation in total revenue is not readily available in any country in the 
region other than Ethiopia as far as the author is aware.  This in and of itself speaks to the absence of effective 
taxation, while this research has already noted the exceptionally small share of local taxation in total revenue 
even in ostensibly decentralized countries like Ghana. 
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linked to land holdings.  Research conducted in 2004-05 found that the actual collection of 
land taxes in Amhara and SNNPR regions amounted to almost 90% of the estimated 
potential, which is a remarkably high rate of coverage given the administrative challenges 
involved (Warner et al. 2005a, 2005b).   
 
This pattern appears to reflect Ethiopia’s unique state building trajectory.  Herbst (2000) 
has explained the weakness of administrative capacity at the local government level in most 
of sub-Saharan Africa by the fact that states have rarely faced significant territorial threats, 
and have thus had weak incentives to extend taxation, and thus the broader administrative 
presence of the government, into rural areas.  By contrast, Emperors Menelik and Selassie 
in particular had strong practical incentives to strengthen the system of land taxation.  They 
were confronted by significant external threats from the European powers, and by a long 
historical tendency towards internal fragmentation, and their claims to power rested entirely 
on their ability to project effective power throughout the territories that they claimed.  In 
seeking to extend their claims to power the tax system was invariably the leading edge of 
the administrative presence of the state.  Thus, Menelik focused on establishing taxation in 
the south-west in order to establish effective control after his conquest, while Emperor 
Selassie’s decision to create a paid revenue bureaucracy formed part of his efforts to 
undermine the countervailing power of the landed elite.  Slightly later, the politically costly 
reestablishment of rural taxation after the Italian occupation appears to have reflected, at 
least in part, the need to reassert the authority of the Emperor in the countryside. 
 
There is thus compelling evidence that external threats shaped the level and reach of 
domestic taxation, with consequences for the long-term character of the central state.  The 
need to raise tax revenue and entrench the power of the central state contributed to the 
expansion of national borders, the construction of an increasingly effective central 
bureaucracy and to efforts by progressive Emperors to expand central authority over 
regional elites.  This story has strong parallels with the history of taxation and state building 
in early modern Europe. 
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3.2.2. Tax Bargaining in Imperial Ethiopia 
External threats thus generated the need for additional tax revenue, and this, in turn, forced 
the government to bargain with taxpayers.  The core ‘tax bargain’ that underpinned the 
expansion of the Ethiopian state saw successive Imperial governments grant significant 
autonomy and rights to the landed nobility in exchange for allegiance and a share of the tax 
revenue extracted from the relatively powerless peasantry.  This was a ‘tax bargain’ in the 
technical sense, and in the sense in which Tilly (1990) has employed the term in his 
historical cases, but it was not a tax bargain in the sense in which that term is used in this 
study, as it involved the granting of narrow benefits, including effective exemption from 
taxation, to a privileged minority, and entrenched the coercive taxation of the majority.  It is 
consequently more properly thought of as an elite agreement, thus distinguishing it from 
broad tax bargaining between taxpayers and governments. 
 
This agreement between the government and the landed nobility consequently does not 
offer direct evidence that tax reliance contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  However, although the concessions made to the nobility in this case 
effectively entrenched coercive taxation, the history of taxation in Imperial Ethiopia does 
nonetheless present individual examples of broad tax bargaining, which contributed to the 
expansion of responsive and accountable government.  The most prominent examples 
occurred after Haile Selassie’s rise to power in 1930, as it was at this point that the central 
government began in earnest to attempt to tax both the landed nobility and peasant farmers 
directly, thus opening the door to genuine bargaining between taxpayers and the 
government. 
 
The first example of note was the decision to create the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies in the 1930s.  This decision appears to have been a direct concession to the landed 
elite as well as an effort to increase the legitimacy of the government’s reform program.  
The concession appears to have reflected specific tax concerns to a significant degree, as 
taxation was a central, and particularly controversial, component of the government’s 
reform agenda.  Thus we have some evidence of a tax bargain in which limited 
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representation for the elite was provided in a pre-emptive effort to improve the 
government’s ability to raise tax revenue. 
 
Even clearer evidence of tax bargaining can be found in the decision to introduce the 
agricultural income tax.  The extended political battle that ensued contributed to the 
strengthening of the Chamber of Deputies, to establishing a degree of regional control over 
government decisions and to the broader enhancement of bureaucratic capacity. 
 
First, the role of the Chamber of Deputies was effectively transformed in response to the 
new tax.  Despite the official powers granted to the Chamber, it exercised very little 
effective power, as the Emperor had always remained the focus of decision-making.  This 
began to change in 1967, as the proposed agricultural income tax prompted the Chamber of 
Deputies to aggressively resist proposed legislation for the first time.  In so doing its 
members succeeded in profoundly diluting the content of the law and, more importantly, 
permanently altered the political position of the Chamber of Deputies.   Quoting Schwab 
(1972: 20): “The manner in which Parliament opposed sections of the bill has altered to 
some degree the process of rule-making.  Certainly the role and reaction of Parliament was 
a surprise, if not a shock, to many of the bureaucrats and rule makers in the Ministry of 
Finance.”  Thus, while the Chamber of Deputies as a formal institution had long existed, the 
conflict over the agricultural income tax changed the informal institutions governing law 
making in the country. While it is important to remember that the Chamber of Deputies was 
an entirely elite institution, and had few claims to being broadly representative of the 
population, its empowerment nonetheless marked an unprecedented extension of decision-
making influence. 
 
In similar fashion the introduction of the new tax in Gojjam province led to significant tax 
bargaining, as tax grievances became a catalyst for airing deeper concerns about the 
encroachment and brutality of the central government.  The armed rebellion that followed 
the introduction of the new tax resulted not only in the government reducing the tax burden, 
but also in a decision by the government to appoint a locally acceptable governor, along 
with various other senior government officials.  While the rebels were not granted formal 
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powers of representation, the informal granting of influence over central government 
appointments was a significant political outcome that was catalyzed by the tax revolt.  The 
fact that the peasant rebels were defending a feudal land tenure system that benefited elites 
confuses the interpretation of the outcome, as it suggests that elites succeeded, to a certain 
extent, in manipulating public fears for their own benefit.  That said, there is little doubt 
that broader grievances about the encroachment of the central state, and the brutality of the 
governor, were powerfully felt by the rebels themselves, thus reinforcing the view that the 
tax revolt resulted in at least some broad-based gains. 
 
A third outcome of the agricultural income tax was that it prompted the creation of 
significant new administrative capacity.   The new tax called for the assessment of income, 
and this was far more administratively demanding than the comparatively simple taxation 
of land.  The law originally called for expanding the capacity of the Ministry of Finance in 
order to send tax assessors throughout the country.  In practice, resistance by the Chamber 
of Deputies led to the creation of local Tax Assessment Committees, along with a formal 
appeals process.  Despite resistance to the new tax by local elites, Schwab (1972) argues 
that these committees were an important driver of broader bureaucratic modernization, 
while reliance on local Tax Assessment Committees and a formal appeals process marked a 
significant decentralization of power.  Thus, again, there is evidence that tax bargaining 
contributed to the expansion of accountability, this time through the creation of stronger, 
and more inclusive, bureaucratic structures.  
 
Moving away from the case of the agricultural income tax, the decision in 1942 to begin 
providing tax receipts to all taxpayers provides a final example of tax bargaining, as the 
measure was designed to enhance revenue collection, but was also a concessions to the 
peasantry designed to increase voluntary compliance.  During the Italian occupation many 
land taxes had officially been abolished, and as such there was a risk of significant public 
opposition to the reinstatement of land taxes, as reflected in the centrality of tax grievances 
to the weyane rebellion.  It was with this risk in mind that the government decided to link 
tax payments to the establishment of secure land claims, presenting the tax receipt as a sort 
of informal land title.  Over time this policy became very popular with peasants.  A 1960s 
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tax official explained that, “Peasants thought that the tax slip was for the land – that this slip 
recognized their control of the land.  So they were willing to pay…This was a recognition 
and they wanted that recognition – before, they were the property of the landlord.”  He went 
on to argue that, “rural people carried their tax receipt like an identity card.”  This suggests 
that the government effort to strengthen peasant land claims in exchange for tax payment 
had important symbolic value despite its limited practical implications. 
3.2.3. Unresolved Tensions and Revolution 
The story told so far captures the extent to which the need for increased tax revenue, 
frequently driven by the presence of external threats, contributed to the expansion of central 
state authority and to important episodes of tax bargaining between taxpayers and the 
government.  In at least some cases the expansion of taxation contributed to the 
strengthening of institutions of accountability and of bureaucratic forms of government. 
 
Yet, despite these gains, the tax system remained fundamentally coercive.  The landed 
nobility continued to bear only a modest tax burden, while the peasantry remained subject 
to a heavy tax burden and feudal exactions by the landlord class.  Despite government 
reform efforts, there had been little change in the basic characteristics of a system that 
granted the landed nobility extensive local powers in exchange for allegiance and a share of 
local tax revenue being remitted to the central government.  This failure of tax reform 
resulted from the inability of successive Emperors to fully overcome the power of the 
landed nobility and from the unwillingness of the landed nobility to enter into a more 
progressive tax bargain with government.  The landed nobility understood that changes in 
taxation were linked to broader changes in the exploitative system that continued to prevail 
in rural areas, and thus maintained a relentless opposition to any change.  In the short-term 
this opposition to fundamental changes in taxation, and in the broader rights of the 
peasantry, proved effective.  Yet, in the longer-term the failure of the government and the 
landed nobility to arrive at a more inclusive tax bargain contributed to the broader societal 
tensions that eventually resulted in Revolution in 1974. 
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That the failure of tax reform contributed to the outbreak of revolution is reflected in the 
fact that in the lead up to the Revolution, a dominant issue among the opposition 
movements was the demand for ‘land to the tiller’.  While this demand for the reform of 
feudal control in the countryside was about more than taxation alone, the tax reform battles 
of the 1960s were proxies for the broader conflict.  As early as the 1940s, proposed reforms 
had called for the abolition of feudal exactions in favour of private property rights and 
equitable taxation of all individuals.  While these battles were motivated by the revenue 
needs of government, they were also tied to the broader goal of modernizing the 
countryside.  At least part of the intelligentsia recognized the broader political centrality of 
the battles over agricultural taxation, and as a result the failure of tax reform fed the energy 
of the opposition movement (Eshetu Chole 1966).   
 
At the same time that the opposition was spurred by continued exploitation in the 
countryside, it was also motivated by the government’s simple failure to invest sufficiently 
in modernizing public services and infrastructure.  This grievance likewise found its roots at 
least in part in the failure of the government and elites to arrive at a tax bargain that would 
raise greater revenue for the state.  The fiscal weakness of the state was thus an important 
contributor to the outbreak of Revolution and the inability of the government and the landed 
nobility to agree on tax reform contributed to this weakness. 
 
Indeed it could be said that the failure to arrive at a modernizing tax bargain reflected a 
failure to bridge the vastly different visions for the future of the country that were held by 
different elements within society.  The landed elite persistently resisted change, while urban 
progressives refused to be satisfied with the slow rate of reform achieved by the 
government.  The resistance of the landed nobility ensured that the government could never 
raise enough revenue to meet growing demands, while it also ensured that the government 
could not escape complaints about the gross inequities that continued to exist in rural areas.  
As in early modern Eastern Europe and Russia, the feudal system provided a viable model 
for collecting the revenue necessary to expand the military and bureaucratic power of the 
state, but ultimately proved unable to reform itself in the face of rapid change.  Quoting 
Gebru Tareke (1991: 96),  “It’s [the gentry] members’ obstructionist activities that 
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eventually helped to pave the way to the revolution that destroyed all of them along with 
the old regime.”  While the battle over taxation was only one part of a broader story, the 
failure of the government and the landed nobility to arrive at a more inclusive tax bargain 
appears to have played a meaningful role in the genesis of Revolution. 
3.3. Conclusions 
The argument that the need for taxation may contribute to the expansion of responsiveness 
and accountability derives overwhelmingly from the experience of state formation and state 
building in early modern Europe.  This raises the question of whether the centrality of 
taxation to state building in early modern Europe was historically unique, or potentially 
holds broader lessons for other parts of the world.  This chapter has argued the latter, 
presenting evidence that taxation was central to processes of state formation and state 
building in Imperial Ethiopia and that the Ethiopian experience had much in common with 
broad narratives of taxation and state building in early modern Europe.   
 
This is not to claim that taxation has necessarily played a similar role elsewhere on the 
continent, or in the developing world, as Ethiopia is interesting precisely because of its 
unique history, which differed dramatically from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.  Instead, 
the evidence in this chapter argues that the importance of taxation to state building is not 
specific to any particular region, culture or historical period, but is instead grounded in 
particular economic, social and political conditions that appear to facilitate tax bargaining.  
The economic and political system in Imperial Ethiopia had much in common with the 
economic and political systems of early modern Europe, and particularly of Eastern Europe 
and Russia, and the centrality of taxation to state building in Ethiopia correspondingly bears 
much in common with earlier experiences in those countries. 
 
Notably, this experience does not particularly resemble the model of tax bargaining that 
contributed to the emergence of parliamentary government and the rule of law in England.  
In Imperial Ethiopia the need for increased tax revenue yielded important tax bargains over 
time, which contributed to slow improvements in the responsiveness and accountability of 
government.  Yet, the government and the landed nobility were persistently unable to arrive 
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at a more fundamentally modernizing tax bargain that would have helped to contain the 
growing tensions within society that ultimately led to Revolution.  The Ethiopian 
experience thus highlights the potential for tax bargaining to be a catalyst for the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability, but also the reality that such tax bargaining is far 
from guaranteed.  The landed nobility in Ethiopia, like their historical predecessors in early 
modern France, Russia and elsewhere, preferred to defend narrow privileges rather than 
enter into a more progressive tax bargain, even as this resistance contributed to social 
instability. 
 
Having thus made an empirical case for studying the centrality of taxation to state building 
in diverse contexts, the thesis now turns to an investigation of the importance of tax 
bargaining to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa.  The next chapter presents econometric tests of the relationship between 
taxation and accountability, and concludes that while cross-country data is consistent with 
such a relationship it is insufficient to convincingly establish a causal relationship.  This, in 
turn, argues for case study research that can cast new light on the causal processes at work. 
 
The subsequent chapters correspondingly present contemporary case studies from Ghana, 
Kenya and post-1974 Ethiopia.  Both the style and content of these contemporary case 
studies differs quite markedly from the preceding discussion of Imperial Ethiopia, and this 
reflects the quite different social, economic and political context.  While this chapter has 
captured specific episodes of tax bargaining, the focus has been on the longer arc of state 
building.  The discussion has emphasized the importance of external threats, the gradual 
emergence of a strong central government, the halting construction of a centralized tax 
system and broader struggles over political and economic modernization.  By contrast, the 
contemporary case studies reside within a much more narrowly institutionalized context: 
external threats are minimal, the basic authority of central states is widely accepted (despite 
their frequent weakness), relatively standardized tax systems are the norm across the 
developing world, liberal economic policies are ubiquitous and formal democracy has 
spread rapidly, even if it is frequently limited in practice.  As such, the analysis in the 
subsequent case studies focuses less on the broad arc of state building, and more narrowly 
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on specific tax episodes around which taxpayers have sought to implicitly and explicitly 
bargain with governments to achieve the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
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4. Cross-Country Econometric Evidence: Tax Reliance 
and Accountability  
The previous chapter presented an empirical case for studying the relationship between tax 
reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in the developing world.  
While the details of Ethiopian state building are unique within sub-Saharan Africa, the 
broad message that emerges from the previous chapter is that the political processes 
through which taxation shaped broader political outcomes in early modern Europe have 
been equally relevant in a non-western environment.  While far from constituting proof that 
these processes have been equally relevant everywhere, this empirical evidence provides a 
far stronger justification than has previously been available for investigating the role of 
similar political processes in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
This chapter correspondingly presents novel econometric tests of the cross-country 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability in sub-Saharan Africa.9  While the 
remainder of the thesis relies heavily on case study evidence, there are several reasons to 
begin with cross-country econometric tests.  First, the research question is, in principle, 
ideally suited to cross-country comparison, as it yields a clear prediction about the impact 
of different levels of tax reliance on levels of political accountability.  Cross-country 
analysis thus holds the potential to overcome the risk of bias in small-n analysis, by asking 
whether the predicted relationship holds, on average, across all countries in the region.  
Second, the initial quantitative results reported here are important for shaping the case 
selection strategy, consistent with the logic of “nested-analysis” outlined in chapter 2.  
Finally, econometric evidence has previously played a prominent role in shaping our 
understanding of the relationship between tax reliance and accountability in the developing 
world through a series of well-known studies.  There is a consequent need to engage with 
this existing evidence before seeking to draw new or more nuanced conclusions.  
 
                                                
9 While the research hypothesis focuses on both responsiveness and accountability, only accountability offers 
a set of cross-country indicators for econometric analysis, though even these indicators are highly imperfect, 
as is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
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Existing econometric studies have generally argued that governments that are more reliant 
on tax revenue are more likely to be accountable to their citizens.  This includes three 
particularly well known cross-country studies (Ross 2004, Mahon 2005, Timmons 2005), 
which have been buttressed by two sub-national studies (Hoffman and Gibson 2005, 
Gervasoni 2010).  But while these consistently positive results are encouraging, they are 
also potentially misleading, as researchers have been forced to rely on highly imperfect 
methods and data (Haber and Menaldo 2009).  This chapter is thus devoted to revisiting the 
particularly influential cross-country results, while paying particular attention to 
methodological and data problems in order to test the robustness of existing results and 
propose more nuanced conclusions.10 
 
With this goal in mind, the first section of this chapter explores the general methodological 
and data challenges encountered by cross-country studies of tax issues.  It presents an 
extended discussion of available econometric methods and of the measures taken to 
improve the coverage and accuracy of the data used in the econometric tests.   The second 
section presents the econometric tests and results.  The tests follow a similar econometric 
strategy to earlier studies but employ improved data and greater econometric caution.  The 
results reveal that while available data is consistent with the hypothesis that more tax reliant 
states are more likely to be accountable, it is not possible to decisively establish causation, 
contrary to earlier findings.  The third section concludes by arguing that the absence of 
conclusive econometric evidence of a causal relationship between tax reliance and 
accountability does not necessarily imply the absence of a causal relationship in practice.  
Instead, the ambiguous results can be explained by a combination of enduring data 
problems and the inability of standard cross-country econometric methods to capture the 
complexity of the causal processes at work.  The results in this chapter thus suggest that 
existing econometric work has offered an overly simplistic view of the relationship between 
tax reliance and accountability, thus arguing for detailed case study evidence that can cast 
new light on the question. 
                                                
10 The analysis focuses on extending existing cross-country studies because they have been particularly 
widely cited and influential in the field; they have tested the research hypothesis very directly; they most 
closely reflect the national, comparative, focus of the case studies to follow; and they are based on widely 
available data and are thus more easily subject to replication and extension. 
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4.1. Methodological Challenges 
The use of statistical methods to investigate political science questions has become 
increasingly common over time.  This development has obvious advantages, as such 
methods are able to guard against the risks of case-selection bias, and provide significantly 
more leverage for distinguishing those variables that actually drive outcomes from those 
that are prominent but largely idiosyncratic. 
 
That said, while statistical methods are ideally suited to dealing with relatively 
deterministic relationships, significantly more caution is needed when applying such 
methods to the contingent relationships that characterize much of political science.  
Regression methods are best suited to capturing linear and probabilistic relationships; 
where there are multiple, quite different, causal pathways at work, or where outcomes are 
contingent on intervening factors, simple econometric models may misrepresent the 
underlying relationship.  At a more methodological level, studies that rely on relatively 
small cross-country data sets face inherent econometric challenges that demand careful 
attention.  Several recent studies have noted that the expanded use of statistical methods in 
political science has not been matched by the development of a robust and widely 
understood methodological literature.  As a result many studies have applied overly 
simplistic methods, or, more often, have failed to sufficiently address concerns about the 
robustness of results (Wilson and Butler 2007, Beck and Katz 1995, Beck 2001).  
 
Wilson and Butler (2007) found in a recent survey of statistical studies published in major 
political science journals that less than 5% employed a battery of methods consistent with 
what they considered to be minimum levels of statistical rigor.  They went on to conduct a 
more detailed study of eight published papers, and found that several key results were 
significantly altered, or in some cases even reversed, when relatively modest alternative 
specifications were implemented.  In a similar vein, an earlier paper by Beck and Katz 
(1995) persuasively demonstrated that several key statistical results in the field were driven 
by the application of inappropriate statistical methods, which artificially inflated the 
statistical significance of explanatory variables. 
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Even when appropriate methods are adopted there are potentially intractable questions 
about the ability of available methods to deal with the statistical challenges inherent in 
working with time-series cross-section (TSCS) data, on which many studies in political 
science rely.  When relying on observations for multiple countries over multiple years, the 
number of observations is necessarily small.  As a consequence, panel data models that rely 
on the asymptotic properties of the estimators, and thus become unbiased and efficient in 
large data sets, may encounter significant problems when applied to TSCS data (Beck and 
Katz 2004).   At a more specific level TSCS data are plagued by unit heterogeneity, 
correlation between the observations over time and across units, and panel 
heteroskedasticity (Wilson and Butler 2007).   
4.1.1. Fixed-Effects Models 
The most basic challenge facing studies using TSCS data is unit heterogeneity, which refers 
to the fact that country specific factors may lead to systematically higher or lower levels of 
the dependent and independent variables in individual countries.  In the specific case of 
taxation, existing studies establish quite clearly that some countries have consistently high 
levels of tax collection, and vice versa, for historical reasons of path dependency (Bird 
2008, Lieberman 2002).  The most common approach to dealing with unit heterogeneity is 
the use of fixed-effects models.  Fixed-effects models include a dummy variable for each 
country in the sample, which accounts for unobserved characteristics of individual countries 
that result in persistently high or low levels of the dependent variable.  Intuitively, fixed-
effects models focus attention on the movement of the dependent and independent variables 
over time within a particular country, while differences in collection across countries are 
captured by the country-specific dummy variables, and thus not reflected in the regression 
coefficients. 
 
Rather than asking whether countries with high levels of tax reliance also tend to be more 
accountable, fixed-effects models ask whether, within countries, accountability has been 
higher when tax reliance has been higher.  This is a much more robust specification, as it 
eliminates the risk that results are driven by persistent, but unobserved, characteristics of 
individual countries.  The primary disadvantage of fixed-effects models is that they 
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preclude the use of time invariant variables, which are captured by the fixed-effects term, 
and reduce the explanatory power of variables that change slowly over time.  Moreover, 
because fixed-effects models only capture changes within countries over time, statistical 
relationships that precede available time series data are not captured.  This emerges as a 
serious problem for quantitative studies of taxation, as the impact of reliance on non-tax 
revenues is of particular interest, but resource dependence often predates available data.   
4.1.2. Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Lagged Dependent 
Variables 
Aside from unit heterogeneity, there is also a need to address the econometric problems 
posed by panel heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and serial correlations, 
each of which violates the assumptions needed for standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions.  Panel heteroskedasticity refers to the possibility that different units in the 
panel may have different error patterns or may have key variables of significantly different 
magnitudes.  Contemporaneous correlation refers to the possibility that the movement of 
variables in one country may be correlated with movements in variables in other countries, 
for example in the case of two interdependent economies.  Finally, serial correlations refers 
to the fact that the values of individual variables may be persistent over time, causing the 
error terms to be correlated over time, in violation of the OLS assumptions. 
 
Simultaneously dealing with these problems in TSCS data is relatively complex and has 
given rise to a significant methodological debate.   An early solution was the use of 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), which used the error terms from a standard 
OLS regression to adjust the data and eliminate the impacts of serial correlation, panel 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation.  Unfortunately, analysis by Beck and 
Katz (1995) has determined that while this method is reasonably effective for dealing with 
bias in the estimation of the coefficients it frequently yields standard errors that are 
significantly over optimistic.  Beck and Katz (1995) consequently recommended the use of 
Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) to deal with panel heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation, while PCSEs can be combined with a Prais-Winsten 
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regression in order to correct for serial correlation.  They have demonstrated that in most 
real world applications PCSE models have superior estimating properties to FGLS. 
 
While this solution is reasonably effective, Beck (2001) argues that the preferred method is 
to directly model the temporal dynamics of serially correlated data through the inclusion of 
a lagged dependent variable (LDV) as an explanatory variable.   This has the advantage of 
addressing the dynamics of the data directly, rather than treating those dynamics as a 
“nuisance” to be eliminated.  But while this presents a nice solution in some cases, it also 
introduces new risks, as it can create bias in the estimation of the coefficients.  Achen 
(2000) has demonstrated that the use of LDVs in fixed-effects models can artificially 
suppress the explanatory power of other variables in the regression, even leading to sign 
reversals in some cases.  Kristensen and Wawro (2003) have since demonstrated that the 
risk of a high degree of bias is most acute when the inclusion of an LDV fails to fully 
eliminate serial correlation in the data, and argue that in such cases the use of a fixed-
effects model with robust standard errors is likely to be more reliable.   
 
Several alternative dynamic models, which seek to model serial correlation directly, have 
emerged in an effort to deal with the risk of bias that results from the use of LDVs.  The 
most popular are a group of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators designed to 
overcome the bias introduced by the joint introduction of LDVs and fixed effects under 
OLS.  The most well known is the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, though it is 
particularly appropriate to situations with many individuals and a short time period, which 
does not strictly describe the data used here (Roodman 2006).  More generally, while these 
and other relatively sophisticated dynamic models are attractive in principle, Beck and Katz 
(2004) suggest that simpler models generally perform equally well and are thus likely to be 
preferable where data is imperfect. 
 
Overall, debates over the optimal strategy for dealing with TSCS data lead to two 
conclusions.  First, the robustness of existing studies and results should be evaluated in light 
of these methodological risks.  Second, the imperfect nature of available methods argues for 
a progressive data analysis strategy, which begins with simple and intuitive tests and builds 
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towards more sophisticated models.  These two lessons underpin the analysis presented 
later in this chapter.  
4.2. Improving Data Quality 
While econometric challenges are deeply important, they can distract attention from much 
more basic, but at least equally important, problems of data quality.  This challenge relates 
both to the simple availability of data, and to the careful construction of datasets such that 
the data reflects what it actually of interest and is comparable across countries.  Both of 
these issues are relatively acute when dealing with tax data, and appear to have been poorly 
addressed by previous studies.  What follows explains the scope of these problems in more 
detail and introduces the measures adopted here to address these concerns. 
4.2.1. Poor Data Quality and Availability 
One of the dominant features of tax data in sub-Saharan Africa is the extent of missing data, 
while the quality of available data is also questionable.  The extent of missing data 
generates major concerns about case selection bias, as the missing data is almost certainly 
non-random and concentrated in resource dependent states, states involved in conflict and 
those with poor relationships with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).  Tellingly, 
Ross’s (2004) widely cited study of the relationship between tax reliance and accountability 
covers only 1633 of a possible 3051 observations, while coverage is even more limited for 
non-OECD countries.  Table 4.1 provides a further indication of the extent of missing data 
in a number of recent tax studies. 
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Table 4.1: Data Coverage in Existing Tax Studies 
 
Historically, the primary sources of tax data have been the IMF’s Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  In both 
cases regular data availability begins at the beginning of the 1970s, but both databases 
cover at best half of available country-year observations for developing countries.11  Data 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that neither source is entirely continuous throughout 
the period due to methodological changes.  The IMF GFS adopted a new methodology at 
the beginning of the 1990s, creating a structural break in the data-series, while the WDI 
after 2002 omit significant data contained in earlier versions of the dataset.  Prevailing 
practice, which is followed here, has been to merge the different versions of the data sets 
despite these inconsistencies, but this raises additional questions about the validity of the 
data. 
 
More recently additional data sources have become available, but this has not solved the 
problem of missing data.  The World Bank’s Africa Development Indicators (ADI) dataset 
contains more data that the WDI, but does not cover all tax categories and still contains 
significant gaps.  An alternative is to rely on country-by-country data drawn from Statistical 
                                                
11 This statement is necessarily vague, as the number of observations varies depending on the edition of the 
databases that is consulted, while some of the data in both datasets is transparently inaccurate. 
Author Year Observations Country Coverage and Notes 
Ross 2004 1633/3051 Low coverage despite inclusion of OECD 
countries, for which data is readily available. 
Gupta et al. 2004 1943/3317 Covers all developing countries from 1970-
2000.  Total observations fall significantly in 
several specifications. 
Mahdavi 2008 769/1290 Low coverage despite focusing on only 43 
countries, of which 11 are from sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Gupta  2007 1875/2625 Relies on total government revenue, as 
opposed to total tax revenue. This offers 
greater coverage, but alters the research 
question. 
Stotsky and 
Woldemariam 
1997 170/258 The authors limit their sample to 1990-95, and 
exclude Liberia and Somalia, in order to 
improve coverage. 
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Appendixes compiled by IMF staff.  These publications provide relatively detailed and 
complete data, but are generally only publicly available beginning in the early 1990s.  
These documents have been an under-used resource in existing studies, seemingly owing to 
the fact that the IMF does not make the data available in a single dataset or in an entirely 
consistent format across countries. 
 
As troubling as the gaps in data availability is the fact that reported data often varies 
significantly across sources.  It is relatively common to find that reported tax revenues 
differ by 5-10% or more between at least two of the available data sources, while there are 
occasionally very large differences between IMF and WB sources during the 1970s and 
1980s.  This problem is compounded by equally frequent differences in reported GDP 
figures across sources, as many tax studies, including this one, rely on measuring tax 
revenue as a share of GDP.  The problem with GDP figures appears to have become more 
acute in recent years, as many countries have adopted new methodologies for calculating 
GDP, but these new methodologies, which generally lead to higher estimates, are not 
always retroactively applied to earlier data. 
 
Despite these well-known problems, disappointingly little has been done in most studies to 
address them.  This particularly raises questions about the relevance of existing results to 
the underrepresented sub-Saharan African sample.  To take a striking recent example, a 
study of income taxation by Bird and Zolt (2005) reports the average level of income tax 
collection in Africa, but the sample comprises only eight countries, of which two are islands 
(Madagascar and Mauritius), one is in North Africa (Morocco) and two are the exceptional 
cases of South Africa and Lesotho. 
4.2.2. Constructing a More Complete Data Set 
In the absence of more complete data, the results of econometric studies will remain open to 
question.  This research has sought to improve the quality of the underlying data by 
drawing on each of the data sources discussed above in order to construct a more complete 
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dataset.  The resulting dataset covers 45 countries from 1972-200512, and includes 1214 
observations out of a theoretical potential of 1530.  In practice coverage is much more 
complete than these aggregates suggest, as the majority of the missing data is from 
countries that did not begin reporting data until after 197213, or for which 2005 data is not 
available.  After excluding these two issues total coverage is 1146 out of a possible 1236 
observations. 
 
While drawing on multiple data sources has allowed a vast improvement in data coverage, 
it is not without significant difficulties and risks.  Any effort to merge different datasets 
raises the risk that the datasets are not recording precisely the same information.  This, in 
turn, means that trends in the merged data may reflect differences in data sources rather 
than differences in reality.  Given that there are sometimes significant differences in the tax 
data reported by different sources, the potential for errors when merging data would appear 
to be significant. 
 
This risk must thus be balanced against the risks inherent in using very incomplete data.  
Deciding on the best course is, in turn, largely dependent on assessing just how large and 
problematic the data discrepancies across sources are.  To take one example, the IMF itself 
advises against merging data from the IMF GFS before and after 1990 due to changes in 
methodology.  In practice, researchers often merge those two datasets, as the 
methodological changes seem to have a limited impact on the data, at least in developing 
countries where available data is highly aggregated and imperfect to begin with. 
 
The dataset used here reflects a judgment that the benefits of data merging outweigh the 
risks.  The first stage of merging the various data sets proceeded as follows. First, the IMF 
GFS was adopted as the baseline data source, as it is the mostly widely used, and detailed, 
source available.  Second, missing data points were filled using data from the WDI 
                                                
12 This excludes Somalia, for which no revenue data is available for any periods, and Togo, for which data 
needed to be entirely excluded because it has so far been impossible to credibly separate resource rents from 
reported income tax revenue (this is discussed further later in this chapter). 
13 In many countries independence was not achieved until later than 1972, including Eritrea, Namibia, 
Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, among others 
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wherever data was available.  Third, remaining missing data was then filled using data from 
the ADI and from the IMF Statistical Appendixes.  Finally, GDP data was drawn from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics, with missing values drawn from the ADI. 
 
The second stage was relatively more complex, as it involved identifying instances where 
the data merger appeared to be problematic, and then correcting resultant problems.  This 
process was driven by three broad questions.  First, when data from two different sources is 
combined is the overall trend credible or is there an unusual, and unlikely, jump in the data?  
Second, where there are unusual shifts in the data, can they be explained by economic or 
political events or do they appear to be errors in one or the other of the data sources?  Third, 
where different sources are drawn on to provide different revenue components (for example 
total tax revenue from the IMF, but trade and goods and services tax revenue from the ADI) 
are the various components internally consistent and compatible? 
 
Where there were unexplained breaks in the data, or major disagreements across data 
sources, it was then necessary to make somewhat subjective choices.  This involved asking 
three additional sets of questions. First, are the general trends in the data consistent across 
sources?  Where they are not, can other sources support one or the other trend as being 
more accurate?  Second, where different sources present different data, which value(s) is 
most credible?  Is one or the other value a better fit within the longer-term trend?  Third, 
where there are individual missing data points is it credible to impute the missing data from 
surrounding observations or does alternative information about the country (i.e. wars or 
coups) suggest a more fundamental disjuncture, demanding that data be omitted? 
 
In practice, conflicting data sources generally had periods of overlap and agreement, which 
facilitated the data merging process.  While it would be unwieldy to attempt to document 
the specifics of this process in detail here, the source for each observation is documented in 
the dataset itself, which is available in full upon request.  Despite every effort to be 
systematic and transparent, the data merging process was inherently imperfect, particularly 
due to elements of subjectivity. That said, there is every reason to believe that this process 
is far superior to existing alternatives.  Even selecting a single data series implies a high 
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degree of subjectivity given the stark differences between data sources, quite apart from the 
intolerable level of missing data.  The process undertaken here has at least sought to make 
educated choices based on all available data.  While there is no doubt room for 
improvement, this data set almost certainly represents broad trends over time much more 
accurately and completely than available alternatives that have been employed in past 
studies. 
4.2.3. Data Corrections 
Alongside the need to construct a more complete and accurate dataset lies the need to 
ensure that the data is an accurate reflection of the concepts of interest, and that it is 
comparable across countries, but this issue has also been frequently overlooked by existing 
studies.  The most glaring problem relates to how existing data deals with resource rents, 
while there are also issues related to the treatment of decentralized revenue collection and 
the allocation of trade and goods and services taxes. 
4.2.3.1. Dealing with Resource Rents 
Most studies of taxation rely on drawing a sharp distinction between traditional sources of 
domestic tax revenue and resource rents. Unfortunately, existing sources of tax revenue 
data do not draw this distinction so clearly, or in a consistent manner. 
 
Some countries with access to resource rents record that income as non-tax revenue, 
particularly when the resource is exploited by state owned firms, as is common in the 
Middle East.  Other countries record resource rents as taxation, most commonly as a 
combination of corporate income taxes and royalties.  This is common where private firms 
exploit the resource and then pay taxes to government.  Finally, some countries record 
resource rents under both categories, for example recording corporate income taxes as tax 
revenue while listing royalties or production sharing revenues as non-tax revenue.  While 
the resource rents in the latter two cases are, technically, taxes, they are, in analytical terms, 
best treated as non-tax revenue because they represent a captive income source for 
government that does not rely on the domestic citizenry. 
 
 135 
It is essential that any econometric study treat resource rents in a consistent fashion across 
countries, but existing studies have often failed to do so, or even to explicitly acknowledge 
the problem.  For this study, every effort has been made to treat all resource rents as non-
tax revenue, though this process is, unfortunately, very difficult to achieve with precision.  
For years after the early 1990s it is generally possible to draw on data from the IMF 
Statistical Appendixes to make the necessary adjustments, as these reports generally report 
resource revenues as a separate category for countries where such revenues are large.  
Making adjustments for earlier years is much more problematic, as it is necessary to draw 
on external sources to estimate resource rents during those years.  This study draws heavily 
on estimates originally produced by Mahon (2005),14 but, unfortunately, it becomes clear 
upon inspection that his estimates, while much better than pre-existing data, still sometimes 
significantly underestimate the share of resource rents in total revenue.  In these cases there 
has been little choice other than to draw on all available data, including country specific 
sources, and then extrapolate trends to intervening years, and these decisions are fully 
documented in the data set.  While frustratingly imprecise, the only alternative is to drop 
affected observations entirely, as was done in the case of Togo, where large fluctuations in 
minerals production over time, and an absence of alternative data sources, made 
extrapolation an unrealistic approach. 
4.2.3.2. Central, Regional and Local Government Tax Revenue 
A second issue is that previous work has generally relied exclusively on central government 
tax revenues.  This is problematic in so far as it understates, sometimes dramatically, the 
total level of tax collection in federal and fiscally decentralized states.  This is a minor issue 
for this study, as countries in sub-Saharan Africa are overwhelmingly centralized and the 
two federal states, Nigeria and Ethiopia, appear to report virtually all revenue as central 
government revenue in the relevant databases.  That said, the question of state and local 
government revenue raises significant questions about earlier studies, as most OECD 
nations, as well as a significant number of large developing nations, derive substantial 
revenue from the sub-national level.  Any regressions involving these countries will have 
been seriously biased by the underestimation of actual revenue collection in certain states. 
                                                
14 Sincere thanks are due to James Mahon for this work, and his generosity in sharing the estimates. 
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4.2.3.3. Disaggregating Trade and Goods and Services Taxes 
A final issue is ambiguity in the way that tax revenues are allocated between trade and 
goods and services taxes.  This confusion arises from the fact that many goods and services 
taxes are collected at the point of import.  Some countries record this revenue as goods and 
services taxation, while others include the revenue as trade tax revenue, presumably 
because it is collected by customs agencies.  Over time the situation is further complicated 
by the fact that changes in tax laws can lead to changes in the way that revenue is allocated.  
Thus, for example, many countries experienced major shifts at the time of implementing a 
VAT.   
 
It should, in principle, be possible to correct for this problem for years in which IMF 
Statistical Appendixes are available, but it is less clear whether there is a reliable means to 
correct for the problem in earlier years.  The result is that any research that claims to 
distinguish between trade and goods and services taxes for econometric purposes must be 
carefully examined.  There is a strong suspicion that this issue has been handled 
imperfectly, if at all, by some existing research, with consequences for the reliability of 
those results.  For the purposes of this paper, the difficulty of solving this data problem has 
meant that none of the results directly rely on either the trade or goods and services sub-
categories of taxation. 
4.3. Testing the Relationship 
The preceding discussion of methodological and data issues sets the stage for testing the 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  As was noted in the introduction, 
several previous studies have sought to address this question econometrically.  Most 
frequently cited is pioneering cross-country work by Ross (2004), who explicitly tested the 
hypothesis that states that are more reliant on tax revenue are more likely to be democratic.  
He concluded that there is compelling cross-country evidence of a positive and causal 
relationship.  This finding is echoed by methodologically similar work by Mahon (2005), 
who finds a weaker, but still positive, relationship between tax reliance and accountability 
after improving both data quality and the econometric methods employed.   
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These findings are buttressed by work at the local level by Hoffman and Gibson (2005), 
who present evidence that localities in Tanzania and Zambia that are more reliant on own-
revenues spend a greater share of their budgets on public services.  In a similar vein, 
Gervasoni (2010) reports evidence of reduced democratic competition in Argentinean states 
that are more reliant on fiscal transfers and resource rents.  Finally, Timmons (2005) 
approaches the question slightly differently, reporting cross-country evidence that the types 
of taxes that states collect are reflected in the types of services that they provide.  He argues 
that states that rely on broad-based indirect taxes are more likely to focus on providing 
broad-based public services, while governments that rely on income tax revenue, primarily 
from elite groups, are more likely to favour elite interests, which he measures by the level 
of protection of private property rights. 
 
While these studies present a seemingly persuasive body of evidence, there are important 
reasons for scepticism.   The first reason is the weakness of available data, which has 
already been discussed at length.  By employing a new, and much improved, data set the 
econometric tests to follow stand to dramatically improve on existing findings.  The second 
reason for scepticism is the difficulty of establishing causality when testing the relationship 
between tax reliance and accountability.  Putting aside, for now, more specific questions 
about variables and measurement, the research hypothesis predicts that, ceteris peribus, 
countries that are more reliant on tax revenue will be correspondingly more accountable.15 
Unfortunately, there is a glaring problem of endogeneity, as tax reliance may cause greater 
accountability, but greater accountability may likewise be the cause of increased tax 
collection and tax reliance.  The latter possibility is raised in several recent studies which 
have specifically asked whether greater accountability leads to greater tax collection, rather 
than the reverse (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 2004, Cheibub 1998).  This 
endogeneity problem is, in fact, explicit in the research hypothesis itself: tax reliance is 
expected to lead to increased accountability precisely because governments recognize that 
they can increase tax revenue by being more accountable.  As a result, even if it is true that, 
all else being equal, more tax reliant states are also more accountable, there remains the 
                                                
15 At a purely descriptive level, it is near universally accepted that high-income countries are both more likely 
to be democratic (Reuschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992) and more likely to have high levels of tax 
collection (Gupta 2007).  This, though, is evidently not evidence of causation in either direction. 
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challenge of establishing that tax reliance is the cause of greater accountability, rather than 
the reverse. 
 
With this challenge in mind, the next section introduces the dependent and independent 
variables, and is followed by an explanation of model specification and the econometric 
strategy employed to address the problem of endogeneity.  This is followed by the 
presentation of the empirical results and, finally, by a discussion of interpretation and 
implications. 
4.4. Selecting Dependent and Independent Variables 
At a descriptive level, the dependent and independent variables of interest are 
straightforward, as the level of accountability is expected to be a function of the level of 
reliance on tax revenue.  Unfortunately, the measurement of these concepts presents a 
significant challenge.  With respect to the dependent variable, what is the most effective 
way to measure accountability across countries?  With respect to the independent variable, 
what is the most appropriate means to measure tax reliance?  These questions are addressed 
in turn. 
4.4.1. Dependent Variables 
Accountability is a broad concept and comprises a combination of formal and informal 
elements.  This implies that cross-country indicators of accountability inevitably face both 
definitional challenges and significant measurement problems.  While bearing these 
limitations in mind, the econometric tests presented here follow existing researchers in 
testing three alternative measures of accountability.  The first measure, regime, focuses 
narrowly on the level of democratization and follows early work by Ross (2004).  The 
variable is drawn from the Polity IV database and ranges from 0 (not at all democratic) to 
10 (entirely democratic).16  The second measure, icrgind1, measures a broader concept of 
accountability and follows Mahon (2005).  It is drawn from the International Country Risk 
Guide database and is a composite average score based on individual ICRG scores for 
                                                
16 In the Polity IV database the regime variable ranges from -10 to 10, but is adjusted here in order to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
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corruption, bureaucratic quality, law and order and democratization.  Finally, a third 
measure of accountability is available from the more recent World Bank Governance 
Indicators dataset (wbacc), and while this indicator has not been employed by previous 
studies it is included here to test the robustness of the results. 
 
Alongside the inherent difficulty of measuring accountability across countries, all three 
indicators, and particularly the final two, are heavily reliant on subjective judgments by 
‘country experts’.  This implies that these measures, while still valuable, are inherently 
imprecise, and this is reflected explicitly in the reporting of the WB indicators.  Researchers 
have generally judged these to be acceptable limitations, and cross-country econometric 
work using such indicators has become increasingly common, but the lack of precision 
should nonetheless be borne in mind when interpreting the results (Williams and Siddique 
2008).  It is precisely the uncertainty associated with indicators that explains the decision to 
employ three alternative measures, and thus implicitly test the robustness of the results.  
The ICRG and WB indicators also face a more practical limitation in their data coverage.  
The ICRG indicators first become available in 1984 and cover only 31 countries, thus 
implying significant data loss, though most of the excluded values are from island and 
small nations.  The problem is even more severe for the WB indicators, which are available 
for all 47 countries, but only begin in 1996.  These problems are, unfortunately, 
unavoidable, but do mean that results using the Polity IV and ICRG indicators are given 
significantly greater weight in interpreting the results, owing to the very short time series 
available using the WB indicator. 
4.4.2. Measuring Tax Reliance 
The primary independent variable in the model is tax reliance, but tax reliance can be 
measured in several different ways.  The most important question is whether tax reliance 
should be measured by the level of tax revenue collection as a share of GDP, or by the 
share of tax revenue in total government revenue.  
 
Tax revenue as a share of total government revenue (taxrev_tr) reflects the concept of tax 
reliance most closely, and the case for relying on this variable is captured by Ross (2004) 
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when he argues that, “both the size of the tax burden, and the quality and quantity of 
government spending matter; citizens ultimately care about the ‘price’ they pay for the 
government services they receive. Democracy in this case is not necessarily a way for 
citizens to reduce their taxes, or to increase spending, but to get more for their money” 
(234).  Following this logic, demands for accountability will be stronger in states that are 
reliant on tax revenue because the ‘price’ of government services is high, as they are fully 
financed by tax revenue.  By contrast, demands for accountability will be low in countries 
that rely heavily on non-tax revenue, as that non-tax revenue subsidizes the cost of 
government services.  Seen from the perspective of government, it is the level of tax 
reliance, rather than the absolute level of tax collection, that is likely to shape the 
willingness of government to make tax bargaining concessions to citizens.  Quite simply, a 
government that has limited access to non-tax revenue is likely to have strong incentives to 
bargain with taxpayers owing to the simple absence of alternative revenue raising options. 
 
Yet, while tax revenue as a share of total revenue is most consistent with the concept of tax 
reliance, and with the broader theoretical framework presented so far, there is still value in 
also testing the results using tax revenue collection as a share of GDP (taxrev) as the 
independent variable.  This alternative approach is appealing because it captures the 
straightforward idea that when taxpayers are forced to pay more taxes to the government 
they are likely to correspondingly demand greater accountability, even if they are receiving 
high quality government services.  Thus, while there is a modest preference on conceptual 
grounds for focusing on tax revenue as a share of total government revenue all of the results 
to follow are tested using both possibilities. 
 
A final question in deciding on the independent variable is whether to rely on total tax 
revenue (taxrev) or exclusively on income tax revenue (taxinc).  There is a long literature 
arguing that income taxes are likely to be particularly relevant to tax protests and tax 
bargaining because they are more reliant on voluntary compliance and are most explicitly 
visible to taxpayers (Lieberman 2002, Bates and Lien 1985, Martin and Gabay 2007).  On 
the other hand, in developing countries indirect taxes affect a much broader segment of the 
population than direct taxes and are often the dominant source of government revenue.  As 
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a consequence it seems reasonable to test both total tax revenue (taxrev) and income tax 
revenue alone (taxinc). 
4.4.3. Other Independent Variables 
In testing the impact of tax reliance on levels of accountability it is necessary to control for 
other factors that may shape the accountability of governments.  Yet, somewhat 
surprisingly, existing econometric studies have uncovered relatively few variables that 
consistently affect levels of democratization and accountability across countries.  The most 
robust finding from existing studies is that levels of per capita GDP are positively 
associated with the expansion of accountability, and all of the tests that follow 
correspondingly include the log of per capita GDP (loggdp) as a control variable. 
 
Other studies of the determinants of democracy have suggested a variety of other variables 
that may influence democratization across countries, including violent conflict, religious 
composition, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, colonial heritage, agricultural share of 
employment, literacy levels, urbanization and others (Barro 1999, Clague, Gleason and 
Knack 2001).  Nonetheless, the core results reported below do not include any of these 
variables, for two reasons.  First, many of these variables are time invariant characteristics 
of individual countries, and are thus captured by the fixed-effects term of the models 
employed here.  Second, while robustness tests were conducted including controls for 
conflict, literacy, agricultural share and urbanization none of these variables had a 
consistently statistically significant impact.  While this may appear surprising at first it is, in 
fact, consistent with the earlier studies by both Ross (2004) and Mahon (2005). 
4.5. Model Specification: Correlation and Causation 
In order to test the hypothesis that states that are more reliant on taxation are more likely to 
be accountable to their citizens it is useful to consider two questions in turn.  First, is the 
data consistent with the research hypothesis?  Specifically, are states that are more reliant 
on taxation also more likely to be accountable, all else being equal?  Second, is it possible 
to establish a causal relationship?  Specifically, is there compelling evidence that tax 
reliance has been the cause of higher levels of accountability?  Answering these two 
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questions in turn is useful because of the already noted difficulty of establishing causality 
when there is such a significant risk of endogeneity.  If the research hypothesis is accurate 
then the cross-country data should minimally be consistent with the hypothesis, even if it is 
not possible to decisively establish causation. 
 
In order to answer the first question we specify a relatively simple model in which the level 
of accountability is a function of a tax revenue variable, the log of per capita GDP, country-
fixed effects and an error term: 
 
Accountabilityit = a + b1*(TaxRevit) + b2*(LogGDPit) + ai + eit 
 
We test this model using a relatively simple OLS model with country-fixed effects and 
robust standard errors.  While this model makes no effort to establish causation, it provides 
a baseline for asking whether the data conforms to the basic patterns predicted by the 
research hypothesis.  
 
Establishing causation is more challenging and the econometric tests here follow earlier 
work by Ross (2004) and Mahon (2005).  Following the methodological discussion at the 
beginning of this chapter, all of the results employ panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
and correct for serial correlation either by employing Prais-Winsten or Baltagi-Wu 
regressions or by making use of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model.  In order to 
establish causation, the results here follow both Ross and Mahon in relying on the use of 
lagged versions of the tax revenue term as the explanatory variable.  Thus the basic model 
becomes: 
 
Accountabilityit = a + b1*(TaxRevi(t-l)) + b2*(LogGDPit) + ai + eit 
 
or, in the case of the LDV model: 
 
Accountabilityit =a +b1*(Accountabilityi(t-l)) +b2*(TaxRevi(t-l)) +b3*(LogGDPit) + ai + eit 
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This strategy rests on the assumption that if tax reliance is the cause of increased 
accountability, then changes in tax reliance should precede subsequent, and related, changes 
in accountability by one, three, five or ten years.  Ross (2004) writes that, “it seems most 
sensible to me that a change in the independent variables (taxes) should precede a change in 
the dependent variable (regime type)” (238).  Unfortunately, while this is an intuitive claim, 
there is little evidence to suggest that it is necessarily true, as both historical experience and 
the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 2 point to the possibility of more complex 
causal processes.  The tests here nonetheless follow this approach, which appears to be the 
best available and, perhaps more importantly, subjects earlier (positive) results to scrutiny 
using a more complete and accurate dataset.  We will return to concerns about model 
specification at the end of this chapter. 
4.6. Results 
Given the inherent imperfection of available econometric methods, and uncertainty 
about the preferred variables and model specification, what follows presents a relatively 
wide array of econometric tests in order to ensure the robustness of the results.  The first 
set of results confirms that the cross-country data is minimally consistent with the 
research hypothesis. The more extensive second set of results finds that, contrary to 
previous findings, there is not compelling evidence of a positive causal relationship 
between tax reliance and levels of accountability.  Instead, the results are generally 
inconclusive, as most results lack statistical significance and different specifications 
yield substantially different results.  
4.6.1. Is Tax Reliance Associated With Greater Accountability? 
The first set of tests asks whether tax reliance is correlated with greater accountability.  
These tests fall short of testing for causality, but are important in order to confirm that 
cross-country data is minimally consistent with the research hypothesis.  The results 
reported in Table 4.2 are based on an OLS model with fixed effects and PCSEs, and the 
model is tested using three alternative measures of accountability and four alternative 
measures of tax reliance.  The results broadly confirm that, all else being equal, tax reliance 
is correlated with greater accountability, as the coefficients on the revenue terms are 
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positive and statistically significant in seven of the twelve specification, and positive in all 
but one.  While these results are not overwhelming, they are certainly sufficient to confirm 
that the cross-country data is broadly consistent with the research hypothesis, which is an 
important initial finding.  
 
Table 4.2: Basic Fixed Effects with PCSEs: Contemporaneous Relationships 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 wbacc wbacc wbacc wbacc 
loggdp -1.591*** -2.477*** -1.482*** -1.951*** -0.023 -0.019 0.124 -0.018 0.814*** 0.790*** 1.057*** 0.899*** 
 (0.462) (0.479) (0.527) (0.508) (0.186) (0.192) (0.155) (0.173) (0.257) (0.262) (0.283) (0.255) 
taxrev 0.0026    0.0115    0.024***    
 (0.026)    (0.008)    (0.008)    
taxinc  0.241***    0.033    0.039   
  (0.069)    (0.028)    (0.024)   
taxrev_tr   0.952*    -0.150    0.360***  
   (0.571)    (0.161)    (0.117)  
taxinc_tr    5.777***    0.971**    0.832*** 
    (1.270)    (0.470)    (0.283) 
Constant 7.860*** 9.941*** 7.412*** 8.624*** 2.249*** 2.255*** 1.937*** 2.265*** -3.828*** -3.681*** -4.417*** -3.950*** 
 (1.368) (1.355) (1.546) (1.445) (0.507) (0.527) (0.450) (0.489) (0.744) (0.747) (0.826) (0.734) 
             
Obs. 1,073 1,071 1,075 1,070 552 551 552 551 303 301 303 301 
R2 0.453 0.464 0.455 0.464 0.633 0.634 0.632 0.635 0.895 0.893 0.892 0.893 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 45 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.6.2. Does Tax Reliance Cause Greater Accountability? 
Having confirmed that the cross-country data is broadly consistent with the research 
hypothesis we now turn to efforts to explicitly test causality.  Tables 4.3 through 4.9 report a 
wide range of results from the most econometrically robust specifications, relying on three-
year lags on the tax variables unless otherwise noted.  These represent only a subset of the 
total tests that have been run, but provide a relatively thorough and representative sense of 
the results    
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the results of a fixed effects model using PCSEs and a Prais-
Winsten correction for serial correlation. Table 4.3 reports results using each of the four 
hypothesized revenue variables, with three year lags, alongside all three political variables.  
Table 4.4 focuses exclusively on the tax revenue share variable, testing results using zero, 
one, three and five years lags in order to explore the sensitivity of the results to different lag 
structures.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are a mirror image of Tables 4.3 and 4.4, with the exception 
that they rely on the Baltagi-Wu correction for serial correlation and, consequently, do not 
include the use of PCSEs.  Tables 4.7 and 4.8 again adopt the same basic pattern, but 
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employ a simple LDV model with fixed-effects and PCSEs.  The results using the World 
Bank accountability variable are dropped because the available time series is insufficiently 
long when employing an LDV model.  Finally, Table 4.9 employs a dynamic Arellano-
Bond model using a three-year lag, and the results using the WB accountability variable are 
again dropped. 
 
Table 4.3:  Fixed Effects with PCSEs and AR(1) Correction: All Variables Using 3-
Year Lags  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 wbacc wbacc wbacc wbacc 
             
loggdp -0.236 -0.267 -0.085 -0.325 0.482 0.501 0.475 0.474 1.005*** 0.917*** 0.987*** 0.916*** 
 (0.763) (0.772) (0.789) (0.756) (0.335) (0.333) (0.340) (0.339) (0.327) (0.303) (0.316) (0.309) 
L3.taxrev -0.007    -0.002    0.009    
 (0.016)    (0.007)    (0.009)    
L3.taxinc  0.048    -0.008    -0.017   
  (0.042)    (0.018)    (0.024)   
L3.taxrev_tr   -0.006    -0.047    0.154  
   (0.443)    (0.148)    (0.165)  
L3.taxinc_tr    0.844    -0.045    -0.268 
    (0.918)    (0.344)    (0.309) 
Constant 4.345** 4.315* 3.863* 4.520** 0.959 0.905 0.974 0.971 -4.281*** -3.958*** -4.200*** -3.966*** 
 (2.188) (2.212) (2.275) (2.162) (0.977) (0.971) (0.989) (0.986) (0.968) (0.870) (0.916) (0.887) 
             
Obs. 966 964 968 963 535 535 535 535 304 303 304 303 
R2 0.109 0.101 0.079 0.123 0.473 0.473 0.471 0.473 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.881 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 45 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.4: Fixed Effects with PCSEs and AR(1) Correction: Tax Revenue Share Using 
all Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 wbacc wbacc wbacc wbacc 
             
loggdp -0.444 -0.220 -0.0855 -0.149 0.336 0.298 0.475 0.577** 0.953*** 0.939*** 0.987*** 1.269*** 
 (0.776) (0.827) (0.789) (0.821) (0.335) (0.353) (0.340) (0.288) (0.321) (0.348) (0.316) (0.376) 
taxrev_tr 0.0750    0.0216    0.308**    
 (0.400)    (0.142)    (0.121)    
L.taxrev_tr  0.304    -0.147    0.0467   
  (0.411)    (0.145)    (0.203)   
L3.taxrev_tr   -
0.00591 
   -0.0467    0.154  
   (0.443)    (0.148)    (0.165)  
L5.taxrev_tr    -0.607    -0.163    0.104 
    (0.489)    (0.161)    (0.145) 
Constant 4.523** 3.956* 3.863* 4.251* 1.214 1.379 0.974 0.534 -4.133*** -4.046*** -4.200*** -4.977*** 
 (2.250) (2.398) (2.275) (2.390) (0.963) (1.020) (0.989) (0.827) (0.930) (1.020) (0.916) (1.081) 
             
Obs. 1,075 1,041 968 894 552 547 535 523 303 309 304 294 
R2 0.094 0.067 0.079 0.136 0.452 0.463 0.471 0.520 0.878 0.875 0.881 0.886 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 45 45 45 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5: Fixed-Effects with Baltagi-Wu AR(1) Correction: All Variables Using a 3 
Year Lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 wbacc wbacc wbacc wbacc 
             
loggdp 1.600** 1.680*** 1.701*** 1.682*** 1.097*** 1.098*** 1.097*** 1.099*** -0.480*** -0.480*** -0.489*** -0.486*** 
 (0.629) (0.644) (0.645) (0.642) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.182) (0.176) (0.186) (0.178) 
L3.taxrev -0.003    -0.004    -0.006    
 (0.0163)    (0.006)    (0.008)    
L3.taxinc  0.038    -0.009    -0.039**   
  (0.045)    (0.015)    (0.0191)   
L3.taxrev_tr   0.148    -0.003    -0.042  
   (0.442)    (0.145)    (0.138)  
L3.taxinc_tr    0.575    -0.129    -0.402 
    (0.916)    (0.296)    (0.311) 
Constant 0.860*** 0.455*** 0.430** 0.480*** -0.322*** -0.342*** -0.370*** -0.353*** 0.966*** 1.080*** 0.942*** 1.003*** 
 (0.168) (0.171) (0.172) (0.170) (0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
             
Obs. 924 922 926 921 506 506 506 506 259 258 259 258 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 45 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.6: Fixed-Effects with Baltagi-Wu AR(1) Correction: Tax Revenue Share 
Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 wbacc wbacc wbacc wbacc 
             
loggdp 0.449 0.621 1.701*** 2.141*** 1.474*** 1.535*** 1.097*** 1.018*** -0.593*** -0.535*** -0.489*** -0.436*** 
 (0.654) (0.647) (0.645) (0.639) (0.304) (0.291) (0.206) (0.167) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.165) 
taxrev_tr 0.165    0.075    0.078    
 (0.414)    (0.138)    (0.165)    
L.taxrev_tr  0.421    -0.069    -0.174   
  (0.421)    (0.138)    (0.156)   
L3.taxrev_tr   0.148    -0.003    -0.042  
   (0.442)    (0.145)    (0.138)  
L5.taxrev_tr    -0.234    -0.067    -0.068 
    (0.493)    (0.156)    (0.139) 
Constant 3.431*** 2.891*** 0.430** -0.377** -1.372*** -1.428*** -0.370*** -0.102 1.168*** 1.197*** 0.942*** 0.793*** 
 (0.178) (0.179) (0.172) (0.180) (0.115) (0.112) (0.081) (0.071) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
             
Obs. 1,033 999 926 852 523 518 506 494 258 264 259 250 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 45 45 45 44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7: Lagged Dependent Variable with PCSEs and Fixed-Effects: All Variables 
Using a 3 Year Lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 
         
loggdp -0.443 -0.775* -0.743 -0.713 0.404* 0.477** 0.369* 0.442** 
 (0.443) (0.431) (0.473) (0.445) (0.230) (0.225) (0.220) (0.218) 
L3.regime 0.692*** 0.701*** 0.698*** 0.699***     
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)     
L3.icrgind1     0.449*** 0.457*** 0.446*** 0.458*** 
     (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) 
L3.wbacc         
         
L3.taxrev -0.033*    -0.011    
 (0.019)    (0.007)    
L3.taxinc  0.042    -0.058**   
  (0.049)    (0.025)   
L3.taxrev_tr   -0.845*    -
0.439*** 
 
   (0.489)    (0.163)  
L3.taxinc_tr    1.445    -1.004** 
    (1.147)    (0.447) 
Constant 2.887** 3.549*** 3.656** 3.387** 0.174 -0.0298 0.279 0.0173 
 (1.331) (1.277) (1.448) (1.327) (0.649) (0.638) (0.620) (0.610) 
         
Obs. 962 961 964 960 469 469 469 469 
R2 0.703 0.706 0.704 0.706 0.739 0.743 0.741 0.742 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.8: Lagged Dependent Variable with PCSEs and Fixed-Effects: Tax Revenue 
Share Using Different Lag Structures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 
       
loggdp -0.278 -0.743 -0.699 0.093 0.369* 0.691*** 
 (0.242) (0.473) (0.504) (0.126) (0.220) (0.229) 
L.regime 0.906***      
 (0.028)      
L3.regime  0.698***     
  (0.071)     
L5.regime   0.550***    
   (0.099)    
L.icrgind1    0.817***   
    (0.042)   
L3.icrgind1     0.446***  
     (0.088)  
L5.icrgind1      0.107 
      (0.096) 
L.taxrev_tr -0.0894   -0.242***   
 (0.288)   (0.0938)   
L3.taxrev_tr  -0.845*   -0.439***  
  (0.489)   (0.163)  
L5.taxrev_tr   -1.449**   -0.430** 
   (0.604)   (0.202) 
Constant 1.262* 3.656** 4.228*** 0.192 0.279 0.046 
 (0.722) (1.448) (1.630) (0.368) (0.620) (0.683) 
       
Obs. 1,039 964 888 525 469 412 
R2 0.895 0.704 0.617 0.899 0.741 0.706 
No. of id 42 42 42 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9: Arellano-Bond Lagged Dependent Variables Model: All Variables Using a 3 
Year Lag 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 regime regime regime regime icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 icrgind1 
         
L.regime 0.971*** 0.974*** 0.970*** 0.975***     
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)     
L2.regime -0.137*** -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.142***     
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)     
L3.regime 0.012 0.012 0.0165 0.014     
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)     
L.icrgind1     1.035*** 1.031*** 1.034*** 1.036*** 
     (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.054) 
L2.icrgind1     -0.305*** -0.302*** -0.310*** -0.308*** 
     (0.042) (0.041) (0.04) (0.041) 
L3.icrgind1     0.018 0.0188 0.02 0.019 
     (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
loggdp -0.042 -0.112 -0.166 -0.052 0.138 0.154 0.091 0.117 
 (0.606) (0.608) (0.718) (0.679) (0.319) (0.331) (0.322) (0.327) 
L3.taxrev 0.007    -0.006    
 (0.018)    (0.004)    
L3.taxinc  0.035    -0.017   
  (0.039)    (0.015)   
L3.taxrev_tr   -0.453    -0.146  
   (0.572)    (0.136)  
L3.taxinc_tr    0.127    -0.085 
    (0.959)    (0.259) 
Constant 0.684 0.841 1.447 0.785 0.324 0.265 0.481 0.319 
 (1.676) (1.609) (2.007) (1.771) (0.824) (0.831) (0.834) (0.824) 
         
Obs. 904 903 906 901 436 436 436 436 
No. of id 42 42 42 42 29 29 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results using fixed effects models with corrections for serial correlation, reported in 
Tables 4.3 through 4.6, are almost universally statistically insignificant.  The insignificance 
of the results is, moreover, entirely insensitive to changes in the length of the lag or to 
changes in the particular political and revenue variables employed. This suggests clearly 
that changes in taxation do not consistently precede corresponding changes in 
accountability, in contrast to the findings of previous studies. 
 
The LDV specifications present even more surprising results.   In almost half of the basic 
LDV specifications reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 the results are negative and statistically 
significant.  Not only does this finding directly contradict the research hypothesis, it is at 
odds with the finding that contemporaneous values of the taxation and accountability 
variables are positively correlated.  In simplest terms, it is logically impossible for 
increased tax reliance to be a cause of declining accountability and for high levels of 
taxation and accountability to be positively correlated.  Indeed, a negative relationship 
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between taxation and accountability is logically problematic on its own merits, as it implies 
that improvements in tax collection will lead to dictatorship and, more illogically, that 
improvements in accountability will erode the fiscal base of the state.  These suggestions 
are, moreover, totally at odds with the observed experience of the large number of high 
accountability, high taxation states in the world. 
 
The concerns raised by these results are alleviated to some degree by the model reported in 
Table 4.9, which again finds no statistically significant relationship in any of the model 
specifications.  Given that the Arellano-Bond model is generally held to be more robust 
than the simpler model implemented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, the overall message appears to 
simply be that there is no statistically significant, positive, cross-country relationship 
between increased tax reliance in one period and increased accountability in subsequent 
years.  In addition, the seeming implausibility of the results from the simple LDV model 
argues for taking a closer look at questions of data and model specification in order to better 
understand the econometric outcome. 
4.7. Interpretation 
While earlier studies have reported a positive causal relationship between tax reliance and 
accountability, this study has failed to find any consistently significant relationship, while 
employing much improved data and more robust econometric methods.  This may mean 
one of two things.  The first possibility is that increased tax reliance simply is not a 
consistent catalyst for broader improvements in accountability.  The alternative possibility 
is that there are underlying limitations in the data or with the econometric model, which 
prevents it from capturing the positive impact of tax reliance on accountability.  In practice, 
there is good reason to believe that the highly inconclusive econometric results are, in fact, 
a reflection of such underlying limitations. 
4.7.1. Underlying Data Problems 
In order to better understand the highly inconclusive, and sometimes negative, econometric 
results, it is instructive to return to a more descriptive and intuitive view of the underlying 
data.   Figure 4.1 presents a graphical representation of the key relationship reflected in the 
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results, plotting changes over a five-year period in the share of taxation in total revenue on 
the horizontal axis, and changes in the level of democratization over the subsequent five-
year period on the vertical axis.  This mimics the basic causal model tested earlier, as 
changes in tax reliance in one period are expected to generate corresponding changes in 
accountability in the subsequent period.   Positive results, in the econometric sense, are 
those that fall in the top-right quadrant, representing increased tax reliance and increased 
accountability, and those in the bottom-left quadrant, representing decreased tax reliance 
and correspondingly decreased accountability. 
 
Figure 4.1: Impact of Changes in Tax Revenue Share on Subsequent Changes in 
Regime Type 
 
 
What is immediately clear from Figure 4.1 is that while the largest number of results falls in 
the top-right quadrant, as the tax-accountability hypothesis would predict, virtually no 
results fall in the bottom left quadrant.  The absence of outcomes in the bottom left 
quadrant could account for the overall weakness of the econometric results, as a positive 
result is highly unlikely with such a distribution of outcomes.  This pattern of a large 
number of observations in the top-right quadrant and very few in the bottom left quadrant is 
repeated across the different model specifications employed here. 
 
Most importantly, the absence of outcomes in the bottom-left quadrant appears to be largely 
an artefact of limited data, rather than a strict empirical reality.  The research hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that highly tax reliant countries will be more accountable, while 
countries with access to significant non-tax revenue will be less accountable.  Yet, while 
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sub-Saharan Africa contains many countries that fit the latter description, experiencing low 
levels of both tax reliance and accountability, in most cases the dependence of those 
countries on resource revenue pre-dates the availability of time-series revenue data.17  
 
Because the preceding econometric tests necessarily rely on fixed-effects models, which 
focus on within country variation over time, these cases of declining tax revenue and 
declining accountability are simply not captured due to the absence of historical data.  To 
take one particularly relevant example, the first well-known study to consider the 
connection between taxation and accountability in an African context was Jane Guyer’s 
(1992) work documenting the declining accountability of the government in Nigeria after 
the discovery of oil.  She attributes declining accountability in Nigeria to falling levels of 
taxation, but this case pre-dates data availability, and thus cannot be captured by the 
econometric results reported here.  The only case of a major decline in tax reliance that is 
captured by available data is Equatorial Guinea, but in that case the level of accountability 
was so low even before the discovery of oil that no further change was possible. 
 
Of course, none of this constitutes positive evidence of a strong, causal, cross-country 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  What it does do is provide a credible 
empirical explanation for the absence of compelling econometric results, and thus provides 
a basis for the belief that the weakness of the econometric results does not necessarily 
imply the absence of a relationship in practice.  
4.7.2. Problems of Model Specification 
A more interesting explanation for the absence of compelling econometric results surrounds 
the question of model specification.  The econometric results reported here test a very 
specific causal model, in which increases in taxation in one period are followed by 
increased accountability one, three or five years later.  This strict temporal structure follows 
widely cited earlier work and is adopted in an effort to establish causality, but it represents 
                                                
17 In the first year for which data is available for Nigeria, 1973-74, tax revenues comprised only 26% of total 
revenue.  In Angola only 12.4% of revenue came from domestic tax revenue in the first year for which data is 
available.  In Guinea tax revenue was 15% of total revenue in the first year for which data is available, while 
in Gabon the figure is 55%, and has remained reasonably stable over time. 
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a very strong assumption about the character of the tax bargaining process.  As noted 
earlier, both historical evidence and theory provide significant grounds to suspect that this 
assumption is, in fact, problematic. 
 
The implicit model of tax bargaining that lies behind the econometric results proceeds as 
follows.  First, the government takes a fiscal action, such as introducing a new tax or 
expanding enforcement of an existing tax.  Second, taxpayers respond politically to this 
new tax.  Third, the government is forced to bargain with taxpayers and is eventually forced 
to expand accountability.  In this simple narrative an increase in tax revenue does, indeed, 
precede the expansion of accountability. 
 
Yet, in reality, tax bargaining is equally likely to follow alternative pathways that would not 
be captured by the simple econometric model employed by this and earlier studies.  In one 
scenario the government, anticipating public resistance to new taxation, may make pre-
emptive concessions to taxpayers in order to smooth implementation of new taxation.  In 
this case accountability precedes the expansion of taxation, and the econometric model 
would fail to capture the connection between tax reliance and accountability.  In a second 
scenario, taxpayers, unsatisfied with government performance, may resist existing taxation 
and thus force the government to expand accountability in order to restore tax collection.  In 
this case not only does increased taxation not precede increased accountability, increased 
accountability is actually preceded by reduced taxation, which would yield negative 
econometric results.  Finally, in a third scenario government may seek to introduce new 
taxation but be prevented from doing so by public opposition which, thus mobilized, also 
demands the expansion of accountability.  This is, again, a clear case of tax bargaining, but 
accountability is expanded without any actual change in tax revenue, thus making such an 
episode invisible to econometric analysis.   
 
There are thus very good reasons to believe that the econometric model employed here, and 
by earlier studies, will simply be unable to capture the complex dynamics linking tax 
reliance to the expansion of accountability.  While this possibility has been presented in 
largely theoretical terms here, it finds compelling empirical support in the case studies to 
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follow.  Tax bargaining only occasionally follows a simple pattern in which increased 
taxation leads to tax bargaining and the expansion of accountability, and just as frequently 
conforms to the alternative scenarios presented here. 
4.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has taken a fresh look at earlier cross-country econometric studies of the 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  Drawing on a dramatically improved 
data set it has demonstrated that cross-country data is broadly consistent with the claim that 
governments that are more reliant on tax revenue are more likely to be accountable to their 
citizens, but that, contrary to earlier studies, there is no compelling evidence of the 
existence of a causal relationship.  It has gone on to argue that this is not necessarily 
evidence of the absence of a causal relationship in practice, as the weakness of the results 
can be credibly explained by underlying data problems and, most tellingly, by problems 
with model specification.  The ultimate message of the results is that if there is a causal 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability then it is likely to operate through a 
relatively complex set of causal processes rather than the simple linear formulation 
embodied in existing econometric models.  This, in turn, argues for the need for alternative, 
and more nuanced, research strategies.   
 
While this chapter reflects an implicit scepticism about the potential for cross-country 
econometric models to effectively capture complex and contingent causal processes, there 
is nonetheless almost certainly scope for creative econometric approaches to addressing the 
relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  This is likely to be particularly true at 
the sub-national, firm and individual levels as the quality of available data improves.  That 
said, this chapter has emphasized the potential pitfalls of pursuing econometric tests in the 
absence of a clear theoretical and empirical understanding of the causal processes at work.  
Such knowledge remains all too limited with respect to the relationship between tax 
reliance and accountability.  As such, there is a pressing need to gain a much clearer 
understanding of the particular causal processes at work at the country level, and this is best 
achieved through detailed case studies.  The next chapter correspondingly presents the 
methodology that has been employed in identifying three case study countries for this 
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thesis, and situates the three case studies within the broader context of experiences in sub-
Saharan Africa.  This sets the stage for the presentation of the case study evidence in the 
chapters to follow. 
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5. Case Selection: Tax Effort, Foreign Aid and Levels of 
Development  
 
The previous chapter argued the need for case study research to further our understanding 
of the relationship between tax reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  Of course, the weakness of case study evidence lies in the risk that findings 
will be idiosyncratic and country specific, and thus fail to be more broadly relevant.  
Careful case selection is essential.  The goal of this chapter is to describe the case selection 
process in detail while contextualizing the case study countries relative to other countries in 
the region, in order to better define the scope of the research. 
 
The chapter begins by undertaking a cross-country econometric investigation of the tax 
collection performance of sub-Saharan African countries.  This information is used to both 
inform the case selection process and place the cases that are selected in broader context.  
Conventionally know as a ‘tax effort’ analysis, the econometric analysis captures levels of 
tax collection in each country over time relative to expected levels of collection.  These 
expected levels of collection are, in turn, based on a series of factors that are expected to 
shape tax collection, including per capita income and levels of international trade.  In 
essence, the analysis provides a clearer picture of the effectiveness of tax collection both 
across countries and within countries over time, by controlling for structural economic 
factors that are likely to lead to differing levels of tax collection. 
 
In addition to providing insight into tax performance, the econometric analysis also sheds 
light on the relationship between foreign aid and levels of tax collection.  Various recent 
studies have argued that access to foreign aid may have consistently eroded incentives for 
domestic tax collection in developing countries (Gupta et al. 2004, Moss, Pettersson and 
van de Walle 2006).  If true, this would have important implications for both case selection 
and our broader understanding of tax behaviour, and tax bargaining, in aid-dependent 
countries.  As such, this question is given special attention here, as well as in Chapter 11, 
which focuses explicitly on the impact of aid on taxation and tax bargaining. 
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5.1. Estimating Tax Effort 
In practical terms, the estimation of ‘tax effort’ involves estimating the impact of various 
exogenous factors on levels of tax collection across countries.  While such studies are 
relatively common, they encounter many of the same econometric and data challenges 
described in the previous chapter.  The unique contribution of the analysis presented here 
lies in addressing a long-standing econometric question using significantly improved data. 
 
The long history of tax effort studies is ably reviewed elsewhere, and does not demand 
extensive discussion here beyond highlighting the key results (Gupta 2007).  The most 
robust findings from existing studies are that tax revenues increase with GDP per capita and 
with the share of trade in the economy, while tax revenue declines when the agricultural 
share is higher and when governments have access to large non-tax revenues.  Trade 
increases revenue because it is taxed directly and because trade is generally indicative of 
greater formalization of economic activity.  By contrast, agriculture is notoriously difficult 
to tax because of low incomes, low levels of monetization, the difficulty of tracking 
transactions and political resistance.  The fact that tax revenue collection as a share of GDP 
increases with income is somewhat less clear-cut, but is generally held to reflect the greater 
sophistication and formalization of higher income economies, which, in turn, tends to 
facilitate taxation.  It is also possible that high income may act as a proxy for greater 
government administrative capacity.  Finally, non-tax revenue is associated with reduced 
tax collection because such revenue reduces the need for politically contentious taxation. 
 
Different studies have included myriad other possible explanatory variables, but none has 
proven to be consistently significant.  These have included measures of debt reliance, 
corruption, economic structure, human capital development and institutional quality, among 
others.  The most contentious debate has centred on the impact of foreign aid on domestic 
tax collection.  Several authors have proposed that access to foreign aid may reduce tax 
effort by providing a fungible form of foreign exchange that can act as a substitute for 
domestic tax revenue.  These authors have thus proposed that foreign aid is likely to 
influence tax collection much like any other source of non-tax revenue.  However, while 
this argument has a compelling logic, other authors have pointed out that foreign aid is very 
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different from other forms of non-tax revenue and may thus have very different effects.  In 
broad terms, foreign aid is frequently accompanied by donor conditionality and technical 
assistance, both of which may lead to higher, rather than lower, levels of tax effort (Collier 
2006). 
 
This debate is reflected in conflicting findings among existing econometric studies.  Among 
the most cited studies is that of Gupta et al. (2004), which reports that increased foreign aid 
has led to reduced levels of domestic tax collection across the developing world.  More 
strikingly, the authors argue that when aid is disaggregated into grant and loan components, 
grants have discouraged revenue performance while loans have not, presumably because 
loans need to be repaid.  The finding that total foreign aid reduces tax collection is echoed 
by several other studies, (Mahdavi 2008, Remmer 2004, Gupta et al. 2005, Devarajan, 
Rajkumar and Swaroop 1999, Brautigam and Knack 2004) while a more recent study has 
reported a negative relationship between foreign aid and the quality of tax administration, 
as reported by World Bank staff (Knack 2009).  While this evidence is not insignificant, 
these studies all suffer from the data problems raised in the previous chapter, while there 
are also two additional reasons for caution in interpreting the results.  First, the finding of a 
differential impact of loans and grants on levels of tax collection does not appear to have 
been replicated in any of these studies.  Second, despite the prevailing view that foreign aid 
has a negative impact on tax collection, several recent studies, which have relied on 
improved data and more careful econometric strategies, have found the opposite (Gupta 
2007, Brun, Chambas and Guerineau 2008).  Most striking is recent work by Clist and 
Morrissey (2010) which finds that foreign aid has, in fact, had a positive impact on levels of 
tax collection over the past two decades, most likely reflecting greater donor attention to 
domestic tax performance. 
5.1.1. Model and Results 
Given that tax effort studies are relatively ubiquitous, the analysis presented here has two 
relatively modest ambitions.  First, to specifically address the uncertainty related to the 
impact of foreign aid on levels of domestic tax collection.  Second, to draw on the improved 
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data set compiled for this study to produce a robust set of tax effort scores that can be used 
to inform case selection and contextualize the case studies to follow. 
 
Given these very specific ambitions the econometric approach follows well-established 
practices.  The analysis relies on total tax collection (as opposed to any individual tax 
types), and focuses on those independent variables that have been consistently significant in 
a large proportion of previous studies.  Each regression correspondingly includes either the 
log of GDP or the agricultural share of GDP as an independent variable.  The two are not 
included together, as they are strongly correlated with one another (Gupta 2007).  Also 
included are a trade share variable and a variable for total non-tax revenue, excluding 
grants.  The inclusion of the non-tax variable is made possible by the data cleaning exercise 
described in the previous chapter, and thus differs from earlier studies, which have tended 
to rely on highly imperfect proxies such as the mining share of GDP.  Finally, all of the 
regressions include foreign aid variables, either as total Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) or disaggregated into loans and grants.  Thus the basic model is as follows: 
 
TaxRevit = a + b1*(logGDPit) + b2*(tradeit) + b3*(non-taxit) + b4*(aidit) + eit 
 
Table 5.1 presents the basic battery of results, with each econometric specification tested 
alternately using log GDP and agricultural share as explanatory variables.  The first two 
columns present the results using a simple OLS regression with panel-corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs). Columns 3 and 4 present a fixed-effects model with PCSEs, while columns 
5 and 6 add to that model with a correction for first order serial correlation.  Finally, 
columns 7 and 8 use the same econometric strategy, but employ lagged versions of the aid 
variables, based on the possibility that the impact of aid may require a year to take effect.  
Building on this first set of results, Table 5.2 presents the core results when a dynamic 
model is employed, with columns 1 and 2 reporting the results of a simple lagged 
dependent variable model, and columns 3 and 4 reporting results using the Arellano-Bond 
general method of moments procedure. 
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In order to ensure the robustness of the results, all of the tests were also conducted using the 
import share of GDP, instead of the total trade share, but the overall impact on the results 
was very small.  Tests were likewise conducted using alternative control variables, 
including political indicators, debt share, manufacturing share and the annual growth rate of 
GDP.  As with previous studies none of these variables were consistently significant or 
meaningfully altered the primary results.  These additional tests are thus not reported here, 
as our primary interest is in the aid variables and in specifying a robust baseline model to 
support the case selection process. 
Table 5.1: Tax Effort Results Using Fixed-Effects, PCSEs and AR(1) Correction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 taxrev Taxrev taxrev taxrev taxrev taxrev taxrev taxrev 
 OLS OLS FE FE FE, AR(1) FE, AR(1) FE, AR(1) FE, AR(1) 
         
loggdp 3.784***  7.970***  8.318***  8.419***  
 (0.578)  (1.145)  (1.712)  (1.629)  
agri  -0.139***  -0.151***  -0.099***  -0.101*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
tradesh 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.021** 0.016* 0.0225*** 0.0162** 
 (0.005) (0.00507) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
nontax -0.324*** -0.352*** -0.138*** -0.156*** -0.056** -0.063** -0.0263** -0.026** 
 (0.024) (0.0242) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.012) (0.011) 
grantsgni -0.045*** -0.0625*** 0.025** 0.007 0.011 -0.000   
 (0.015) (0.0138) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)   
loansgni -0.04 -0.0556 0.013 0.005 -0.012 -0.029   
 (0.051) (0.0490) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)   
L.grantsgni       0.015* 0.009 
       (0.009) (0.009) 
L.loansgni       0.046** 0.047*** 
       (0.017) (0.018) 
Constant -1.083 13.89*** -16.58*** 9.495*** -18.26*** 6.937*** -19.91*** 5.509*** 
 (1.368) (0.737) (3.393) (1.415) (5.115) (1.747) (4.942) (1.59) 
         
Obs. 1,065 1,066 1,065 1,066 1,065 1,066 1,089 1,089 
R2 0.471 0.497 0.830 0.836 0.670 0.676 0.671 0.676 
No. of id   45 45 45 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.2: Tax Effort Results Using a Dynamic Estimator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 taxrev taxrev taxrev taxrev 
 LDV LDV GMM GMM 
     
L.taxrev 0.745*** 0.739*** 0.530*** 0.522*** 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
loggdp 1.227  2.344  
 (0.867)  (1.504)  
agri  -0.026**  -0.0423** 
  (0.012)  (0.017) 
tradesh 0.0199*** 0.0180*** 0.0194*** 0.0176*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
nontax -0.033* -0.037* -0.055** -0.063** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027) 
grantsgni 0.004 0.002 0.0127 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
loansgni 0.012 0.011 -0.002 -0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant -3.263 0.912 -0.559 7.171*** 
 (2.588) (0.948) (3.843) (0.952) 
     
Obs. 1014 1014 943 943 
No. of id 45 45 45 45 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The basic results are largely as expected based on previous studies.  Agricultural share has a 
consistently negative impact on revenue collection, GDP per capita has a consistently 
positive impact and tax revenue increases with the trade share.  As expected, the non-tax 
revenue variable is consistently negative and significant, thus validating the careful 
construction of this variable in the new dataset employed here, as the use of proxies for 
resource dependence has often yielded much weaker results (i.e. Knack 2009). 
5.1.2. Foreign Aid and Tax Effort: Reassessing the Evidence 
The most interesting results relate to the impact of foreign aid on tax revenue.  The basic 
pooled OLS regressions yield the conventional result that greater aid is associated with 
lower levels of tax collection.  Yet this methodology tells us only that countries with low 
levels of tax collection also tend to have high levels of aid, rather than saying anything 
about causality.  It may be that aid causes low tax collection, but it may also be that 
countries with low levels of tax collection need, and receive, more aid over time. 
 
When we turn to the fixed-effects and LDV estimators, which focus on the relationship 
between aid and taxation within countries over time, we find quite decisively that the 
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relationship between aid and taxation has been either negligible or positive, suggesting that, 
if anything, higher aid has encouraged improved revenue performance.  There is, moreover, 
no evidence that loans have had a more positive impact on tax collection incentives than 
grants, contrary to earlier claims.  These findings are based on testing two slightly different 
causal models, reflecting uncertainty about the timeline over which aid may shape tax 
effort.  The first assumes that higher levels of foreign aid will lead to reduced levels of tax 
collection in the same year, and using this model the results are generally statistically 
insignificant.  The second model employs a lagged version of the aid variable, thus 
assuming that higher levels of foreign aid will lead to reduced levels of tax collection in the 
subsequent year, reflecting the possibility that technical assistance and conditionality may 
take time to affect tax collection decisions.   When this model is employed the impact of aid 
on taxation is consistently positive and significant.  It is, of course, possible that aid may 
shape tax effort over an even longer time horizon, but robustness tests using longer lags 
revealed similar results to those reported here.  
 
While these results are not strong enough to argue that there is a consistently positive 
relationship between aid and tax revenue collection, they do argue strongly against the 
common claim that aid consistently leads to reduced domestic tax collection.  For the sake 
of illustration, this ambiguity is readily apparent in looking at country level tax and foreign 
aid data from the three case study countries (Figures 5.1 through 5.3).  In Ghana, a cursory 
look at the data is strongly indicative of a positive relationship between aid and taxation, as 
aid as a share of GDP has increased steadily since the late 1970s, as has tax revenue.  By 
contrast, both Kenya and Ethiopia present more ambiguous patterns.  In Ethiopia, there 
appears to have been a mild correlation between higher levels of aid and lower levels of tax 
collection from 1993-2001, but this trend was reversed from 2002-2004, as unprecedented 
high levels of aid were accompanied by significant revenue growth.  Finally, in Kenya there 
is no discernible relationship between aid and taxation in macro level data.  The message 
here is not necessarily that aid does not affect tax collection, but simply that country level 
evidence is not at all consistent with the existence of a simple linear relationship between 
increased aid and lower tax collection.   
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Figure 5.1: Tax Effort and Foreign Aid in Ghana 1972-2004 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Tax Effort and Foreign Aid in Ethiopia 1981-2004 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Tax Effort and Foreign Aid in Kenya 1972-2004 
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Despite the fact that this conclusion is inconsistent with much accepted wisdom, the results 
reported here are intuitively appealing.  While access to aid undoubtedly creates 
disincentives to tax collection under some circumstance, it may also contribute to 
strengthened domestic tax collection in at least three ways that have frequently been 
overlooked by earlier studies.  First, aid is often accompanied by technical assistance aimed 
at strengthening tax collection, and there is significant research suggesting that these efforts 
have been effective in at least some contexts (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008, Sanchez 2006).  
Second, aid has increasingly been accompanied by conditionality explicitly focused on 
revenue performance, with donors demanding consistent or increased levels of tax 
collection in exchange for aid disbursements (Fjeldstad 2001).  Third, aid is also frequently 
accompanied by broad demands from donors for increased social spending, and this may 
generate indirect pressure for the expansion of public revenue collection.  This is reflected 
in concerns about the sustainability of large increases in aid funding, as large expenditure 
commitments taken on by governments with external support are likely to create long-term 
fiscal pressures when external support declines (Moss and Subramanian 2005).   
 
Overall, while the results reported here contradict assumptions in some quarters about the 
negative impact of aid on taxation, the fact that they are based on a much improved data set, 
and that they echo several other recent studies, suggests that these results should be taken 
seriously.  This certainly does not mean that we should not be concerned with the potential 
for foreign aid to reduce incentives for domestic tax collection.  Instead, it suggests the 
need for a more nuanced and refined understanding of the impact of aid on tax revenue 
collection.  This issue is taken up in detail in Chapter 11. 
5.1.3. Tax effort Scores 
Having conducted the econometric analysis, the final step is to generate a set of tax-effort 
scores for each country and year.  Tax effort is calculated as the ratio of actual tax 
collection to predicted tax collection, and is a rough indicator of the effectiveness of 
revenue mobilization efforts in each country.  Alongside tax revenue as a share of GDP, tax 
effort scores are a useful basis for making comparisons across countries, and within 
countries over time, and thus offer a valuable input into the case selection process. 
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Table 4 reports tax effort scores for every country in the sample.  These values rely on a 
very simplified model in which total tax revenue is a function of only the two primary 
explanatory variables: log GDP and the trade share.  These two variables could reasonably 
be replaced with agricultural share and import share, but the results are broadly similar.  
Unlike the approach adopted by many earlier studies, this approach excludes the non-tax 
revenue and foreign aid variables in calculating the tax effort scores, reflecting a 
substantive judgment about what it is that these tax effort scores are meant to tell us.  When 
the non-tax and aid variables are included, tax effort scores tell us how much tax revenue a 
country is collecting relative to what we would expect, given access to external resources 
and the existence of external pressures.  By contrast, when these variables are excluded, as 
is the case here, the tax effort scores tell us how much tax revenue is collected relative to 
what reasonably could be collected, given underlying economic conditions.  The approach 
adopted here is based on the belief that the latter meaning is more relevant for comparing 
tax performance across countries. 
 
In calculating tax effort scores it is important to be aware of the impact of model 
specification on the results, and Table 5.A1, in the Appendix, reports two sets of tax effort 
scores, the first using a simple fixed effects model, the second using a fixed-effects model 
with a Baltagi-Wu correction for serial correlation.  In all available cases the tax effort 
scores reported here are based on average values of the relevant variables during the period 
2003-2005; where data is unavailable for those years data for the period 1998-2000 is used 
instead.18 
5.2. Case Selection 
The analysis so far has achieved two goals: it has highlighted the complexity of the 
relationship between aid and domestic taxation and it has provided additional information 
to support the case selection process.  The remainder of the chapter is devoted to laying out 
the factors that shaped the selection of Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia for in-depth case studies, 
                                                
18 This applies to the Central African Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Mauritania, while, as noted 
in the previous chapter, no reliable data is available for Somalia and Togo. 
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while also situating those cases in the context of broader experiences in the region.  
Ultimately, case selection was driven by four primary considerations:  Levels of tax 
collection and tax effort, changes in tax collection and tax effort, the importance of foreign 
aid and achieving variation in key political and economic variables.  All else being equal 
preference was also given to conducting research in countries in which data was readily 
available and in which there was at least some existing research on taxation. 
5.2.1. Levels of Tax Effort 
The first case selection criterion was that case study countries have relatively high levels of 
tax collection and tax effort.  The research methodology is premised on exploring political 
responses to efforts to increase taxation, and as such countries with low levels of tax 
collection are unlikely to offer sufficient analytical material.  Quite simply, where there is 
little or no taxation it is unlikely to be possible to study taxpayers’ responses to taxation or 
government strategies for securing tax compliance.  As was noted in the introduction to the 
thesis the most notable consequence of this methodological choice is the exclusion of oil 
producing countries, which have universally low levels of tax effort and non-oil tax 
collection.  By contrast, the three case study countries all have tax effort scores above one.  
Kenya and Ghana are among the most effective tax collectors in the region, measured by 
tax revenue or tax effort, while Ethiopia also achieves a relatively high level of tax effort, 
despite a relatively low absolute level of tax collection, which reflects the fact that it is a 
very poor, agrarian, economy. 
5.2.2. Changes in Tax Collection and Tax Effort 
Just as the research methodology calls for countries with comparatively high levels of tax 
effort, it calls for countries that have experienced significant changes in tax performance 
over time.  This is, again, a pragmatic requirement, as episodes of significant change in 
levels of tax collection are expected to offer the greatest analytical leverage in studying 
political responses to taxation.  While this is a seemingly straightforward requirement, in 
practice major changes in tax performance are relatively rare in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
elsewhere (Bird 2008).  Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia have nonetheless all experienced 
dramatic changes in tax performance over time, as reflected in Figures 5.4 through 5.6.  
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Ghana is alone in having experienced a relatively continuous, and dramatic, increase in tax 
effort over time, and thus intuitively would seem to offer a likely context for tax bargaining.  
By contrast, both Kenya and Ethiopia have experienced significant fluctuations in tax 
performance over time, offering an opportunity to explore the presence of tax bargaining 
during periods of increasing collection and to understand the causes and consequences of 
declining tax collection.19 
 
Figure 5.4: Tax Effort in Ghana 1971-2005 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Tax Effort in Ethiopia 1981-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 It is worth noting that short-term fluctuations in tax effort may in some cases reflect economic or political 
cycles, or idiosyncratic features of individual countries.  By contrast, the changes in tax effort in both Ethiopia 
and Kenya have occurred in long waves, suggesting more fundamental changes. 
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Figure 5.6: Tax Effort in Kenya 1972-2005 
 
 
5.2.3. The Impact of Foreign Aid 
The third factor of interest in selecting cases has been the potential impact of foreign aid.  
This chapter has already noted recent scholarship arguing that aid may reduce incentives for 
domestic tax collection, and thus for tax bargaining, by virtue of offering governments an 
alternative source of non-tax revenue.  At the same time, there are compelling reasons, 
including the ambiguous econometric results presented earlier in the chapter, to believe that 
the relationship between aid, domestic taxation and tax bargaining may be significantly 
more complex.  This suggests that there is likely to be significant value in focusing on 
countries with different levels of aid dependence, and in which the impact of aid on levels 
of domestic tax collection appears to vary. 
 
As discussed earlier, and illustrated in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia 
satisfy these criteria.  With respect to levels of aid dependence, both Ghana and Ethiopia 
have received foreign aid worth greater than 10% of GDP in most years since the beginning 
of the 1990s.  In recent years Ethiopia has received almost 20% of GDP in aid, making it 
one of the most aid-dependent countries in the region outside of immediate post-conflict 
settings.  By sharp contrast, Kenya has consistently been among the least aid-dependent 
countries in the region since the early 1990s, with aid levels never exceeding 10% of GDP 
since 1993.  These three countries also offer diversity with respect to the apparent 
relationship between aid and taxation.  In Ghana, increasing aid and tax effort have largely 
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gone hand in hand, offering the possibility of insights into the potentially positive impact of 
aid on tax collection.  By contrast, the long-term relationship between aid and taxation in 
both Kenya and Ethiopia has shown no consistent pattern.  While this may be taken as 
evidence of the absence of a relationship, the more likely explanation, which is borne out 
by the case studies, is that it reflects a changing relationship between aid and taxation over 
time.  These countries thus offer the potential to provide particularly interesting insights 
into how aid affects domestic taxation. 
5.2.4. Political and Economic Variables 
Finally, having satisfied the preceding criteria, there is additional value in looking at cases 
that exhibit significant variation in their social, political and economic characteristics.  This 
variation holds the potential to expand the validity of the results to a broader range of 
social, political and economic contexts, and may yield greater insights into the impact of 
contextual factors on tax bargaining outcomes.  While it would be impossible to capture the 
entire range of possible variation, three factors are particularly noteworthy: the extent of 
political representation, the level of economic development and the socio-historical context 
for taxation. 
 
With respect to the extent of representation, the three countries offer significant variety.  
Ghana is particularly striking as it experienced military rule throughout much of the 1970s 
and 1980s, including a period of particularly strong military control in the 1980s, but has 
since emerged as arguably the most democratic country in the region.  By contrast, Ethiopia 
has long been among the most politically autocratic countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  This 
was most obviously true under the socialist Derg regime from 1974-1991, but even the 
post-1991 government has maintained a high degree of political control.  Finally, Kenya 
falls somewhere in the middle, as it has maintained a moderate degree of political openness 
virtually throughout its post-independence history, but has also only held one election, in 
2002, which was entirely competitive and free of controversy. 
 
The three case study countries are also diverse in economic terms.  At one end of the 
spectrum lies Kenya, which has long been viewed as the region’s economic success story, 
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and ranks highly in terms of both per capita GDP and the strength of the private sector.  At 
the other end of the spectrum lies Ethiopia, which is among the poorest and most agrarian 
economies in the world, and where the private sector is particularly weak owing to an 
extended history of socialist rule and government control of the economy.  Ghana provides 
a middle ground, as it suffered a dramatic economic crisis beginning in the late 1970s, but 
has experienced relatively consistent growth since then, making it one of the strongest 
economies in the region by the end of the period under study. 
 
Finally, if we step back to look at the broader historical context, the three cases again offer 
significant diversity.  While both Kenya and Ghana emerged from British colonial rule at 
the beginning of the 1960s, their experiences before and after independence have been 
vastly different.  Kenya was a settler colony, and thus became home to a large racial 
minority that was able to maintain a dominant economic position even after independence.  
More generally, while Kenya has been among the most economically and politically stable 
countries in the region since independence, Ghana, like many sub-Saharan African states, 
prospered in the decade immediately after independence, but was plagued by repeated 
military coups and a dramatic economic breakdown during the 1970s and 1980s, including 
a near total collapse of tax revenue.  As a result, while Kenya’s tax system has been 
relatively robust and stable for almost five decades, tax collection in Ghana has been rebuilt 
almost from scratch since the early 1980s.  The inclusion of Ethiopia introduces a much 
broader historical diversity, as it is the one country in the region to have largely avoided 
colonial rule, and also to have been home to a full blown socialist state.  As will be seen in 
Chapter 8, these particularities offer compelling insights into the conditions that can shape 
the potential for, and outcomes of, tax bargaining. 
5.3. Conclusions 
This has been a transitional chapter, marking the shift from the historical and econometric 
analysis of the previous two chapters to the detailed contemporary cases studies to come.  
The first objective of the chapter has been to cast light on the nature of the relationship 
between foreign aid and domestic taxation.  The key message of the analysis presented here 
is that the relationship between aid and taxation is likely to be complex, and warrants a 
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more nuanced treatment than is possible using cross-country econometric tests.  While the 
case studies to follow do not focus explicitly on the impact of aid on domestic taxation it is 
a question that lurks in the background, given the obvious potential for aid to shape 
incentives for domestic taxation and tax bargaining.  We will return to the question of aid, 
taxation and tax bargaining in the penultimate chapter of this thesis, by which point it will 
be possible to draw on the econometric evidence, a broader range of secondary literature 
and, most importantly, the insights provided by the case study chapters. 
 
The second objective of this chapter has been to justify the selection of Ghana, Kenya and 
Ethiopia for the case studies to follow, and to situate the experience of those countries 
within the broader context of sub-Saharan Africa.  This is an essential process, as it defines 
the scope of the research, and thus its likely relevance beyond the specific context of the 
three case study countries.  The discussion here has made clear that while case selection has 
been shaped to a large degree by pragmatic research considerations, the three countries also 
achieve significant diversity with respect to changes in taxation over time, the apparent 
relationship between aid and taxation, key economic and political characteristics and the 
broader historical context.  This suggests that the findings that emerge from the case studies 
to follow are likely to also have broader relevance. 
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5.4. Appendix: Table 5.A1: Tax Effort By Country 2003-2005 
 Fixed-Effects 
Fixed-Effects with AR(1) 
Correction 
 Predicted Actual Tax Effort Predicted Actual Tax Effort 
Angola 18.185 7.956 0.437 17.355 7.956 0.458 
Benin 12.899 15.286 1.185 13.511 15.286 1.131 
Botswana 18.989 17.282 0.910 13.659 17.282 1.265 
Burkina Faso 12.055 11.146 0.924 13.267 11.146 0.840 
Burundi 10.686 18.324 1.714 14.233 18.324 1.287 
Cameroon 14.658 10.411 0.710 13.180 10.411 0.789 
Cape Verde 17.762 19.812 1.115 15.410 19.812 1.285 
Central African Republic 12.105 8.570 0.707 13.320 8.570 0.643 
Chad 14.327 5.614 0.391 16.315 5.614 0.344 
Comoros 13.406 9.710 0.724 13.678 9.710 0.709 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 11.325 7.501 0.662 15.671 7.501 0.478 
Congo, Rep. 18.615 8.022 0.430 17.510 8.022 0.458 
Cote d'Ivoire 15.727 14.754 0.938 15.399 14.754 0.958 
Djibouti 17.208 21.776 1.265 16.290 21.776 1.336 
Equatorial Guinea 25.776 4.127 0.160 23.544 4.127 0.175 
Eritrea 13.759 21.747 1.580 16.620 21.747 1.308 
Ethiopia 11.402 14.579 1.278 14.505 14.579 1.005 
Gabon 20.115 12.938 0.643 14.955 12.938 0.865 
Gambia, The 15.226 16.530 1.085 16.538 16.530 0.999 
Ghana 14.323 21.119 1.474 15.877 21.119 1.330 
Guinea-Bissau 12.798 9.106 0.711 16.233 9.106 0.560 
Guinea 13.768 8.356 0.606 14.132 8.356 0.591 
Kenya 13.928 20.154 1.446 14.435 20.154 1.398 
Lesotho 18.246 41.133 2.254 18.881 41.133 2.178 
Liberia 12.560 9.650 0.768 16.008 9.650 0.602 
Madagascar 13.212 10.329 0.781 15.060 10.329 0.685 
Malawi 12.770 21.368 1.673 15.815 21.368 1.351 
Mali 13.167 15.962 1.212 14.856 15.962 1.074 
Mauritania 14.852 16.200 1.090 15.457 16.200 1.048 
Mauritius 20.731 17.053 0.822 15.480 17.053 1.101 
Mozambique 13.729 12.207 0.889 15.126 12.207 0.807 
Namibia 18.650 27.360 1.467 15.139 27.360 1.807 
Nigeria 15.187 8.562 0.563 15.815 8.562 0.541 
Niger 11.477 10.123 0.882 13.999 10.123 0.723 
Rwanda 12.335 12.266 0.994 13.616 12.266 0.900 
Sao Tome  17.039 13.904 0.816 18.671 13.904 0.744 
Senegal 14.698 18.188 1.237 14.736 18.188 1.234 
Seychelles 24.620 35.368 1.436 19.096 35.368 1.852 
Sierra Leone 12.863 11.395 0.885 14.873 11.395 0.766 
Sudan 13.503 7.142 0.528 13.320 7.142 0.536 
Swaziland 20.993 28.718 1.367 19.495 28.718 1.473 
Tanzania 13.022 10.812 0.830 13.778 10.812 0.784 
Uganda 12.509 12.263 0.980 13.693 12.263 0.895 
Zambia 13.198 16.980 1.286 13.772 16.980 1.232 
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6. Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Ghana 
1981-2008 
 
Before moving on, a brief summary of the thesis to this point is in order.  Chapters 1 and 2 
presented a detailed theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding the 
relationship between tax reliance and the emergence of more responsive and accountable 
government.  Building on this foundation, Chapter 3 provided evidence that the political 
processes that linked taxation and state building in early modern Europe were similarly 
relevant in Imperial Ethiopia, thus confirming that such processes are not unique to a 
particular cultural or historical context.  Having thus made an empirical case for exploring 
these processes more broadly, Chapter 4 turned to contemporary sub-Saharan African states 
and presented cross-country econometric evidence that while cross-country data is 
consistent with the predictions of the research hypothesis, it is not possible to conclusively 
establish a causal relationship owing to problems with data and model specification.  These 
findings point toward the value of exploring the relationship between taxation and the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability through detailed case studies, and Chapter 5 
presented the rationale for pursuing contemporary case studies in three countries: Ghana, 
Kenya and Ethiopia. 
 
This chapter presents the first of these three cases studies; evidence from Kenya and 
Ethiopia is presented in the two chapters to follow.  These cases studies rest on a simple 
premise: If taxation is an important contributor to expanded responsiveness and 
accountability then it should be possible to observe processes of direct and indirect tax 
bargaining.  While it is certainly possible that taxation may also shape political dynamics in 
more subtle and unobservable ways, it is difficult to claim that taxation is of central 
political importance if issues around taxation have not at least occasionally prompted 
discernable cases of tax bargaining.  In order to capture specific cases of tax bargaining, 
each chapter presents a historical narrative of the political economy of taxation and then 
focuses on the analysis of particular tax episodes: moments of significant tax reform, 
changes in tax collection or political debates about taxation.  
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The Ghanaian case study is presented first because it provides the most compelling and 
clear-cut evidence of tax bargaining playing a prominent in role in shaping the 
responsiveness and accountability of government.  The chapter begins with an analytical 
historical narrative of the political of economy of taxation in Ghana since 1981, the starting 
date a reflection of the fact that 1981 was a moment of profound economic and political 
transition.  Although focused on taxation the narrative is shaped by the broader political and 
economic developments of the period.  The essential question that it answers is what major 
changes in taxation occurred and why. The second part of the chapter assesses whether the 
narrative thus told amounts to persuasive evidence that taxation has been a driver of 
expanded responsiveness and accountability. 
6.1. The Political Economy of Taxation in Ghana, 1981-2008 
In 1981 the Ghanaian state and economy were deeply in crisis.  The preceding five years in 
particular had been defined by rapid economic decline, rampant rent-seeking and the 
atrophying of the state.  The democratically elected government of Hilla Limann had 
replaced a string of military governments in 1979, but had been unable to slow the 
downward trend.  Government revenues had fallen to below 5% of GDP, which was not 
nearly sufficient to sustain a well functioning government, and reflected the state of 
economic and political collapse (Chazan 1983). 
 
This changed dramatically when military officers led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings 
took power on Dec 31, 1981 under the banner of the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC).  Rawlings had already gained a reputation for ruthlessly attacking the perceived 
corruption of previous regimes during a short-lived seizure of power in 1979.  This 
ruthlessness, coupled with the simple weakness of other forces within society, allowed the 
new regime to establish unquestioned dominance relatively quickly, ushering in what 
historian Adu Boahen (1987: 135-36) has called the period of the  “Culture of Silence”.  
While the government arrived under the banner of populist revolution, the regime 
ultimately used its political dominance to implement an IMF and World Bank sponsored 
structural adjustment program, known as the Economic Recovery Program (ERP).  The 
vestiges of the early ideology nonetheless remained in evidence, particularly in several 
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early measures that took aim at the purportedly ill-gotten gains of the political and 
economic elite. 
 
The second Rawlings coup represented a major break in the economic and political history 
of the country, and thus provides a sensible starting point for the analysis presented here 
(Nugent 1995, Herbst 1993, Chazan 1983).  What follows divides subsequent Ghanaian 
history into several periods, each of which exhibits particular political dynamics 
surrounding taxation.  The Appendix provides a detailed view of the evolution of tax 
collection and expenditure over the entire period. 
6.1.1. 1983-1987: The Imperative of Revenue Generation 
By 1983 the new regime had consolidated power and initiated the ERP.  This entailed major 
economic reform, including efforts to rapidly increase government revenue.  Academic 
writing on tax reform during the period tends to focus on major institutional reforms 
undertaken in 1985-86.  These reforms fundamentally re-organized the institutional 
structure for tax collection, creating the National Revenue Secretariat (NRS) to oversee the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS).  
Each agency was granted increased independence from the Ministry of Finance in a 
pioneering example of a semi-autonomous revenue authority (Terkper 1998, Osei and 
Quartey 2005).   
 
While these administrative reforms set the stage for long-term improvements in taxation, 
the most dramatic increases in revenue occurred prior to these reforms, as the PNDC 
moved to address its crippling fiscal weakness and more than doubled tax collection 
between 1983 and 1985, to almost 10% of GDP.  Part of the revenue improvement was 
attributable to the ERP, which, thanks to the rapid depreciation of the exchange rate, led to 
increased exports and imports, with corresponding increases in import duties, export duties, 
excise taxes and sales taxes.  That said, all but the taxes on exports consistently, and 
sometimes dramatically, underperformed relative to budgeted expectations.   
 
 175 
The impressive performance of export taxes, which were levied almost entirely on cocoa 
production, thus warrants special attention.  From 1955-75 cocoa comprised the strong 
majority of Ghanaian export earnings, and an average of greater than 13% of GDP.   Cocoa 
production was also heavily taxed through a combination of export taxes and below market 
prices paid by the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), which had monopoly control over 
official cocoa exports.  While data is imperfect, Frimpong-Ansah (1991) estimates that 
from 1958-1980 cocoa taxation averaged almost 40% of the export price and accounted for 
32.95% of total government revenues, and this is broadly consistent with estimates found 
elsewhere (Stryker et al. 1990, Bulir 1998).   
 
These high levels of production masked the progressive decline of the sector.  Producer 
prices during the 1960s and early 1970s were below those that prevailed prior to 
independence, owing to lower world prices, continued high levels of taxation and an 
increasingly inefficient CMB.  Lower prices led to a gradual decline in production owing to 
lower levels of harvesting and reduced tree planting and upkeep.  When world and producer 
prices plummeted after 1976 smuggling increased, harvesting declined and official 
production fell to less than 300 000 tonnes, as compared to 450 000 tonnes in the 1960s.  
While small farmers were relatively poorly organized politically, reduced production and 
increased smuggling were effective forms of everyday resistance (Scott 1985, Chazan 1983, 
Widner 1993, Herbst 1993).  
 
Even as decline set in the government continued to extract a large revenue surplus, but this 
revenue stream dried up at the end of the decade.  The growing economic crisis included 
the dramatic overvaluation of the exchange rate, and this depressed the real value of cocoa 
exports, such that neither producers nor the government was able to profit.  Ultimately, 
mismanagement, short-sighted revenue goals, and major exchange rate imbalances eroded 
an essential economic sector, and dramatically undermined the fiscal solvency of the 
government (McMillan 2001, Frimpong-Ansah 1991, Stryker et al. 1990). 
 
Given this history, it is little surprise that cocoa played an important part in the fiscal 
recovery.  With the devaluation of the currency, exports resumed, and export taxes 
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averaged 3% of GDP, and accounted for more than 25% of total government tax revenue, 
during the period 1985-87.  Further supporting the recovery was an increase in prices paid 
to producers, as the producer share of world prices was increased from 1983-85 and these 
higher prices for producers were sustained by the subsequent recovery of world prices.  
While the government continued to extract significant revenue from the cocoa sector, its 
early policy stance nonetheless broke the pattern of unsustainable exploitation in favor of 
long-term improvements in production.  In doing so the PNDC resisted the urban bias of the 
past, adopted a longer-term view and sought to gain the support of rural constituents 
(McMillan 2001, Stryker 1990, Martin 1993). 
 
Alongside export taxation, the most unexpected source of increased revenue was a dramatic 
increase in corporate and personal taxation.   This is attributable to the Citizens Vetting 
Committees (CVCs), which, reflecting the ideological radicalism of the early Rawlings 
years, identified citizens of conspicuous wealth who were suspected of tax evasion. Where 
that wealth could not be accounted for and/or taxes had not been paid, the CVCs enforced 
tax compliance in a somewhat ad hoc and extra-legal manner, collecting not only annual 
taxes, but also substantial tax arrears, which accounted for the dramatic surge in revenue 
from 1983-85.  While many elites resent the events of this period, and the methods 
employed to pursue these revenues, there is no question about the short-term effectiveness 
of the strategy. 
 
Ultimately, the virtual collapse of government revenue in the early 1980s had created a 
desperate need to expand the fiscal capacity of the state.  This was matched by the 
ideological commitment of the government to bringing elites back into the tax net and 
reviving some notion of a “social contract” (Nugent 1995).  Lurking in the background 
were the IMF and World Bank, both of them influential advocates of tax reform and 
increased tax collection.  The rapid pace of reform bred major discontent among elites, but 
witnessed very little overt public opposition, owing to the entrenched position of the 
government and its popularity in many circles.  In the words of one senior tax official, the 
government “put the fear of God in them [taxpayers].  They were practically running to the 
tax office to pay their taxes.”  Thus, the expansion of tax revenue resulted from a 
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combination of expediency, ideology and outside pressure, all implemented effectively by 
government decree. 
6.1.2. 1988-1991: Rationalization and Consolidation 
Total tax collection as a share of GDP stagnated at about 12% of GDP from 1988-91, but 
this figure masks major compositional changes.  The shares of export taxes and corporate 
taxes plummeted, and were progressively replaced by sales taxes, import duties and fuel 
taxes.  These changes were facilitated by major improvements in administrative capacity 
resulting from the administrative reforms of 1985-86. 
 
The rapid decline in export taxation followed a sharp fall in world cocoa prices.  In the face 
of falling world prices the government maintained real producer prices at a relatively 
constant level, thus sacrificing government revenue in favor of the long-term rehabilitation 
of the sector.   This decision broke with the short-term revenue focus that had characterized 
earlier regimes and marked a major transfer of benefits to rural constituents (Martin 1993, 
Herbst 1993). 
 
Politically, the decision to maintain cocoa prices reflected both external pressure and the 
political interests of the regime.  Externally, the World Bank in particular favored reduced 
export taxation in order to spur cocoa production.  Internally, President Jerry Rawlings had 
an ideological commitment to supporting rural areas and to maintaining producer prices.  
More generally, there appears to have been a desire to build a rural political constituency 
for the PNDC, which ran counter to the long standing urban bias of parties in Ghana and 
much of sub-Saharan Africa (Bates 1981, Martin 1993, Herbst 1993).  
 
The rapid decline in corporate taxation had a more technical origin, but also reflected the 
ideological evolution of the regime.  The dramatic increase in corporate tax collection had 
been reliant on both improved enforcement and the collection of substantial tax arrears.  
The revenue from arrears could only provide a temporary burst before being exhausted.  
Two other factors were also at play.  First, with revenue stabilized, the government, under 
pressure from the IMF and World Bank, wished to reduce the tax burden in order to 
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promote private sector growth.  Second, as the revolutionary fervor of the populace abated 
the government was compelled to relax the aggressiveness of the sometimes extra-legal 
pursuit of large taxpayers. 
 
As export and corporate taxation declined, the government remained opportunistic in 
seeking ways to strengthen still relatively low tax revenues.  This was most apparent in the 
case of government controlled petroleum prices, which experienced a very sharp rise in late 
1990 in response to world price increases caused by the Gulf War.  In early 1991 when 
world fuel prices declined the government chose to maintain increased domestic prices, 
thus increasing the share of taxes in the pump price of gasoline from 16.5% in early 1990 to 
47.8% by mid-1991.  The Gulf War had justified the original price increase, and thus 
obscured the subsequent imposition of additional taxation from public view.  This ensured 
that public opposition was modest, leading one key policy maker to view the increase in 
petroleum taxes as “opportunistic”, “a windfall” and “a God send”. 
 
The only troubling development of the period in the realm of taxation was the reversal of 
some of the earlier administrative reforms in 1991.  The creation of the NRS in 1985 had 
given it significant independence from the Ministry of Finance, had allowed for improved 
conditions of work within the tax agencies and had included the creation of the post of 
Minister of Revenue.  The revenue gains that resulted from more skilled staff and greater 
political focus were undeniable, but the new structure also bred jealousies.  At the highest 
level, the Minister of Finance felt that his authority was being undermined, while within the 
bureaucracy complaints were emerging about special treatment being afforded to the 
revenue agencies.  Thus, the Minister of Finance moved to abolish the NRS and bring the 
tax agencies back under Ministerial control in 1991.  This move immediately prompted a 
modest decline in revenue collection, as overall political attention to tax collection wavered, 
as did bureaucratic morale.  This episode demonstrated both the difficulties inherent in 
major administrative reform and the threat to the effectiveness of tax collection posed by 
growing political tensions at the highest level. 
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6.1.3. 1992-1996: Elections, Public Spending and Popular 
Opposition 
Although overt political conflict was very rare under the military regime, that changed 
when an increasingly assertive domestic opposition and growing international pressure 
persuaded the PNDC government to hold elections late in 1992.  The political temperature 
subsequently rose even further when Jerry Rawlings was declared victorious in the 
Presidential elections as head of the newly named National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
and the opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP) responded with accusation of electoral 
fraud and a boycott of parliament. While many observers believe that NPP claims of fraud 
may have been overblown, the boycott nonetheless created an extended political standoff 
(Nugent 1999, Osei 2000). 
 
Tax issues played an important role throughout this period, beginning with the decision by 
labour unions, recognizing the political leverage offered by upcoming elections, to stage 
repeated strikes demanding increased wages and improved benefits.  Given the political 
threat, the government capitulated to many of the demands, setting the stage for a major 
budget shortfall in the subsequent fiscal year.  This looming fiscal crisis was exacerbated 
when the IMF and WB interpreted the concessions as discretionary, and reckless, pre-
election spending, and cancelled aid disbursements in protest.  As soon as the elections 
were over the government was thus confronted with the urgent need to raise revenue. 
 
The first tax conflict occurred in 1993 when the government sought to further increase 
petroleum prices.  Petroleum price increases were by far the most administratively simple 
way to quickly increase revenue, but were also highly politically salient.  A first increase 
took effect in January 1993, days before the inauguration of the new parliament and 
constitution.  While the increase met some public outcry, the decision to introduce the price 
increases before inaugurating the new parliament ensured that opposition remained 
fragmented.  The government proposed a second price increase to parliament in the spring, 
assuming that the NDC dominated parliament would accept it without protest.  In the words 
of one key policy maker at the time, “We were in for a shock”, as the increase was rejected 
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by parliament.  With this the party leadership “realized that the whole relationship had 
changed,” as the executive would no longer be able to make policy be decree. 
 
This conflict over petroleum taxation paled in comparison to the protests that greeted the 
introduction of a 17.5% Value Added Tax (VAT) to replace the existing system of sales 
taxes in 1995.  The introduction of the new tax was undertaken on relatively short notice, 
owing to major fiscal concerns as well as additional pressure from the IMF.  It resulted in 
arguably the most dramatic public protests of the era, and in the ultimate repeal of the tax 
despite its centrality to the government agenda (Ninsin 2007).  The scale of the protests was 
attributable in part to the fact that the tax was introduced relatively suddenly, at a high rate 
and with limited public consultation, but also reflected the strength of broader public 
grievances (Osei 2000). 
 
Much of the leadership of the protests came from the opposition NPP, but the scale of the 
protests was largely unexpected, as was the need for the government to repeal the new tax 
in order to restore order.  It was, in the words of one leading participant, “a sobering 
moment for the government.”  As important as the repeal of the tax itself, the protests came 
to encompass broader demands for democratization, reduced corruption and improved 
public services, and prompted the government to adopt a fundamentally more open 
governing style thereafter.  The protests also figured prominently in the resignation of long-
serving Minister of Finance Kwesi Botchwey, thus highlighting the depth of the political 
conflict (Osei 2000, Terkper 1998, Assibey-Mensah 1999). 
6.1.4. 1997-2000: Open Elections, Increased Harmony and Modest 
Revenue Growth 
The NDC won a second popular mandate at the end of 1996 in an election that was 
accepted by the opposition and prompted their entry into parliament.  This ushered in a 
period of greater political harmony, as structured parliamentary debate facilitated 
bargaining and the NDC adopted a relatively more inclusive governing style.  Nonetheless, 
while the NDC government continued to achieve some revenue gains, increasing public 
unhappiness prevented it from expanding revenue sufficiently to fully close the fiscal gap. 
 181 
 
The VAT was re-introduced in parliament in 1998 and was smoothly implemented in early 
1999.  The re-introduction of the tax resulted from internal commitment and growing 
pressure from the IMF, while its smooth implementation reflected both policy changes and 
changes in the political context.  First, although the government had agreed with the IMF to 
subsequently raise the rate to 15%, the initial rate was only 10%, which was below the 15% 
of the existing sales tax.  Second, a major program of public outreach and education was 
carried out.   Finally, the entry of opposition political parties into parliament increased the 
scope for structured debate and created a shared interest in fiscal stability, both of which 
reduced the likelihood that the formal opposition would again join in organizing street 
demonstrations (Osei 2000). 
 
In accordance with its earlier plan, the NDC government proposed a 2.5% increase in the 
VAT the following year.  This prompted a public outcry and the government responded by 
announcing that the new funds would be earmarked for a Ghana Education Trust (GET) 
Fund.  The fund was to be used primarily for educational infrastructure and scholarships, 
with a focus on tertiary education.  While the Ghana National Union of Students had long 
been mobilizing in favour of increased tertiary funding, there is ample evidence that the 
decision to create the GET Fund was first and foremost a politically motivated means to 
secure passage of the increase in the VAT rate (Prichard 2009). 
 
Despite significant revenue gains associated with the VAT, the overall fiscal position of the 
NDC government remained weak.  Faced with a persistent fiscal deficit, and constrained by 
huge debt repayment costs, the government found itself unable to further increase tax 
revenue.  Senior officials report that while there was a desire to increase taxation they could 
not mobilize the necessary political support to do so in the face of growing public 
opposition.  This was most apparent in the slow erosion of petroleum taxation to the point 
that the government was subsidizing fuel prices by the end of the decade.  As the world 
price of fuel rose in the late 1990s, the government judged that due to persistent political 
opposition it could not afford to increase domestic prices.  This political stalemate left the 
government fiscally crippled as it moved towards the 2000 elections. 
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Although it attracted less public attention, the faltering political position of the government 
appears to have similarly forestalled reforms in tax administration.  During the 1990s 
several administrative reform programs remained on hold despite protests from the IFIs.  
These included: the functional integration of the IRS and CEPS (and eventually VAT 
Service as well), the creation of a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) and the computerization of 
the IRS.  The government repeatedly expressed a commitment to move ahead with these 
initiatives in order to improve its fiscal position, but major progress did not occur until after 
the NPP had come to power. 
 
The lack of progress appears to have had multiple causes, beginning with resistance within 
the Ministry of Finance to the prospect of a more autonomous revenue agency.  There 
equally appears to have been some tension between the different tax agencies, as their 
functional integration would have reduced the control and autonomy exercised by senior 
officials in any individual agency.  Similarly, there was bureaucratic resistance to the 
creation of an LTU owing to the revenue losses that would be suffered by individual 
offices.  Many tax administrators further resisted, and even undermined, computerization 
efforts out of a concern that their limited computer skills would put their jobs in jeopardy 
(Bird and Zolt 2007).  Finally, any effort at tax reform, particularly as it related to income 
taxation, was bound to encounter staunch opposition from the economic elite, who were 
among the greatest beneficiaries of weak tax enforcement (Ascher 1989).  The 
computerization of the IRS, in particular, threatened to dramatically improve transparency 
surrounding the economic activities of taxpayers, with risks to those who preferred to have 
their activities remain secret (Fjeldstad 2005: 11-12). 
 
While the challenges inherent in administrative reform warrant much further discussion, 
these issues are not the focus here.  The relevant point for this research is that 
administrative reform in the tax agencies held the potential to generate important revenue 
gains, but also faced entrenched opposition on many fronts.  Consequently, any reform 
effort would require significant political capital, and in the late 1990s the increasingly 
unpopular NDC government was unable to generate the necessary support. 
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6.1.5. 2001-2008: A New Government and Expanded Public 
Revenue 
At the end of the year 2000 the NPP was voted into office and it immediately enjoyed 
significant goodwill, even among its opponents, owing to its promise of increased political 
openness (Frempong 2007, Amponsah 2007).  This goodwill provided the government with 
much greater freedom than its predecessor in implementing its policy agenda.  Central to 
this agenda was a program to restore fiscal balance in the wake of the large deficits of 
previous years.  Two immediate measures were particularly noteworthy:  Accession to the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt relief, which was accompanied 
by a large increase in petroleum prices and petroleum taxes, and the introduction of the 
National Reconstruction Levy (NRL). 
 
Ghana had first been offered access to the HIPC initiative for debt relief in 1999, but the 
NDC government did not accede to the agreement.  This partly reflected an unwillingness 
to accept the stigma that President Rawlings associated with admitting the need for debt 
relief.  More important, though, was the fact that increasing petroleum prices was a central 
condition of HIPC, and the government considered this to be politically impossible prior to 
the election.  By contrast, the new NPP government quickly joined HIPC and implemented 
large petroleum price increases in 2001 and 2003.  In fact, not only did the government 
increase petroleum prices, which implied proportional increases in tax revenue, but also 
simultaneously increased the share of taxation in the total price.  Unlike the harsh reception 
that would have met such action by the NDC, the government faced limited popular 
opposition.  This reflected a combination of the goodwill enjoyed by the new government, 
and the ability to blame the stigma of HIPC, and the hardship of new prices, on the NDC.  
The decision to simultaneously increase petroleum taxation demonstrated the potential for 
disguising new taxes within apparently inevitable price increases mandated by the IMF. 
 
In 2004 the HIPC conditions called for the government to increase prices again, but a 
temporary waiver was granted by the IMF in recognition of the political difficulty posed by 
price increases in the run up to the election.  The government thus went ahead with the 
promised increase in petroleum prices in 2005, after winning the 2004 elections, but having 
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used up some of the goodwill that greeted it in 2001 was forced to achieve the increase in 
part by reducing petroleum taxation.  These compromises further highlight both the 
political salience of petroleum prices and the close relationship between the ability to raise 
revenue and the broader political popularity of government. 
 
In addition to these measures related to HIPC, the government introduced the NRL in 2001 
as a 2.5% surcharge tax on corporate profits, with a special rate of 15% for financial 
institutions.  The tax was initially meant to last for three years, though it was ultimately 
renewed in 2004 before being removed in 2007.  Surprisingly, the tax was subject to 
relatively muted opposition from the business community.  This reflected the strategic 
mobilization of public opinion in favour of the tax, but also the increasingly conciliatory 
relationship between government and business.  While the NDC had improved the business 
climate during its tenure, business confidence increased dramatically after the election of 
the NPP, while the new government also expanded consultation (Amponsah 2007).  The 
NPP also managed to play shrewd politics when it extended the NRL in 2004, co-opting 
significant opposition by promising that 25% of the levy would be used to create a venture 
capital fund. 
 
Having stabilized the fiscal situation the government undertook two major additional 
revenue measures.  The first was the introduction of the National Health Insurance Levy 
(NHIL), which amounted to a 2.5% increase in the VAT rate, and was earmarked to fund a 
new National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).  The new government was adamant that 
the new tax be separately quoted as the NHIL, and not be called VAT, owing to very vocal 
opposition to the VAT from 1994-2000.  It is also widely believed that, as in the case of the 
GET Fund, the primary government objective was to increase revenue, while the decision 
to earmark funds for the NHIS was a concession to political necessity. 
 
The second important revenue measure was the introduction of a Communications Tax, 
which was primarily a tax on mobile phone calls.  The tax was first proposed in 2007 and 
was met by a significant public backlash, which prompted the government to seek a 
political strategy to ease its passage.  The government initially claimed that the tax was 
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meant to offset customs losses from mobile phone smuggling, but this rationale was quickly 
abandoned when the public realized that the expected revenue far exceeded any plausible 
losses from smuggling.  The government subsequently announced that the tax revenue 
would be earmarked to fund the Youth Employment Scheme.  This proved to be an 
effective political strategy, but was also deeply disingenuous, as the Act itself only 
earmarked 20% of the revenue for youth employment, and in very vague terms at that.  This 
highlights the scope for deception in building public support for earmarking, along with the 
weakness of parliament, which failed to draw attention to the discrepancy.  While this 
parliamentary failure may reflect the simple weakness of the opposition it also suggests that 
with an election on the horizon the NDC may have seen the merits of increased government 
revenue.  
6.2. Evidence of Tax Bargaining 
Having presented this detailed historical narrative the challenge is twofold: First, to decide 
whether it constitutes evidence of a causal relationship between taxation and the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability and, second, to provide an analytically rigorous 
account of the causal processes driving that relationship.  In some cases this only requires 
explicitly summarizing connections that are relatively self-evident in the preceding 
historical narrative.  In other cases additional information about the motives, perceptions 
and activities of political actors allows us to add nuance to the overview provided so far.  
On the whole the Ghanaian case presents extensive evidence of tax bargaining, and what 
follows captures the diversity of particular outcomes under four distinct categories, which 
mirror those introduced in chapter 2: taxation without bargaining, direct tax bargaining, 
taxation as a catalyst for public engagement and tax resistance as a contributor to changes 
in government. 
6.2.1. Repression, Coercion and the Absence of Tax Bargaining 
The first lesson that can be drawn from the Ghanaian narrative is that sufficiently coercive 
governments can, for a time at least, push through major new taxation without prompting 
effective citizen demands for responsiveness or accountability.  Research on structural 
adjustment in Ghana has focused on the extent to which the government was sufficiently 
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well entrenched to be able to undertake reforms with minimal political opposition (Herbst 
1993, Martin 1993).  Taxation was no different.  During the 1980s the government 
undertook major reforms of tax policy and administration, and dramatically increased tax 
collection, but leading government officials make clear in interviews that they had little 
concern for any potential political consequences. 
 
While the overall picture during the period was thus one of coercion, rather than tax 
bargaining, several caveats are warranted.  First, this state of affairs was temporary.  By the 
end of the decade scattered tax protests had begun to emerge, while, as tellingly, revenue 
generation had reached a temporary plateau.  Second, a large share of Ghanaians held a 
positive of view of the reforms, despite the overall increase in collection.  Increases in 
income taxation clearly targeted an unpopular and elite minority, while renewed cocoa tax 
collection was a reflection of improved prices and production following the devaluation of 
the currency.  Finally, there is a sense among some observers that aggressive taxation may 
have quietly fueled levels of political engagement and mobilization, either at the grassroots 
level or within the ranks of the organized political opposition.  At a minimum the 
aggressive taxation of elite incomes became the subject of future political attacks by the 
opposition, suggesting that while taxation during the period was achieved coercively it was 
not entirely without longer-term political consequences. 
6.2.2. Direct Tax Bargaining: Protests, Earmarking and 
Compromise 
While the expansion of taxation in the 1980s was driven by coercion, there is significant 
evidence that tax bargaining was an important contributor to the process of democratization 
in the first half of the 1990s, and to the further expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability thereafter.  While these political processes undoubtedly had multiple and 
complex roots, the goal here is to highlight the important contribution of relatively direct 
forms of tax bargaining.  The analysis focuses on three distinct parts of this story: tax 
protests and democratization in the early 1990s, tax earmarking and government 
responsiveness during the next decade and the particular case of tax bargaining around 
informal sector taxation. 
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6.2.2.1. Tax Protests and Government Accountability 
As Ghana slowly emerged from a period in which political opposition was sharply 
controlled, various anti-tax mobilizations, particularly by traders, were among the first signs 
of political agitation.  A senior PNDC official explained that, “the first time I felt political 
pressure was from the women who were going to Nigeria and bringing back plastic goods.”  
When the government tried to crack down through the collection of customs taxes the 
traders organized to resist.  Likewise, the Ghana Union of Traders Association (GUTA) 
was formed as part of mass protests responding to new municipal market taxes introduced 
in 1989.  While these early examples were ultimately repressed, they are evidence of the 
role played by tax protests in opening space for political opposition. 
 
More significant was the political conflict that surrounded efforts to increase petroleum 
prices in 1993.   While the PNDC government had been able to implement price increases 
by decree earlier in the year, the second fuel price increase in 1993 was rejected by the 
NDC controlled parliament.  In acting against its own executive the NDC parliament was 
responding to public outcry against the first fuel price increase, which had led the budget to 
be dubbed the “killer budget.”  While the government did not make immediate concessions 
during the parliamentary debate over the proposed price increases, party officials make 
clear that the emergence of public and parliamentary opposition forced the leadership to 
rethink their highly centralized approach to decision-making.  The debate thus changed the 
informal rules of decision-making and accountability.      
 
A very similar, but more dramatic, process played out two years later with the repeal of the 
newly introduced VAT amid mass public demonstrations that left several people dead.  The 
protests, known as Kume Preko, were loosely organized by the Alliance for Change, which 
comprised civil society leaders as well as prominent members of the opposition NPP and 
other political parties.  The involvement of the formal political opposition was pivotal and 
resulted from the fact that they had boycotted parliament and thus were compelled to 
engage in mass politics rather than parliamentary debate.  While the protests were initially a 
response to the VAT, they quickly came to encompass a much broader range of grievances 
against the government, including demands for political liberalization.  The eventual 
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government decision to repeal the VAT was of major consequence, as it was both 
profoundly embarrassing and significantly undermined its fiscal and economic objectives. 
 
In the long term what was most noteworthy about the protests was that they significantly 
advanced the process of democratization in the country.  For the opposition, the protests 
were a watershed, as, unlike during the elections, they were able to present a fully unified 
front.  This greater unity carried over to subsequent elections and was a sine qua non of 
political success (Frempong 2007).  More importantly, the protests made clear that the 
government could not continue to govern without opening the political process and inviting 
deliberation.   Among other factors, the prominent role of opposition political parties in 
organizing the protests made clear to the government that it was better off with these groups 
in parliament than in the streets.  If the government wished to pursue its policy agenda 
successfully it became clear that parliament would be an important institution for 
facilitating bargaining and dialogue (Osei 2000).   
 
Thus, there is little doubt that conflict over taxation was a catalyst for significant changes in 
the informal institutions of accountability, as the role of parliament and the inclusiveness of 
the ruling NDC expanded meaningfully in the aftermath of the protests.  A more nuanced 
lesson is that while taxation was a catalyst for the protests, the protests were not simply 
about the tax.  Instead, taxation was a spark that unleashed much broader grievances.  
Finally, although the VAT was a broad based tax, and the protests attracted a diversity of 
taxpayers, elite involvement was absolutely central to what transpired.  Whether or not the 
protests would have enjoyed the same success in the absence of leading politicians is very 
much open to question (Ninsin 2007). 
6.2.2.2. Tax Earmarking and Responsiveness  
The failed implementation of the VAT resulted in a significant expansion of accountability, 
but this outcome was largely implicit and was achieved through very public political 
conflict.  By contrast, subsequent government efforts to expand taxation were characterized 
by relatively explicit, pre-emptive, forms of tax bargaining that ensured the smooth 
implementation of reform.  Unlike the broad changes in accountability that resulted from 
the original VAT protests, these later tax bargains, which relied on earmarking tax revenues 
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for popular programs, were focused on more narrow improvements in the responsiveness of 
government. 
 
The most dramatic examples of such tax bargaining were the earmarking of successive 
increases in the VAT rate to the GET Fund in 2000 and the NHIS in 2003.   In both cases 
the preponderance of evidence indicates that the ultimate decision to earmark funds was a 
purely political strategy to reduce public opposition to tax increases.  This is not to imply 
that the earmarked activities were not legitimate, and justified, government priorities.  It is 
simply that the decision to explicitly earmark the funds, and create dedicated oversight 
bodies, would not have occurred if not for public resistance to the prospect of additional 
taxation.  This marks the process of earmarking as a clear example of tax bargaining 
leading to the expansion of government responsiveness. 
 
While the evidence of tax bargaining is clear, the more challenging, and more important, 
question is whether that bargaining resulted in genuinely improved outcomes.  Put another 
way, the fact that the government created the appearance of responding to popular demands 
is not sufficient evidence that this commitment was carried out in practice.  Untangling the 
actual impact of earmarking requires consideration of four related issues: the actual content 
of the legal commitment, the impact on the budget process, the risk of fungibility and the 
quality of oversight. 
 
The first risk is that the government may announce that funds are being earmarked for a 
particular purpose but fail to follow through on that promise in practice.  This was the case 
for the Communications Tax, as the public was led to believe that revenues would be 
earmarked for the Youth Employment Scheme, but in practice only a small share of 
revenue was allocated to that program.  Worse still, even the 20% allocated to youth 
employment was defined so vaguely in the law as to call into question the reliability of the 
earmarking.  Yet, despite the overt deception practiced by the government the public 
remained overwhelmingly unaware of the discrepancy.  In this case tax bargaining was, to a 
significant degree, a mere “gimmick” for easing the passage of legislation. 
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The second concern is that the practice of earmarking can be a mixed blessing, as it is 
politically useful and can ensure certain types of spending, but also reduces budgetary 
flexibility and, potentially, the overall quality of the budgeting processes (McCleary 1991).  
The earmarking of tax revenue has been widely supported in the case of Road Funds, due to 
the chronic failure of governments to invest in road maintenance, but ‘best practice’ has 
generally been to discourage earmarking in other area because of the impact on budget 
flexibility (Gwilliam and Shalizi 1999).  While resolving this debate is beyond the scope of 
this research, it is possible that responsiveness through earmarking has hidden costs. 
 
The third risk is that earmarked funds may be fungible.  In such cases total funding for 
earmarked activities might increase by far less than the amount of the earmark as existing 
funds are shifted elsewhere in the budget.  While this is a risk in principle, it has so far not 
been borne out in practice in Ghana.  Overall levels of health and education funding have 
expanded significantly more than the amount of the new revenues earmarked for the GET 
fund and NHIL respectively.  Two concerns persist nonetheless.  First, some officials 
believe that the share of spending on health, outside of the NHIS, may begin to decline in 
upcoming years, which would be consistent with the use of earmarked funds to substitute 
for general budgetary funding.  Second, there is evidence that the earmarked funds have not 
been used exclusively for their prescribed purposes within the health and education 
budgets.  Most notably, both programs, and particularly the GET Fund, should have led to 
increased non-wage expenditures.  Yet, in practice, the share of non-wage spending in the 
core health and education budgets has fallen in recent years (Lawson et al. 2007).  
Regardless of the justification for this choice, it indicates some degree of fungibility in the 
use of funds. 
 
Finally, all of these issues point to the broader reality that the long-term impact of 
earmarking will be largely dependent on the extent to which earmarking strengthens the 
quality of internal and external oversight.  In the absence of effective monitoring, deception 
by the government, fungibility, corruption and waste are all made more likely.  The impact 
of earmarking in Ghana on the quality of oversight remains somewhat ambiguous and 
under researched.  Both the GET Fund and NHIS are managed by appointed Boards of 
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Directors, and audited by the Auditor General, rather than being subject to the standard 
oversight mechanisms of the Ministry of Finance.  The merit of this decision is a much 
larger research question, but it is not a given that the new structures will be more effective, 
particularly given the costs of more fragmented monitoring of the budget as a whole 
(Gwilliam and Shilizi 1999).  Perhaps more tellingly, little attention seems to have been 
paid to this question by either internal or external actors despite rapid escalation in the share 
of tax revenue subject to earmarking. 
 
A more interesting possibility is that earmarking may improve external oversight by making 
spending more transparent or by generating greater public attention and interest.  While 
these factors are difficult to evaluate, civil society leaders generally feel that modest 
oversight benefits exist, but remain limited due to the lack of available information.  For 
example, a public backlash forced the government to return revenues to the GET Fund after 
the government had initially appropriated tax revenues that were collected after the passage 
of the law but before the Fund was operational.  On the other hand, the GET Fund has been 
beset by accusations that funds are being used beyond the originally prescribed purposes, 
and that it has suffered from significant corruption.  There is much more to be learned about 
this issue. 
6.2.2.3. Accountability and Cooptation in Informal Sector 
Taxation 
Recent government efforts to expand taxation of the informal sector have also prompted 
relatively explicit tax bargaining, though with mixed results.  The government push to 
improve taxation of the informal sector has been motivated by a combination of internal 
commitment from tax administrators, international pressure and pressure from the major 
business associations.  The role of business is particularly interesting, as it reflects an 
apparent tax bargain in its own right: formal sector businesses report that they have been 
willing to expand their own tax compliance on the condition that the government 
simultaneously endeavour to expand the tax base.   
 
While the government has undertaken many measures to expand taxation of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) in the informal sector, this analysis focuses on two measures in 
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particular: taxes on public transport operators and the introduction of a Flat Rate VAT 
Scheme for small retailers.  In the early 1990s government efforts to expand informal sector 
taxation initially focused on public transport using what has been called “associational 
taxation” (Joshi and Ayee 2008).  They government agreed with the Ghana Public Road 
Transport Union (GPRTU) leadership that the union would collect taxes itself and then 
remit the revenue to government. The goal was to make compliance as simple as possible, 
with taxes collected on a daily or weekly basis to accommodate the difficulties that 
operators faced in paying large lump sum taxes.  In exchange for tax compliance, the 
GPRTU membership expected to be relatively protected from the arbitrary assessment of 
penalties by the police and tax officials.  While this tax arrangement was one of the first of 
its kind, over time the model was extended to many other sectors.  This agreement was 
facilitated by the fact that the leadership of the GPRTU and the NDC government were 
close allies (Joshi and Ayee 2008).    
 
In the short term the arrangement was a mutually beneficial tax bargain, but the relationship 
soured over time.  The government became frustrated with the union leadership as revenues 
failed to expand at the expected rate and checks and balances were progressively eroded.  
Meanwhile, the union membership became increasingly disenchanted due to a feeling that 
the union leadership was pocketing much of the tax revenue that was being collected.  In 
2003 the agreement with the GPRTU was replaced by a Vehicle Income Tax, which 
mandated that every commercial operator would prominently display a tax sticker 
purchased from the IRS on a quarterly basis.  The new scheme immediately yielded 
significantly more revenue, while also being more popular with much of the membership of 
the GPRTU. 
 
Thus, the system of associational taxation provides a mixed picture as a form of tax 
bargain.  On the one hand, public transport operators were successfully brought into the tax 
net, and, in exchange, appear to have been spared certain forms of police harassment.  
While these gains are relatively narrow, they are nonetheless indicative of a more 
responsive government.  On the other hand, while the original scheme was apparently well 
intentioned, it evolved into a more cynically corporatist relationship.  Even as collection 
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efficiency declined, the NDC gained the support of the union leadership by allowing them 
to retain part of the collection, while the union leadership remained in the good graces of 
government by offering legitimacy to the tax.  Meanwhile, it was individual operators who 
were forced to pay higher taxes for smaller benefits.  It was only after the exit of the NDC 
that the tax system was regularized.  
 
The second prominent effort to tax SMEs has been the introduction of the Flat Rate VAT 
Scheme by the NPP government, and it has resulted in a similarly complex relationship 
between the government and GUTA.  The new tax aimed to improve compliance among 
small retailers by replacing the more complex accounting requirements of the standard 
VAT with a flat 3% tax on turnover.  The government would benefit from additional 
revenue, while traders would face reduced harassment, simpler accounting requirements 
and greater legitimacy.  In order to ease acceptance of the new tax the government sought 
an endorsement from GUTA, and this did, indeed, facilitate implementation. 
 
To some extent, GUTA entered into partnership with the VAT Service in order to create a 
legitimate tax bargain, with benefits for both the government and taxpayers.  Yet there are 
suggestions in many quarters that the GUTA leadership was also wiling to endorse a higher 
tax burden on its members in order to secure narrow personal benefits.  For one, the GUTA 
leadership were larger traders, and thus had an interest in bringing smaller traders into the 
tax net in order to improve their own competitive position in a dynamic common to many 
countries (Goldsmith 2002).  Equally, it is widely believed that the GUTA leadership were 
willing to cooperate with the government to further their own political ambitions or, even 
more cynically, to improve their access to government contracts.  While these claims 
cannot be verified, there is a strong sense that co-optation was as much a part of the 
introduction of the Flat Rate Scheme as was improved government responsiveness. 
6.2.3. Taxes, Civil Society and Public Engagement 
The analysis so far has considered relatively clear-cut examples of direct tax bargaining, or 
its conspicuous absence.  Yet, taxation may also encourage the expansion of responsiveness 
and accountability indirectly by catalyzing longer-term processes of political organizing 
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within society, thus expanding the ability of taxpayers to exercise oversight and make 
demands on government.  While these processes are similar to processes of direct tax 
bargaining, they are distinct in that they do not involve immediately observable quid pro 
quo but are instead likely to encourage increased public engagement, and reform, over time.  
There is significant evidence that taxation has, indeed, encouraged the strengthening of civil 
society in Ghana, and the analysis is usefully divided into two components: broad-based 
advocacy groups and business associations. 
6.2.3.1. Taxation and the Committee for Joint Action 
The prototypical example of taxation catalyzing new civil society organizations is the 
creation of the Alliance for Change in response to the introduction of the VAT in 1995.  
While the anti-VAT protests yielded relatively immediate gains in the accountability of the 
government they also contributed to longer-term processes of political organizing and 
engagement.  At the level of the formal political opposition, the period of cooperation as 
part of the Alliance for Change provided the foundation for more unified efforts by the 
opposition in the 1996 and 2000 elections (Frempong 2007).  Equally important, the 
experience of 1995 was a precursor to the coalescing of civil society grievances in response 
to new taxation in subsequent years.  
 
At the centre of these efforts has been the Committee for Joint Action (CJA), a loose 
association of civil society actors often working in partnership with the minority parties in 
parliament.  The CJA has been a prominent voice of discontent with government policy, 
and has been most notable for its ability to coordinate mass public mobilizations.  Building 
on the early pro-democracy movement and the VAT protests, it has demanded policies 
including political liberalization, anti-corruption efforts, expanded public spending and 
reduced taxes. 
 
The political prominence of the CJA has ebbed and flowed over time, with its moments of 
strength consistently a response to high taxes.  Of particular salience have been highly 
visible and contentious conflicts over petroleum prices (and the petroleum taxes embodied 
in those prices), consistent with the politicization of petroleum prices in other countries as 
well (Esfahani 2001, Gupta and Mahler 1995).  Petroleum price increases in 1998 vaulted 
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the CJA to prominence as an heir to the fragmented Alliance for Change, and made the CJA 
a major factor in the inability of the government to implement subsequent price increases.  
The CJA faded from prominence amidst the goodwill welcoming the new NPP government 
to power in 2001, but a second round of petroleum price increases in 2002-03 catalyzed 
renewed activism.  This pattern was repeated at the end of 2007, as the CJA led mass 
demonstration in the north that were reputed to be the largest since the VAT protests of 
1995.  The backdrop was, again, high petroleum prices, though the demands of protesters 
were much broader.  In the words of a CJA leader, “Taxes have always provided a focal 
point for public mobilization.  Have provided momentum for the resistance.” 
6.2.3.2. Taxation and Business Associations 
Taxation has likewise played an important role in the expansion of the political activism of 
business associations.  The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) had existed since 
independence, but only re-emerged as an important political player after 1999.  While this 
has been facilitated by political liberalization the immediate catalyst for AGI’s revival was 
the need to respond to the VAT.  Whereas sales tax had been collected after production, the 
VAT was collected on inputs at the point of import, only to be subsequently refunded after 
the final sale.  This meant that a share of the firms’ working capital remained tied up in 
what were effectively advance tax payments.  The AGI lobbied for tax compliant firms to 
be exempted from the upfront payment of taxes on inputs, on the assumption that full taxes 
would be paid after production and sale.  This effort was ultimately successful and the 
increased staffing and political assertiveness of the AGI has persisted far beyond the initial 
advocacy campaign. 
 
Other business associations offer similar, though more modest, lessons.  For example, the 
major business associations in Ghana came together to form an umbrella organization, the 
Private Enterprise Foundation, in 1994, just as the VAT was initially emerging as a major 
political issue facing business.  Similarly, the GUTA was initially formed as a response to 
new market taxes being imposed by the Accra Metropolitan Authority and coalesced 
around a series of major protests beginning in 1989.   
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The remaining question is what implications stronger business associations are likely to 
have for broader political developments. Business associations may have relatively narrow 
interests that differ from those of citizens in general.  Thus, while some researchers view 
business associations as potentially important contributors to improved governance others 
see them primarily as rent seeking organizations (Olson 1965, Handley 2008, Goldsmith 
2002).  This is a broader question than can be addressed here, but the prevailing view in 
Ghana is that while business associations may seek certain special benefits, greater 
organization has, on the whole, contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  AGI has emerged as a prominent voice pushing for more open political 
processes and for greater macroeconomic stability, while GUTA has remained an important 
voice for retail traders. 
6.2.4. Tax Resistance, Changes in Government and Reform 
Finally, it is clear that in Ghana the revenue raising ability of successive governments was 
shaped by public perceptions of their performance, and this, in turn, had major implications 
for their political prospects.  The Ghanaian case provides significant evidence that the 
ability of taxpayers to resist taxation by unpopular governments can contribute to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability by increasing the likelihood of a change in 
government and providing incentives for incoming governments to adopt a reformist 
agenda.  While this is a particularly indirect form of tax bargaining, it is nonetheless 
potentially very significant. 
 
Despite the relatively harmonious political environment that prevailed after the 1996 
elections, the government experienced a progressively deepening fiscal crisis, and was 
unable to raise the revenues necessary to close the gap due to its growing unpopularity.  
While the government was successful in re-introducing the VAT, and in raising the rate, it 
was crippled by its inability to raise petroleum prices or to undertake desired administrative 
reforms.  Former members of the government are adamant that their inability to raise 
additional tax revenue was the result of relentless popular opposition to such measures.  In 
this way the wavering popularity of the NDC government exacerbated the fiscal crisis, 
which, in turn, further eroded the ability of the government to supply public services or 
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implement popular public policies.  While the NDC may have lost the elections in 2000 in 
any event, there is little doubt that their revenue difficulties rendered this outcome 
significantly more likely, and thus made tax resistance an important means by which 
taxpayers indirectly encouraged reform. 
 
Of course, the simple fact that taxation gave taxpayers and the opposition an additional 
lever through which to hasten the removal of the incumbent government does not 
necessarily imply that tax reliance made the expansion of responsiveness and accountability 
more likely.  Drawing such a causal connection rests on the strength of three additional 
considerations:  First, was there evidence that the new government was significantly more 
responsive and accountable than its predecessor; second, was there evidence that the greater 
responsiveness and accountability of the new government resulted in a greater ability to 
raise revenue; and third, was there evidence that the incoming government behaved more 
responsively and accountably at least in part owing to the need to increase tax collection.  
In Ghana there is strong evidence for at least the first two conditions, and some evidence 
for the third. 
 
The arrival of the new NPP government unquestionably brought with it the expansion of 
political freedom and the strengthening of formal institutions of accountability.  At a macro 
level, the Freedom House index of political and civil liberties registered one-point 
improvements (on a seven point scale) in both measures by 2004. At a micro level one of 
the first actions of the new government was to abolish the Criminal Libel Act, which 
restricted press freedom, while consultation with civil society was expanded and business 
confidence increased dramatically.  While the NDC government had made large strides in 
these areas, it was clear that the transfer of power further changed the tone of politics. 
 
Even more evident is that the political goodwill engendered by these measures eased the 
passage of revenue measures that would have been impossible under the NDC, most 
notably fuel price increases, the NRL and the NHIL.  It is widely accepted that the new 
government enjoyed a revenue dividend as a result of the goodwill accompanying its 
political openness.  There is also a general sentiment that the speed with which the NPP 
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government expanded the inclusiveness of policy consultation, particularly with the private 
sector, partly reflected the revenue pressures it faced.  While there is not sufficient evidence 
to conclusively claim that this was a central government motive, the evidence suggests 
strongly that tax reliance was a catalyst for expanded responsiveness and accountability. 
6.3. Conclusions 
The evidence presented here leaves little doubt that in Ghana since 1981 both direct and 
indirect forms of tax bargaining have contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  Beginning in the late 1980s, conflict over taxation was an important 
catalyst for the gradual expansion of accountability, and particularly for making formal 
democratic institutions function more inclusively and effectively. Since the arrival of 
parliamentary politics in 1996 Ghana has witnessed a series of relatively explicit tax 
bargains in which the government has exchanged greater responsiveness for tax 
compliance.  These have included both broad bargains surrounding increases in the VAT 
rate, and more narrow bargains around informal sector taxation.  During this period the 
drive for additional taxation has likewise spurred the strengthening of civil society. Finally, 
government reliance on taxation gave citizens additional leverage in precipitating a change 
of government in 2000, with positive consequences for the subsequent expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability. 
 
While highlighting the importance of tax bargaining, the case study evidence also speaks to 
the reality that the likelihood of tax bargaining, and the nature of particular outcomes, is 
likely to be shaped by context.  The military government faced remarkably little opposition 
to major tax reforms in the 1980s, highlighting the extent to which highly repressive 
governments can prevent tax bargaining, at least for a time.  The examples of tax 
earmarking and of bargaining around informal sector taxation make clear that while tax 
bargaining can lead to important gains, those gains will frequently rely on continued public 
engagement and oversight.  Tax bargaining is not a one off process, and an inattentive 
citizenry can be misled, as appears to have been the case with the misleading earmarking of 
the Communications Tax in 2008. 
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The emerging lesson is that tax bargaining has been an important contributor to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability, but tax bargaining is a more complex 
process than has often been implied by earlier work.  Not only is it clear that the term tax 
bargaining encompasses a diverse set of causal processes, both implicit and explicit, but it 
is also clear that particular outcomes are shaped in important ways by contextual factors.  
These broad messages are developed further in the two case studies to follow, while 
broader conclusions are reserved for chapters 9 and 10. 
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6.4. Appendix 
 
Figure 6.A1: Total Tax Revenue by Component 1982-2007 
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Figure 6.A2: Direct Tax Revenue by Component 1982-2007 
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Figure 6.A3: Indirect Tax Revenue by Component 1982-2007 
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Figure 6.A4: Trade Tax Revenue by Component 1982-2007 
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Figure 6.A5: Expenditure by Category 1989-2006 
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7. Direct and Indirect Tax Bargaining in Kenya 1963-2008 
 
Tax bargaining in Ghana occurred against the backdrop of dramatic changes in taxation and 
economic performance; in contrast, Kenya has experienced remarkable stability.  Kenya has 
long been regarded as sub-Saharan Africa’s success story, owing to a history of consistent 
economic growth and political stability.  Despite periods of autocratic rule and economic 
stagnation under President Moi during the 1980s and 1990s, Kenya can still claim that, in 
contrast to virtually every country in the region, it has experienced neither wholesale 
economic collapse nor military rule.  This has been reflected in tax collection, which has 
consistently been among the highest in the region since independence.  Despite this stability 
Kenya has nonetheless struggled with high levels of corruption and deep ethnic and racial 
divisions, the latter the product of having been a British settler colony until independence. 
 
These unique features of the Kenyan case make it a valuable context in which to study the 
dynamics of tax bargaining.  The analysis once again begins with a detailed historical 
narrative of the political economy of taxation, followed by a discussion of the implications 
of that narrative for theories of tax bargaining.  What emerges is that cases of direct tax 
bargaining have been comparatively rare in Kenya, but the need for taxation has 
nonetheless resulted in indirect forms of tax bargaining playing an important role in the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  The reasons for this particular pattern of 
development are analyzed toward the end of the chapter. 
7.1. The Political Economy of Taxation in Kenya 
Despite the economic and political stability that has prevailed throughout most of Kenya’s 
history the country presents a complex political economy setting.  Politics is often carried 
out behind closed doors and has been shaped by complex patronage networks, ethnic and 
racial divisions, powerful special interests and a sometimes very influential bureaucratic 
elite (Throup and Hornsby 1998).  The complexity of this political environment warrants 
detailed consideration, but the constraints of space dictate a narrow focus here on the fiscal 
evolution of the state.  The tax narrative that is presented here integrates broader reflections 
on the political economy of the country where necessary, though these are invariably 
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simplified caricatures of a more complex reality.  What follows consequently aims not at 
providing a perfectly nuanced account, but, instead, at highlighting those issues that tell us 
most about the relationship between taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  As in the 
previous chapter, detailed data on tax collection and expenditure over the entire period is 
included in the Appendix. 
7.1.1. Independence and Revenue Growth 1963-73 
During the colonial period, Kenya was a British settler colony and also became home to a 
large Asian population.  The presence of the privileged white settler population contributed 
to the development of a more sophisticated political and economic base than in other 
colonies in the region, but also led to more extensive exploitation and conflict.  Within the 
realm of taxation, the White and Asian populations were subject to income taxes, excise 
taxes and import duties, while the African population was primarily subjected to a poll tax, 
which evolved into the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) late in the colonial period (Waris 
2008).  While resistance to colonial rule had broader foundations, it is worth noting that the 
poll tax was a source of significant political mobilization, with, for example, one of the 
early political associations in Western Kenya being named the North Kavirondo Taxpayers 
Association (Nyangira 1987). 
 
Independence brought little change to the structure of taxation.   Africans with significant 
incomes became subject to income taxation, while the remaining population continued to be 
subject to the collection of GPT by local governments until its abolition in 1974.  The 
abolition of the GPT appears to have been largely a response to its historical association 
with colonial rule and exploitation, while its abolition also served to increase the 
dependence of local governments on the centre. 
 
The period witnessed a progressive rise in tax revenues as a share of GDP, reflecting 
gradual improvement in administration and continuous economic growth in the country.  
By the beginning of the 1970s tax revenue had already reached almost 15% of GDP, while 
income taxation, at greater than 5% of GDP, had attained a level that was not meaningfully 
surpassed until the 1990s.  In the context of significant revenue growth and broad fiscal 
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balance there was limited political attention to taxation, and little pressure for change 
(Muriithi and Moyi 2003). 
 
The revenue gains of the period experienced virtually no public opposition, and this is 
attributable to three factors.  First, President Kenyatta, as the champion of independence, 
initially enjoyed overwhelming authority and goodwill. Second, those Africans who 
became subject to the income tax were a very small minority, and, in the context of 
tremendous improvements in their overall situation, were not inclined to protest against 
government tax measures.  Third, most of the private sector remained under the control of 
Europeans and Asians, so the African population, having gained political power, had strong 
incentives to ensure effective income taxation as a means of redistribution. 
7.1.2. Uncertainty, Administrative Decay and New Taxes 1973-78 
The period from 1973-1978 brought much greater uncertainty, owing to major external 
economic shocks and the deteriorating health of President Kenyatta (Throup and Hornsby 
1998).  The first major event was the OPEC oil crisis, which led to a sharp increase in 
world oil prices and consequently, a major foreign exchange shortage and a growing, 
though still manageable, fiscal deficit.  In response to the growing fiscal deficit an internal 
constituency for expanded taxation emerged, bolstered by similar demands from the IMF, 
from whom the government was seeking additional foreign exchange. 
 
In 1974 the government introduced a sales tax on most goods.  The tax immediately led to 
large revenue gains, as goods and services taxation increased from 3.5% of GDP in 1973-74 
to 5.9% in 1975-76.  Despite the relatively broad incidence of the tax, it saw limited 
popular resistance.  This is largely attributable to the factors that facilitated the expansion of 
income taxation: the overwhelming political authority of President Kenyatta, and the 
continuing assumption that the tax would be borne primarily by Europeans and Asians.  A 
senior official put it bluntly: “Sales tax was seen to be paid by Indians and Europeans…you 
could find a Minister saying ‘we are not supposed to be paying that tax’”. Two other factors 
played a role.  First, the sales tax was an indirect tax, and was often levied several levels 
removed from the point of sale, thus reducing the visibility of the tax to consumers.  
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Second, the government exempted “essential commodities” from taxation, selling the tax as 
a tax on luxury goods, and thus reinforcing the image that it would be borne by non-
Africans (Moyi and Ronge 2006, Karingi and Wanjala 2005).  
 
While the new tax was leading to significant revenue growth, income taxes were stagnant 
and trade taxes falling, as earlier improvements in administrative effectiveness slowed.  
Several of those interviewed attribute this weaker than expected revenue performance to 
Kenyatta’s flagging health and popularity.  By the mid-1970s Kenyatta’s declining health 
weakened his attention to policy and administration and this permitted poorer performance 
and the expansion of official corruption (Leonard 1991: 283).  Meanwhile, the assassination 
J.M. Kariuki in 1975, on the heels of the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969, saw the 
previously unassailable popularity of Kenyatta’s government begin to decline (Throup and 
Hornsby 1991).  This reduction in legitimacy, and in government professionalism at the 
highest levels, contributed to increased collusion between administration officials and 
taxpayers for purposes of tax evasion. 
 
In 1977-78 there was a major surge in tax revenue, as trade taxes, sales taxes and, to a 
lesser extent, income taxes, increased in response to a major coffee boom that had begun in 
1976.  This served to disguise the declining performance of the central government and 
eased the foreign exchange and fiscal crises of earlier years.  The death of President 
Kenyatta came in 1978, at the height of the coffee boom, and, after a period of intense 
political manoeuvring, Daniel Arap Moi assumed the Presidency. 
7.1.3. Political Transition and Stabilization 1979-82 
The rise of President Moi had two dramatic implications for politics in Kenya. First, unlike 
Kenyatta, Moi was initially relatively weak politically, and was forced to rely heavily on 
Mwai Kibaki, his Minister of Finance and Vice-President, and Charles Njonjo, the 
Attorney-General, to secure his position.  Second, whereas Kenyatta had been a member of 
the demographically and economically dominant Kikuyu ethnic group, Moi was a member 
of the smaller and more economically marginalized Kalenjin group.  He was consequently 
committed to redistributing economic resources towards the less developed areas of the 
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country, and particularly the Kalenjin areas of the Rift Valley.  This necessitated the 
dismantling of Kenyatta’s elaborate patronage network, and the creation of a political 
environment more firmly centred on himself and his allies (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 
Barkan and Chege 1989).  
 
Given his relative political vulnerability, and the positive fiscal impact of the coffee boom, 
it is not surprising that Moi did not pursue any major taxation initiatives during his early 
years in office.  However, despite the absence of new tax policy initiatives, tax collection 
was significantly stronger in the wake of the coffee boom than had been the case before it.  
In particular, there was a sharp and sustained increase in the collection of goods and 
services taxes in 1980-81.  These improvements resulted from Moi’s dismantling of the 
networks of patronage and corruption that had emerged under Kenyatta.  Quoting Leonard 
(1991: 283): “The dangerous narrowing of the interests pursued in the late Kenyatta years 
was partly reversed when Daniel arap Moi became President.  This correction of the ship of 
state was reinforced by cabinet ministers such as Njonjo, Kibaki and later, Vice-President 
Saitoti, who tended to think of policy in terms that were broader than immediate personal 
interest.”  While similar networks of patronage and corruption eventually grew up around 
Moi, the early years of transition were a period of relatively effective administration. 
 
The only major tax event during the period was the reduction of the capital gains tax in 
1981, a precursor to its suspension in 1985.  The capital gains tax had initially been 
introduced in 1975 as Minister of Finance Mwai Kibaki responded to growing demands for 
equity and redistribution by seeking to tax the earnings of the wealthy.  The tax was popular 
with the public but faced very vocal opposition from MPs and other elites who had to bear 
the weight of the new tax.  While Kenyatta’s backing had been enough to force the tax 
through parliament, his death opened the door for MPs to renew their demands for repeal.  
The reduction in the tax, and its subsequent repeal, were the predictable outcome of 
Kibaki’s declining political influence and Moi’s need to secure political allies.  That said, 
the fact that the tax was repealed despite broad popular support, and not long after the 
introduction of a broad based sales tax, was an early indicator of the ability and willingness 
of elites to manipulate tax policy to their benefit. 
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7.1.4. Political and Economic Decline 1982-90 
The coffee boom of the late 1970s had given rise to large increases in expenditure, and the 
inability of the government to rein in this spending gave rise to subsequent fiscal deficits.  
In response, leading technocrats in the Ministry of Finance, who were given significant 
independent authority, proposed a phased process of economic liberalization, along with 
efforts to continue to strengthen the administration of taxation in order to further increase 
revenue.  The spirit of reform was thus in the air amidst the broadly positive developments 
of Moi’s early years in office. 
 
The situation changed dramatically in August 1982 as a coup attempt against President Moi 
put plans for reform on hold as he moved to consolidate his power (Throup and Hornsby 
1998).  Technocrats within the government eventually persuaded Moi to resume 
engagement with the IMF and the broader reform program (Leonard 1991: 215-17), but 
progress was slow as Moi’s potential opponents were increasingly pushed out of office.  
While Kenyatta had monopolized decision-making power at the national level, he had 
generally allowed local elections and politics to be carried out unimpeded.  By contrast, the 
elections of 1983 saw a level of electoral fraud and intimidation not previously seen in 
Kenya, and by 1988 elections had lost virtually all legitimacy (Throup and Hornsby 1998).  
 
Although economic growth slowed dramatically during this period, this was largely due to 
political uncertainty and external developments, as economic policy retained a significant 
element of rationality and reform.  Moi appointed George Saitoti, a talented mathematician 
and well respected academic, as Finance Minister in 1983, and gave Saitoti and his team of 
leading civil servants, led by Philip Ndegwa, Harris Mule and Simeon Nyachae, significant 
latitude (Leonard 1991).  While corruption and other forms of public sector manipulation 
were becoming more widespread, it was clear to those involved that Moi saw it as being in 
his interest to put broad economic management in capable hands (Leonard 1991).  The 
ambitious liberalization agenda of those reformers was summarized in Sessional Paper #1 
of 1986, Economic Policy for Renewed Growth. 
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With tax revenue already high by regional standards, the President overwhelmingly 
concerned with consolidating power, and aid flows helping to close the fiscal gap, no 
significant new taxes were introduced during the 1980s (O’Brien and Ryan 2001).  The tax 
reform agenda focused on administrative improvements, reducing income and corporate tax 
rates and rationalizing import, excise and sales tax rates.  Despite initial enthusiasm 
progress was slow, as the leading bureaucrats behind the reform program had all been 
forced into retirement by 1987 and Saitoti’s attention was diverted elsewhere when he was 
named Vice-President in 1988.  Thus, despite the apparently genuine commitment to reform 
and administrative improvements, overall revenue generation declined during the decade 
from 18.2% of GDP in 1981-82 to 16.4% in 1990-91. While taxes on goods and services 
experienced a slight improvement, income tax collection fell and taxes on international 
trade experienced a prolonged and significant decline. 
 
Those involved attribute the modest fall in collection to four factors.  First was the growth 
slowdown, as both income and trade taxes tend to be higher during periods of rapid growth.  
Second, taxation had become more politicized, as parastatals increasingly failed to remit 
sales tax revenues to the tax agencies and, according to a senior tax official, “[Moi’s] allies 
were not paying tax because they were protected.” Third, the popularity and legitimacy of 
the regime were declining, and, as in the late Kenyatta period, this contributed to declining 
tax compliance and administrative probity.  Finally, the overall policy-making environment 
remained extremely hierarchical, and this reduced the level of initiative within the tax 
administration. 
7.1.5. Political Conflict and the VAT 1990-92 
After a decade of relative inaction, the 1989 Budget Speech announced that a VAT would 
be implemented the following year.  This announcement was remarkable both for its 
timing, and because of the subsequent manner in which the tax was introduced.  The timing 
was surprising in that the announcement came just as opposition to Moi’s government was 
becoming more politically assertive, and implementation consequently occurred during a 
period of high political tensions.  The political repression that accompanied the 1988 
elections had finally spurred the fracturing of Moi’s political coalition, while the end of the 
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Cold War led aid donors to become increasingly assertive about the need for political 
liberalization.  These forces culminated in a period of intense political conflict and demands 
for democratization, with elections eventually being held in 1992 (Throup and Hornsby 
1998).  
 
The decision to implement the VAT during this period largely reflected technocratic 
concerns, as the tax reform agenda had been plotted earlier, while fiscal pressure, as well as 
external pressure from the IMF, was mounting.  However, delay was still an option.  There 
is consequently a widespread belief that the government made a political decision that it 
would be best able to weather the political storm if it had greater resources at its disposal.  
One official explained that once it became clear that elections were going to occur the 
government decided that “elections were not won, they were bought.” This view is 
supported by the fact that increases in tax revenues in 1991-92 and 1992-93 were further 
accompanied by a surge in non-tax revenue.20 
 
As interesting as the motivation for the tax was the gradualist approach to implementation 
that was adopted.  Across sub-Saharan Africa VATs have generally been implemented with 
a single standard rate between 10% and 20%, along with a well-defined set of exemptions, 
which is consistent with IMF and World Bank advice.  By dramatic contrast, the Kenyan 
government introduced the VAT with fifteen rates, ranging from 0 to 150%, which broadly 
reflected the structure of the sales tax that preceded it (Karingi and Wanjala 2005, Muriithi 
and Moyi 2003).   
 
While concerns about administrative capacity played some role in this decision, it appears 
to have been overwhelmingly driven by politics.  By gradually moving away from the 
multiple rates that existed under the sales tax regime the government could simultaneously 
accommodate powerful, but narrow, special interests and obscure the impact of the changes 
from public view.  Such gradualism was an established characteristic of economic reform in 
Kenya and officials are transparent about the fact that it was a means to reduce opposition.   
                                                
20 Unfortunately a detailed break down of the sources of this revenue is unavailable, while even in later years 
the majority of non-tax revenue is simply classified under “other non-tax revenue” in government accounts. 
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And, indeed, the government had achieved a more conventional rate structure by 1997, just 
as it had planned (Karingi and Wanjala 2005).  Of course, the ability of the government to 
adopt this gradualist approach reflected the fact that it was not in a state of fiscal crisis and 
was, consequently, not entirely beholden to the IFIs and their preference for rapid reform. 
 
Ultimately, the political strategy adopted by the government was highly successful, as 
revenues increased in subsequent years, while the tax prompted very little public opposition 
despite the tense political environment.  On top of the basic effectiveness of gradualism as a 
reform strategy, the government won business support by simultaneously reforming the 
hugely inefficient system of sales tax refunds.  Meanwhile the government secured public 
approval, as it had with the sales tax in 1974, by exempting ‘essential commodities’ from 
taxation and initially selling the VAT as a luxury tax.  The importance of this strategy was 
apparent when the government attempted to apply the VAT to restaurants after the 
elections.  They immediately encountered public condemnation on the basis that food 
should not be taxed, and this forced the government to rescind the VAT, which it 
subsequently replaced with a 5% tax on turnover.  This was evidence that if the VAT had 
not been sold to the public effectively there likely would have been resistance.  
Interestingly, a 5% turnover tax on restaurants is, in fact, roughly equal in magnitude to a 
15% VAT, but the government was able to take advantage of the lack of public 
understanding to sell the former as a tax reduction. 
7.1.6. Elections, Economic Crisis and Reform 1993-97 
At the end of 1992 national elections returned Moi to power thanks to the combination of a 
divided opposition and the shrewd use of vote buying and intimidation by the government 
(Throup and Hornsby 1998).  The years that followed witnessed renewed economic growth, 
rapid economic liberalization and major improvements in tax revenue, which increased 
from 17.4% of GDP in 1992-93 to 20.5% in 1995-96. 
 
The acceleration of liberalization and tax reform both flowed from a major economic crisis 
that emerged after the election.  The government had engaged in substantial pre-election 
spending, and thus opened up a large fiscal deficit.  The government was not able to turn to 
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donors, as it had in the past, because they had become more aggressive in their demands for 
political liberalization with the end of the Cold War, and as a result had largely cut of aid in 
1991.  The resulting fiscal imbalances became a full blown crisis when the government 
uncovered the Goldenberg Scandal21, which had allowed theft from the Central Bank on a 
sufficient scale to fundamentally destabilize the entire economy, sending inflation 
skyrocketing, decimating foreign reserves, and leading to massive depreciation and 
exceptionally high interest rates (O’Brien and Ryan 2001, Legovini 2002).  
 
The government was consequently forced to turn to the IMF for emergency support and this 
accelerated the reform process at the Ministry of Finance, which was now led by an 
energetic and influential new Finance Minister, Musalia Mudavadi (Morton 1998). The 
reform program centred on devaluation and the rapid liberalization of exchange and interest 
rates, and included an accelerated process of tax reform (O’Brien and Ryan 2001, Legovini 
2002).  The rationalization of tax rates and tariffs had begun in 1986.  Reform accelerated 
with the beginning of the donor supported Tax Modernization Program (TMP) in 1990, but 
the TMP only gained full political priority after the elections and in response to the fiscal 
crisis. 
 
The post-1993 reforms focused on administration and prompted a dramatic improvement in 
income tax collection, which was further aided by a tax amnesty granted in 1994.  The 
period witnessed, among other things, the introduction of income tax self-assessment, 
strengthened audit capacity, improvements in customs processes and the progressive 
rationalization of VAT rates.  These changes were followed in 1994-95 by the creation of 
the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), which brought all of the tax agencies under one roof 
and provided greater decision making autonomy from the Ministry of Finance, greater 
flexibility with respect to hiring and salary scales and stable funding through a revenue 
retention scheme (Glenday 1996).  While the large revenue gains of the period were 
partially a consequence of renewed economic growth, real improvement was evident in 
                                                
2121 Orchestrated by Kenyan businessman Kamlesh Pattni in cooperation with the government, the 
Goldenberg Scandal saw the perpetrators receive enormous export refunds for fictitious exports of diamonds 
and gold. 
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expanded compliance by parastatals, a sustained improvement in the collection of trade 
taxes and improved income tax compliance. 
 
Despite the large increase in tax collection, the reforms experienced very little popular 
opposition, and this is attributable to three major factors.  First, the reforms were primarily 
administrative and did not involve introducing new taxes.  As a result the changes were less 
immediately visible and, more importantly, they provided a weak basis for public 
opposition, as they were aimed at improving equity in the application of the law.  Second, 
while elites and the business community might have been expected to vigorously oppose 
improved collection behind closed doors, their concerns were muted by the fact that the 
administrative changes continued to be accompanied by rate reductions.  Further, large 
businesses had long sought the expansion of the tax net to medium sized firms, in order to 
increase competitive parity, and appear to have viewed this as an important benefit of the 
reform program.  Finally, the elections, for all of their limitations, had provided the 
government with some renewed popular legitimacy.  Several administrators are adamant 
that this improved taxpayers’ compliance and that it contributed to improvements in the 
performance of the tax administration.  
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting the expansion of fuel taxes, which, while small in absolute 
revenue terms, were indicative of the broader absence of political conflict around taxation.  
Beginning in 1994 the government introduced a new fuel tax, the Road Maintenance Levy 
(RML), increased fuel prices through deregulation and, introduced a further fuel tax 
earmarked for rural electrification (Wasike 2001).  All of these changes had a reasonably 
broad-based and visible impact, but yet prompted little public response beyond the protests 
of public transport operators.   
 
This can partly be explained by the effective framing of the new taxes by government:  the 
RML reduced reliance on an unpopular and inefficient system of tolls, while road 
maintenance and rural electrification were both popular initiatives. The government further 
justified the RML by arguing that poor roads were dramatically increasing the costs of 
vehicle upkeep, and whether this was true or not, “the public swallowed the explanation 
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wholesale.” The other factor was that public transport operators, who attempted to lead 
resistance to the tax, were so unpopular with the public that their campaigning generated 
little public support.  Thus, while the earmarking of the tax provided a degree of 
responsiveness to public preferences, the overall level of political engagement around 
taxation remained very low. 
7.1.7. Instability and Upheaval 1998-2002 
President Moi was returned to power at the end of 1997 in elections that were contested by 
a divided opposition and were again marred by vote buying, intimidation and sporadic 
violence.  More troubling, however, was that 1997 marked a transition from economic 
growth and stability to economic stagnation and uncertainty.  Economic crisis began to set 
in through a combination of runaway pre-election spending, a sudden and significant 
impasse with donors and a series of negative external shocks to the economy (Legovini 
2002).  Growing political conflict and instability quickly reinforced the initial economic 
crisis.   From 1998-2002 Kenya experienced four different Ministers of Finance, beginning 
with Simeon Nyachae, while the civil service experienced major personnel changes, 
particularly in its upper ranks (Southall 1999).  This political and administrative upheaval 
had roots in, among other things, an intensified form of winner take all politics, the 
fracturing of existing patronage networks, uncertainty around succession to Moi and an 
antagonistic relationship with donors.  While a more detailed explanation of the crisis is of 
significant interest, it is beyond the scope of this particular account (Southall 1999).  
 
Developments in the revenue sphere reflected the broad state of decline and uncertainty.  
Tax revenue experienced a dramatic fall, from 20.5% of GDP in 1995-96 to 15.7% in 2001-
02.  A significant part of this fall in revenue was attributable to technical factors.  First, the 
economic crisis implied declining corporate profits, and thus lowered corporate income tax 
collection.  Second, the reduction of tariffs under the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) treaty led to a gradual decline in import duties (Cheeseman 
and Griffiths 2006).  This decline accelerated at the end of the decade amidst increasing 
problems with goods being re-imported into Kenya from other COMESA countries, and 
corresponding pressure for reduced tariffs for other importers. Third, and more generally, 
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the government was reluctant to increase tax rates during a time of severe economic 
recession. 
 
Despite these technical issues, it is widely believed that declining revenue was also the 
result of the prevailing administrative and political turmoil, and the sheer scale of the 
revenue losses supports this claim.  While the government remained committed to tax 
collection, and the administrative apparatus remained very sophisticated by regional 
standards, there is a belief among many senior officials that staff turnover and 
disillusionment with the broader political context led to declining performance.  High levels 
of staff turnover led to a loss of competence and institutional memory, but equally had a 
sharply negative impact on morale.  Meanwhile, the declining legitimacy and popularity of 
the government led to some decline in the commitment to probity within the tax 
administration. 
 
The declining legitimacy and popularity of the government equally appears to have 
prompted declining tax compliance. In fact, several senior officials, of mixed political 
orientation, argue confidently that it was an informal “opposition strategy” to seek to 
actively undermine the fiscal position of the government.  “Those who were not allies of 
Moi became more difficult to tax,” owing to a willingness to “do almost anything to stifle 
the government” and a feeling that “we don’t want to give them the money to beat us”. The 
impact of popular opposition to taxation carried over to the broad inability of the 
government to introduce new taxation.  This was exemplified by a government attempt to 
introduce new taxes in 1998.  The government proposed the introduction of taxes on low-
interest loans that financial institutions were providing to their employees as a tax-free 
benefit.  This was a relatively modest tax proposal affecting a tiny segment of the 
population, but became a significant factor, along with a proposal to revoke pay increases 
for teachers, in launching a nationwide strike.  The strike came to focus on broader issues of 
official corruption and mismanagement and while it was ultimately broken up by force, it 
did lead the government to back down on the new tax proposal (Southall 1999). 
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The one exception to the inability of the government to secure new revenue was the 
introduction of a 5% excise tax on mobile phone use in 2002.  The tax was attractive to the 
government due to its administrative simplicity and guaranteed revenue impact.  It is of 
interest to this research because it reveals that even at times of high political tension the 
government was able to pass new taxation if it was sufficiently strategic, as only the service 
providers themselves presented significant opposition to the tax.  One reason was that the 
timing was highly effective, as the tax was introduced early on in the history of mobile 
telephony, when use remained relatively less common and when consumers remained 
focused on the enormous benefits relative to the use of landlines.  In addition, the new 
revenue was officially earmarked for micro-finance initiatives, rural electrification and 
HIV/AIDS programs, all of which were popular with the public and, as importantly, 
parliament.  Yet, while the earmarking strategy was effective for selling the tax, there is 
great uncertainty about whether all of the resources were ever, in fact, used for those 
purposes. 
7.1.8. Political Liberalization and Economic Recovery 2003-2007 
The elections at the end of 2002 brought President Mwai Kibaki to power as the leader of a 
unified national opposition under the banner of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).  
The new government ushered in a period of unprecedented, if still very imperfect, political 
openness, with the Freedom House indicators of political and civil liberties jumping by 
three and two points respectively between 2001 and 2003.  These changes, coupled with 
improved external economic conditions and renewed dialogue with donors, facilitated a 
major economic recovery.  While fissures in the ruling coalition emerged dramatically in 
2005, progress during the first three years under the new government was notable. 
 
These broad improvements were reflected in exceptional improvements in tax revenue 
collection, which expanded from 15.7% of GDP in 2001-02 to 21.8% of GDP in 2004-05.  
The period did not witness any major tax policy changes, and the major revenue gains are 
thus attributable to the economic recovery and to improved collection of existing taxes. 
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Improved compliance was attributable in large part to significant administrative reforms, 
which were, in turn, the product of high-level political commitment. These reforms 
included the functional integration of the different tax departments within the KRA, a new 
cross-cutting staff training program, the increasing use of computers, and a dramatic new 
emphasis on Results Based Management and the attainment of revenue targets. These 
administrative reforms were coupled with an informal understanding that the new 
government was significantly less willing than its predecessor to countenance tax evasion 
by its allies (Moye and Ronge 2006). 
 
Political commitment to these reforms appears to reflect four factors.  First, the government 
was confronted with a significant fiscal deficit.  Second, this fiscal deficit made the 
government relatively beholden to donors, and the government was eager to reduce this 
reliance given a long history of antagonism.  Third, the government had made large 
spending promises during the elections, most notably to provide free primary education.  
These commitments all required additional revenue.  Finally, many of those close to the 
process attribute it to the fact that Kibaki was a technocrat, committed to effective 
management, whereas Moi’s more populist instincts had made taxation less of a priority. 
 
Equally important to revenue gains was the public goodwill that greeted the new 
government, as this goodwill increased the willingness of taxpayers to comply and 
improved morale within the tax administration.  In fact, increases in public revenue often 
appeared to be as much a source of public pride as of popular anger, regularly appearing 
prominently in the major newspapers and in speeches by politicians.  Public interest in 
revenue collection is widely noted by those within the tax administration, and is reflected in 
the fact that the huge revenue gains during the period elicited very little public resistance.  
A tax officer explained that, “the biggest thing is that there is renewed goodwill towards the 
government…this has made it much easier to extract revenue from taxpayers”. Tax officials 
likewise explain that when disagreements emerged within the ruling coalition in 2005, tax 
compliance simultaneously declined, and this is reflected in reduced levels of tax collection 
in 2004-05 and 2005-06. 
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Not only did the NARC government benefit from public goodwill, it sought to explicitly 
connect its popular initiatives with the drive for increased tax revenue.  This was true of the 
provision of free primary education, and was likewise true of the creation of Constituency 
Development Funds (CDFs), which were introduced in 2003 and earmarked 2.5% of total 
ordinary revenues for local development projects under the leadership of local MPs.  
Despite concerns about the mismanagement of the CDFs, they achieved significant public 
notoriety and popularity and were an obvious way to ensure the support of MPs for revenue 
measures (Kimenyi 2005).  Particularly interesting was a government effort to link tax 
compliance to the more amorphous goal of achieving aid independence, as reflected in the 
KRA slogan “Tulipe Ushuru, Tujitegemee” – paying tax is earning independence.  While 
the practical impact of aid independence on citizen welfare is difficult to assess, it is clear 
that the call for aid independence achieved public resonance, and thus aided tax collection. 
 
Aside from this broad story, various tax episodes with smaller revenue implications provide 
useful insights into the politics of taxation during the period.  Most of these cases point to 
the weakness of public resistance to taxation, and the relative absence of direct tax 
bargaining.  In July 2003 the government increased the excise tax on mobile phone usage 
from 5% to 10%, but, as was the case in 2002, public opposition was largely restricted to 
the mobile operators themselves (GSM Association 2007). The 2006 Budget Speech 
included an almost 50% increase in the RML, but resistance was again muted due to 
genuine public interest in road maintenance and the inability of transport operators to 
mobilize public support.  The only major hurdle to passing the new tax was parliamentary 
approval, and this was achieved through an earlier decision to decentralize part of the funds 
for use in the upkeep of local roads.  Similarly, a Turnover Tax, which imposed a 3% tax on 
the turnover of small and informal sector firms, was passed in parliament in 2007, and 
introduced in early 2008, apparently in response to demands from larger firms for greater 
equity in taxation.  While the implementation was slowed by an apparent lack of 
enthusiasm at KRA, which had long viewed the costs of collection as excessively high, the 
passage of the bill was never subject to organized resistance from a significant segment of 
the business community. 
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A government decision to require the use of Electronic Tax Registers (ETRs) in all VAT 
registered shops was the one tax episode that spurred significant public opposition, but 
nonetheless yielded little in the way of tax bargaining.  The ETRs were expected to reduce 
the scope for tax evasion by creating an inalterable record of every transaction.  The 
drawback was that compliance costs were meaningful, including purchase and maintenance 
of ETRs, additional bookkeeping requirements and difficulty in dealing with refunds.  
These concerns, along with a general desire to avoid tighter tax enforcement, led traders, 
under the umbrella of the newly formed United Business Association (UBA), to engage in 
large-scale protests in Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, and to bring lawsuits against the 
government. 
 
Yet, despite substantial resistance, the government offered neither concessions nor 
compromise, as it retained popular support outside of the protesters.  This was largely 
attributable to the political goodwill that continued to sustain the government, as there is a 
widespread belief that the same reform could never have succeeded under the Moi 
government.  The inability of the UBA to garner public support was further exacerbated by 
the fact that members quickly came to be labelled tax evaders, which, in turn, was 
facilitated by popular perceptions of the protesters as a “group of Asians” (despite having 
an African chairman).  Thus, as had been the case in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
implementation of new taxes was facilitated by the perception that the weight of taxation 
would be borne by the economically privileged minority. 
 
While most of the population thus remained relatively unable, or unwilling, to mobilize 
against taxation or to engage in tax bargaining, events from 2006 onwards provided further 
evidence of the power exercised by elites.  The 2006 Budget Speech announced two 
measures that would specifically affect elites: the taxation of the very large non-salary 
benefits enjoyed by MPs and the reintroduction of the capital gains tax, which had been 
suspended in 1985.  These two measures, and particularly the tax on MPs, enjoyed 
overwhelming public support, but were nonetheless rejected by parliament.  Voters vowed 
that they would punish the intransigent MPs at the ballot box and there was, indeed, 
enormous turnover of MPs in the 2007 elections.  There was thus some expectation that 
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when the taxation of MP benefits was reintroduced in the 2008 Budget Speech MPs would 
be forced to accept the measure.  Yet, in spite of public outrage, MPs again rejected the 
measure, while the reintroduction of the capital gains tax was not even proposed. 
7.1.9. Political Crisis and the Elections of 2007 
The elections at the end of 2007 resulted in accusations of electoral fraud and the outbreak 
of widespread violence along ethnic and political lines.  With both sides initially refusing to 
make concessions the violence continued unabated for over a month, killing at least a 
thousand people and displacing more than half a million.  The violence and political 
uncertainty in turn prompted a growing economic crisis as businesses shut down, tourism 
ground to a halt and investment ceased. 
 
While taxation did not figure prominently in the political conflict, the course of the conflict 
sheds light on the impact of tax reliance on broader political outcomes.  The crisis led the 
business community to emerge as a powerful voice in favour of a settlement, and as the 
crisis wore on business leaders used the threat of refusing to pay taxes to prod the political 
leadership towards a resolution.  While those involved cannot say with certainty how large 
a role this threat played, there is a general sense that pressure from the business community 
was important.  More generally, it is clear that the economic costs of political stalemate, 
including the potentially crippling impact on government revenue, increased the urgency 
with which political leaders sought a resolution. 
7.2. Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Kenya 
The most striking feature of the political economy of taxation in Kenya is the relative 
complexity of reform processes.  Rather than comprising a set of discrete, well-defined 
changes, tax reform was often continuous and gradual, while collection experienced 
significant ups and downs over time.  This makes the analysis of tax reform more complex, 
and requires an attention to both direct and indirect forms of tax bargaining. 
 
The remainder of the analysis proceeds in three parts.  The first section presents a more 
detailed discussion of the relative absence of cases of direct, explicit, tax bargaining.  The 
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second section argues that despite this, indirect tax bargaining, through tax resistance and 
the growth of civil society, has been important to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  Section three presents a series of factors that can account for the pattern of 
tax bargaining observed in Kenya. 
7.2.1. The Absence of Direct Tax Bargaining 
In Kenya there has been very little public conflict over taxation, and even less evidence of 
direct tax bargaining between taxpayers and governments.  One very well placed policy 
maker put it plainly, explaining that, “I have always been very surprised that Kenyans don’t 
take more interest in tax issues, but they simply do not”. 
 
There has been an absence of meaningful public engagement during several periods of 
significant tax reform.  From 1993-1996 total levels of tax collection, especially of income 
and corporate taxes, increased dramatically.  While increasing collection was partly the 
result of strong economic growth, it is accepted that tax enforcement was improved 
significantly.  Yet, despite these new tax burdens there were no sustained public protests 
nor is there evidence of significant tax bargaining and conflict behind the scenes.  Even 
more notable was the absence of public mobilization around the introduction of the VAT.  
The VAT was introduced in the midst of elevated political tensions and mass political 
mobilization surrounding demands for democratization, but there is scant evidence that the 
new tax became a rallying point for the opposition.  This stands in sharp contrast to the role 
of the VAT as a catalyst for broad based political mobilization in Ghana at a similar 
moment in its political history.  Finally, major increases in fuel prices and fuel taxes have 
likewise rarely been a source of significant political conflict, despite their broad impact and 
high level of visibility.  This was particularly true in 1994 when both prices and taxes were 
increased, but no major public mobilization ensued. 
 
One exception to the absence of taxpayer mobilization around tax issues was the emergence 
of large-scale protests against the introduction of ETRs, but this resulted in neither the 
repeal of the law nor concessions by government.  Aside from this example, debates over 
tax policy have largely been restricted to MPs and elites who have merely sought to defend 
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established privileges and exemptions. The capital gains tax was successfully suspended in 
1985 as the result of opposition from MPs and elites, while efforts to reintroduce the capital 
gains tax and to introduce the taxation of MPs’ benefits were rebuffed by parliament in 
recent years. 
 
At a relatively small scale there have been a handful of direct tax bargains between MPs 
and the Executive, but there is little evidence of significant public engagement. The most 
interesting examples are narrow tax bargains in which the government offered MPs greater 
authority over public expenditure in an effort to secure their support for broader tax 
collection.  In seeking to expand the RML the government agreed to decentralize part of the 
fund, thus increasing the power wielded by MPs.  Likewise, in the wake of the 2002 
elections, the creation of the CDFs was an explicit response to demands from MPs for 
greater control over public spending, and was at least partly motivated by the broader 
government goal of gaining support for increased tax collection.  These examples represent 
a modest expansion of governmental accountability, in so far as they contributed to 
increasing parliamentary authority at the expense of the Executive, but the absence of 
broader public engagement invites scepticism.  For example, the new tax on mobile phone 
usage was initially earmarked for microfinance, rural electrification and HIV/AIDS 
programs, but there is no evidence that the funds were reliably allocated according to the 
original promise. 
7.2.2. The Importance of Indirect Tax Bargaining 
The relative absence of direct tax bargaining in Kenya does not similarly imply the absence 
of indirect tax bargaining.  The ability of taxpayers to resist taxation by unpopular 
governments has created broad pressure for increased responsiveness and accountability, 
while taxation has played a role in catalyzing the growth and strengthening of civil society.  
What follows presents evidence of both processes. 
7.2.2.1. Tax Compliance, Tax Resistance and Reform  
Despite the relative absence of direct tax bargaining, or of major public conflict over 
taxation, it is very clear that the popularity and perceived legitimacy of successive Kenyan 
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governments has shaped their ability to raise revenue.  Resistance to taxation has 
contributed to the fiscal weakness of unpopular governments, and has provided added 
pressure for changes in government and positive incentives for subsequent reform. 
 
The relative inability of governments with flagging popularity to raise tax revenue was 
modestly apparent during the first three decades after independence.  From 1975-78 the 
Kenyatta government experienced increasing tax collection difficulties as it began to lose 
public confidence.  This pattern was reversed during the optimistic early days of the Moi 
government, as tax collection improved noticeably.  As Moi’s popularity declined after the 
mid-1980s the government again experienced increasing difficulty sustaining tax collection 
and closing a growing fiscal deficit.  Finally, the elections of 1992, which imbued the 
government with some renewed legitimacy also set the stage for a dramatic period of tax 
reform and a major surge in revenue collection. 
 
While tax collection thus consistently tracked the broad fortunes of governments for the 
first three decades after independence, the political consequences were modest as firmly 
entrenched governments successfully weathered the fiscal downturns that resulted from 
declining popularity.  This began to change in the late 1990s, as tax resistance took on 
greater political importance.  Revenues began to fall rapidly after 1997, and while this was 
driven to a significant degree by economic crisis, it also reflected the fact that the declining 
popularity of the government was eroding administrative probity and encouraging citizens 
to engage in tax evasion and avoidance.  This view is widely shared by tax officials, and 
some go so far as to describe this as a semi-explicit opposition strategy to weaken the Moi 
government in anticipation of important elections in 2002. 
 
The growing fiscal crisis undermined the ability of the government to implement popular 
public programs and reduced the capacity of the government to dispense patronage to 
sustain elite support.  This, in turn, contributed to Moi’s defeat in the 2002 election.  Thus, 
the ability of citizens to resist taxation by an unpopular government contributed to change.  
Furthermore, the tax resistance that contributed to Moi’s defeat also created strong 
incentives for the incoming government to expand responsiveness and accountability in 
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order to secure improved tax compliance and collection.  This contention is supported by 
three key facts.  First, the new government was responsible for substantial improvements in 
responsiveness and accountability by any available cross-country measure.  Second, efforts 
to improve tax collection were facilitated by widely acknowledged improvements in the 
willingness of citizens to pay taxes.  And, finally, there is evidence that in implementing its 
reform program the government was explicitly motivated by the revenue imperative, as it 
repeatedly sought to connect tax compliance to key aspects of the reform agenda, including 
free primary education, the creation of the CDFs and aid independence.  Thus, there is 
important evidence that tax conflicts contributed to the change in government and provided 
significant additional incentives for reform, thus contributing to the expansion of both 
responsiveness and accountability. 
 
While the events around the 2002 elections thus provide the most compelling evidence of 
the importance of indirect tax bargaining, a similar pattern unfolded in the aftermath of the 
2007 elections.  The outbreak of violence posed a major threat to Kenyan businesses, so the 
major business associations pushed the government for a peaceful settlement.  The business 
community used their status as taxpayers in calling for a resolution of the political impasse 
by explicitly threatening to withhold tax revenue if the government failed to make peace.  
While there were diverse factors that contributed to the resolution of the post-election crisis, 
many observers feel that that role of the business community was significant, and that the 
need to sustain tax revenue played an important part in pushing the government towards 
peace.  Consistent with this view is the fact that the level of tax collection returned to 
normal in the aftermath of the violence, following earlier fears of a fiscal crisis. 
 
The events surrounding the post-election violence also highlight the broader argument that 
governments that are reliant on tax revenue are likely to have significantly stronger 
incentives to resolve such crises in order to avoid a fiscal emergency.  The violence that 
followed the elections led to a major decline in economic activity, and this would 
eventually have generated a fiscal crisis, irrespective of the willingness of businesses to pay 
taxes.  In simplest terms, the government could not afford to allow a protracted period of 
violence due to the fiscal consequences, whereas pressure for a resolution would have been 
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significantly reduced had the government had access to non-tax revenues that were less 
sensitive to conflict.  While the economic costs of civil conflict are significant anywhere, 
they have a much more immediate impact on government when the government is reliant 
on tax revenue. This follows scholarship on civil war in sub-Saharan Africa, which argues 
that conflict is likely to subside when the combatants can no longer afford to sustain it 
(Leonard and Strauss 2003).  This observation is neither new, nor strictly an example of tax 
bargaining, but reinforces the more general argument that governments that are reliant on 
tax revenue are more likely to be responsive and accountable. 
7.2.2.2. Taxation, Civil Society and Public Engagement  
Taxation has also contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in 
Kenya by acting as a catalyst for the strengthening of civil society.  This has been true of 
both business associations, for whom the threat of taxation has encouraged greater 
engagement, and broader civil society organizations, several of which have organized 
advocacy campaigns explicitly focused on the rights of taxpayers. 
7.2.2.2.1. Business Associations 
While business associations have the potential to play an important role in supporting the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability, research about business associations in the 
developing world has argued that in practice business associations have frequently sought 
narrow benefits for their most powerful members, rather than pursuing broad-based 
improvements in governance (Olson 1965, Goldsmith 2002, Brautigam, Rakner and Taylor 
2002).  The political challenge thus largely lies in shifting business associations from an 
essentially rent-seeking role to engaging in “constructive contestation” with government 
(Handley 2008: 2).  In Kenya, there is evidence that taxation has contributed to such a shift. 
 
Under President Moi, the country’s major business associations were primarily engaged in 
lobbying for narrow benefits rather than providing a unified voice for change.  This 
reflected the fact that the Moi government offered significant scope for these kinds of 
narrow benefits.  This dynamic began to change after the 2002 election in response to 
political opening, reduced opportunities for narrow rent seeking and the shifting burden of 
taxation.  Whereas under Moi businesses allied with the government were able to secure 
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formal and informal relief from paying their full share of taxes, the increasingly aggressive, 
and balanced, enforcement of taxation after 2002 provided stronger incentives for business 
to bargain with government on a collective basis.  Taxes have correspondingly remained 
near the top of the agenda for the large business associations, which have particularly 
argued for broadening the tax base.  The government has made at least halting efforts to 
respond to this demand, and business leaders report that the increased willingness of 
business to comply with tax laws has been driven in part by reciprocal efforts by the 
government to extend taxation to small and medium enterprises. 
 
While fairer enforcement of taxation has thus contributed to large business associations 
engaging more constructively with government, it has also directly catalyzed the growth of 
business associations representing small and medium enterprises, which were historically 
excluded from the larger associations.  The most high profile example was the emergence 
of the UBA, which was founded in 2001 to oppose a government decision to require all 
traders to use Stock Cards, designed to monitor movements in their inventory of goods and 
thus curb tax evasion.  The organization subsequently grew to greater prominence 
organizing resistance to the introduction of ETRs, and opted for further formalization and 
the creation of a permanent Secretariat in response to continued government efforts to 
improve tax collection from medium sized firms. 
 
Taxation has also played a role in strengthening informal sector associations, including the 
Nairobi Informal Sector Confederation (NISCOF).  NISCOF and similar associations have 
gained some prominence in recent years in response to political liberalization and growing 
government interest in engaging with the sector, driven, in turn, by a desire to expand the 
tax base.  The Kenya Private Sector Association (KEPSA) has also supported the growth of 
NISCOF, with KEPSA members hoping to increase their political legitimacy and encourage 
the formalization of small firms.  Interestingly, informal sector associations are not simply 
focused on resisting taxation but also in bargaining directly with government.  While 
bargaining is highly informal, NISCOF and others have hoped to exchange greater tax 
compliance for the simplification of business registration rules, a strengthened political 
voice and greater protection from the predation of municipal officers seeking bribes.  As 
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captured by Sheila Kamunyori (2007: 17) in her study of the association, “NISCOF was 
clear that street vendors would be willing to pay tax, in return for guaranteed services (or at 
least the right to demand these services).” 
7.2.2.2.2. Civil Society and Taxpayer Mobilization  
While the threat posed by taxation has catalyzed the growth and more active engagement of 
business associations, it has also prompted responses from a broader range of civil society 
organizations.  These organizations have been explicitly organized around the idea that the 
payment of taxes entitles taxpayers to demand responsiveness and accountability from 
government.  While these organizations have had a modest absolute impact on the 
behaviour of government, often owing to the unwillingness of government to make 
concessions, they point to the mobilizing potential of taxation and provide some indication 
of opportunities for future civil society engagement. 
 
The Karen and Langata District Association (KLDA), which represents taxpayers from one 
of Nairobi’s wealthiest neighbourhoods, challenged the right of the City Council to collect 
taxes in light of the absence of any transparency or accountability.  The KLDA won a court 
decision in 1995 that suspended the right of the City Council to collect property taxes and 
mandated that taxes be placed in an escrow account until the City Council had put in place 
appropriately transparent financial accounts.  Unfortunately, this decision resulted in a 
stalemate rather than leading to an effective tax bargain: Taxes continued to be placed in 
the escrow as of the time of writing, with the KLDA demanding that it be given greater 
control over district development planning before releasing the funds. 
 
The KLDA was followed by another wealthy group of taxpayers who created the We Can 
Do It (WCDI) campaign.  The group challenged the right of the City Council to collect 
property taxes until such time as it could demonstrate improved accountability, and a court 
ruled in its favour in both 2001 and 2004.  The WCDI campaign demanded that stakeholder 
boards be created to expand public participation in municipal management and also 
demanded that property taxes be based on the level of development of the property, as 
opposed to land area alone.  Yet, as of the time of writing, there had been no compromise, 
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with the local government unwilling to create stakeholder boards and claiming that property 
valuation based on the level of development was beyond the capacity of the council (Kelly 
2000).  
 
Finally, the Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations (KARA) was founded in 1999 to 
connect and support residents’ associations in their demands for improved government 
performance.   While the organization has addressed a huge array of primarily urban 
development issues, the work of KARA is underpinned by the argument that tax payment 
provides residents with a basis for demanding improved performance from government.    
Although the organization is still relatively young, the effort to link taxation and public 
accountability as a strategy for mobilizing public advocacy does appear to have meaningful 
resonance within the forums in which the organization operates. 
 
While all of these organizations have made some strides in linking taxation to broader 
demands for responsiveness and accountability, they are plagued by the fact that they have 
been largely unable to reach beyond relatively elite constituencies.  A more recent initiative 
has sought to achieve this broader outreach and make demands for public responsiveness 
and accountability on the basis of the status of its members as taxpayers.  The National 
Taxpayers’ Association (NTA) was launched in 2007 as a joint initiative of the Centre for 
Governance and Development (CGD) and the UK Department for International 
Development.  The practical focus of the NTA has been on monitoring local expenditure 
under the CDFs, and this objective is shared with several other organizations in the country.  
The agenda thus remains very expenditure focused but there is an internal desire to engage 
more directly with issues of tax policy and administration.  More generally, one of the goals 
of the NTA has been to make taxpayer rights a central theme underpinning and motivating 
advocacy efforts and campaign organizers report significant success in this regard.  To 
quote one leader of the campaign, “They [local residents] get really excited when you 
explain to them that they are actually the ones who fund the government, [and that] this can 
be negotiated.” The early work of the NTA thus presents important, though still tentative, 
evidence that taxation can be a catalyst for broad-based community organizing and 
demands for responsiveness and accountability. 
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While the evolution of the NTA is very interesting, it also presents a mystery.  The link 
between taxation and accountability appears to have significant public resonance, and is 
echoed by other observers.  One well-placed observer notes that, “there is a huge amount of 
concern about tax and about how it is being used.  A strong feeling that ‘this is our 
money.’”  Yet, these claims are seemingly at odds with the history of taxation in the 
country, which has been characterized by relatively little conflict or public engagement.  
Central to this story, in the view of those involved, has been the role of the CDFs in 
expanding public awareness and engagement in recent years.  While the CDFs were 
initially a concession to MPs hoping to use them to entrench their political positions, an 
unexpected consequence has been to raise awareness and reinforce the message among 
taxpayers that government funds are ‘their money’.  The lesson, it seems, is that taxation 
can be a powerful basis for organizing public engagement when citizens are aware of the 
taxes that they pay and have come to expect reciprocity from government. 
7.2.3. Explaining Patterns of Tax Bargaining 
There is thus significant evidence that while direct tax bargaining has been rare in Kenya, 
indirect tax bargaining has made an important contribution to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability.  This finding is somewhat surprising, as on the surface 
Kenya would seem to present a case in which direct tax bargaining would be particularly 
likely: Kenya has collected the most tax revenue of any country in the region in most years 
since independence, has a relatively active civil society and data from the Afrobarometer 
survey indicates that Kenyans are comparatively likely to support tax avoidance and 
evasion when the government is deemed to be unaccountable.22 
 
The purpose of this last section is thus to offer an explanation for the relative absence of 
direct tax bargaining and for the importance of indirect forms of tax bargaining.  What 
follows presents four broad factors that help to explain observed patterns: coercion, 
                                                
22 The survey asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement that, “The department of taxes 
always has the right to make people pay taxes”.  Out of sixteen countries Ghanaians had the second highest 
level of agreement, while Kenya was ninth.  Ethiopia, which is the subject of the next chapter, was not 
surveyed. 
 230 
strategic government behaviour, fragmented taxpayer interests and the history of taxation in 
Kenya.  The first three factors are focused on explaining the absence of direct tax 
bargaining, while the fourth factor seeks to explain both the absence of direct tax 
bargaining and the prominence of indirect tax bargaining. 
7.2.3.1. Coercion 
Despite a high degree of political stability, Kenyan politics remained relatively autocratic 
until the 2002 elections, with the period from the mid-1980s until 1991 being particularly 
repressive.  When asked why there was not more of a public response to taxation 
throughout the period, and particularly to the introduction of the VAT in 1990, most 
observers first point to the general absence of political liberties.  While there were large 
public protests leading to the introduction of elections in 1992, this mass political action 
stood in contrast to the special interest driven politics of the period.  In the presence of 
relatively limited outlets for tax protest we might reasonably expect taxpayers to resort to 
tax evasion and avoidance rather than confronting the state directly, and evidence of high 
levels of evasion and avoidance in both the late 1980s and the late 1990s are consistent with 
such a response. 
 
While the direct impact of coercion on levels of public engagement with tax issues cannot 
be directly observed, it is clear that political repression limited political debate.  That said 
this is alone is not a sufficient explanation for the absence of direct tax bargaining.  The 
Ghanaian case of mobilization against the VAT makes clear that taxation can be a catalyst 
for protest even where the government remains relatively authoritarian (Osei 2000).  
Furthermore, reduced political repression since 2003 has not given rise to any dramatic 
examples of direct tax bargaining despite large increases in revenue collection. 
7.2.3.2. Strategic Government Behaviour 
The second issue that is frequently proposed in interviews to explain the lack of public 
action around taxation is the strategic behaviour of government in introducing new tax 
measures.  This can be broken into two areas:  the importance of timing when introducing 
new measures, and the importance of gradualism for disarming public opposition. 
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7.2.3.2.1. Timing 
The most ambitious tax reforms undertaken by the government occurred following the 
elections of 1992 and 2002, both of which were periods of relative political goodwill and of 
broader economic boom.  The controversial capital gains tax in the 1970s followed the 
same pattern, as it was implemented during the early phases of the coffee boom and was 
pitched in part as a tax on that new wealth.  Similarly, while the VAT was introduced in 
1990, more controversial efforts to extend taxation to services and to rationalize the rate 
structure were put off until after the 1992 election.  The government was thus able to take 
advantage of popular goodwill to push through reforms that might otherwise have been 
highly controversial.  Once the reforms had been implemented it was, in turn, unlikely that 
they would be subsequently reversed, although the capital gains tax was suspended in 1985.  
One senior official captured this dynamic succinctly: “You need to introduce new taxes at a 
time of boom.  That is the politics of taxation.”  By observing this basic rule the 
government appears to have limited the likelihood of conflict and thus minimized the need 
for tax bargaining. 
7.2.3.2.2. Gradualism 
The government consistently pursued a policy of gradualism when undertaking any kind of 
economic reform.  The broad program of economic liberalization, for example, was 
prominently proposed within government as early as 1982, but reforms were still being 
implemented in the late-1990s. This stands in contrast to many other countries in the region, 
which have often been characterized by rapid and clearly defined periods of reform, in part 
due to the demands of international donors (O’Brien and Ryan 2001).  
 
Senior policy makers are transparent about the fact that the gradualist approach to reform 
has been driven by a desire to reduce public resistance.  Gradualism has been a means to 
limit the amount of public attention given to reform programs and to ensure that the impact 
is spread over time and thus less likely to spark a spontaneous public reaction.  While 
policy makers were frequently more concerned about the influence of narrow special 
interests than of the public at large, the reform strategy served to limit resistance on both 
fronts.  One of Kenya’s prominent economic policy makers reports gaining a measure of 
infamy with international organizations for arguing that, “the more you involve people in 
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reform the less likely you are to achieve your goals.  The less transparent you are the more 
likely you are to succeed”. This view seems to have been widely shared by similarly placed 
officials, who propose that Kenya has been characterized by “reform by stealth” and 
“reform by subterfuge”.  Within the realm of taxation this was most apparent in the case of 
the VAT, as the rationalization of the rate structure, and the extension of the new tax to 
services, was stretched over more than six years. 
7.2.3.3. The Fragmentation of Taxpayer Interests 
The third issue that appears to have played a part in the relative absence of direct tax 
bargaining is that taxpayers have rarely presented a united response to government tax 
initiatives.  Because of the absence of a unified position taxpayers have not wielded the 
political power and cohesion necessary to compel government concessions.  The lack of 
unity among taxpayers has two notable causes.  First, powerful individuals and interests 
have preferred to seek narrow benefits rather than seeking to bargain for collective benefits.  
Second, groups seeking to resist new taxation have often failed to gain broader popular 
support.  Central to the lack of unity among taxpayers has been the extent of racial 
cleavages in the country, and this is discussed in detail at the end of this section. 
7.2.3.3.1. Elite Fragmentation and Narrow Benefit Seeking 
When confronted with taxation, taxpayers may respond collectively with other taxpayers in 
an effort to secure a broad tax bargain with government or may respond by seeking narrow 
benefits for themselves.  For example, a business confronted with the increasingly assertive 
collection of corporate taxes may: (a) opt to work with other businesses to ensure that the 
government improves the business environment in exchange for tax compliance, or; (b) 
work through individual contacts in government to ensure that it will be spared part of the 
new tax burden.  In broad terms, many Kenyan elites have preferred to pursue narrow 
benefits, thus undermining the potential for more productive bargaining between taxpayers 
and governments.  This outcome is broadly consistent with the predictions of pioneering 
work by Margaret Levi (1988: 64), who suggested that governments might seek to purchase 
the allegiance of a small number of influential taxpayers using “side payments”, rather than 
engaging in tax bargaining with a broader group. 
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It is, of course, difficult to point directly at the narrow, and informal, privileges enjoyed by 
individuals and small groups precisely because those privileges are kept secret due to their 
illegality or unpopularity.  That said, Kenya is remarkable in that the efforts of politicians to 
avoid taxation have often played out in the public domain.  Parliament’s refusal to pass 
laws taxing their benefits or to re-institute the capital gains tax is indicative of a class that is 
happy to tax others, secure in the knowledge that they will remain relatively less affected.  
This dynamic is similarly apparent in the poorly kept secret that, particularly under Moi, the 
politically well connected frequently paid less tax then they should have by law, 
exemplified by the consistent failure of state-controlled firms to pay taxes.  In an 
environment in which the relatively powerful are able to pursue narrow benefits and 
exemptions it is little surprise that elites have historically not led efforts to catalyze public 
demands for reciprocity in taxation.  In fact, those who enjoy privileged treatment under an 
existing tax system are likely to prefer to keep tax issues off the political agenda so as not to 
draw attention to their privilege. 
 
As was noted earlier, such a pattern of narrow benefit seeking was equally apparent among 
many business elites, at least until 2003.  A well-placed observer of the historical role 
played by the Kenya Alliance of Manufacturers, likely Kenya’s strongest business 
association, captures this succinctly.  He explains that, “a few people got what they wanted, 
but they did not go after a whole business agenda for manufacturing.”  The preference for 
seeking narrow benefits seems to have reflected the fact that political repression made it 
difficult to pursue a national agenda, while widespread corruption made it relatively 
straightforward to secure narrow benefits and exemptions. 
7.2.3.3.2. The Absence of Popular Support 
While the ability of elites to pursue narrow benefits has eroded the likelihood of unified tax 
bargaining, an equally important issue has been the inability of those resisting taxation to 
garner significant popular support.  Two examples stand out: the conflict over ETRs and the 
absence of conflict over fuel taxes. 
 
While major protests erupted in response to government legislation requiring the use of 
ETRs by all VAT registered firms, those protests were undermined by the fact that the 
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protesters, numerous as they were, never enjoyed broad based popular support.  The 
government successfully labelled them tax evaders, and, in the public mind, this 
outweighed trader complaints about the costs of collection.  This allowed the government to 
ignore the widespread protests and press forward with the measure without making any 
meaningful concessions.  In similar fashion, increases in fuel prices have consistently been 
met with complaints from public transport operators.  Yet, despite the fact that the public 
bears the higher costs of transport that result, the transport operators have never enjoyed 
broad public support in their protests against fuel taxes.  It is broadly believed that this has 
resulted from the deep unpopularity of public transport operators, who are viewed as 
reckless, disrespectful and, occasionally, criminal.23  While the inability of different groups 
of taxpayers to find a united voice with which to bargain with government has diverse 
roots, these examples make clear that the absence of unity has undermined the likelihood of 
tax bargaining. 
7.2.3.3.3. The Role of Racial Divisions 
A particularly important factor in explaining the absence of unified taxpayer interests in 
Kenya is the extent of racial divisions.  These divisions appear to be so significant that it is 
tempting to consider them a distinct explanation for the absence of direct tax bargaining.  
However, racial difference are included within the broader question of the unity of taxpayer 
interests, as it is the absence of unity, rather than racial differences as such, which explains 
observed outcomes.  Ultimately, racial differences have contributed to the absence of 
unified taxpayer interests in three, closely interconnected, ways: popular willingness to 
impose taxes on wealthy ‘others’, popular unwillingness to support resistance by those 
same groups, and the tendency of those factors to encourage narrow benefit seeking. 
 
Particularly during the 1960s and 1970s the willingness of parliament, and the population, 
to accept rapid increases in taxation was largely driven by a belief, with significant 
justification, that much of the tax burden would be borne by economically dominant Asians 
                                                
23 The most dramatic evidence of this lack of popularity comes from 2004 when then Minister for Transport, 
John Michuki, instituted major new regulatory and safety requirements for public transport operators.  The 
operators staged a two-week strike over the perceived high cost of the measures, and completely shut down 
transport in the major urban centres.  Yet, as a group, citizens, despite being forced to walk enormous 
distances to work, continued to side with the government on the need for reform. 
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and Europeans.  Thus the unique racial characteristics of the country help to explain the fact 
that Kenya established a relatively effective tax system soon after independence.  While this 
dynamic became less explicit over time, concerns about tax evasion by Asian 
businesspeople remains a ubiquitous topic in discussions with tax officials, suggesting 
strongly that public support for effective tax administration continues to be shaped by 
support for taxing Asians and Europeans.  
 
The flip side of popular support for an effective system to tax Asians and Europeans has 
been public unwillingness to support tax resistance and tax bargaining by those groups.  
This was prominently on display during the protests against ETRs, as the protesters were 
not only labelled tax evaders, but were specifically labelled Asian tax evaders, and this 
fatally undermined public support for their cause.  The absence of public support, and the 
salience of the racial dimension, is more remarkable given that the Chairman of the UBA, 
which organized the protests, was an African and that the cost of increased prices would 
ultimately be borne by consumers. 
 
Finally, there is a widespread belief that the exclusion of economically dominant minorities 
from politics, and their broader inability to garner public support for their concerns, has 
contributed to the rise of narrow rent seeking.  This is necessarily speculative, but it is 
relatively common to hear variants on the claim that, ‘non-African businesses lack political 
support, and as a result their only options are to engage in tax evasion or seek individual 
benefits, often through bribery or collusion.’  While there is nothing to suggest that Asians 
or Europeans have been disproportionately involved in such activities, the fact that non-
Africans dominated the large business associations almost certainly weakened their ability 
to pursue a broad based advocacy program by courting public support.  Thus racial 
dynamics appear to be an element in explaining the historical tendency of business 
associations to pursue narrow aims, to the exclusion of opportunities for tax bargaining. 
7.2.3.4. The Importance of History 
While coercion, government strategy and the absence of taxpayer unity provide compelling 
explanations for the relative absence of direct tax bargaining, it is useful to conclude by 
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considering the importance of historical context in shaping outcomes.  The Kenyan 
government is unique in sub-Saharan African for having maintained a long and 
uninterrupted tradition of relatively effective tax collection since independence.  While 
conclusions are necessarily somewhat tentative, what follows argues that this history helps 
to explain both the relative absence of direct tax bargaining and the relative prominence of 
indirect tax bargaining.  On the one hand, the long, uninterrupted, history of taxation in 
Kenya may contribute to reduced levels of tax bargaining by shaping expectations and 
facilitating tax reform efforts.  On the other hand, the long history of tax collection may 
promote indirect tax bargaining by contributing to the strengthening of civil society and 
broader public engagement. 
7.2.3.4.1. History, Expectations and the Politics of Reform 
Lieberman (2002), among others, has argued that tax systems are highly path dependent:  
once successful tax reform has been achieved, it is unlikely to be reversed and thus shapes 
the context for future reform.   Extended to the level of individual expectations, this 
suggests that those who are accustomed to paying taxes are more likely to view taxes are 
fair.  By contrast, someone who has never previously paid taxes is likely to find the demand 
for tax revenue unjustifiable.  Tellingly, this difference would not necessarily be reflected 
in survey answers to questions about individual willingness to comply with taxes: A person 
may be very hostile to paying unjust taxes, but yet consider a wide array of taxes to be just 
in light of previous experience.  In the Kenyan context, taxpayers may be less likely to 
actively oppose taxation precisely because taxation has been a relatively consistent feature 
of life since independence, and has thus become normalized even if unpopular.  
Unfortunately, this dynamic is poorly amenable to empirical testing, but the intuition is 
certainly persuasive. 
 
Moving away from the murky area of expectations, an established history of taxation is also 
likely to make future reform easier because it expands the tools available to the government 
as it seeks to ‘sell’ tax reform.  For example, the major tax reforms from 1993-95 were 
possible, in part, because the large increases in total collection were accompanied by 
declining tax rates and improved customer service.  Businesses that may otherwise have 
been hostile to increased enforcement could at least point to falling rates as a benefit of 
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reform.  Similarly, the introduction of the VAT in 1990 included efforts to reform the 
hugely unpopular and burdensome system of tax refunds, while the introduction of the 
RML in 1994 was eased by the fact that it reduced reliance on the unpopular system of road 
tolls.  In each case reform generated significantly more revenue than had previously been 
the case, but in each case the existence of the earlier taxes, and the possibility of pointing to 
the relative benefits of the new system, improved the bargaining position of government. 
 
This is all particularly relevant to Kenya because it had already developed a remarkably 
effective tax system by the late 1970s and, despite the ups and downs of the 1980s and 
1990s, that system has largely been maintained.  If the arguments proposed here are correct, 
then this early success in raising taxation partially explains the absence of contemporary 
conflict over taxation.  Of course, even if the lack of conflict over taxation over the past 
three decades were a symptom of Kenya’s history, we would expect the initial introduction 
of effective taxation to have been subject to tax conflict and tax bargaining.  Yet, in 
practice, the initial establishment of relatively effective taxation did not involve significant 
tax bargaining.  At the time the afterglow of independence imbued the President with 
enormous moral authority, and the capacity to put a system in place without significant 
public opposition.  While difficult to prove, President Kenyatta’s success in putting in place 
an effective tax system during the optimistic days after independence may have actually 
reduced the likelihood of direct tax bargaining in the future.  Unlike Ghana, where tax 
reform involved imposing significant new burdens on taxpayers, Kenyan taxpayers have 
simply continued to shoulder a long established load, without experiencing the moments of 
dramatic change that are often conducive to public mobilization. 
7.2.3.4.2. History, Taxation and Civil Society Oversight 
While there are thus persuasive reasons to believe that the long history of stable taxation in 
Kenya has reduced the scope for direct tax bargaining, it is equally possible that that same 
history has contributed to the prominence of indirect tax bargaining.  Most important in this 
respect is the potential for tax payment to contribute to the strengthening of civil society 
and of oversight of government activities.  Whereas short-term changes in taxation may 
prompt tax protests, the experience of tax payment over longer periods may contribute to 
higher levels of public engagement, as taxpayers seek to monitor the use of public funds.  
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While this dynamic is virtually impossible to observe directly, it is consistent with observed 
patterns of engagement with tax issues in Kenya: while there has been limited tax conflict 
and direct tax bargaining, a number of civil society organizations, including the NTA, have 
organized advocacy campaigning specifically around the message that taxation can be the 
basis for making demands on government.  These campaigns have found that their message 
has significant resonance, suggesting that the experience of tax payment may have 
contributed to longer term, but largely unobservable, changes in notions of citizenship and 
levels of public engagement. 
7.3. Conclusions 
The Kenyan experience advances our understanding of tax bargaining in three particular 
ways.  First, despite the relative absence of direct tax bargaining, it provides important 
evidence that tax bargaining more generally has contributed significantly to the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability in Kenya.   Second, it specifically highlights the 
importance of indirect tax bargaining.  Discussions of tax bargaining have instinctively 
tended to focus on direct tax bargaining, involving the relatively explicit exchange of tax 
compliance for improved responsiveness and accountability.  This is most clearly reflected 
in existing econometric approaches to the question, which have assumed a highly linear 
causal process.  By contrast the Kenyan experience has highlighted the importance of 
indirect tax bargaining, through resistance to taxation by unpopular governments and the 
gradual strengthening of civil society and public engagement.  Third, this chapter has begun 
to highlight the contextual factors that appear to shape the particular character and 
outcomes of tax bargaining.  The analysis here has focused on four factors: Coercion and 
the extent of state repression, specific government reform strategies, the importance of 
unified taxpayer interests and the role of history in shaping expectations and engagement.  
Collectively these factors make clear that while the central logic of direct and indirect tax 
bargaining is important to understanding political developments, these processes are shaped 
in important ways by the social, economic and political context. 
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7.4. Appendix 
 
Figure 7.A1: Composition of Government Revenue 1971-2008 
 
Source: Revenue data is drawn from IMF Statistical Appendixes for available years, from the IMF GFS for 
earlier years, and from government budget data for the most recent years.  Where possible the sources have 
been cross-referenced to ensure accuracy.  GDP data is drawn from KIPPRA, the leading government 
research institute.  This data is more reliable that data reported in the IMF IFS, as KIPPRA has revised older 
GDP figures to reflect updated methodologies for calculating GDP.  The IMF data has not been similarly 
revised, and thus substantially underestimated GDP figures for earlier years.  As a consequence the tax values 
as a share of GDP that are reported here are lower than those reported in earlier works on the subject (ie 
Glenday 1996) but follow similar trends and provide a more credible view of the evolution of tax collection 
over time. 
 
Figure 7.A2: Government Expenditure and Revenue 1971-2008 
Source: Expenditure and GDP data from the same sources used above. 
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8. The Quiet Politics of Taxation in Contemporary 
Ethiopia 1974-2008 
 
This final case study chapter looks at the recent history of taxation in Ethiopia, building on 
the earlier case study of Imperial Ethiopia.  The most important reason for studying 
Ethiopia is its uniqueness, which stems both from its long Imperial history and its 
experience of socialist rule from 1974-1991.  This makes it possible to study the political 
dynamics around tax bargaining in a profoundly different context than that which has 
prevailed in either Ghana or Kenya, with the potential to yield important new insights. 
 
While Ghana and Kenya were selected as case study countries owing in part to the a priori 
likelihood of tax bargaining, the factors that make Ethiopia distinctive also make tax 
bargaining intuitively unlikely.  Four issues stand out.  First, throughout the period 1974-
2009 Ethiopia has remained a comparatively autocratic state.  The socialist government that 
ruled until 1991 was exceptionally repressive, while under the current government space for 
public debate and competitive politics has remained sharply curtailed.  Second, Ethiopia is 
one of the poorest, most agrarian, countries in the world, and has a significantly weaker 
private sector than either Ghana or Kenya.  Third, Ethiopia is very heavily dependent on 
foreign aid.  The socialist government that was in power until 1991 received significant aid, 
primarily from the Soviet Union, while the government in power since 1991 has received 
aid from the West worth an average of more than 10% of GDP annually, and reaching 
almost 20% of GDP from 2002-2004.  Fourth, Ethiopia has had a long history of highly 
autocratic rule, which is reinforced by a culturally ingrained conservatism and deference to 
established authority, as well as the absence of a consistent history of organized public 
opposition and political contestation (Levine 1965: 3, Amare Tekle 1990:45-47, Clapham 
1988: 21-22). 
 
Aside from these basic social, economic and political characteristics, Ethiopia is also 
unique in being a federal state and in having experienced both civil war and an inter-state 
war with Eritrea in the recent past.  Taken together these various factors make Ethiopia a 
compelling setting for providing new research insights.  Like the preceding chapters what 
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follows begins with an analytical narrative of the political economy of taxation in Ethiopia 
from 1974-2009, and then asks what that evidence tells us about the relationship between 
taxation, responsiveness and accountability.  Owing to the particularities of the Ethiopian 
political and fiscal environment the tax narrative is divided into three parts: the period of 
socialist rule until 1991, the period of EPRDF rule since 1991 and a final section focused 
on regional taxation.  Data on levels of tax collection, government revenue and expenditure 
throughout the entire period are presented in the Appendix.  As expected, we find that there 
has been relatively limited direct and indirect tax bargaining in Ethiopia since 1974, owing 
to the particular social, economic and political characteristics noted above.  Yet, despite the 
relative absence of tax bargaining at the national level, there is nonetheless important 
evidence of direct tax bargaining at the regional level, as well as evidence that the ability of 
the government to collect tax revenue has been shaped by public perceptions.  These 
findings suggest that while the Ethiopian context has been particularly unfriendly to the 
emergence of both direct and indirect tax bargaining, the basic political processes of interest 
remain relevant. 
8.1. The Derg and the End of the Feudal State 1974-1991 
Haile Selassie’s overthrow in 1974 ushered in a period of profound social, political and 
economic change along socialist lines.  In the most thorough history of the period, Clapham 
(1988) has argued forcefully that, for all the limitations of the new regime, the scale of 
change was undeniably revolutionary.  What follows provides an overview of the broad 
politics and reforms of the revolutionary period before turning to the specifics of the fiscal 
evolution of the state.  
8.1.1. Revolution and the Transformation of the State 
Mid-level and junior military officers initially seized power in 1974 in the midst of a 
growing urban protest movement committed to a broadly socialist ideology.  The Imperial 
regime had become unable to contain the growing political pressures emanating from a 
modernizing class of students who expressed outrage at the narrowness of Imperial rule and 
at the continued existence of exploitative relations in the countryside.  Yet, the urban unrest 
remained poorly organized, which created uncertainty about who would seize the leadership 
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of the new movement and about the extent to which the socialist ideals of the protesters 
would be transformed into reality. 
 
Over time it was military officers who progressively asserted control.  Internally, the 
military leadership was organized into an inclusive leadership committee known as the 
Derg, but by 1977 Mengistu Haile-Mariam has seized unrivalled control of the Derg 
through cunning political manoeuvring and the removal of his major rivals through 
violence.  Externally, two major civilian rivals, the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement 
(known by its Amharic acronym, Meison) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP), confronted the Derg.  Each professed socialist ideals and a desire for civilian 
government, but both were largely eliminated during a period of urban terror and violence 
that peaked during 1976-77.  The violence initially pitted the Derg and Meison against the 
EPRP, after which the Derg violently turned on its erstwhile allies. 
 
Programmatically, while the Derg was not steeped in socialist ideology, it quickly adopted 
a broadly socialist program of action focused on nationalization and the construction of a 
powerful central state.  The centrepiece was the announcement of land reform in 1975.  The 
proclamation nationalized all land and called for its equal distribution among the peasantry, 
who were, in turn, to be organized into peasant associations (PAs).  At a single stroke this 
sought to fulfil a central promise of the revolution and decisively eliminate the power of the 
traditional landed classes.  While parts of the former elite engaged in armed resistance, the 
most remarkable trait of the reform was its popularity and the consequent speed and 
ruthlessness with which the old elite was swept away and replaced by the PAs.  The reform 
served to improve the position of the peasantry, particularly in the south, and also 
dramatically enhanced the power of the government.  Despite the differences in method, 
this push for greater centralization had much in common with earlier efforts dating back to 
Emperor Tewodoros (Clapham 1988, Bahru Zewde 2002). 
 
In subsequent years land reform was followed by a series of policy pronouncements that 
were consistent with socialist ideology and a desire to expand state power.  The government 
nationalized virtually all industry as well as a large share of urban property and housing.  
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Urban areas were organized into Kebeles (neighbourhoods), and individual kebeles were 
made responsible for local administration, land nationalization and security, the last most 
apparent in the role of kebele defence squads during the urban terror campaign.  In rural 
areas the PAs initially enjoyed significant freedom of action, but it was not long before the 
government began to extend its control.  By 1978 the government had seized increasing 
control over the marketing and transport of agricultural products and was thus able to 
institute tightly enforced production quotas and price controls (Ottaway 1990, Clapham 
1988). 
 
Government efforts to transform the countryside took on progressively more ambitious 
forms over time.  The initial creation of the PAs had been accompanied by incentives for 
the creation of cooperatives, but this initial program proceeded gradually, and showed no 
benefits in terms of productivity.  More ambitious was the villagization campaign that got 
underway in 1985.  The goal was to permanently change the basic character of the 
countryside by relocating scattered peasant homes, which tended to be located near 
individual fields, into centralized villages.  Despite the fact that promised improvements in 
service provision in these new villages often did not materialize, the implementation of the 
policy was remarkable, as millions of peasants literally knocked down their previous homes 
and moved them to new settlements.  Moreover, while peasants often moved grudgingly, 
the power of the central government was such that villagization was largely achieved 
without recourse to overt violence (Cohen and Isaksson 1987, Brietzke 1976, Clapham 
1988).  This form of social engineering reached its climax in the government push to 
resettle peasants away from the densely populated, and famine prone, north.  While planned 
resettlements were not entirely new to Ethiopia, the government resettlement of a reported 
600 000 people in the aftermath of the 1984-85 famine was unparalleled, while subsequent 
plans to resettle an even larger share of the population appear only to have been prevented 
by the deteriorating position of the regime in the late 1980s (Clapham 1988).   
 
While the government thus succeeded in building a massive administrative apparatus, and 
in developing the capacity to profoundly reshape the lives of citizens, it remained unable to 
decisively solve the problem of armed insurgency in the north.  Armed resistance to the 
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regime emerged almost immediately in 1974, and was led by the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  The resistance 
in Eritrea was unsurprising given longstanding secessionist ambitions in the region.  By 
contrast, the resistance in Tigray was aimed at autonomy rather than independence, and 
reflected a deeply rooted, though more complex, regional identity.  These resistance 
movements exercised a degree of control within their regional bases, and necessitated the 
continuous militarization of the country, including extremely high levels of military 
spending, significant military aid from the Soviet Union and periodic conscription.  That 
said, these resistance movements did not appear to pose a serious military threat to the state 
as a whole until suddenly claiming the initiative after 1988 amidst evidence of the internal 
collapse of the Ethiopian army and state (Clapham 1988). 
8.1.2. The Fiscal Basis of the Socialist State 
The Derg period witnessed the rapid expansion of the role and reach of the state through 
nationalization, the strengthening of the administrative apparatus and significant 
militarization.  This needed to be matched by a corresponding growth of state revenues, 
despite the problems that this had posed for previous governments.  In practice the 
expansion of revenue was never sufficient to match the dramatic expansion of the state and 
the costs of endless warfare, and fiscal deficits began to accumulate in the 1980s.  Revenue 
gains were nonetheless dramatic, with the difficulties of taxation in earlier periods largely 
overcome by nationalization and the destruction of the old elite. 
 
Studying the political economy of taxation in a socialist state poses a particular challenge, 
as government control of economic activity implies that taxation is frequently hidden within 
the broader activities of the command economy.  Extensive state control of the formerly 
private sector meant that tax compliance was assured, as a significant share of economic 
production was internal to the state.  While government accounts officially distinguished 
between taxation and investment income, in a command economy the practical distinction 
would often have been merely a matter of accounting.  In writing about the transition from 
Communism in the former Soviet Union, Gehlbach (2008: 20) clearly highlights the 
differences between taxation in a command economy and taxation in an open economy: 
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“Laying claim to funds to run the state was largely an accounting matter when most 
productive assets were state owned. But with privatization and liberalization, bureaucracies 
had to be created to locate and encourage the transfer of what was now possessed by private 
actors.”  While remarkably little detailed information is available about taxation under the 
Derg, the basic message that state control internalized a significant share of taxation 
appears accurate.  That said, there is no question that a small private sector did survive, 
though interviews suggest that these firms often engaged in aggressive tax evasion, owing 
to cripplingly high tax rates on the private sector and the general hostility of the 
government to private enterprise. 
 
Within the agricultural sector taxation retained its character as a transfer from private 
agents to the government to a significantly greater extent.  The new government eliminated 
earlier agricultural taxes but replaced them with a land-use tax and an agricultural income 
tax, which together yielded roughly 5% of tax revenue annually, which is a similar 
proportion to what was collected by the Imperial government.  In addition to these official 
taxes, agricultural producers faced significant and increasing taxation through the system of 
agricultural price controls.  In these cases precise levels of taxation were hidden in prices, 
but the possibility of smuggling offered peasant producers both insight into the extent of 
government taxation and a means of tax evasion (Dercon and Ayalew 1995).  Finally, the 
peasantry faced significant informal exactions by local officials to support the 
government’s military campaigns, and this appears to have gradually contributed to 
disenchantment with the regime (Clapham 1988: 124-125). 
 
With these caveats in place, and bearing in mind the serious limitations of available data, it 
remains possible to chart broad revenue patterns over the period.  In 1973-74 government 
tax revenue had reached a historic high of 8.5% of GDP, while total revenue, excluding 
grants, amounted to 9.9% of GDP.  By 1979-80, tax revenue had grown to 11.7% of GDP, 
with total revenues of 14.1%, while after a period of stagnation total revenue reached an all 
time high of 18.8% of GDP in 1988/89.  These figures further exclude both on-budget grant 
revenue and off-budget military assistance, the former of which exceeded 3% of GDP in 
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several years in the 1980s.  Thus, at their height, the fiscal resources available to the Derg 
were as much as double the highest levels achieved during the Imperial regime. 
 
These revenue gains came from four primary sources: Business income taxes, government 
investment income, export taxes on coffee and excise taxes on alcohol.  The excise tax on 
alcohol was simply a case of the government levying a large tax on a good that was easy to 
tax and faced inelastic demand.  There is no evidence that this generated any particular 
political debate within the broader context of state control.  More interesting is the rapid 
expansion of government investment income, which appears to have included profits from 
nationalized activities, and most notably state owned firms and urban housing, though 
available data does not allow for a specific categorization.  A dominant source of 
investment income was profits retained from state run enterprises, which, unlike in most 
countries in the region, appear to have been reasonably efficient through much of the 
period.  Following the nationalization of the majority of industry, much of the growth of 
business income tax flowed from these same firms, with the division between taxation and 
profits largely a question of accounting.  Finally, remaining private firms also certainly 
contributed to these totals, though specific information is unavailable (Clapham 1998: 124-
125). 
 
The surge in export taxes from coffee reflected a combination of high global prices in the 
second half of the 1970s, and a long-term government decision to reduce the share of the 
world price that was returned to producers.  After world prices returned to normal in the 
1980s the Derg government held the distinction of paying a smaller share of the world price 
to producers than any other government in Africa.  This story of the progressive erosion of 
producer benefits is reflective of the broader trend in agricultural prices during the period.  
The effect of these policies was that export taxes on coffee increased from 0.6% of GDP in 
1974-75 to a high of 3% of GDP in 1977-78 before settling at close to 1.5% of GDP until 
1985 (Clapham 1988: 184, Dercon 2001: 10, Dercon and Ayalew 1995). 
 
Taking a broader view of government policy, land reform initially implied a marked 
increase in peasant welfare, as rural producers were freed from the exactions of landlords 
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and the collection of land and agricultural taxes was temporarily virtually eliminated.  But it 
was not long before the government had replaced old burdens with new ones in an effort to 
finance its program of industrialization and militarization (Love 1989).  This began with the 
introduction of the agricultural income tax and land use fee, and was followed by the more 
burdensome exactions imposed through price controls at below world market prices.  While 
the case of coffee was most important to public revenue, the most notorious example was 
the forced delivery of quotas of grain at far below market prices (Dercon 2001: 4-6).  These 
formal agricultural exactions were matched by the regular burdens imposed by military 
conscription, the need for communities to directly support their conscripts and requirements 
of forced labour on government projects.  Overall, the peasantry, which was initially highly 
supportive of the new regime as a result of land reform, became increasingly disenchanted 
as a result of these increasing burdens, though overt protest remained virtually unheard of 
given the extensive repressive apparatus of the state (Clapham 1988). 
8.1.3. Fiscal Dimensions of Crisis and Collapse 1988-1991 
Among the most remarkable aspects of the Derg government is that it succeeded in 
dramatically extending the power of the state for over a decade but then collapsed both 
suddenly and completely from 1988 onwards.  While there had been a long standing 
guerrilla war in the north, the Ethiopian army possessed an overwhelming numerical and 
technical advantage and appeared firmly in control in mid-1987.  Yet, by 1990 the 
overthrow of the regime appeared inevitable, and it was completed with surprisingly limited 
bloodshed in 1991 (Clapham 1988). 
 
The obvious explanation for this sudden collapse lay within the military itself.  By 1987 
morale in the military was declining after a decade of forced conscription and seemingly 
endless warfare, and this was undoubtedly a factor in explaining the earliest military defeats 
in late 1987.  The situation was exacerbated when these early defeats prompted an 
attempted military coup, which not only further fractured morale, but also led to the 
imprisonment or execution of much of the senior military leadership.  In the aftermath of 
these events the TPLF in particular made large gains against weakened government forces. 
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What this focus on the military overlooks is the broader fiscal collapse of the state and the 
consequences of fiscal collapse for the military campaign.  The year 1989 marked not only 
a military turning point, but also a fiscal turning point, as revenue peaked in 1988-89 and 
began a staggeringly rapid decline the following year. In 1988-89, tax revenue stood at 
11.4% of GDP and total government revenue, including grants, stood at 22.7% of GDP.  
Two years later, in 1990-91, those values had fallen to 8.2% and 10.8% respectively, with 
the latter figure being less than the level of military spending alone during the years 1987-
88 to 1989-90.24  Put quite simply, the government reached a point at which it simply could 
not afford to maintain the war effort any longer, which accelerated its defeat. 
 
The fiscal collapse was in part the product of military losses, as lost territory implied lost 
tax revenue and disrupted transport networks.  But this explanation is grossly insufficient in 
light of the small revenues collected in the north and the massive scale of actual revenue 
losses.  Instead, the collapse of state revenue seems to have emerged from three major 
factors.  First, grants from the Soviet Union declined substantially in 1989-90 as a result of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Second, the fiscal collapse reflected the accumulated weight of 
a decade of excessively large deficits and overly demanding taxation.  As the fiscal needs of 
the regime became increasingly onerous in the second half of the 1980s the government 
appears to have dramatically increased retention of investment income from state owned 
enterprises.  This eventually proved unsustainable, crippling those enterprises and 
government revenue along with them (Bevan 2001, Bevan and Pradlian 1994).  Finally, 
those interviewed suggest that with morale declining, and the stability of the government 
now in question, the population became increasingly unwilling to bear the fiscal exactions 
of the government and tax compliance declined. 
                                                
24 Data on expenditure varies significantly across sources.  Bevan (2001) estimates that defence spending 
over the period 1986-87 to 1990-91 averaged about 9% of GDP, while Clapham (1988) reports a speech in 
which Mengistu announced that military spending in 1987-88 amounted to 15% of GDP.  Even allowing for 
some under-recording of GDP during these years, it is almost certain that total government revenue in 1990-
91 was below levels of military spending alone in previous years. 
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8.2. Liberalization and Decentralization Under the EPRDF 
1991-2008 
In late 1991 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) officially 
seized power (Bevan 1994).  The EPRDF was thoroughly dominated by the TPLF but also 
incorporated other smaller regional parties.  Meanwhile, the EPLF, which had been an 
equal partner in the campaign to oust the Derg, did not join the new government, preferring 
to focus exclusively on achieving independence for Eritrea.  Both the TPLF and the EPLF 
shared the socialist convictions of the Derg, but they were faced with the practical reality of 
a country crippled by warfare and deprived of the support it had once received from the 
Soviet Union.  In response to these practical realities the new government quickly entered 
into partnership with the international community and embarked on a program of economic 
and political liberalization. 
 
Despite the appearance of a dramatic change in direction, the new reform program was in 
fact very similar to that adopted by the Derg in its final years, as the previous government 
had similarly been compelled by crisis to face the need for reform (Bevan 1994, Clapham 
1988).  The more dramatic step taken by the new government was the rapid promulgation 
of a new constitution in 1995, which enshrined a high degree of formal decentralization and 
effectively confirmed Eritrean independence.  Building on the highly developed 
administrative systems put in place by the Derg government major expenditure tasks were 
devolved to ten new regional governments, though the more limited decentralization of 
revenue collection meant that regional governments continued to rely heavily on block 
grants from the central government (Eshetu Chole 1994, Merera Gudina 2006, Bevan 
2001).  Decentralization reflected the ideological convictions of the TPLF and EPLF, as 
well as the practical need to resolve the regional tensions unleashed by the aggressively 
centralizing agenda of the Derg (Gebru Tareke 1991: 206). That said, actual policy 
divergence between the central and regional governments expanded very gradually, owing 
to the lack of policy-making capacity in the regions and the ability of the central 
government to exercise political control over regional governments (Bevan 2001, Assefa 
Fiseha 2006).   
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The change in government in 1991 thus brought with it dramatic economic and political 
changes.  Since 1991 the EPRDF has remained relatively firmly entrenched in power, 
pursuing halting political liberalization while facilitating significant economic liberalization 
and renewed economic growth.  What follows focuses particularly on the fiscal dimension 
of reform and is organized around several relatively distinct periods in the reform process. 
8.2.1. The EPRDF and Economic Liberalization 1992-1998 
With few other options available, the new government embarked on a World Bank and IMF 
sponsored structural adjustment program in 1992.  Immediate economic reforms included a 
large devaluation of the Ethiopian Birr, the abolition of most price controls, the 
liberalization of agricultural marketing, significant reductions in import duties and some 
financial sector liberalization.  The immediate result of the economic reform program, 
which was aided by favourable weather, was a sharp improvement in economic growth.  
That said, reform followed a persistently gradualist approach, consistent with government 
ideology, and some donors were expressing frustration with the pace of reform by 1996 
(Dercon 2001, Abegaz 2001). 
 
In many respects the most remarkable aspect of the economic transition was the rapid fiscal 
recovery.  In general, countries emerging from civil war can be expected to achieve fiscal 
recovery through three channels: expanded international aid, reduced military spending and 
the recovery of tax revenues.  The last two are generally expected to be slow and difficult 
processes, owing to the cost of demobilizing the military, the complexity of rebuilding 
administrative capacity and the challenge of establishing norms of tax compliance (Bevan 
2001). 
 
Yet Ethiopia succeeded in advancing extremely quickly on all three fronts.  Foreign aid 
exceeded 10% of GDP by 1993, while military spending fell precipitously, from over 40% 
of total spending at the height of the rebel insurgency to an average of 10.8% from 1991-92 
to 1995-96 (Bevan 2001).   Meanwhile, tax revenue expanded from 6.3% of GDP in 1992-
93 to 8.3% in 1993-94 and had reached 9.9% of GDP by 1996-97.  Non-tax revenue 
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likewise increased rapidly owing to the recovery of state controlled industries and proceeds 
from privatization. 
 
Gains in tax revenue, which were primarily from income and trade taxes, are largely 
attributable to economic recovery, as administrative capacity was limited, administrative 
reform was gradual and policy reform was largely limited to reducing income tax rates and 
customs tariffs.  Yet, the fact that the tax administration was able to achieve a significant 
measure of effectiveness was remarkable in the wake of an extended civil war and a 
profound political and economic transition.  It is attributable to the near total absence of 
visible political opposition, a strong bureaucratic culture and a surprising degree of 
administrative continuity in the midst of profound political upheavals.  To take a very 
narrow example, the coordinator of the eventual EPRDF tax reform program had originally 
joined the tax administration in the 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie. 
 
From the perspective of rural citizens, the most significant tax reform of the period was the 
abolition of marketing and price controls along with other forms of forced exactions from 
the peasantry.  While precise estimates are difficult, it is clear that the peasantry 
experienced an immediate and significant improvement in welfare (Dercon 2001).  The 
experience of agricultural taxation also offers a further illustration of the resilience of 
bureaucratic and tax norms.  The collection of the agricultural income tax and the land use 
fee had almost entirely collapsed in 1991-92, but by the following year, under a new 
government, compliance was as high or higher than ever.25  Overall, the government was 
motivated to reduce demands on the peasantry by a combination of ideology, external 
pressure and a desire to secure the political support of rural citizens. 
8.2.2. War with Eritrea 1998-1999 
The highly successful transition to peace and stability was dramatically interrupted by the 
outbreak of war with newly independent Eritrea in 1998.  The conflict was narrowly 
centred on a land dispute over the newly drawn border, but reflected a deeply rooted 
                                                
25 While the share of GDP accounted for by these two taxes was slightly lower than previously, this was 
despite the fact that there has been no increase in the nominal tax rates despite significant inflation and a large 
devaluation.  Thus levels of compliance had likely increased, or at least remained stable. 
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disagreement over the extent to which Eritrea would remain closely tied to Ethiopia.  
Putting aside the complex roots of the conflict (Lata 2003, Clapham 1988), the issue of 
interest here is the fiscal consequences of the war, which involved a dramatic military 
mobilization that lasted until the year 2000 (Addison and Ndikumana 2003: 246-7). 
 
Based on official government data, defence spending increased from 1.5% of GDP in 1996-
97 to 9.8% of GDP in 1999-2000.  This, in turn, led total recurrent expenditure to increase 
from just over 12% of GDP in 1997/98 to almost 20% of GDP in 1999/2000, as the 
government increased defence spending while sustaining spending on social services at pre-
war levels.   In order to pay for this massive increase in recurrent expenditure, the 
government significantly reduced capital expenditures and dramatically increased the size 
of the fiscal deficit.  Capital spending fell from almost 8% of GDP per annum from 1996/97 
through 1998/99 to less than 5% of GDP in 1999/2000.  Meanwhile, the budget deficit rose 
to 8% and 8.6% of GDP during the two years of the war, after never previously exceeding 
4% under the EPRDF.  This vast increase in the deficit reflected not only the increase in 
defence spending, but also the consequences of the suspension of some donor funding in 
response to the outbreak of war. 
 
Warfare has historically been a dominant motive for major tax reform, and both theory and 
intuition supported this expectation as the Ethiopian deficit grew rapidly (Tilly 1990, 
Addison, Chowdhury and Murshed 2004).  However, while there is some evidence that the 
war motivated increased attention to revenue mobilization in Ethiopia, this impact appears 
to have been more modest that may have been expected.  During the war the government 
introduced a 10% surcharge on imports, while a major tax reform, which is discussed in 
detail in the next section, was initiated in 2001 and led to relatively large revenue increases 
(Addison and Ndikumana 2003).  Yet, despite the timing of tax reform, senior officials who 
were involved in the reform program are adamant that the fiscal pressure created by the war 
was not the dominant motivation.  They point to the fact that extensive background work 
for the reform program was initiated prior to the outbreak of war.   Moreover, they argue 
that political infighting within the EPRDF at the end of the war meant that the Minister of 
Finance was too preoccupied for such a reform program to have taken root if it had not 
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been initiated much earlier (Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003).  In fact, senior officials 
cite significantly increased pressure from the IMF, as opposed to domestic priorities, as an 
essential factor in motivating the acceleration of the tax reform program, though it is 
possible that the war played a role in making the IMF a more forceful advocate for 
increased tax collection. 
 
Why, then, did the massive deficits incurred during the war not create greater pressure for 
tax reform?  The answer seems to lie in the fact that the long-term fiscal consequences of 
the war were significantly more modest than might have been expected, and this is 
attributable to three major factors.  First, the deficits accumulated during the war, while 
large, were smaller than would otherwise have been the case due to an unprecedented surge 
in privatization receipts, which exceeded 5% of total revenue in both years of the war.  
Second, in 1999 Russia agreed to forgive 80% of the former-Soviet debts incurred by the 
Derg government as part of a broader agreement with the Paris Club of large lending 
nations (Martin and Johnson 2005).  This amounted to $4.8 Billion of debt forgiveness, and 
ensured that total debt repayments, which would have been expected to expand 
dramatically due to borrowing during the war, remained manageable.  Finally, the end of 
the war witnessed the rapid resumption of high levels of foreign aid, thus helping to reduce 
fiscal pressure on the government.   
8.2.3. Accelerated Reform 2000-2004 
The period following the war was one of accelerated reform, and this was broadly 
attributable to the combination of changing priorities within the TPLF leadership and a 
more assertive stance by donors, both of which were due at least in part to new pressures 
created by the war.  The government drew praise from international observers for 
reenergizing the process of economic reform and continuing to strengthen the role of 
regional governments.  At the same time the government began to focus more heavily on 
infrastructure investment and industry specific incentives as it sought to pursue an 
economic model based on the experience of fast growing economies in East Asia.  Finally, 
political liberalization advanced significantly as a relatively vocal opposition emerged and 
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it appeared that the 2005 national elections would be the first genuinely competitive 
national elections in Ethiopia’s history.  
 
The pace of reform was equally rapid with respect to taxation, as plans initiated in the late 
1990s were progressively rolled out beginning in 2001.  A combination of administrative 
and policy reform contributed to the growth of tax revenue from 8.8% of GDP in 1999-
2000 to 12.1% of GDP in 2003-04.  This revenue growth was given a further boost by a 
substantial increase in trade taxes in 2003-04 and 2004-05, which was driven in part by 
rising imports to supply growing infrastructure investment. 
 
Administrative reform included the creation of a Ministry of Revenue that enjoyed greater 
autonomy from the Ministry of Finance, internal re-organization, the introduction of 
Taxpayer Identification Numbers, the introduction of a basic IT system and a new emphasis 
on taxpayer outreach and education.  Notable for its absence was any effort to significantly 
increase salaries, as had occurred in many other countries in the region, and this reflects a 
commitment to maintaining established norms of equity within the civil service.  Given the 
conformist bureaucratic culture in the country (Amare Tekle 1990: 45) implementation was 
predictably both gradual and without controversy.  The impact of the administrative 
changes, and overall increasing attention to tax administration, appears to have been mixed.  
There were substantial jumps in both trade and sales tax collection quite immediately but 
income tax collection stagnated, aside from a brief spike in revenue in 2001-02 that resulted 
from a tax amnesty program. 
 
The period also witnessed three major policy initiatives: the introduction of a Value Added 
Tax (VAT), the reform and expansion of the presumptive tax system and the introduction of 
a withholding tax on imports.  The most straightforward was the withholding tax on 
imports, an administratively simple means to compel compliance with existing income 
taxes, although it did not have a particularly large revenue impact.  It is interesting that it 
does not appear to have prompted any effective resistance from businesses despite the fact 
that it effectively enforced the pre-payment of a share of income taxes. 
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The implementation of the VAT was designed to be gradual, owing to the limits of 
administrative capacity.  Beginning January 1, 2003, the tax administration initially targeted 
larger firms as it gradually expanded the tax net.  Revenue gains during the first two years 
were meaningful though not spectacular, as overall collection increased by between 5% and 
10% relative to the former sales tax, with most of the gains occurring through collections on 
imports.  While there were some complaints from taxpayers, especially related to the 
penalties for evasion, the implementation experienced little political controversy (Arega 
Hailu Teffera 2004).  One of the most notable features of the new VAT was that it provided 
significantly fewer exemptions for basic goods than the previous sales tax, thus increasing 
the tax burden for low-income consumers (Munoz and Cho 2004).  Yet this too does not 
appear to have generated any significant political response.  The largest controversy was 
over the distribution of revenue and administrative responsibility between the regional and 
central governments, the central government ultimately retaining the bulk of revenue as 
well as primary responsibility for administering the tax (Wollela Yesegat 2008). 
 
Despite the attention given to the new VAT, it was the new presumptive tax regime that 
proved to be both the most important reform in revenue terms and the only measure to 
generate significant political controversy.  Under Ethiopian law, firms are divided into three 
categories based on turnover: Category A above 500 000 Birr, Category B between 100 000 
and 500 000, and Category C below 100 000.  Category C firms are not expected to 
maintain detailed financial accounts, while many Category B firms similarly do not do so.  
Instead of being subject to income tax and the VAT, these firms are required to pay a 
presumptive tax on income and a 2% tax on turnover.  Both are deemed to imply a reduced 
compliance burden, as they only require measuring total turnover.  In the relatively more 
complex case of presumptive taxation, tax liability is assessed by estimating turnover, 
applying a predetermined industry-specific profit rate and then taxing the resultant profits at 
the standard income tax rate. 
 
This basic system had existed prior to 2001 but had been weakly enforced in many areas 
owing to a lack of government commitment and problems with the system for assessing 
turnover, under which individual tax assessors estimated turnover on an annual basis.  
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Under the new system local Tax Assessment Committees, that included both government 
officials and local business representatives, were charged with estimating turnover every 
three years, in hopes of thus increasing coverage and reducing corruption and abuse (Jordan 
1999).  More importantly, the regional governments, which were responsible for 
implementing the new version of the tax, dramatically increased enforcement. 
 
The result of the new system was that income and profit tax collection in the regions 
increased dramatically from 1.12% of national GDP in 1999-2000 to 1.73% in 2003-04.  
Tax officials are adamant that the new system also succeeded in reducing levels of 
arbitrariness, abuse and corruption.  Yet the new system became the subject of significant 
taxpayer unhappiness, as tax liabilities increased dramatically, more than doubling in many 
cases.  While these increases were generally justified according to the letter of the law, the 
suddenness of the increases, and the lack of explanation from government, fed public 
unhappiness and bred mistrust, despite the creation of the Tax Assessment Committees 
(Warner 2005b).  Moreover, the pre-determined profit rates used to calculate tax liabilities 
were, by the admission of many tax officials, excessively high, and while this had been 
relatively inconsequential when implementation was lax, it became crippling for many 
business as the government tightened enforcement.  Such was the level of public 
unhappiness in Amhara region in particular that the government began studies in 2004 to 
evaluate the fairness of the assigned profit rates. 
8.2.4. Taxation and the 2005 Elections 
The 2005 national elections were expected to be a watershed moment in the process of 
political liberalization, as the ruling party had permitted the emergence of an organized and 
vocal opposition for the first time.  In practice the election became a moment of renewed 
political repression.  While most observers believe that the ruling party legitimately 
received the largest number of votes nationally, unexpectedly strong opposition in Addis 
Ababa and the three largest regions led the government to resort to electoral fraud to 
guarantee its dominance.  A significant part of the opposition opted for public 
demonstrations and a decision to boycott parliament and the government responded with 
widespread arrests and the violent disruption of public gatherings.  As of the end of 2009 
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the political atmosphere remained highly repressive, with few signs that subsequent 
elections would offer the possibility of significant contestation (Lyons 2006, Arriola 2008). 
 
The failed elections had major consequences for taxation.  In the run up to the elections, the 
government sought to buy support through the provision of targeted tax concessions.   It is 
difficult to gather information on this topic due to the reluctance of officials to discuss 
potentially politicized issues, but two examples were repeatedly mentioned.  The first was 
the provision of a growing range of trade tax exemptions to favoured sectors.  The 
government plausibly attributes these decisions to an increasingly interventionist industrial 
strategy, but some well-placed individuals argue that there was also a political motive.  
What is certainly clear is that there was a significant fall in trade tax collection in the year 
preceding the election, despite continued increases in imports. 
 
The second, and more widely acknowledged, example was a decision by the government to 
suspend certain types of fines in Addis Ababa, most notably abolishing various fines and 
arrears affecting taxi drivers.  Addis Ababa was the most tightly contested political district 
in the country, and, as a local taxi driver explained, “the government told us that they would 
eliminate these fines if the taxi drivers would vote for them.”  Ultimately, there is a general 
feeling that these measures did little, if anything, to secure additional support for the 
government, as the tax concessions were perceived to be short-term and opportunistic.  But 
while the concessions were of modest practical importance these pre-election concessions 
indicate that the government perceived a meaningful link between taxation and its political 
popularity, even in the absence of visible public opposition to taxation 
 
The election results had a much more profound impact on tax collection, as the results 
alerted the government to its growing unpopularity.  While the government turned to 
political repression in the wake of the elections, it also took highly visible steps to try to 
shore up its popularity outside the capital.  The government sent officials throughout the 
regions to hold public consultations about the roots of public opposition.  Despite their clear 
limitations, these forums appear to have at least provided legitimate opportunities for public 
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feedback, and one of the issues that emerged strongly was public unhappiness with 
taxation, and particularly with the new presumptive tax system. 
 
The government immediately responded with a dramatic reduction in presumptive taxation, 
achieved by way of a sharp reduction in the presumptive profit rates used to calculate tax 
liabilities.  Although presumptive taxation is formally under the control of regional 
governments, the reduction in profit rates was nationwide and overwhelmingly dictated by 
the central government.  While the government had initiated an internal review of 
presumptive profit rates a year earlier, there is widespread agreement that both the 
suddenness and the depth of the rate reductions were politically motivated.  This view is 
supported by the fact that rate cuts were frequently accompanied by significant efforts to 
improve public dialogue and consultation surrounding the tax, while several regions also 
implemented a corresponding reduction in agricultural tax rates in order to maintain 
horizontal equity. 
 
While many tax administrators believed that the original profit rates had been too high, they 
were equally opposed to the sharp cuts, which severely undermined regional government 
tax revenue.  Presumptive tax collection immediately declined from 1.67% to 1.17% of 
GDP, agricultural income tax collection fell from 0.14% to .06% of GDP and collection of 
rural land use fees declined from 0.13% to 0.09% of GDP.  These losses amounted to 
almost 25% of regional tax collection, thus generating a significant decline in regional 
fiscal welfare (Warner et al. 2005b). 
 
In considering the impact of the tax changes following the elections, what it perhaps most 
striking is their somewhat contradictory character.  On the one hand, there is little doubt 
that the decision to reduce tax rates reflected a government desire to garner public support, 
as the tax cuts were fiscally significant and were spread across the majority of the low and 
middle-income population.  On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the changes 
in taxation were simultaneously an effort by the government to punish its opponents and 
centralize political control.   Most widely accepted is belief that the reduction in regional 
taxes was designed in part to make the regional governments more reliant on transfers from 
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the central government, and thus to reduce their independence (Warner et al. 2005b).  
Having experienced unexpected political resistance, the central government was reasserting 
its control.  A second issue lies in the fact that the tax changes, while reducing taxes across 
the board, also made regional tax systems more regressive.  Changes to the presumptive tax 
regime reduced the overall tax burden on mid-sized (Category B) firms much more 
substantially than the tax burden on small-firms (Category C).26  In similar fashion, the 
changes in agricultural taxation generally reduced collection from larger farms most 
dramatically, while the benefits to smaller farms were comparatively modest.   In both cases 
some observers believe that these redistributive shifts were intentional, based on the 
rationale that the government wished to punish the poor, who were more likely to support 
the opposition (Arriola 2008).  This possibility is a reminder that in some cases 
governments may respond to public opposition to taxation not only with compromises, but 
also through implicit or explicit threats. 
8.2.5. Post-Election Revenue Shortfalls 2005-2007  
While changes in regional taxation were the most explicit tax event of the post-election 
period, they were part of a much broader revenue downturn that appears to be attributable 
to the elections.  Overall tax revenue declined significantly from 12.6% of GDP in 2003-04 
to 10.2% in 2006-07, thus reversing many of the gains of previous years.  Declining 
revenue resulted from a continuous decline in direct tax collection, stagnation in domestic 
VAT collection and a marked decline in the collection of import VAT and customs duties.  
While the revenue downturn undoubtedly had multiple causes, interviews suggest that it 
was at least in part the result of government reluctance to crack down on tax evasion in the 
aftermath of the elections. 
 
                                                
26 While the change in presumptive tax rates applied equally to both medium and small 
firms, the aggregate effect of this change was to make the taxation of firms more regressive.  
The reason is that SMEs are subject to two major taxes: a flat 2% tax on turnover and the 
progressive presumptive tax on profits.  By reducing the relative importance of the 
presumptive tax, the progressivity of the business tax system as a whole was sharply 
reduced, implying that much of the benefit of the tax change flowed to relatively better off 
mid-sized businesses.  
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In accounting for revenue performance that fell short of expectations, observers can 
certainly point to explanations grounded in technical barriers to collection.  One prominent 
issue is the simple lack of funding for tax administration.  In the case of the VAT, which is 
indicative of a broader pattern, Arega Hailu Teffera (2004) points to the fact that funding 
for administration is estimated to be less than 0.8% of total collection, which is significantly 
below the level of 1-2% recommended by international tax experts and provides limited 
resources for audit functions in particular (Wollela Yesegat 2008: 14).  While committed 
administrative effort was sufficient to overcome limited resources for a time, administrators 
argue that the lack of capacity became an increasingly severe problem as the number of 
taxpayers increased.  Wollela Yesegat (2008) further points to problems related to the 
distribution of administrative responsibility between the central and regional governments, 
particularly after regional governments were granted greater responsibility for VAT 
collection beginning in 2004.  Finally, the period in question witnessed a significant 
increase in tax incentives and exemptions, which further helps to account for falling rates of 
VAT and trade tax collection. 
 
Yet while such technical explanations are important, the magnitude of the revenue decline 
demands consideration of political factors.  At a basic level the expansion of exemptions, 
while officially motivated by the need to provide incentives for investment and growth, 
almost certainly also embodied political motives.  More strikingly, a senior tax official 
explains that, “after the election they told us you cannot take all the people to court…[As a 
result] taxpayers got relaxed…they knew that we were not in a position to enforce it the 
way we did before.”  This reduced the aggressiveness of enforcement is consistent with the 
government response to unhappiness with the presumptive tax, and offers a more complete 
explanation for the sharp fall in tax collection.   
 
In addition to these factors, there is also a widely held belief that the government had tried 
to extend its political control over the tax administration.  In the aftermath of the election a 
major administrative reorganization was ushered in as part of a broader government 
program of Business Process Reengineering.  The domestic taxation and customs 
departments were brought together under the Federal Inland Revenue and Customs 
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Authority, which replaced the Ministry of Revenue.  This was accompanied by efforts to 
merge activities that were being duplicated, reorganize business processes along functional 
lines, reassign large portions of the existing staff and train a large group of recent university 
graduates to join the administration.  The motivation for the program was largely technical, 
but it is also widely believed to have had political undertones as the government sought to 
reassert bureaucratic control after the elections.  Regardless of the actual politicization of 
the reform program, the impression of politicization appears to have made administrators 
particularly cautious, which, along with the general disruption caused by rapid and centrally 
mandated reorganization, has weakened the effectiveness of administration. 
 
While officials are very guarded in discussing the impact of the elections on the activities of 
government, the overall body of evidence suggests strongly that political considerations 
must figure prominently in explaining falling tax revenue.  It seems relatively clear that 
businesses took advantage of the reticence of the government to aggressively pursue tax 
evaders and that political turmoil undermined the effectiveness of administration.  It is more 
difficult to ascertain whether political alienation reduced the willingness of taxpayers to 
comply with taxation, but sharply declining revenue in the absence of a clear explanation is 
certainly indicative of that possibility.  While political opposition was sharply repressed in 
the aftermath of the election, perhaps the strongest evidence of quiet resistance to taxation 
lies in the fact that the government avoided adopting significant new tax revenue measures 
despite a marked deterioration in its fiscal position, and significant external pressure for 
reform. 
8.2.6. Renewed Revenue Focus 2008-09 
Following a period of declining tax collection after the elections the government began to 
refocus attention on revenue issues from the beginning of 2007.  The profit rates used for 
calculating presumptive tax liabilities were increased, though to a level still below that 
which existed before the election, while all of the highland regions of the country also 
increased agricultural tax rates during the period.27 
                                                
27 The process of central data consolidation often takes several years, and thus precludes providing data on 
the overall impact on collection. 
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More generally, the highest levels of government began to pay increasing attention to 
taxation.  The first highly visible step was the reintroduction of the import surtax, initially 
introduced during the war with Eritrea, in 2007.  In late 2008 the government issued an 
official proclamation about the need to increase collection from large and small taxpayers 
alike, with a special focus on the largest 13000 taxpayers.  While details of these plans 
remained limited, November 2008 saw parliament pass new laws that significantly 
expanded the power of the tax administration to use penalties, coercion and required 
withholding in order to collect the VAT.  Throughout late 2008 and early 2009 there was 
growing evidence that the government was, in fact, being far more aggressive in collecting 
the VAT in particular and the earlier fall in revenue began to be reversed. 
 
This resurgence in government attention to taxation from 2007 onward can be attributed to 
changes in the political environment and to the deteriorating finances of the government.  
Politically, the turmoil surrounding the elections had subsided, and, more importantly, the 
opposition had been decimated.  With the opposition weak and divided, and public 
discontent more generally largely silenced, the government appears to have felt more secure 
in seeking to reinvigorate tax collection.  Even a decision by the government to 
dramatically increase fuel prices in late 2008 produced little, if any, overt public backlash 
despite its wide incidence and high visibility.  Meanwhile external pressure from donors for 
increased tax collection has been mounting in response to significant fiscal deficits.  The 
Ethiopian government has developed a reputation for resisting donor demands in the belief 
that aid will ultimately be forthcoming regardless, but there is evidence that donors may be 
becoming more assertive at the same time that reduced tax revenue is making the 
government more dependent on aid revenues. 
8.3. Regional Government Taxation 
Ethiopia is distinguished from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by the fact that there has been 
a significant degree of revenue decentralization, with regional governments collecting 
upwards of 25% of total taxes.  For example, small business taxation is a central 
government matter in both Ghana and Kenya, but is administered by regional governments 
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in Ethiopia.  This makes it possible to draw on comparisons across regions in order to 
highlight important aspects of the political economy of taxation. 
 
This research has therefore included limited case studies of Amhara and Tigray regions, 
Amhara because it has been the site of the most pronounced tax controversies, Tigray 
because it is home to the TPLF, which dominates the ruling EPRDF party. These case 
studies, and the comparisons between them, shed light on five major issues: the centrality of 
political allegiance to tax compliance, the local nature of tax politics, the importance of 
implementation strategies, the limits of central government commitment to tax collection 
and the politics of land taxation. 
8.3.1. Political Loyalty and Tax Performance 
Theory predicts that citizens that feel a stronger connection to their governments will be 
more likely to comply with taxation, and that administrators that feel greater loyalty to the 
government will be more effective (Lieberman 2002, Kasara 2005).  This prediction is 
borne out by comparing Tigray and Amhara regions. 
 
Through its domination of the EPRDF, the Tigray-based TPLF effectively dominates all of 
the regional governments.  And, as expected, Tigray appears, within the limits of available 
data, to be the most effective tax-collecting region in the country.  Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence suggests overwhelmingly that local leaders and politicians in the region are 
uniquely successful in mobilizing non-tax community resources for local development 
projects.  By contrast, Amhara region was the centre of power in the country during the 
later Imperial period but is now politically dominated by the EPRDF.  This has led to a high 
degree of resistance to the ruling party, as reflected in relatively strong electoral support for 
the opposition in the 2005 election (Arriola 2008).  This tension is reflected in patterns of 
taxation, as Amhara region has been a relatively poor tax collector throughout much of the 
period since 1991.  This began to change with the arrival in 2000 of a new regional 
governor who was deeply committed to improving tax collection, but Amhara region 
subsequently became the site of the most virulent opposition to the new presumptive tax 
regime. 
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8.3.2. Community Contributions, Taxation and History 
One of the more remarkable features of tax collection in both regions, and particularly in 
Tigray, is the widespread belief that citizens are more willing to contribute significant 
resources – both cash and in kind – to locally controlled community development project 
than to the payment of taxes.   Even more striking is the belief that local politicians are 
likely to encourage citizens to contribute to such projects rather than paying their taxes, 
thus eroding the political will for more aggressive tax collection.  At a general level this 
seems to point to the absence of confidence among taxpayers that tax payments to the 
regional government will result in corresponding local benefits, and this pattern of reliance 
on community initiatives funded by voluntary contributions is repeated elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa (Guyer 1992, Chazan 1983). 
 
The fact that Tigray is particularly well known for its community development projects is 
rooted in history.  Tigray has long maintained a strong sense of regional and sub-regional 
independence (Levine 1965: 2).  Local rulers were very autonomous throughout Ethiopia’s 
long history and often displayed limited loyalty to the centre in times of turmoil.  More 
recently, Tigray was persistently resistant to Haile Selassie’s rule, as exemplified by the 
weyane rebellion, and was the site of continuous guerrilla warfare against the Derg regime.  
The guerrilla war fostered not only a sense of regional autonomy but also a culture of self-
reliance, and it is this element of local history that seems to explain the high level of 
community contributions as well as the preference for locally controlled community 
development projects.  In a region where the central government has often been regarded 
with suspicion a strong culture of self-reliance persists, even as the rise to power of the 
TPLF has encouraged a willingness to comply with regional taxes as well (Young 1997). 
8.3.3. Reform Strategy and Public Responses 
One of the most dramatic differences in taxation between the two regions is their divergent 
experience of the new presumptive tax regime.  Despite the absence of public protest, 
which has rarely been a feature of Ethiopian politics, the presumptive tax regime became 
hugely unpopular in Amhara region and a political liability for the government.  By 
contrast, the new tax was introduced with little public opposition in Tigray.  While the 
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generally more cooperative relationship between government and citizens in Tigray 
certainly played some role, those involved strenuously point to the importance of 
implementation strategy.  Amhara was the first region to implement the new tax and did so 
particularly aggressively, leading businesses to frequently experience 100-300% increases 
in their tax payments.  Public opposition became particularly acute because the change was 
sudden and lacked transparency.  So severe was public opposition that after the election the 
regional government provided tax refunds, amounting to 11 million birr (US$1.1 million), 
to all of those taxpayers who had been over taxed relative to the reduced rates introduced in 
2005.  By contrast, tax administrators in Tigray emphasize their explicit and successful 
efforts to avoid Amhara’s fate by introducing the reforms slowly, engaging in extensive 
public dialogue and involving important stakeholders like the local Chamber of Commerce. 
8.3.4. The Weakness of Government Commitment to Taxation 
Tigray is also unique in that it has experienced dramatic revenue volatility, which raises 
questions about the commitment of the central government to revenue enhancement.   From 
1995-96 to 1997-98 the region experienced a short-lived but dramatic surge in tax 
collection, primarily in the area of indirect taxes.  The revenue gains resulted from the use 
of regional border posts to monitor trade, thereby creating a database of information for 
identifying tax evasion.  Yet the policy was reversed in 1998, officially due to concerns 
about disrupting transit, increasing business costs and creating opportunities for corruption.  
While these are valid explanations in principle, it is surprising that the impetus for the 
change came from the federal government and in spite of protests by local revenue officials.  
Without passing judgment on the policy reversal given the difficulty of accessing 
information, it minimally suggests that revenue considerations were secondary to local 
business concerns, while it may point to the politicization of tax compliance in the region, 
which is home to much of the national political leadership. 
8.3.5. The Politics of Agricultural and Land Taxation  
Moving away from a strict comparison of Amhara and Tigray, it is useful to conclude this 
discussion of regional government taxation by looking in more detail at the experience of 
agricultural and land taxes.  In most countries in sub-Saharan Africa agricultural and land 
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taxes are poorly enforced, owing to the lack of administrative capacity and the likelihood of 
aggressive public resistance.  By contrast, successive Ethiopian governments have 
maintained an extensive system of land taxation and, remarkably, this system does not 
appear to have been a source of significant contemporary political conflict. 
 
The absence of political conflict is, undoubtedly, partly explained by political repression 
and the inherited legacy of government control.  At the simplest level peasants dare not 
challenge the government, which controls access to nationalized rural land.  This implicit 
connection between tax payments and land rights dates to Haile Selassie’s tax reform 
efforts in the 1940s.  A tax officer from the Imperial government explains that, “peasants 
thought that the tax slip was for the land – that this slip recognized their control of the land.  
So they were willing to pay.”  This mindset has persisted to the present, despite changes in 
government and land tenure rules.  Reporting the results of a survey of peasant farmers, 
Kassahun (2006: 19) explains that, “all responding farmers confirmed that paying land tax 
is unquestionable. The annual payment implicitly grants a land security where their name as 
land owner is updated on the government’s master document.” 
 
Related to this connection between tax payment and land rights is a broader sense that 
under Haile Selassie land and agricultural taxes became a part of peasant efforts to claim 
rights as citizens.  Bahru Zewde (1991: 192) has argued that as a result of the expansion of 
taxation, “the term gabbar lost its exploitative associations and assumed the more 
respectable connotation of taxpayer.”  An official from the period explains that paying tax 
“was a matter of existence,” as it allowed the peasantry to connect themselves to the 
Emperor and the national community.  Another official explains that during the reign of 
Haile Selassie, “rural people carried their tax receipt like an identity card.”  A third official 
proposes that the tax “was a recognition and they wanted that recognition – before, they 
were the property of the landlord.”  While these officials believe that this connection 
between tax payments and citizenship has been eroded over time, it appears to remain 
relevant. 
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8.4. Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in 
Contemporary Ethiopia 
Having presented this extended narrative of the political economy of taxation in Ethiopia 
since 1974, the pertinent question is whether it constitutes evidence that tax bargaining has 
played a role in the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Ultimately, the 
evidence suggests that tax bargaining has played a comparatively small role in shaping 
political outcomes in Ethiopia: not only has direct tax bargaining been rare, but taxation 
also has played little role in encouraging the growth of civil society.  Moreover, while there 
is evidence that taxpayers have engaged in tax resistance when successive governments 
have been particularly unpopular, the political consequences have been more muted than in 
either Ghana or Kenya.  This finding is not entirely surprising, as social, economic and 
political conditions in Ethiopia all appear to militate against an important role for tax 
bargaining.  These factors include the highly autocratic character of politics, the weakness 
of domestic economic forces, the heavy reliance of the government on foreign aid and a 
historical and cultural context that seems likely to discourage tax conflict.  Thus, to a large 
extent, observed outcomes serve to confirm existing predictions about the contextual factors 
that are likely to discourage tax bargaining. 
 
At the same time, we do observe a handful of politically significant episodes of both direct 
and indirect tax bargaining, and the fact that this is true in spite of all of the factors that 
would seem to militate against it, causes those episodes to take on greater analytical 
significance.  With this in mind, the discussion to follow proceeds in three parts: the first 
section reviews the relative absence of direct tax bargaining, and of public engagement 
around tax issues more generally; the second section considers the more limited evidence of 
both direct tax bargaining at the regional government level and of indirect tax bargaining 
through tax resistance; finally, the third section presents a more extensive discussion of the 
factors that appear to have diminished the potential for tax bargaining in Ethiopia.   
8.4.1. The Limited Role of Tax Bargaining in Ethiopia 
The most glaring feature of the political economy of taxation in contemporary Ethiopia is 
the extent to which overt political conflict over taxation at the national level has been 
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virtually non-existent.  Not only is there no evidence of direct tax bargaining; even civil 
society engagement with tax issues has been extremely rare, with even the major business 
associations playing a primarily informational, rather than advocacy, role. 
 
This pattern is particularly unsurprising during the period of socialist rule, owing to both 
the repressive power wielded by the government and the hidden character of taxation in a 
state controlled economy.  The Derg regime was remarkable in the context of low-income 
countries for its ability to penetrate society, even in rural areas, and thus stifle political 
dissent.  Aside from the absence of open political contestation, there was a widespread 
popular belief that even private activities and views could be uncovered and punished by 
the government (Clapham 1988).  In such an environment of total repression the absence of 
direct tax bargaining was a virtual certainty.  As importantly, the socialist economic system 
placed most non-agricultural economic activity under the direct control of the state, and 
thus obscured the very concept of taxation.  For state-owned enterprises ‘taxation’ was, in 
fact, little more than a book keeping matter, as the government simply claimed a share of 
profits as taxation.  In this context there was little scope for tax bargaining as state 
ownership of large economic enterprises implied that it was both taxpayer and tax collector. 
 
The situation was somewhat different in the agricultural sector, where smallholder farming 
continued to be the dominant form of production despite the government push for 
collectivization.  Yet even in agriculture the strict enforcement of price controls meant that 
taxation was hidden in the low prices paid to producers and tax evasion could only be 
achieved through smuggling.  Meanwhile the fact that the government had nationalized all 
agricultural land increased the vulnerability of the peasantry and their incentives to comply 
with land and agricultural tax requirements.  Thus, state control of economic activity 
significantly curtailed the potential for both direct and indirect tax bargaining.  As Easter 
(2008: 74) writes about tax bargaining in communist Russia and Poland, which were even 
further under government control, “communist states did not require a compliance strategy 
to collect taxes.  Instead they extracted hidden taxes indirectly through the administrative 
structures of the command economy.”  Given that taxation was embedded in the structure 
of the command economy, tax resistance and tax bargaining were, by definition, 
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intertwined with challenges to the broader structure of economic activity and economic 
incentives.  In this context, it is difficult to distinguish grievances related to taxation from 
more general opposition to government control of the economy (Clapham 1988). 
 
The arrival in power of the EPRDF brought with it a degree of political liberalization and 
the dismantling of the nationalized economic system.  The former implied the potential for 
limited forms of public opposition to the regime, while the latter re-established taxation as a 
distinct feature of economic management, potentially subject to more direct tax bargaining.  
Nonetheless, public engagement with tax issues remained extremely limited, and direct tax 
bargaining at the national level virtually non-existent.  This pattern was first apparent in the 
immediate aftermath of the arrival in government of the EPRDF in 1991.  The new 
government oversaw the reorientation of the tax system towards the taxation of new private 
enterprises, but there was virtually no public engagement. 
 
While the ease with which the new tax system was implemented is unremarkable given the 
massive changes associated with the transition, and the goodwill that greeted the new 
government, the absence of public engagement during a new round of tax reform beginning 
in 2001 is striking.  During this period the government introduced a new VAT and 
dramatically improved levels of revenue collection by improving enforcement of trade, 
income and goods and services taxes.  Yet the public response was muted.  Most notable 
was the absence of a public response to the VAT, which reduced the range of tax 
exemptions available for basic goods and thus increased prices that directly affected the 
majority of the population.  Finally, following declining tax collection during 2005-2007, 
the government substantially increased tax collection in 2008 through more aggressive tax 
enforcement and an increase in fuel prices, but again the changes seemed to garner limited 
public attention. 
 
What is particularly noteworthy during this period is not simply the absence of tax 
bargaining, but the absence of engagement with tax issues among the two groups that 
would be most expected to take an active interest: the political opposition and business 
associations.  During interviews members of the political opposition were universal in 
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arguing that tax issues had not been a significant political concern.  In the case of business 
associations, there was a significant interest in tax issues within the Chamber of Commerce, 
but engagement was strictly limited to an educational, rather than advocacy, role. 
 
The one exception to the near total absence of direct tax bargaining at the national level 
appears to lie in efforts by the tax administration since 1991 to increase the transparency of 
the tax system, with the goal of enhancing compliance.  While it is tempting to dismiss 
these efforts given the fact that public outreach and transparency remain comparatively 
limited, leading tax officials speak with pride about them and are adamant that progress has 
been made.  While these changes are specific to the realm of taxation, they hold the 
potential to quietly challenge the tendency towards hierarchical behaviour in public 
administration, and government more generally.  Moreover, a transparent tax system can 
increase public understanding of government activities and affect taxpayer expectations of 
reciprocity.  While it would be foolish to overstate these factors, it would be equally foolish 
to ignore the extent to which such subtle changes may be significant in shaping long term 
public engagement in a historically tightly-controlled political context. 
8.4.2. The Quiet Politics of Tax Bargaining 
While the absence of public debate about tax issues, and of direct forms of tax bargaining at 
the national level, is noteworthy, it is not entirely surprising.  In the context of a highly 
autocratic government public contestation of government policy is unlikely.  However, 
there are alternative avenues through which taxation has shaped broader political outcomes.  
While such cases have also been relatively infrequent in Ethiopia, two issues warrant 
attention: the importance of relatively direct tax bargaining at the regional government level 
and the potential for indirect tax bargaining through tax resistance. 
8.4.2.1. Tax Bargaining at the Sub-National Level 
While tax bargaining, and public engagement with taxation more generally, has been rare at 
the national level in Ethiopia, there is evidence that regional taxation has been more 
contentious, and has yielded important gains in responsiveness and accountability.  This 
finding is consistent with the arguments of proponents of fiscal decentralization, who have 
long argued that constructive engagement between citizens and government may be more 
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likely when governing decisions are decentralized, and thus closer to citizens (Bird and 
Vaillancourt 1998).  
 
The most important example of direct tax bargaining in contemporary Ethiopia surrounds 
the presumptive taxation of small businesses.  When introducing the reformed presumptive 
tax in 2001 the government stressed that Tax Assessment Committees, comprised of 
members of both government and the business community, would conduct assessment of 
the tax.  This appears to have been a pre-emptive concession aimed at curbing public 
opposition to the new tax by increasing public participation and oversight.  Yet, even with 
the establishment of the Committees, increased enforcement of the tax generated significant 
unhappiness among taxpayers. 
 
While the absence of a culture of public protest, coupled with the autocratic character of the 
government, ensured that conflict over the tax occurred relatively quietly, there is no doubt 
that the regional and central governments were well aware of public hostility to the tax.  
The government initially set up a commission to study the fairness of the new tax, but the 
2005 elections led the government to believe that its popularity was being significantly 
undermined by public hostility to the tax.  This led the government to suddenly reduce rates 
and also to introduce broader measures to expand public consultation, particularly in 
Amhara region.  This included nationwide consultations conducted by the EPRDF, and 
since then regional governments have made continuous efforts to be more transparent in 
communicating with taxpayers about the need for taxation and the use of tax revenues.  A 
senior tax official from Amhara region explains that, “[now] we negotiate with society, we 
discuss with society...[we explain] why the government is imposing tax on the society, [and 
provide] transparency to society, [with taxpayers as] active participants in the assessment 
process.”  The same official also contends that this amounted to a process of “door to door 
negotiation by political leaders.” 
 
It is, of course, important not to overemphasize the importance of these reforms.  The 
creation of assessment committees and the expansion of transparency certainly constitute 
gains in accountability, but both are also relatively limited in their scope.  That said, there is 
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a sense among at least some stakeholders that the expansion of consultation and 
transparency around taxation may be an important force in changing the political 
expectations of citizens.  Increased transparency stands to increase public expectations 
about the connection between taxation and public services, while in a broader sense these 
reforms create a modest space for political dialogue within a political environment that has 
remained relatively repressive and closed for centuries.  In a context in which national 
politics has recently become more repressive, such gains, while modest in absolute terms, 
are nonetheless significant. 
 
While the tax bargaining around the presumptive tax is particularly explicit, the fact that it 
has revolved around a regional tax on small businesses, as opposed to a national tax on 
larger firms, points to the potential importance of such smaller taxes for prompting direct 
tax bargaining and public engagement.  The experience of taxation in pastoral regions 
reinforces that broad message.  While the government and pastoralist taxpayers have failed 
to achieve an effective tax bargain, the ongoing debate highlights both the ability of 
taxation to prompt bargaining between taxpayers and government and the potential for tax 
bargaining to be an entry point for broader governance gains. 
 
The taxation of pastoralists has long been a source of conflict in Ethiopia, though the 
small revenue implications have prevented this conflict from being a major political 
issue.  The government has generally sought to tax reluctant pastoralists using a 
combination of movement controls, customs points and market taxes, and has justified 
these taxes on the grounds that pastoralists should be expected to contribute tax 
revenue in exchange for government services.  Such controls could facilitate tax 
collection and aid government efforts to monitor livestock levels and establish how 
much tax should be collected.  Pastoralists have responded to these efforts with 
hostility, for two reasons.  First, pastoralists complain that government efforts to 
impose movement controls and customs points undermine the basic nature of pastoral 
livelihoods, which rely on mobility and adaptability.  Second, pastoralists contend that 
the very low level of existing government services does not justify the levels of 
taxation being demanded. 
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Disagreement over movement controls and taxation has bred occasionally violent 
conflict that dates at least as far back as 1963, when anger amongst pastoralists at the 
imposition of tax-related movement controls contributed to the outbreak of the Bale 
uprising (Gebru Tareke 1991).  In more recent years, conflict between pastoralists and 
state officials, including the military, has led to occasional violence and, more 
frequently, the seizure of livestock and other pastoralist assets.  In aggregate terms the 
government has expended significant resources, and bred significant animosity, 
without achieving meaningful revenue gains.  Meanwhile, the uncertainty, violence 
and seizures encountered by pastoralists, coupled with the absence of effective 
services, appear to entail costs that exceed the burden of potential taxation (Devereux 
2006, Pastoralist Communication Initiative 2005, 2006, Prichard 2007).  
 
At a gathering of pastoralists and policy makers convened in December 200628, the 
nature of the tax conflict was succinctly summarized by a government official:  “The 
pastoralists are saying that they don’t receive services, so they shouldn’t have to pay 
tax. The government says the pastoralists don’t pay tax, so they don’t deserve 
services.”  Both sides expressed an understanding of the potential benefits of a 
mutually acceptable, and conciliatory, tax bargain, but neither side has been able to 
overcome the antagonism that characterizes the current relationship.  At the same 
gathering, senior pastoralist leaders provided clear indications that they would, in 
principle, support greater tax compliance in exchange for better services and reduced 
harassment by the government.  One leader went so far as to ask, “If pastoralists are 
not paying taxes, are they in a position to demand services?”  The message for this 
research is clear: regional government taxation, which involves direct interaction 
between taxpayers and the government, holds significant potential to spur tax 
bargaining and the benefits are potentially large.  Yet, despite these potential gains 
effective tax bargaining can be extremely difficult in the context of deep mistrust. 
                                                
28 The gathering was organized by the Pastoralist Communication Initiative, and was held at the Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton, UK, December 3-8, 2006 
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8.4.2.2. Tax Compliance, Tax Resistance and Incentives for 
Reform 
While experience at the regional level thus provides some evidence of direct tax bargaining, 
it is equally possible that even where taxpayers are unable to engage in direct tax 
bargaining with government they may nonetheless contribute to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability through their tax compliance decisions.  The case studies 
from both Ghana and Kenya have highlighted cases in which resistance to taxation 
contributed to the removal of unpopular governments and created incentives for incoming 
governments to adopt a reformist agenda in order to increase tax revenue.  In Ethiopia 
resistance to taxation has been only a minor factor in changes in government, but there is 
compelling evidence that, as in Ghana and Kenya, levels of tax collection have fallen in 
response to growing popular unhappiness with the government.  This provides further 
evidence that over the long-term tax resistance by unhappy taxpayers may contribute to the 
removal of unpopular governments and to producing positive incentives for greater 
responsiveness and accountability in states that are reliant on tax revenue. 
 
The first Ethiopian example relates to the overthrow of the Derg government, which was 
accelerated by a fiscal crisis to which tax resistance was at least a minor contributor.  While 
the immediate cause of the fall of the government lay in declining morale and military 
defeat, the collapsing finances of the state shaped that military outcome.  While the decline 
of the Soviet Union as a benefactor to the government played an important role in this 
respect, a dramatic fall in domestic revenue figured at least equally prominently.  During 
the final stages of the civil war, which witnessed the unexpected defeat of the government, 
domestic revenue fell from almost 20% of GDP to less than 9% at a time when the fiscal 
demands on the state were at their height.  This stunning collapse of state revenue reflected 
the economic toll of the civil war, which had disrupted transport and caused the government 
to lose control of parts of the country, and the collapse of revenues from state-owned 
enterprises that appeared to wilt after several years in which the government directed profits 
to the war effort. 
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This narrative minimally makes clear that fiscal issues contributed to the fall of the Derg 
government.  Had the government enjoyed access to large non-tax revenues the conflict 
likely would have been both longer and more destructive, and this observation speaks to the 
broad role of tax reliance in shaping political outcomes.  Simply put, the fact that the 
government was reliant on tax revenue, and had limited access to non-tax revenue, hastened 
the end of the conflict and transition to a reformist (though still autocratic) government. 
 
While fiscal crisis was thus essential to political change, the role of tax resistance in 
precipitating this crisis appears to have been modest, but certainly not negligible.  Given the 
limited scope for tax resistance within the state owned sector, the primary evidence of tax 
resistance comes from the realm of agriculture.  There is at last anecdotal evidence that the 
growing unpopularity of the regime, and its efforts to extract ever more revenue to sustain 
the war effort, met with increasing resistance in rural areas (Webb, Braun and Yohannes 
1992: 63).  This is reflected in declining collection of agricultural and land taxes in the last 
years of the war, as well as by a sharp decline in official coffee production during the same 
years, which suggests the possibility that smuggling was also increasing (Dercon and 
Ayalew 1995: 1799).  More speculatively, the fact that the government also relied heavily 
on informal exactions from the peasantry to support its military campaigns suggests the 
possibility that resistance may have played an even greater role in exacerbating the crisis, 
but detailed information is, unfortunately, unavailable.  Thus, we have evidence that fiscal 
crisis played an important role in the fall of the Derg, and that tax resistance played at least 
a small role in this process.  This indicates that indirect tax bargaining through tax 
resistance contributed at least modestly to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability in this particular case, reinforcing our broader faith in the relevance of 
indirect tax bargaining through tax resistance as a causal process linking taxation to broader 
governance gains. 
 
The potential for tax resistance to act as a catalyst for political change was similarly 
reinforced by Ethiopian experience around the 2005 elections.  While taxation was not a 
major campaign issue, the government came to believe that taxation was an important 
source of public opposition.   In response the government both reduced certain tax rates and 
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allowed tax enforcement to become more lax in the aftermath of the election.  The result 
was a sharp decline in the share of tax revenue in GDP in the years following the election.  
While taxpayers did not resist taxation in the classic sense of anti-tax protests or aggressive 
tax evasion, by expressing their displeasure informally and at the ballot box they 
nonetheless precipitated a fall in tax revenue. 
 
While the fall in tax revenue contributed to economic imbalances, it did not ultimately lead 
to a change in government or force the government to expand responsiveness and 
accountability.  The episode nonetheless provides compelling confirmation of the broader 
claim that public unhappiness with government frequently leads to declining tax revenue, 
and thus increases the likelihood of changes in government and of reform.  In highly 
autocratic settings like Ethiopia, where direct tax bargaining is highly constrained, the fact 
that taxpayers were able to force reduced levels of government tax collection offered them 
an alternative avenue through which to create pressure for a change in government and for 
reform. 
8.4.3. Explaining Outcomes: Political, Economic and Social 
Barriers to Tax Bargaining 
The discussion so far has highlighted an important example of direct tax bargaining around 
presumptive taxation as well as evidence that the popularity of the government has shaped 
revenue-raising capacity.  This evidence supports the belief that tax bargaining can be an 
important contributor to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability, but the broader 
message is that tax bargaining, both direct and indirect, has been rare in contemporary 
Ethiopia.  Yet, as has already been noted, this is not entirely surprising, as the political, 
economic and social conditions that prevail in Ethiopia are precisely those that we expect to 
make tax bargaining particularly unlikely: significant political repression, a weak economic 
base, high levels of aid dependence and a long history of highly coercive taxation.  What 
follows discusses each in turn. 
8.4.3.1. Political Repression 
The importance of political repression in reducing the potential for direct and indirect tax 
bargaining does not bear repeating at any length.  Quite simply, direct tax bargaining and 
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the growth of civil society require space for public mobilization and public debate, and this 
has, for the most part, been impossible in Ethiopia, at least at the national level.  Even the 
case of direct tax bargaining over the presumptive tax on small businesses was carried out 
in virtual silence, as taxpayers made their displeasure clear through informal channels 
rather than through significant public protest.  The basic message is that in the presence of 
high levels of political repression citizens are likely to be forced to bargain with 
government indirectly through their tax compliance decisions, and there has, indeed, been 
evidence of this dynamic in Ethiopia. 
8.4.3.2. The Weakness of the Economic Base 
Potentially as important as the extent of political repression, though more difficult to 
capture, is the weakness of the private sector in Ethiopia.  The best known models of tax 
bargaining have long emphasized that relatively mobile capitalists are likely to be 
particularly important to tax bargaining, as they are most able to wield the threat of tax 
evasion and avoidance (Bates and Lien 1985).  As important, though less frequently 
emphasized in formal models, is the fact that the economic power of the private sector is 
likely to provide additional resources with which to challenge the state.  Taken together 
these factors have led Moore (2008) and others to conclude that tax bargaining is 
particularly unlikely in poor and agrarian societies with limited bases of independent 
economic power.  This description closely fits Ethiopia, as it is not only one of the poorest, 
most rural, countries in the world, but the legacy of socialist rule has meant that the private 
sector remains both underdeveloped and politically unassertive.  This dynamic is most 
clearly in evidence in looking at the Chamber of Commerce, which remains divided, weak 
and politically cautious. 
8.4.3.3. Government Dependence on Foreign Aid 
Throughout the period under study Ethiopia has remained heavily dependent on foreign aid.  
Since 1990 Ethiopia has received an average of more than 10% of GDP annually in foreign 
aid, while the level of aid reached almost 20% of GDP from 2002-2004.  In most years the 
level of foreign aid thus matched or exceeded total revenue from tax collection.  Multiple 
authors have predicted that such high levels of aid dependence are likely to discourage tax 
bargaining (Moore 1998, Brautigam and Knack 2004).  While existing studies have largely 
focused on the possibility that high levels of aid dependence may reduce levels of domestic 
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tax collection, access to aid is likely to also reduce incentives for governments to make 
concessions to taxpayers, as they have access to alternative revenue sources. 
 
While this chapter has not focused explicitly on the impact of aid, events in the aftermath of 
the 2005 election point towards the possibility that aid may have reduced incentives for 
taxation and tax bargaining.  At the time the government faced growing popular displeasure 
at both the national and regional government levels and responded by significantly reducing 
tax rates and enforcement, in an effort to purchase public support.  This had significant 
fiscal consequences but the fiscal cost was mitigated by the fact that foreign aid continued 
at levels that exceeded total tax collection.  In the absence of aid the government would 
have been significantly less able to weather the reduction in tax revenue, and thus would 
likely have had stronger incentives to bargain with taxpayers rather than simply reducing 
collection.  This topic is discussed at greater length in chapter 11. 
8.4.3.4. History, Expectations and Norms 
Finally, Ethiopia’s unique history has shaped the contemporary potential for tax bargaining.  
Most striking is the importance of Ethiopia’s long legacy of highly coercive taxation.  The 
absence of public resistance to the dramatic tax changes in the 1990s is widely attributed to 
the fact that the tax burden, while significant, was much lower than it had been under the 
Derg, while the space available to private business had expanded dramatically.  Thus, it was 
the presence of an exploitative revenue system prior to 1991 that ensured a lack of 
resistance to later tax initiatives, which looked very good by comparison. 
 
There is also a deeper question of whether the long history of coercive taxation may have 
shaped public perceptions of taxation, and the extent to which taxpayers expect reciprocity 
for their tax payments.  If taxation is not perceived as a form of exchange, with expectations 
of reciprocity, then the likelihood that taxpayers will make demands for reciprocal 
concessions from government will clearly be sharply reduced.  This possibility is raised 
much more frequently in Ethiopia than in other countries in the region, likely reflecting the 
fact that taxation in Ethiopia has particularly coercive origins, from the tributes levied by 
successive Emperors during the Imperial period to government controls of the Derg period.  
It is telling that the Amharic word, geber, meaning tribute, is also used to refer to 
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agricultural and land taxes and that the payment of land and agricultural taxes has continued 
to be viewed as a claim to land rights and citizenship as much as being viewed as a payment 
for services (Kassahun 2006). 
 
The extent to which taxpayers may not think of taxation in terms of reciprocity should not 
be overstated, however.  Outside observers have long been tempted to make similar claims 
about the ignorance of taxpayers throughout sub-Saharan Africa, but limited survey 
evidence has consistently found that even rural taxpayers have much stronger expectations 
of reciprocity than has often been assumed (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001).  While similar 
survey evidence is not available in Ethiopia, the question of perceptions of taxation is 
complex, and the evidence here very partial.  That said, both interviews and intuition 
suggest that Ethiopian history may have made expectations of reciprocity around taxation 
relatively weak, particularly in rural areas, with possible consequence for tax bargaining.  
8.5. Conclusions 
Since 1974 successive Ethiopian governments have, for the most part, been able to achieve 
reasonable levels of tax collection almost entirely through the use of coercion.  This was 
overwhelmingly true under the Derg regime, but even since the arrival of the EPRDF major 
tax reforms have generally been greeted by passive acceptance or tax evasion, with little 
evidence of direct tax bargaining or civil society engagement.  At the national level neither 
business associations, civil society organizations nor the political opposition have engaged 
actively with tax issues.  But while the relative absence of easily observable tax bargaining 
is striking, it is not particularly surprising.  Social, political and economic conditions in 
Ethiopia present a perfect storm of factors that are expected to reduce the likelihood of tax 
bargaining: repressive politics, a weak private sector, dependence on foreign aid and a long 
history of coercive taxation. 
 
Given that Ethiopia is thus a setting in which tax bargaining is particularly unlikely, the fact 
that there is nonetheless meaningful, if limited, evidence of tax bargaining offers support to 
the broader ideas being explored by this thesis.  Most obviously, tax bargaining around the 
presumptive tax on small businesses at the regional government level was clear cut and 
 280 
resulted in important gains in accountability in an environment in which political repression 
was otherwise increasing.  While the gains were modest in absolute terms, in a context of 
such limited opportunities outcomes that create space for political engagement and for 
shaping political expectations deserve to be taken seriously.  This is likewise true of the 
broader trend towards building a more transparent tax system at the national level. 
 
As important as these examples of direct tax bargaining is evidence that the ability of the 
government to raise tax revenue has been shaped by levels of popular support.  While 
falling tax revenue after the 2005 elections did not result in a change in government or in 
major concessions, the episode offers further support for the argument that taxpayers can 
exercise political power through their compliance decisions, even in a repressive political 
environment.  Over the long-term there is every reason to believe that the ability of 
taxpayers to exercise such indirect political influence through tax resistance will increase 
the likelihood of more responsive and accountable government. 
 
While these examples, taken on their own, would constitute weak evidence at best of the 
role of tax bargaining in shaping the responsiveness and accountability of government, they 
offer important confirmation of the importance of tax bargaining when considered in 
conjunction with the two previous case studies.  In a repressive environment like Ethiopia 
the importance of taxation in shaping broader political outcomes will invariably be indirect 
and difficult to observe, but this chapter has made clear that the basic political mechanisms 
of interest are no less relevant.  In doing so it has also re-emphasized the importance of 
context, while suggesting that sub-national taxation may be an important focus for future 
research. 
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8.6. Appendix 
Figure 8.A1: Composition of Revenue 1949-2008 
 
Source:  Revenue data provided by the Ministry of Finance for 1975/76 to 2006/07.  Data for subsequent 
years is drawn from the IMF Statistical Appendix, while earlier data is drawn from Wogene Yirko (1994).  
The government has adopted a new methodology for calculating GDP in recent years, and has updated earlier 
data using the new methodology such that a continuous data series exists from 1996/97.  In order to construct 
a consistent data series for earlier years, GDP values prior to 1996/97 have been adjusted upwards by a factor 
of 1.27, which is the average adjustment for revised figures 1996/97-2004/05.  The resultant trends for 
individual periods are unchanged, while the adjusted tax to GDP figures for earlier years are more credible 
and consistent after the adjustment. 
 
Figure 8.A2: Expenditure and Revenue 1949-2008 
 
 
Source: Expenditure data are drawn from IMF Statistical Appendixes from 1992/93 onward.  Data from 
1974/75 to 1991/92 is drawn from the IMF GFS.  Earlier data is drawn from Wogene Yirko (1994).  Revenue 
and GDP data is drawn from the same sources as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 8.A3: Composition of Regional Tax Revenue 1996-2007 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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9. Does Tax Reliance Increase Responsiveness and 
Accountability? 
 
This research has covered significant ground.  While the research hypothesis is succinct, the 
research itself has been both broad and exploratory.  The evidence that has been presented 
has been equally diverse.  Each chapter has sought to tell part of the larger story, and each 
individual tax episode has had its own lessons and messages.  The remainder of this thesis 
takes stock of the entirety of the evidence presented so far, and synthesize it into a set of 
coherent and manageable conclusions.  The analysis is divided into three brief chapters.   
 
This chapter answers the primary research question: Is there compelling evidence that tax 
reliance has been a catalyst for increased responsiveness and accountability in Ghana, 
Kenya and Ethiopia?  The analysis further focuses on the specific causal processes that 
have observably linked tax reliance to broader governance gains.  Following this analysis, 
chapter 10 addresses the most important contextual factors that have shaped the relationship 
between tax reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Finally, 
chapter 11 turns to the question of foreign aid and whether it may reduce levels of tax 
reliance and thus erode incentives for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
 
This chapter is organized in two parts.  The first provides a broad summary of the evidence, 
while the second presents detailed analysis of the specific causal processes that have linked 
tax reliance to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
9.1. Reviewing the Evidence 
The first question posed by this research has been whether there is compelling evidence that 
tax reliance has been a catalyst for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  While the research question is conceptually straightforward it is not 
easily amenable to empirical testing owing to the complexity of the causal processes of 
interest and the difficulty of directly observing those processes in practice.  This thesis 
consequently began with a cross-country econometric analysis of the relationship between 
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taxation and accountability in sub-Saharan Africa.  Finding the economic evidence to be 
inconclusive, it then moved on to a more detailed exploration of the relationship between 
taxation, responsiveness and accountability in three countries: Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  
What follows provides a broad recapitulation of the evidence.  The first part reviews the 
econometric evidence, the second re-introduces the key elements of the theoretical model 
underpinning the case study analysis and the third addresses the overall pattern of the case 
study evidence. 
9.1.1. Econometric Tests and the Complexity of Causality 
The empirical investigation began by revisiting earlier econometric studies that had 
reported a positive and statistically significant cross-country relationship between tax 
reliance and accountability.  The econometric analysis presented in chapter 4 replicated the 
basic structure of existing cross-country studies, but improved upon them econometrically 
and, most importantly, by relying on a dramatically improved dataset.  This analysis yielded 
two important results.  First, it confirmed that available data is consistent with the existence 
of a positive relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  All else being held 
equal, higher levels of tax reliance, measured as either total tax collection as a share of GDP 
or tax collection as a share of total government revenue, are consistently correlated with 
higher levels of accountability.  Second, the analysis made clear that, contrary to earlier 
results, accepted econometric techniques do not yield compelling evidence of a robust 
causal relationship between tax reliance and accountability.  Over a wide array of 
econometric tests there was simply no consistent pattern of statistically significant results. 
 
While the analysis did not reveal a statistically significant causal relationship, this does not 
imply rejection of the hypothesis that tax reliance can be an important catalyst for the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability in practice.  Instead, the weakness of the 
results can be persuasively explained by the limitations of available data and, more 
importantly, the inability of the simple causal model underlying the econometric tests to 
capture the complexity of the causal relationship in practice.  Specifically, the causal model 
that lies behind existing cross-country econometric evidence assumes that tax bargaining 
will follow a consistent temporal logic in which increases in taxation precipitate subsequent 
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improvements in accountability one, three or five years in the future.  However, the case 
study evidence presented here makes clear that the causal processes that function in practice 
follow multiple different patterns, and consequently cannot be adequately captured by 
existing econometric models.  While there undoubtedly remains scope for econometric 
approaches to further contribute to research in this area, the weakness of these econometric 
results provided a strong justification for pursuing a series of case studies capable of 
capturing the nature of relevant causal processes in more detail.  
9.1.2. Theoretical Framework and Causal Model  
In order to strengthen the case study analysis it was essential to begin by laying out a clear 
theoretical framework and causal model capturing the relationship between tax reliance and 
the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Towards this end, Chapter 2 presented 
a model in which tax reliance is expected to contribute to broader governance gains by 
increasing the bargaining power of taxpayers relative to governments. 
 
The first level of the model laid out two general channels through which the need for 
taxation may expand the political power wielded by taxpayers.  First, tax reliance may 
expand opportunities for taxpayers to engage in tax resistance, and thus create incentives 
for governments to make concessions to taxpayers in order to improve tax compliance and 
increase tax revenue.  Second, increased taxation may encourage public engagement and 
collective action among taxpayers seeking to ensure that they benefit from their tax 
payments.   Within this simple framework, tax bargaining, leading to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability, is more likely when taxpayers are able to engage in tax 
resistance and collective action. 
 
The second level of the model turned from these relatively general observations to 
identifying a subset of three clearly defined, and empirically observable, causal processes 
through which the need for taxation may contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  While these causal processes were not expected to capture some of the 
relatively implicit and unobservable ways in which tax reliance may shape levels of 
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responsiveness and accountability they provided a clear empirical basis for evaluating the 
case study evidence.   
 
The first causal process was termed direct tax bargaining, and referred to cases in which 
governments respond to taxpayer demands by making relatively explicit concessions aimed 
at securing increased tax collection and curtailing public opposition.  The second and third 
causal processes were jointly termed indirect tax bargaining, as they referred to cases in 
which governments do not make reciprocal concessions to taxpayers, but in which the need 
for taxation nonetheless contributes to long-term political change.  Thus, tax resistance and 
changes in government, referred to cases in which resistance to taxation weakens the fiscal 
base of an incumbent government, creates pressure for a change in government and 
provides positive incentives for an incoming government to make concessions to taxpayers 
in order to improve tax collection in the future.  Meanwhile, strengthened political 
capabilities of taxpayers, captures cases in which tax reliance contributes to strengthening 
civil society and the opening up of new spaces for political engagement, with long-term 
implications for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  These latter two 
processes were an extension of standard models of tax bargaining, and reflected a desire to 
capture difficult to observe processes that are less explicit than direct tax bargaining but 
rely on a comparable causal logic and contribute to the outcomes of interest. 
9.1.3. Evidence of Tax Bargaining 
With this causal model as background, the case study chapters have presented historical 
narratives of the political economy of taxation, with a focus on the political dynamics 
surrounding particular tax episodes.  The analysis of political processes surrounding these 
tax episodes has, in turn, provided the basis upon which to evaluate the presence, or 
absence, of a relationship between tax reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability. 
 
The primary challenge in evaluating the evidence is that the relationship between taxation, 
responsiveness and accountability is expected to be probabilistic, and as such we do not 
expect to observe evidence of direct or indirect tax bargaining during every tax episode.  
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Taxation remains a fundamentally coercive process and there will inevitably be instances in 
which taxpayers are unable to mount an effective response or in which governments 
increase tax collection irrespective of the protests of taxpayers.  Thus, the expectation is not 
that every tax increase will result in tax bargaining, but that the case studies will 
collectively yield sufficient evidence of direct and indirect tax bargaining to confirm that 
tax reliance has been an important factor in the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability.  
 
Table 9.1 provides a general summary of the most important tax episodes from the four 
case study chapters (inclusive of Imperial Ethiopia).  Particular tax episodes and outcomes 
are categorized as being representative of one of the three causal processes identified by the 
model or as falling into a fourth category, taxation without tax bargaining, which captures 
instances in which significant increases in taxation did not yield evidence of tax bargaining.  
Consistent with expectations, the case studies have yielded many examples in which 
increased taxation has not given rise to direct or indirect tax bargaining.  This includes the 
relative absence of a response to the introduction of the VAT in both Kenya and Ethiopia, 
the lack of controversy surrounding large increases in tax collection in Kenya in the early 
1990s and the limited public response to a variety of tax changes in Ethiopia since 1991.  
These episodes are a clear reminder that the presence of taxation is by no means a guarantee 
that governments will bargain with taxpayers or make any important concessions to them 
(Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). 
 
Despite these cases, the overall body of evidence makes clear that tax reliance can be an 
important catalyst for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  It is possible to 
point to clear examples of each of the three hypothesized causal processes in each of the 
three case study countries.  Moreover, these examples are substantively important, with tax 
bargaining contributing centrally to the expansion of public services, to changes in the way 
that taxes are administered and to processes of political liberalization.  While there have 
been clear differences in the form and extent of tax bargaining across countries, the fact that 
there has been visible evidence of tax bargaining even in Ethiopia, where social, political 
and  
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economic conditions would seem to mitigate against it, is particularly striking.  There is no 
question that the evidence here comfortably meets the threshold of significance outlined in 
chapter 2: standard accounts of political development and change in the case study 
countries have been meaningfully enhanced by the inclusion of tax bargaining as an 
explanatory process.  With this in mind, the next section delves more deeply in the 
evidence, and presents key examples of each of the three causal processes. 
9.2. Causal Processes and Outcomes 
This research has aimed not only to ascertain whether tax reliance has contributed to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability in the case study countries, but also to 
understand the specific causal processes through which this relationship has operated.  This 
is not only of theoretical interest, but also has potentially important policy implications.  
Chapter 2 proposed three specific causal processes that appeared likely to link tax reliance 
to expanded responsiveness and accountability: (a) direct tax bargaining, (b) tax resistance 
and changes in government and (c) strengthened political capabilities of taxpayers.  The 
case study evidence has confirmed that these three processes, while they disguise important 
diversity, have all been empirically important in linking tax reliance to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability.  What follows summarizes the most important evidence 
of each process in turn, while this section concludes with a discussion of the relationship 
between particular types of processes and specific outcomes.  While the importance of 
context is apparent in the discussion to follow, systematic discussion of particularly 
important contextual factors is reserved for chapter 10. 
9.2.1. Direct Tax Bargaining 
The term direct tax bargaining refers to cases in which governments have relatively 
explicitly conceded increased responsiveness and accountability in an effort to increase 
acceptance of taxation by citizens.  The framework laid out in chapter 2 proposed that direct 
tax bargaining is likely to result in three observable types of outcomes, which are a subset 
of the broader concepts of responsiveness and accountability.  These outcomes are: (a) 
broad expansions of accountability, (b) improved provision of public services and (c) 
changes in tax policy and administration.   The case studies provided significant evidence 
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of direct tax bargaining, summarized in Table 9.1, and what follows briefly reviews three 
prominent examples, capturing each type of outcome in turn. 
 
The most dramatic example of direct tax bargaining was the broad expansion of 
accountability that followed the anti-VAT protests in Ghana.  In 1995 the Ghanaian 
government introduced a new Value Added Tax, and this effort prompted arguably the 
largest public protests of the previous fifteen years, and quickly led the government to 
repeal the new law, which was not reintroduced until 1998.  More important than the repeal 
of the tax was the fact that the protests came to incorporate much broader demands for 
political liberalization, which, once catalyzed, persisted beyond the repeal of the tax itself.  
This put pressure on the government, which remained highly hierarchical, to move towards 
a more inclusive governing style.  The government recognized that such a shift would be 
required both to calm the immediate anger unleashed by the tax protests and in order to 
regain the political legitimacy necessary to raise revenue in the future.  Thus, there is near 
universal agreement in Ghana that the VAT protests were integral to a significant expansion 
of domestic accountability. 
 
A second example from Ghana highlights the important role of subsequent tax bargaining 
in prompting sustained, and institutionalized, improvements in public service provision.  In 
2000 and 2003 successive Ghanaian governments sought to introduce increases in the VAT 
rate.  As with the original introduction of the VAT, these plans were met by public outcry, 
and, in response, the government agreed to commit all new tax revenues to specific, and 
popular, social programs.  This resulted in the creation of the Ghana Education Trust Fund, 
to support higher education and educational infrastructure, and a new National Health 
Insurance Scheme.  Moreover, both funds were accompanied by the creation of new Boards 
of Directors intended to achieve a measure of transparency in the management of the funds.  
Thus, the government conceded targeted public spending, and a degree of increased 
oversight and transparency, in exchange for public acceptance of taxation, thus presenting a 
particularly explicit example of tax bargaining. 
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Finally, the imposition of the presumptive tax on small businesses in Ethiopia prompted the 
government to increase the transparency of the tax system and introduce new spaces for 
public engagement.  Presumptive taxation had always held the potential for controversy 
owing to the subjective nature of tax assessment and the level of direct interaction between 
tax collectors and taxpayers.  Thus, when the government sought improved enforcement of 
the tax beginning in 2001 it also pre-emptively decided to establish Tax Assessment 
Committees, composed of representatives from both government and the business 
community, to increase public confidence in assessment procedures.  Despite this measure, 
the dramatic increase in enforcement led to significant controversy.  While political 
repression in Ethiopia prevented this opposition from erupting into explicit protest, the 
government came to believe that unhappiness with the tax was an important reason for its 
lack of success in controversial elections in 2005.  In response the government reduced 
rates and, more importantly, took further steps to expand transparency, most notably by 
creating new public forums in which citizens could raise questions and concerns about tax 
collection and public expenditure.  Both the creation of these forums and the introduction of 
the Tax Assessment Committees were modest measures in absolute terms, but in a 
relatively closed political environment they were important, incremental, processes for 
institutionalizing consultation and participation, if not formal accountability.   
9.2.2. Tax Resistance and Changes in Government 
The case studies also capture important evidence of the importance of tax resistance and 
changes in government to the emergence of responsiveness and accountability.  This causal 
process captures cases in which citizens have resisted taxation by an unpopular 
government, thus creating pressure for a change in government and positive incentives for 
future reform.  These cases minimally require evidence that (a) tax resistance contributed to 
declining tax revenue, (b) fiscal crisis contributed to a change in government and (c) the 
new government ushered in important improvements in responsiveness and accountability.  
In addition to these factors, the most compelling cases were those in which incoming 
governments experienced dramatic revenue gains after explicitly linking governance 
improvements to efforts to increase tax collection. 
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The most clear-cut example comes from Kenya, where revenue collection declined 
dramatically after controversial elections in 1997.  Much of the decline was attributable to 
declining economic growth, but well placed observers are near universal in arguing that it 
was also the result of explicit efforts by businesses aligned with the opposition to evade 
existing taxes, resist new taxes and weaken the fiscal position of the state.  The success of 
this tax resistance contributed significantly to a growing fiscal crisis, which, in turn, made a 
change in government in the 2002 elections more likely.  As importantly, having witnessed 
the struggles of its predecessor, the incoming government made tax reform a major priority 
and sought to explicitly link improved tax compliance to success in increasing political 
freedom and expanding popular social programs.  Thus we have a clear case in which tax 
resistance, largely by elites, created added pressure for a change in government and 
provided positive incentives for future reform.  It is also significant that when violence 
broke out after the 2007 elections the business community used the threat of non-
compliance with taxation as an important means to gain leverage over the government in 
calling for a peaceful resolution. 
 
A similar pattern was apparent in Ghana, where government controlled fuel prices were the 
central issue.  As was noted previously, while government controlled fuel prices are not 
technically taxes, changes in fuel prices were fiscally and behaviourally equivalent to taxes, 
with higher prices for consumers entailing greater government revenue.  In the late 1990s 
global fuel prices began to rise, which implied fiscal losses for the government if domestic 
fuel prices remained unchanged.  The fiscally responsible choice would have been to raise 
domestic fuel prices along with global prices, but such an increases was judged to be 
politically impossible due to relentless public opposition driven by frustration with the 
declining pace of political liberalization.  The inability of the government to raise fuel 
prices was, in turn, central to a growing fiscal crisis, and to this day remains a source of 
frustration to the government at the time.  As in Kenya, the fiscal crisis contributed to a 
change of government in the 2000 elections.  The incoming government learned from the 
fiscal struggles of its predecessor, and quickly made tax reform, including increased fuel 
prices, a major priority linked explicitly to broader political liberalization.  Thus, again, 
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resistance to taxation created pressure for a change in government and generated positive 
incentives for the incoming government to adopt a reformist agenda. 
 
In Ethiopia tax resistance has not played an equally decisive role, but there is nonetheless 
some evidence of the ability of taxpayers to use tax resistance as a means to respond to 
political repression.  Under the Derg regime political opposition was aggressively 
controlled, while even the potential for tax resistance was reduced by government control 
over a significant portion of economic activity.  Tax resistance in rural areas appears, 
nonetheless, to have played a meaningful, if still limited, role in accelerating the fiscal crisis 
that was central to the eventual overthrow of the government in 1991.  While the incoming 
government remained autocratic, it undoubtedly marked a move towards political 
liberalization and greater responsiveness.   
 
More than a decade later, the potential importance of tax resistance was again apparent, as 
tax collection fell sharply in the aftermath of highly controversial elections in 2005.  In this 
case it was the government that pre-emptively decided to ease the aggressiveness of tax 
enforcement, but that choice was a response to quiet, but increasingly apparent, public 
opposition.  The sharp fall in tax revenue after 2005 did not lead to a change in government, 
as the EPRDF was firmly entrenched in power and managed to aggressively repress the 
opposition.  However, the fact that quiet public opposition was sufficient to generate a 
sharp fall in tax revenue collection even in a relatively repressive environment provides 
powerful confirmation of the ability of taxpayers to weaken unpopular regimes through 
their opposition to tax collection.  While tax resistance did not generate major political 
changes in this particular instance, the case nonetheless reaffirms our confidence that tax 
reliance can increase the indirect political power wielded by taxpayers.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that tax resistance, when it does not lead to more consensual 
direct tax bargaining with government, is a relatively blunt political instrument.  While 
aggressive tax resistance can weaken an unpopular incumbent, it cannot guarantee that a 
new government will be more responsive and accountable than its predecessor.  To take an 
obvious example, resistance to taxation by the landed nobility in late Imperial Ethiopia 
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contributed to a change in government, but the new government proved to be more 
repressive than its predecessor and aggressively attacked the same nobility that had resisted 
taxation under the Imperial regime.  The basic message is nonetheless clear: when a 
government is reliant on tax revenue taxpayers have the potential to threaten the regime 
through tax resistance.  In some cases that threat will contribute to direct tax bargaining, but 
even where it does not tax resistance can be a means to undermine repressive regimes, thus 
opening the door to reform. 
9.2.3. Strengthened Political Capabilities of Taxpayers 
The final causal process captures instances in which increases in taxation have acted as a 
catalyst for strengthening the political capabilities of taxpayers, thus contributing to long-
term demands for responsiveness and accountability.  While taxation may contribute to 
long-term levels of political engagement in relatively invisible ways, this research has 
focused on cases in which conflict over taxation has contributed to strengthening visible 
civil society networks and organizations, which have in turn made broader demands for the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
 
The experience of the Committee for Joint Action (CJA) in Ghana speaks clearly to the 
centrality of taxation to the mobilizing efforts of civil society actors.  The CJA was initially 
founded in the aftermath of the anti-VAT protests, emerging as an informal heir to the 
broader Alliance for Change, which directed the 1995 protests.  While conflict over 
taxation figured centrally in the origins of the CJA, it subsequently grew beyond its initial 
founding, emerging as an important organizer of mass public mobilization around issues of 
political liberalization, corruption and poverty reduction.  Yet even as the CJA has grown to 
encompass a much wider vision and focus, its efforts have continued to be profoundly 
shaped by tax debates.  Since 1995 the CJA has repeatedly used frustration over tax related 
issues, including high fuel prices, as a central theme for mobilizing public protests aimed at 
demanding broader improvements in government performance.  In the words of one of the 
CJA’s leaders, “Taxes have always provided a focal point for public mobilization.  Have 
provided momentum for the resistance.” 
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More recently, the Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) in Kenya has made 
more explicit use of the idea that taxation can be a catalyst for public engagement over the 
longer-term.  The CGD was already supporting local level expenditure monitoring when, in 
2005, it decided to participate in the founding of a National Taxpayers’ Association (NTA).  
The goal of the NTA was to explicitly link tax related concerns and advocacy to existing 
activities related to expenditure monitoring.  The NTA organizers believed that by 
reinforcing community ownership of public revenues they could encourage more active 
public engagement.  While still in its infancy, the campaign has found that the message that 
tax payment can be a basis for making claims on the government has significant public 
resonance, and has the potential to become an increasingly important basis for public 
engagement and advocacy. 
 
Finally, the case studies have highlighted a wide array of examples in which taxes have 
played a role in catalyzing enhanced, and more constructive, political engagement amongst 
business associations.  In some ways these examples are particularly interesting, as business 
associations are viewed by some as a key component of improved governance in the 
developing world, but have remained very weak throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Doner and 
Schneider 2000, Handley 2008).  The central question about business associations in the 
region has long been whether they would act as narrow rent seeking organizations (Olson 
1965, Goldsmith 2002), or whether they would become productive interest groups engaged 
in processes of “constructive contestation” with government (Handley 2008:2, Brautigam, 
Rakner and Taylor 2002).  One of the key insights from earlier research is that, among other 
things, the emergence of constructively engaged business associations requires the 
emergence of a unified set of interests that encourages cooperation and collective action.  
Because taxation, when equitably applied, often represents a common threat to a large 
segment of business, it has played an important role in spurring precisely this kind of 
unified engagement with government.  This has, in turn, had lasting implications for the 
ability of business associations to become active in demanding greater responsiveness and 
accountability from government.  The impact of taxation on the activities of business 
associations can be seen among large business associations, including the Association of 
Ghana Industries and the Kenya Private Sector Association, as well as associations 
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representing small and medium enterprises, including the United Business Association in 
Kenya and the Ghana Union of Traders Association. 
9.2.4. Linking Processes and Outcomes 
The brief summary presented here provides evidence that tax reliance has been a catalyst 
for the expansion of responsiveness and accountability through three observable processes: 
direct tax bargaining, tax resistance and changes in government and strengthened political 
capabilities of taxpayers.  The next question is whether particular processes have given rise 
to specific types of outcomes.  Responsiveness and accountability, though closely related, 
are very different types of outcomes and may consequently be likely to result from 
particular processes. 
 
While this is an intriguing possibility, there is no evidence that it is, in fact, the case.  The 
examples of direct tax bargaining noted earlier have contributed to improved provision of 
public services, to changes in tax policy and administration and to broad expansions of 
accountability.  Meanwhile, processes of indirect tax bargaining do not lend themselves to 
attributing specific outcomes to particularly episodes of tax conflict or tax resistance.  
Typically, tax resistance is one of many factors contributing to a change in government and 
to a wide array of political reforms.  And where tax conflicts contribute to the strengthening 
of civil society, the need for taxation results in strengthened demands on government in the 
long-term rather than being the catalyst for a single specific outcome. 
 
More generally, it seems likely that the nature of political outcomes will primarily reflect 
the political priorities of taxpayers and governments rather than the particular 
characteristics of any individual tax conflict.  Levi (1999:115) has argued that the content 
of tax bargains will be shaped by the position and strategy of government.  She writes that, 
“it is the ruler who extends the franchise and other rights in order to promote joint ventures 
with subjects whose cooperation the ruler requires to maximize his own revenue.  In this 
view, only secure and relatively powerful rulers will act in this way; insecure rulers will 
grant exemptions to those whose alliance is necessary to protect power”.  While the case 
studies do not cast light on her particular claim, which would require a much broader 
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comparative study, the general argument rings true.  Faced with the same pressure from 
taxpayers, different governments will almost certainly make different types of concessions 
depending on their circumstances and priorities. 
 
Turning to the role of taxpayers, their demands are likely to reflect both political 
circumstances and the characteristics of those most directly involved.  The demands that 
emerged from the anti-VAT protests focused on political liberalization at least in part 
because the protests occurred at a time when the opposition was boycotting parliament and 
was thus particularly interested in political liberalization.  Later bargains focused on the 
provision of public services in part because gains in political liberalization had already been 
achieved, thus shifting priorities.  While bearing in mind the importance of context, it is 
possible that different taxpayer groups may have systematically different preferences, thus 
indirectly linking bargaining over certain types of taxes, affecting certain groups of 
taxpayers, to particular types of outcomes.  Timmons (2005) has suggested that the lower-
income majority may have a preference for public services, while higher-income taxpayers 
are more interested in institutionalized accountability, and this certainly sounds plausible.  
That said, there is a clear danger in making simplified assumptions about group interests, 
and the case study evidence here is not sufficiently broad to justify such expansive claims. 
9.3. Conclusions 
The introduction to this thesis set out three broad goals.  First, to assess whether the need 
for taxation has contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in the 
three case study countries.  Second, to capture the specific causal pathways through which 
this relationship has operated.  Third, to better understand the most important contextual 
factors that have shaped the relationship between tax reliance and the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability. 
 
This chapter has addressed the first two goals.  It has summarized a substantial body of case 
study evidence that has detailed the importance of tax reliance to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  This body of evidence 
captures three specific causal processes that underpin that relationship: direct tax 
 298 
bargaining, tax resistance and changes in government and strengthened political capabilities 
of taxpayers.  The discussion in this chapter has correspondingly summarized important 
evidence of each of these processes in practice.  These three causal processes do not capture 
the entire range of ways in which tax reliance may contribute to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability, as some such processes are likely to be subtle and 
difficult to observe.  For this reason the actual importance of tax reliance to the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability is likely to be still greater than the sum of the 
examples presented here.  Moreover, the findings reported here are focused exclusively on 
tax episodes related to central and regional government taxation, and thus do not address 
the equal potential for tax bargaining at the local government level, where the bulk of 
taxpayers in sub-Saharan Africa experience taxation most directly (Fjeldstad and Semboja 
2001, Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008, Prichard 2010). 
 
While the econometric tests presented early on in this thesis provided an ambiguous picture 
of the relationship between tax reliance and accountability, the subsequent analysis has 
made clear that those ambiguous results are likely a reflection of the complexity of the 
causal processes at work, which cannot be adequately captured by the simple causal model 
assumed by cross-country econometric tests.  This thesis thus provides important empirical 
evidence of the importance of taxation to the emergence of responsive and accountable 
government.  What remains is to explore the role of contextual factors in shaping the 
potential for tax bargaining.  The evidence presented so far suggests that such contextual 
factors may be decisive, as the particular patterns of tax bargaining have varied enormously 
between Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia.  The following chapter thus seeks to capture the 
factors driving these differences in greater detail. 
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10. Contextual Factors and Tax Bargaining 
 
While this thesis has presented evidence that tax reliance has contributed to the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability in the case study countries, specific outcomes both 
within and across countries have been extremely varied.  The Ghanaian case study captured 
extensive evidence of direct tax bargaining, while indirect tax bargaining figured more 
prominently in the Kenyan study.  In Ethiopia observable evidence of tax bargaining was 
comparatively rare, owing to a range of social, economic and political factors.  While each 
case study chapter presented partial explanations for observed patterns of direct and indirect 
tax bargaining, this chapter provides a more systematic accounting of the most important 
contextual factors shaping the relationship between tax reliance and the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability. 
 
In pursuing this task this chapter draws on a combination of the case study evidence and 
propositions derived from the existing literature.  On their own, four case study chapters 
offer a limited basis for drawing definitive conclusions about the role of specific contextual 
factors, but when such evidence complements existing research propositions, significantly 
stronger conclusions are possible.  This chapter does not seek to provide an exhaustive list 
of the contextual factors that may shape political outcomes, but instead focuses on six 
factors that are expected to be particularly significant.  The choice of factors reflects 
received propositions from earlier studies, while special attention has been paid to factors 
that have emerged in the case studies presented here (Moore 2008, Levi 1988, 1999). 
 
In order to understand the importance of context for the potential for tax bargaining it is 
useful to begin by again returning to the underlying causal model.  It proposes that states 
that are more reliant on taxation are more likely to be responsive and accountable to their 
citizens because tax reliance increases the bargaining power of taxpayers and thus increases 
incentives for governments to make corresponding concessions.  Tax reliance contributes to 
the relative bargaining power of taxpayers by increasing opportunities for tax resistance and 
enhancing the likelihood of public engagement and collective action.  The contextual 
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factors that shape the potential for tax bargaining are correspondingly those that are likely 
to affect opportunities for tax resistance and the potential for collective action.  
 
With this framing in mind what follows addresses six important contextual factors: (a) 
access to non-tax resources, (b) political institutions and context, (c) the strength and 
mobility of the private sector, (d) unity of interests among taxpayers, (e) taxpayers’ 
awareness of taxation and (f) a set of additional factors conducive to collective action. 
10.1. Access to Non-Tax Revenue 
The first contextual factor of interest is implicit in the research hypothesis itself, and that is 
the importance of access to non-tax revenue.  The evidence in this thesis has specifically 
addressed the extent to which the need for taxation has contributed to incentives for 
responsiveness and accountability in the case study countries.  Yet, in a broader sense, this 
thesis feeds into debates about the difference between those countries that that have access 
to significant non-tax revenue and those that are forced to rely primarily on tax revenue.   
 
The evidence presented here, coupled with existing theory and empirical accounts, suggests 
that access to non-tax revenue may reduce the scope for tax bargaining through four broad 
channels.  First, and most obviously, access to non-tax revenue generally leads to reduced 
levels of tax collection, thus reducing opportunities for tax resistance as well as the 
likelihood that taxation will spur political engagement and collective action.  This issue 
warrants little further discussion at this stage, as the previous chapter has presented 
substantial evidence of the positive relationship between taxation and the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability in the case study countries.    
 
Second, states with access to non-tax revenue are likely, on average, to face greater revenue 
pressure, and thus to have stronger incentives to make concessions to taxpayers in order to 
secure greater tax revenue.  Intuitively, when citizens engage in tax resistance, governments 
are likely to make reciprocal concessions if they face an urgent need for revenue, whereas 
states with large alternative sources of revenue may be more willing to tolerate reduced tax 
collection rather than conceding greater responsiveness and accountability.   By the same 
token, tax resistance is more likely to contribute to a change in government, and to the 
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potential for subsequent reform, when the incumbent government has limited access to 
alternative sources of revenue.  While the case studies presented here have not focused 
explicitly on these dynamics, they minimally provide evidence that tax resistance has been 
most successful in precipitating political change during periods in which governments have 
faced broader fiscal pressure, as at the end of the 1990s in both Ghana and Kenya. 
 
Third, Ross (2004:234) has argued that when governments have access to extensive non-tax 
revenue the apparent “price” of public services for citizens, in the form of tax payments, is 
likely to decrease, as taxpayers receive greater services while paying less taxes than would 
be the case in the absence of non-tax revenue.  He predicts that this is likely to reduce the 
tendency for taxation to spur taxpayers’ displeasure and consequent incentives to engage in 
collective action or tax resistance.  While this thesis has not explored this possibility in 
detail, due to the difficulty of observing this possibility using the chosen methodology, it is 
an important issue to be explored in future research.  
 
Fourth, access to non-tax revenue may reduce the likelihood of tax bargaining by making it 
possible for well-resourced governments to reduce public opposition through a combination 
of targeted patronage and enhanced repression.  While this research has, again, not focused 
specifically on this possibility, it has minimally highlighted the extent to which well 
entrenched and highly repressive governments have been successful in preventing most 
forms of direct or indirect tax bargaining, at least for a time. 
 
Finally, it is useful to conclude with a note about foreign aid.  As has been periodically 
noted throughout this thesis, aid is likely in some cases to have similar effects to other 
sources of non-tax revenue in reducing the potential for tax bargaining.  That said, the 
econometric evidence presented earlier also makes clear that while non-tax revenue from 
resource rents consistently leads to reduced levels of tax collection, the average impact of 
foreign aid of tax collection is more ambiguous.  Meanwhile, it is relatively clear that 
foreign aid is not simply equivalent to other forms of non-tax revenue, owing to the 
existence of technical assistance and conditionality (Collier 2006).  As such, the impact of 
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foreign aid on the potential for tax bargaining is the subject of a more detailed discussion in 
chapter 11. 
10.2. Political Context and Institutions 
Moving to contextual factors that lie outside of the core causal model, the case studies have 
made clear that the broad political context plays a central role in both the potential for tax 
bargaining and the extent to which direct or indirect bargaining is likely to be important.  
While the impact of political context and institutions is broad the discussion here focuses on 
three issues: the extent of political openness, the role of representative institutions in 
facilitating tax bargaining and the impact of elections and representative institutions on the 
level of revenue pressure facing governments.  The section concludes by revisiting the 
causal model laid out in chapter 2 and proposes that while tax bargaining contributes to the 
expansion of accountability, the expansion of accountability can equally increase the 
potential for tax bargaining. 
10.2.1. Political Openness, Repression and Tax Bargaining 
The most basic message from the case studies has been that where governments are 
relatively repressive, tax bargaining, at least in relatively observable forms, is likely to be 
comparatively rare.  This is intuitively unsurprising, as tax bargaining relies on the ability 
of taxpayers to engage in tax resistance and collective action, and both are likely to be more 
difficult in repressive environments due to the risk of retaliation by the state.  Of the two, 
collective action is likely to be most difficult, and as a result the existence of political 
repression is not only likely to shape the extent of tax bargaining, but also its particular 
form.  Specifically, we expect that in repressive environments direct tax bargaining, which 
is reliant on collective action by taxpayers, will be rare, while direct and indirect tax 
bargaining that emerge from tax resistance will be more important. 
 
The case studies provide only a limited sample, but they are consistent with these 
predictions.  First, tax bargaining has been rare in comparatively repressive contexts.  This 
is most apparent in Ethiopia, where public engagement with tax issues was virtually non-
existent under the Derg and where visible public action around tax issues has remained 
essentially unheard of under the EPRDF since 1991.  In Ghana, tax bargaining likewise 
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remained essentially impossible under military rule from 1981-1992, despite dramatic 
increases in tax collection.  In Kenya, those involved with taxation likewise attribute the 
absence of tax bargaining in the 1980s and 1990s to the relatively repressive character of 
the government, while visible public conflict over taxation has expanded since 2002. 
 
Second, there is evidence that tax resistance has been a more important source of political 
leverage for taxpayers in repressive contexts, while collective action and direct tax 
bargaining have been more important where there has been greater political freedom.  
Ethiopia again provides the most striking example of a total absence of collective action in 
response to taxation.  The Ethiopian case does present one significant example of direct tax 
bargaining, resulting from the presumptive tax on small businesses, but taxpayers never 
engaged in collective protests, rather expressing their grievances quietly through tax 
resistance, voting and informal channels.  In Kenya in the late 1990s, taxpayers similarly 
did not engage in collective action in response to taxation, owing at least in part to 
restrictions on political freedom, but instead contributed to change by engaging in 
aggressive tax resistance that exacerbated the fiscal crisis in the lead up to the 2002 
election.  In contrast to these cases, Ghana since 1992 has experienced comparatively 
extensive political freedoms, and collective action in response to taxation has been 
correspondingly common.  This has contributed to repeated examples of direct tax 
bargaining, beginning with the role of the anti-VAT protests in 1995 in advancing political 
liberalization. 
10.2.2. Representative Institutions and Tax Bargaining 
While the preceding discussion has focused on the broad impact of political context in 
shaping opportunities for tax bargaining, existing work has also focused more narrowly on 
the importance of representative institutions.  The works of Levi (1988) and North and 
Weingast (1989) have argued that representative institutions are likely to increase the 
potential for direct tax bargaining by reducing the transaction costs involved in the process 
of bargaining itself.  In fact, they argue that this was historically an important reason for the 
strengthening of such institutions.  They argue that representative institutions provide a 
forum for aggregating taxpayer interests and demands, thus facilitating the relatively 
explicit exchange of expanded responsiveness and accountability for acceptance of 
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increased taxes.  By contrast, in the absence of representative institutions, tax bargaining is 
likely to be relatively implicit, emerging from either aggressive tax resistance or relatively 
public conflict, such as tax protests. 
 
These basic predictions are borne out by experience in Ghana.  When the government 
sought to introduce the VAT in 1995 it did so at a time when the opposition was boycotting 
parliament, thus rendering organized political bargaining unlikely.  The result was that the 
implementation of the VAT was undertaken hastily and was met by massive public protests 
led, to a large degree, by the political opposition.  The resultant tax bargain did not emerge 
from any explicit agreement between protesters and the government, but from what Moore 
(2008) has termed “mutual behaviour adjustment”, as the government opted to adopt a more 
inclusive governing style in order to prevent similar protests in the future.   
 
Part of the government reaction to the anti-VAT protests was a greater commitment to 
ensuring that the elections held in 1996 were perceived to be fair, which contributed to 
entry of the opposition into parliament.  This, in turn, facilitated more explicit forms of 
direct tax bargaining.  The reintroduction of the VAT was achieved peacefully in 1999 after 
significant consultation and bargaining between the government and the opposition resulted 
in a reduction in the initial rate.  Later increases in the VAT rate likewise prompted public 
opposition, but that opposition was resolved through explicit bargaining in parliament that 
resulted in additional revenue being earmarked for the Ghana Education Trust Fund and the 
National Health Insurance Scheme, respectively.  The same pattern was followed by other 
taxes, as the extension of the National Reconstruction Levy included explicit concessions to 
the business community, while part of the revenue from the Communications Tax in 2008 
was earmarked for youth employment.  The basic message is that once the role of 
parliament was strengthened so too was the potential for relatively explicit forms of direct 
tax bargaining. 
10.2.3. Representative Institutions and Revenue Pressure 
A final issue is the extent to which representative institutions increase demands for public 
services, and consequently the extent of the revenue pressure facing governments.  In the 
historical cases captured by Tilly (1990), tax bargaining resulted when governments faced 
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severe revenue pressure brought on by the threat of war, and thus had strong incentives to 
bargain with taxpayers.  By contrast, war has very rarely been a cause of similar revenue 
pressure in sub-Saharan Africa owing to the relative absence of significant inter-state 
warfare (Herbst 2000).29 
 
In the absence of revenue pressure generated by the threat of war, direct tax bargaining in 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa has instead frequently resulted from the revenue pressure 
generated by elections and representative democracy.  The case studies present significant 
evidence that elections have frequently strengthened popular demands for public services, 
thus creating pressure on governments to increases tax revenue collection.30  Most notably, 
the Ghanaian government expanded public spending in response to the introduction of 
elections in 1992, which led to a significant fiscal crisis.  This, in turn, set the stage for 
increased fuel prices in 1993, and for the introduction of the VAT in 1995, both of which 
resulted in the further expansion of accountability.  Thus, by increasing the revenue 
pressure facing governments, democratization acted as a catalyst for tax bargaining and the 
further strengthening of accountability and democracy. 
10.2.4. A Mutually Reinforcing Relationship 
The basic message from the preceding discussion is that while tax bargaining is important 
to promoting expanded accountability, the reverse is also true: expanded accountability, 
reflected in reduced political repression and the existence of representative institutions, can 
also significantly contribute to the potential for tax bargaining.  This plays out in two ways.  
First, reduced political repression and the existence of effective representative institutions 
can facilitate tax bargaining, and particularly relatively explicit forms of direct tax 
bargaining.  Second, elections and the existence of representative institutions can increase 
demand for public services, and the consequent need for tax revenue.  This is likely to 
increase the revenue pressure facing governments, thus expanding government incentives to 
                                                
29 This study has, of course, captured one of the rare exceptions in the case of the short-lived Ethiopian-
Eritrean war in 1998-99. 
30 Econometric studies have yielded ambiguous results about whether, on average, democratization leads to 
higher levels of tax collection (Cheibub 1998, Mahon 2004, Boix 2001), but this ambiguity reflects the fact 
that democracy is likely to simultaneously increase demands for public services and create disincentives for 
governments to collect taxes, given the political cost.  As such, these results do not at all contradict the 
general proposition that democracy is likely to frequently increase the revenue pressure facing governments. 
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make concessions to taxpayers in order to secure greater tax revenue.  Together these two 
observations indicate that the relationship between tax reliance, tax bargaining and the 
expansion of accountability is not a one way causal relationship, but can in fact be a 
mutually reinforcing cycle, in which tax bargaining contributes to accountability, which, in 
turn, contributes to additional tax bargaining.  This logic is captured in Figure 10.1, which 
extends the causal model initially introduced in chapter 2. 
 
Figure 10.1: A Mutually Reinforcing Relationship Between Tax Bargaining and 
Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.3. The Strength and Mobility of the Private Sector 
In Tilly’s (1990) account of taxation and state building in early modern Europe the 
economic power wielded by the capitalist class was the decisive factor in shaping processes 
Tax Reliance and Contextual Factors 
Public 
Engagement 
and 
Collective 
Action 
Among 
Taxpayers 
Potential for 
Tax 
Resistance by 
Taxpayers 
Tax Resistance 
and Changes in 
Government 
Strengthened 
Political 
Capabilities of 
Taxpayers 
Direct Tax 
Bargaining 
Responsiveness and Accountability 
Political 
Conditions 
Conducive 
to Direct 
Tax 
Bargaining 
Increased 
Demand 
for Public 
Services 
 308 
of tax bargaining.  Where the capitalist class was powerful tax bargaining was likely, while 
countries that lacked a strong capitalist class tended to pursue coercive taxation.  The 
reason for this pattern was simple: capitalists controlled valuable and mobile economic 
resources and the state could only secure access to those resources through bargaining.  It 
was comparatively easy for capitalists to evade or resist taxation, owing to the extent, 
secrecy and mobility of their assets, and states were thus compelled to make concessions to 
those taxpayers in order to encourage greater tax compliance.  This logic is reflected in the 
classic model of tax bargaining developed by Bates and Lien (1985), in which the owners 
of mobile capital are most able to make demands on the state due to the potential for tax 
evasion and resistance.  This logic also underpins the prediction that income taxes will be 
central to processes of tax bargaining, as income taxes are particularly important to the 
taxation of significant wealth and also pose the greatest threat of evasion (Mahon 2005, 
Lieberman 2002, Moore 1998). 
 
In concrete terms, these models predict that a significant proportion of observed tax 
bargaining will be driven by the ability of owners of mobile capital to threaten, or actively 
engage in, tax evasion and resistance.  More generally, they predict that tax bargaining will 
be most pronounced in countries with strong private sectors, and comparatively weak in 
poor and agrarian contexts (Moore 2008:40-42).  These predictions are broadly borne out 
by the case study evidence.  The ability of wealthy individuals and businesses to engage in 
aggressive tax evasion was central to episodes of direct and indirect tax bargaining in 
Kenya.  The tax resistance that contributed to a change in government in 2002, and 
provided incentives for the incumbent to adopt reformist measures, was driven to a large 
degree by income tax evasion by large taxpayers.  Later, when businesses were lobbying 
the government to resolve the violence that followed the 2007 elections, it was again the 
ability of large, mobile, businesses to threaten evasion that was important to those lobbying 
efforts.  At a more general level, the relative absence of tax bargaining in Ethiopia is 
consistent with the fact that it is among the poorest, most agrarian, countries in the world, 
and much more weakly reliant on income taxes than either Ghana or Kenya. 
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Finally, in additional to the importance of a strong private sector to facilitating tax 
resistance through evasion, a strong private sector is likely to contribute to the emergence 
of tax bargaining by virtue of the fact that its control of significant economic resources can 
reduce vulnerability and thus create political space for public debate.  In Ethiopia the 
weakness of public engagement with tax issues begins with the Chamber of Commerce, 
which has played a strictly educational rather than advocacy role.  The weakness of the 
Chamber is, in turn, a reflection of the weakness of the private sector, and its dependence 
on the government.  Prior to 1991 almost all large-scale economic activity was under the 
control of the government, and while government control and intervention have diminished 
over time, they remain significant.  By contrast, the relatively more developed private 
sectors in Ghana and Kenya have given rise to business associations that have been 
significantly more engaged in generating public debate of tax issues, thus contributing to 
the potential for tax bargaining. 
10.4. Unity of Interests 
The analysis has so far has focused on broad features of the economic and political 
environment that are important to shaping the potential for tax bargaining.  The remainder 
of this chapter focuses on factors that are more idiosyncratic, but which are essential to the 
ability of taxpayers to engage in effective collective action in order to make demands on 
government.   
 
The first such issue is the importance of relatively unified interests and political objectives 
among taxpayers, as such unity underpins the political effectiveness of collective action.  
Without seeking to definitively explain the factors that account for taxpayer unity, the 
importance of taxpayers being able to rally around shared demands is readily apparent in 
comparing anti-VAT protests in Ghana and Kenya.  In Ghana, the political opposition had 
been divided and ineffective during the 1992 elections, but the anti-VAT protests, under the 
umbrella of the Alliance for Change, successfully brought together leading opposition 
politicians, prominent members of civil society, large and small businesses and citizens at 
large, all unified around calls for the repeal of the tax and for political liberalization.  It was 
this sudden show of unity by the opposition that was particularly shocking to the 
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government and explains the urgency with which it sought to expand the inclusiveness of 
future political decision-making. 
 
By contrast, experience in Kenya demonstrates clearly that governments are unlikely to 
make collective concessions to taxpayers when such unity does not exist.  When the 
government introduced legislation requiring the use of Electronic Tax Registers (ETRs), 
designed to reduce tax evasion, mid-sized businesses organized substantial nationwide 
protests.  Yet, far from catalyzing broader demands for responsiveness and accountability, 
the protesters found themselves without support from the public or elites, both of whom 
labelled the protesters ‘Asian tax evaders’ rather than allies.  Given this lack of public 
support, the government was able to press through the ETR requirement without making 
meaningful concessions to the protesting businesses.  This general pattern is consistent with 
the fact that successive Kenyan governments since independence were able to introduce 
new taxes with a minimum of opposition by framing them as taxes on minority Whites and 
Asians.  Had those being taxed been able to call on greater public sympathy there would 
likely have been significantly greater pressure on government to make concessions. 
 
A specific issue related to the question of taxpayer unity is whether taxpayers will choose to 
respond to taxation by seeking narrow privileges and benefits for themselves or by pursuing 
broader governance gains cooperatively with other taxpayers.  This question derives from 
Levi’s (1988:64) prediction that governments seeking to secure tax compliance will 
frequently prefer to grant narrow privileges (“side-payments”) to small groups of taxpayers 
rather than making broader concessions.  There are thus important reasons to expect the 
pursuit of narrow privileges to undermine taxpayer unity, while tax bargaining is only likely 
to contribute to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability when sufficiently large 
groups of taxpayers opt instead to pursue broader benefits.  
 
The importance of this issue is again revealed by Kenyan experience, where the ability of 
the businesses community to function as an effective interest group, engaged in broad tax 
bargaining, has been historically undermined by the pursuit of narrow benefits.  Until at 
least the late 1990s the private sector was characterized by extensive patronage and rent 
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seeking, as many businesses responded to taxation by seeking individual benefits rather 
than broader political influence for the sector.  As a result the major business associations 
played little role in engaging with tax issues or pressing for improved governance despite 
the relatively well-developed private sector in the country.  As opportunities for such 
narrow rent seeking have diminished over the past decade the advocacy role of business 
associations has correspondingly expanded, including their involvement in pressing for the 
resolution of post-election violence in 2007-08. 
 
The question of whether businesses and wealthy individuals are likely to respond to 
taxation by seeking narrow benefits or broad-based gains is particularly significant because 
elite involvement is likely to be very important to successful tax bargaining.  This reflects 
the ability of elites to shape public opinion and to unify disparate grievances into a more 
effective set of political demands (Moehler 2006, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001:142-
143).  Seen in this light, the tendency towards narrow rent seeking among elites in Kenya, 
and even among MPs who have frequently blocked taxation targeting elite groups, helps to 
explain the broader absence of tax bargaining in the country, as collective action has been 
less likely absent the catalyzing role played by elites.  Writing of the anti-VAT protests in 
Ghana, Ninsin (2007:94) stresses the elite dimension, arguing that, “those sporadic mass 
actions were part of opposition politics...They were therefore not driven by citizens' free 
will to effect policy changes.”  While this may be an overly pessimistic assessment of 
citizen action, it nonetheless captures the centrality of elites both to making the VAT such a 
commanding political issue and to catalyzing public grievances into an identifiable political 
movement.  The positive engagement of elites with tax issues, in turn, seems to reflect, at 
least in part, the extent to which the NDC government had insisted on enforcing taxation 
among elites more aggressively than previous governments (Nugent 1995). 
10.5. Awareness and Political Salience 
The role of elites as catalysts for public engagement with tax issues forms part of the 
broader argument that tax bargaining is more likely when taxpayers are more keenly aware 
of the taxes that they pay.  This argument is intuitive, but nonetheless significant, and 
warrants careful attention. 
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In the field of public finance, discussion of this issue has generally revolved around what 
Martin and Gabay (2007:2) term “the visibility hypothesis,” which predicts that some taxes 
will be more visible to taxpayers, and thus more likely to provoke a political response.  
Specifically, income taxes, and other taxes paid directly by individual taxpayers to tax 
collectors, are expected to be more visible, and thus more politicized.  By contrast, goods 
and services taxes, which are collected at the point of sale and then remitted to the 
government by individual businesses, are expected to be less visible to individual taxpayers, 
and thus less likely to provoke a response.  This prediction is intuitively appealing, and on 
the surface would appear to be particularly relevant to developing countries, where the 
VAT is often hidden by the fact that small retailers, on whom most consumers rely, do not 
collect the VAT directly, despite paying VAT on their purchases of inputs (Bird and 
Gendron 2007).   
 
Despite the widespread popular belief that income taxes will thus be more politicized than 
goods and services taxes, the case study evidence is relatively mixed.  There certainly is 
significant evidence of the politicization of taxes that are directly paid to the government.  
Tax resistance in Kenya has consistently revolved around income taxes, while efforts by 
various residents’ associations to explicitly demand reciprocity for tax payments have 
focused primarily on direct property taxes.  More compelling, the lone example of direct tax 
bargaining in Ethiopia since 1974 revolved around the highly visible presumptive tax on 
small businesses, while during the Imperial period tax conflicts consistently focused on 
direct property and agricultural taxes even though the largest increases in state revenue 
were coming from sales taxes and trade taxes. 
 
However, while direct taxes have been politicized, so too have supposedly invisible taxes 
on goods and services.  In Ghana far and away the most contentious taxes have been the 
VAT and fuel taxes, until recently embodied in government controlled fuel prices.  The 
original introduction of the VAT led to the largest tax protests observed in any of the case 
study countries, while subsequent increases in the VAT rate required the earmarking of 
revenue for popular public services in order to minimize political opposition.  Meanwhile 
changes in fuel prices, which remained functionally equivalent to tax changes as long as 
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prices remained government controlled, led to public resistance almost without fail.  
Finally, there were also large tax protests centring on the VAT in Kenya, in response to the 
requirement that medium sized firms use ETRs. 
 
The message is that while awareness certainly does matter, the simple dichotomy between 
income taxes and goods and services taxes is an insufficient means to capture levels of 
awareness.  This conclusion is echoed by Martin and Gabay (2007), who were the first to 
systematically test this question in developed countries.  As a result, tax analysis needs to 
be concerned not simply with the crude concept of visibility, but with the slightly broader 
concepts of awareness and political salience, the latter following from Martin and Gabay’s 
(2007:2) argument that protest often reflects “the ease with which [the tax] burden can be 
traced to the actions of policy makers.”  The concept of visibility may still play a role, as 
the almost complete absence of a public response to the initial implementation of the VAT 
in both Kenya or Ethiopia suggests that goods and services taxes are, indeed, often hidden 
from public view.  Yet the case study evidence suggests that awareness and political 
salience are also shaped by other factors, including the reform strategy adopted by 
government and the role of elites in encouraging public awareness and engagement. 
 
The importance of the reform process itself is particularly in evidence in Kenya, where the 
government has consistently adopted a gradualist approach to reform, with reform leaders 
transparent about their efforts to pursue reform “by stealth” in order to reduce public 
scrutiny.  Unlike the decisive implementation of the VAT in most developing countries, the 
Kenyan VAT was implemented over the course of six years, with incremental changes over 
time used as a strategy to avoid public debate and controversy.  By contrast, the most 
important episodes of tax bargaining in Ghana and Ethiopia occurred when reform was 
undertaken hastily and very publicly.  This was true of the original introduction of the VAT 
in Ghana, and of the introduction of the presumptive tax on small businesses in Ethiopia, 
which produced major controversy in Amhara region, where it was introduced relatively 
suddenly, but less controversy elsewhere, where it was phased in gradually. 
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Returning to the role of elites in politicizing taxes that may not otherwise be visible to 
taxpayers, it is often the case that taxpayers in general are not fully aware of the burden of 
the VAT in their purchases, but business owners and political elites are.  As such, the extent 
to which goods and services taxes spark awareness among taxpayers, and become 
politically salient, is likely to be a reflection of the success of business owners and elites in 
placing those taxes on the public agenda.  The fact that the VAT prompted major protests in 
Ghana, and has remained a prominent and controversial issue since, reflects the fact that 
both political elites and organized civil society have been actively involved in transforming 
the otherwise relatively invisible VAT into an issue of national concern.  The 1995 anti-
VAT protests were largely attributable to a public belief, fed by elites, civil society and the 
media, that the new tax was going to cause major price increases.  In subsequent years 
resistance to increases in the VAT rate again originated with the political opposition and 
organized civil society, both of whom mediated public understanding.  Thus, the evidence 
suggests that when certain taxes do not prompt a broad-based public response an important 
part of the explanation is likely to lie in the actions of business owners, politicians, civil 
society and the media, all of whom play an important role in shaping the political salience 
of individual taxes.  
10.6. Trust, Expectations and History 
Many of the factors discussed so far are relevant because they are expected to contribute to 
the potential for collective action and, consequently, to the emergence of tax bargaining.  
These factors include the political context, the involvement and support of elites, the 
importance of unified interests among taxpayers and the broad centrality of awareness.  
Although not a comprehensive list of factors affecting the potential for collective action, 
these factors capture the most important issues that emerge from the case studies and from 
existing research about tax bargaining.  Before concluding it is useful to touch briefly on 
two final issues that are likewise likely to be important to the emergence of tax bargaining, 
but around which it is possible to make only relatively general comments owing to the 
breadth of the topics and the limits of the case study evidence.  These two factors are the 
importance of trust to tax bargaining and the role of history and expectations in shaping 
public responses to taxation. 
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10.6.1. The Importance of Trust 
The importance of trust lies in the fact that in order for there to be direct tax bargaining, as 
opposed to tax resistance alone, citizens must trust that promises made by government will 
be implemented and sustained, while government must believe that increased tax 
compliance will similarly endure (North and Weingast 1989).  If governments do not 
believe that concessions will, in fact, lead to increased tax compliance, they will have 
significantly weaker incentives to make such concessions (Gehlbach 2008).  If citizens have 
sufficiently low trust in the government they will not be willing to comply with taxes 
beyond what can be compelled through coercion.  This is the conclusion drawn by Fjeldstad 
and Semboja (2001) in writing about taxation in rural Tanzania, where citizens do, in 
principle, embrace the idea of a fiscal bargain, but are, in practice, unwilling to voluntarily 
comply with taxes because of extremely low levels of trust in government.  Within the case 
studies presented here the importance of trust is best illustrated by the tax disputes that have 
occurred between the government of Ethiopia and pastoralist communities.  The lack of 
trust has led the government to demand tax payments before providing better services, 
while pastoralists have long demanded better services, and treatment in general, before 
complying with taxes.  The result has been perpetual conflict, despite the fact that tax 
bargaining appears to hold the potential for significant mutual benefit as well as an entry 
point for broader engagement between the two groups.  The basic question is whether there 
are specific strategies that can be employed to progressively increase trust in such 
environments, and thus promote the potential for tax bargaining.  While the emergence of 
strong political institutions offers the surest way to increase trust, the research and policy 
challenge is likely to lie in identifying intermediate strategies for achieving this same goal, 
but this is ultimately a much broader topic than can be captured here (Bird 2008, North and 
Weingast 1989, Braithwaite and Levi 1998). 
10.6.2. Expectations and History 
A final consideration in thinking about the factors that shape tax bargaining is the 
importance of expectations.  The case studies have highlighted the intuitive notion that 
taxpayers are more likely to resist taxation, and demand reciprocal concessions from 
government, when they consider tax demands to be excessive and inconsistent with 
established notions of fairness (Tilly 1990: 101).  This has, in turn, been shaped by history. 
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Evidence across the three countries suggests that where high levels of taxation have been 
well established historically there has tended to be less subsequent resistance to tax 
changes.  In both Kenya and Ethiopia there is a clear sense among many observers that the 
lack of highly visible opposition to taxation reflects the fact that most taxpayers have come 
to expect existing levels of tax collection.  In Kenya this reflects the success enjoyed by the 
immediate post-independence government in introducing a comparatively effective tax 
system, while in Ethiopia it reflects the history of extremely coercive taxation under the 
Derg government and the earlier Imperial regime.  Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that 
the relative absence of tax resistance in rural areas in Ethiopia may to some extent reflect 
the absence of expectations of reciprocity after a long history of coercive taxation.  By 
contrast, in Ghana, where the acute economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s decimated tax 
collection, the government needed to rebuild tax collection from extremely low levels and 
was periodically forced to bargain with taxpayers in order to do so.   
 
In a broad sense, periods of change have proved decisive to the emergence of highly visible 
forms of tax bargaining.  This suggests that taxpayers have tended to adapt their 
expectations to existing levels of taxation, consistent with evidence that levels of tax 
collection tend to be very stable over time within individual countries (Lieberman 2022, 
Bird 2008).  It is possible, and even likely, that persistently high levels of taxation may 
increase levels of public engagement and oversight in less observable ways, but this 
remains an important question for future research to address more fully.  What the case 
study evidence here makes clear is that episodes of highly visible and direct tax bargaining 
have tended to surround periods of significant changes in taxation, thus making history an 
essential determinant of the prospects for tax bargaining later on. 
10.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the primary factors that have shaped the emergence of particular 
types of tax bargaining in the case study countries.  This is an ambitious agenda, and this 
chapter makes no claim to having captured every dimension of this question.  Instead, the 
factors presented have addressed the most important propositions emerging from existing 
literature, while providing an explanation for the patterns of tax bargaining observed in 
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each of the three case study countries in this thesis.  The overarching message from this 
discussion is that contextual factors figure centrally in whether, and how, tax reliance 
contributes to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability. 
 
Before concluding this discussion of contextual factors, it is useful to step back and draw on 
the insights provided here to consider the potential for tax bargaining in poor, politically 
repressive, contexts.  These are the contexts in which tax bargaining is potentially most 
valuable, yet both existing research and the case study evidence here suggest that they are 
also the contexts in which tax bargaining is least likely.  In broad terms, political repression 
makes collective action and tax protests more difficult, while the weakness and immobility 
of economic producers reduces the scope for tax evasion as well as the broader political 
resources wielded by citizens.  However, the message from this research is that while the 
potential for tax bargaining in such contexts is limited in absolute terms, tax bargaining can 
offer a rare source of political leverage to taxpayers in contexts in which few such 
opportunities exist. 
 
While tax bargaining was rare in Ethiopia, it was not non-existent, and revolved around the 
fact that even in the face of repression taxpayers found ways to resist taxation.  This 
weakened the fiscal position of repressive governments and, at least in the case of the 
presumptive tax, compelled the government to make concessions.  Aside from the particular 
benefits of these examples of relatively visible tax bargaining, these episodes support the 
suspicion that in repressive environments the tax reliance of governments may also 
contribute to pressures for greater responsiveness and accountability in relatively less 
observable ways.  The Ethiopian government clearly understood that tax compliance was 
shaped by popular perceptions, implying that, at the margin, it faced consistent additional 
incentives to improve performance.  Likewise, the government decision to reduce tax 
collection in the wake of the 2005 elections suggests a belief that taxation was quietly 
contributing to politicizing the citizenry.  This suggests that even in poor, repressive, 
contexts, governments that are reliant on taxation are likely to face stronger incentives to 
improve performance in order to secure tax compliance and are more likely to be 
confronted by a politicized citizenry.  Unfortunately, observing such subtle processes in 
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politically controlled environments is difficult, and conclusions consequently tentative and 
demanding of further research. 
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11. Foreign Aid and Tax Bargaining 
 
This thesis has argued that the need for taxation can strengthen pressures for the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability, while access to significant non-tax revenue has a 
corresponding potential to undermine the likelihood of tax bargaining.  In recent years the 
latter possibility has received increasing attention from policy makers concerned with the 
implications for foreign aid.  This interest has centred on the possibility that by reducing the 
tax reliance of recipient governments, foreign aid may inadvertently reduce pressures for 
the emergence of greater responsiveness and accountability (Moore 1998, Moss, Pettersson 
and van de Walle 2006, Brautigam and Knack 2004). 
 
Despite growing interest in this question among policy makers, existing research has 
remained highly speculative and open to challenge on empirical grounds.  The view that 
foreign aid may reduce incentives for domestic responsiveness and accountability has, 
instead, been sustained largely by the a priori strength of the theoretical argument.  What is 
needed is a systematic framework for thinking about the impact of foreign aid on the tax 
reliance of governments, and on the broader potential for tax bargaining. 
 
The bulk of existing empirical research has focused on the straightforward question of 
whether access to foreign aid tends to reduce levels of tax collection in recipient countries 
(Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006, Brautigam and Knack 2004, Knack 2009).  
While much of the earliest research concluded that aid does, indeed, lead to reduced tax 
collection, recent evidence, including that presented in chapter 5, has called these results 
into question.  Beyond these concerns about the robustness of available econometric results, 
there has been a broader failure to thoroughly consider the multiple ways in which foreign 
aid is likely to shape domestic tax reliance and tax systems.  This chapter thus begins by 
reviewing existing econometric evidence and then proceeds to address three additional, and 
largely overlooked, issues: first, the multiple factors that are likely to shape the impact of 
aid on levels of tax collection; second, the impact of aid on the dependence of governments 
on tax revenue, as a share of total revenue, and the likely implications for tax bargaining; 
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and third, the impact of aid on the character of tax systems, and the possible consequences 
for the likelihood of tax bargaining.  The discussion here does not aim to provide a 
definitive statement about the impact of aid on the potential for tax bargaining, as foreign 
aid has not been the explicit focus of this research.  Instead, what follows provides a 
framework for thinking more systematically about the relationship between foreign aid, 
taxation and the expansion of domestic responsiveness and accountability.  Examples from 
the case studies offer important initial insights, while the broader goal is to provoke 
additional research in the future. 
11.1. Foreign Aid and Domestic Tax Collection 
Existing research linking aid to the potential for tax bargaining has frequently revolved 
around the narrow question of whether access to foreign aid leads to lower levels of 
domestic tax collection (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006, Brautigam and Knack 
2004).  Many early tax effort studies, canvassed in chapter 5, reported a negative and causal 
relationship between levels of foreign aid and levels of domestic tax collection (Remmer 
2004, Gupta et al. 2005, Devarajan, Rajkumar and Swaroop 1999, Brautigam and Knack 
2004, Knack 2009).  More recently, Knack (2009) has reported evidence that high levels of 
aid dependence have led to weaker tax administration, as measured by World Bank country 
experts, owing to less investment in institution building.  Of these studies work by Gupta et 
al. (2004) at the IMF produced the most dramatic, and widely cited, conclusions, finding 
not only that aid reduced domestic tax collection, but that it was grants in particular that led 
to reduced collection, while loans did not have a similarly negative effect.  
 
Despite the fact that these findings are intuitively appealing, recent work using improved 
data and alternative econometric methods has demonstrated that the relationship between 
foreign aid and taxation is, in fact, much more ambiguous.  The econometric results 
presented in Chapter 5 find, if anything, a modest positive relationship between aid and 
levels of domestic tax collection.  This result is echoed in a more recent IMF paper (Gupta 
2007), while work by Clist and Morrissey (2010) finds a moderately positive relationship 
over the past two decades, during which donors have given significantly greater attention to 
domestic revenue generation.  The message from these more recent studies is that foreign 
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aid may very well contribute to lower levels of domestic tax collection in some cases but 
there is no consistently negative impact of foreign aid on levels of domestic tax collection 
across developing countries.  This reflects the complexity of the relationship between 
foreign aid and domestic tax collection and argues for a more nuanced approach to 
understanding that relationship.  
11.2. How Does Foreign Aid Affect Tax Collection? 
An improved understanding of the relationship between aid and domestic tax collection 
must begin with an acknowledgement that the term ‘foreign aid’, while seemingly capturing 
a straightforward and homogeneous category, in fact disguises an extremely diverse 
underlying reality (Collier 2006).  The term encompasses many very different types of 
financial transfers to developing nations, delivered for a wide variety of different reasons 
and in hugely variable contexts.  In looking at the broader question of aid effectiveness, the 
then Chief Economist of the World Bank argued that, “The empirical literature on aid 
effectiveness has yielded unclear and ambiguous results.  This is not surprising given the 
heterogeneity of aid motives, the limitations of the tools of analysis and the complex 
causality chain linking external aid to final outcomes” (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007: 
316). 
 
While it is not possible to address the entire diversity of aid modalities and motives here, it 
is useful to consider two broad issues.  First is the fact that foreign aid is more than a simple 
financial transfer that is functionally equivalent to revenue from natural resource rents 
(Collier 2006, Therkildsen 2002).  Foreign aid frequently includes technical assistance for 
strengthening tax policy and administration and conditionality linked to government 
programs, levels of revenue collection and particular elements of tax reform.  These 
additional factors inevitably shape tax outcomes.  Second, the impact of aid on domestic tax 
collection is likely to be highly context specific, shaped both by domestic political 
conditions and by the priorities of donors.  The sections below address each element in turn. 
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11.2.1. Revenue Incentives, Technical Assistance and 
Conditionality 
The case study evidence, combined with earlier works, suggests that aid can affect domestic 
tax collection though three direct channels - pure revenue incentives, technical assistance 
and conditionality – as well as indirectly by generating increased expenditure pressure 
(Collier 2006). 
 
The first channel is the impact of pure revenue incentives.  Taken alone, the availability of 
aid revenue seems likely to reduce the priority and urgency accorded to domestic tax 
collection, as aid revenue can frequently act as a substitute for tax revenue in financing 
important government functions and services.  While governments with access to 
substantial foreign aid revenue may not actively decide to reduce tax collection, when faced 
with the political costs associated with increased tax collection such governments are more 
likely to avoid political conflict, implicitly accepting reduced levels of collection. 
 
The second channel is through the role of technical assistance.  Donors have committed 
significant revenue to supporting tax policy reform and improved tax administration in 
individual countries, while also supporting the emergence of transnational communities of 
tax professionals that have been central to driving reform agendas across the globe 
(Fjeldstad and Moore 2008).  While small relative to total aid flows, the OECD estimates 
that tax related assistance amounted to $121 million worldwide in 2005 (OECD 2008).  
While debates continue about the design and implementation of these programs, there is 
little doubt that they have had a significant impact on both levels of tax revenue collection 
and the ways in which revenue is collected (Sanchez 2006, Bird 2008). 
 
The third channel is through revenue conditionality, as donors have increasingly made 
domestic revenue collection an important formal and informal condition for the 
disbursement of foreign aid.  This conditionality has typically taken two forms.  The first is 
matching funds requirements, by which donors have required local governments to provide 
a share of project financing before the disbursement of aid revenues (Fjeldstad 2001). The 
second is broader conditionality in which aid funds, particularly in the form of budget 
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support, are made conditional on recipient governments raising a minimum level of total tax 
revenue or implementing particular tax reforms.  Both forms of conditionality have played 
an important role in each of the case study countries.  In a sense, donors have taken on the 
role of taxpayers, bargaining with government by virtue of the political power that they 
enjoy through their funding of government activities.  They are able to compel recipient 
governments to act in particular ways because they wield the implicit or explicit threat that 
they will otherwise reduce aid flows, much as taxpayers wield the threat of tax evasion and 
resistance. 
 
While there are longstanding debates about the effectiveness of conditionality and technical 
assistance in aid programs (Collier et al. 1997), existing research unambiguously finds that 
international actors have played an important role in shaping tax policy and administration 
in developing countries (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008, Sanchez 2006, Thirsk 1997).  This 
broad message is supported by the case study evidence, which confirms that the availability 
of aid has sometimes reduced incentives for tax collection in recipient countries but also 
that donors have encouraged significant revenue collection gains. 
 
The Ethiopian case offers the most striking evidence of the complexity of the relationship 
between tax collection and aid, with periods over the past two decades in which aid appears 
to have had both significantly positive and negative impacts on tax collection.  During two 
recent periods foreign aid appears to have reduced the urgency with which the government 
pursued increased revenue collection.  The first was during the period 1995-1998, when 
levels of tax collection stagnated at a relatively low level despite the pressing needs of post-
conflict reconstruction.  At the time aid levels were very high, and stable, and public 
officials are transparent about the fact that while revenue mobilization was considered 
important, it was never a leading government priority.  The second was in the aftermath of 
the 2005 elections when the government decided to reduce some tax rates and reduce the 
intensity of tax enforcement.  Given the fiscal pressures facing the government at the time it 
seems inconceivable that it could have allowed such a fall in revenue in the absence of 
significant aid flows. 
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Yet, while these examples point to the role of aid in reducing tax effort in Ethiopia, tax 
officials in Ethiopia were also adamant about the positive influence of donors on levels of 
tax collection.  During interviews with senior officials, external pressure and support were 
almost universally cited as crucial factors in motivating the successful tax reforms initiated 
in 2001.  In fact, it was suggested that with the government preoccupied with internal 
political conflicts, it was only external intervention that ensured the priority given to tax 
reform.  Tax officials are similarly adamant that during the early 1990s, immediately 
following the end of the civil war, the government could not have reinvigorated tax 
collection as quickly as it did without external support.  
 
Turning to the Ghanaian case, foreign aid seems to have had a largely positive impact on 
levels of domestic revenue mobilization.  Technical assistance figured prominently in the 
tax reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, as the Ghanaian tax reform followed donor 
prescriptions very closely, and came to be viewed as a model for reform elsewhere on the 
continent.  Conditionality likewise appears to have played a prominent role, most evidently 
in pushing the government to introduce the failed VAT in 1995.  Tax administrators make 
clear that donor conditionality remained important in subsequent years as well, particularly 
with respect to the formation of the Revenue Agencies Governing Board to oversee the 
three distinct revenue agencies.  
 
Meanwhile, Kenya exhibits the same contradictory patterns as Ethiopia, demonstrating both 
the negative incentives created by aid, but also the importance of technical assistance to 
revenue gains.  The most telling episode surrounds the dramatic tax reforms that took place 
from 1993-1996.  The reforms followed the partial suspension of aid in 1991, and there is a 
clear sense that the strained relationship with donors helped to encourage the government to 
increase domestic revenue collection.  This suggests that the availability of aid suppressed 
tax effort during the 1980s.  That said, the same episode points to the positive potential of 
aid, as technical assistance was integral to the revenue gains during the period, and 
continued to be important to subsequent episodes of tax reform (Glenday 1999). 
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Having thus highlighted the contradictory ways in which foreign aid may affect domestic 
tax collection, it is valuable to conclude by highlighting a fourth channel through which aid 
may indirectly encourage higher levels of domestic tax collection.  While much more 
difficult to observe, this channel can be captured under the banner of expenditure pressure.  
Foreign aid is frequently accompanied by conditionality related to the expansion of pro-
poor government spending, particularly with respect to social services including health and 
education.  While in the short-term aid allows the government to provide these services 
without resorting to the collection of tax revenue, in the long-term the expansion of social 
spending may create pressures for the expansion of government revenue in order to sustain 
those programs when aid declines or shifts towards other priorities.  Thus, rather than 
creating disincentives for tax collection, conditionality associated with aid may generate 
indirect pressure for greater social spending, and thus increased tax collection over the 
longer-term.  While this claim is not easily testable, this possibility is widely acknowledged 
by policy makers within the case study countries.  The fact that this possibility has not been 
more widely recognized in recent work on aid and taxation is surprising, as the possibility 
that aid may generate substantial long-term expenditure commitments for recipient 
governments was widely acknowledged in the1980s, including in the hugely influential 
World Bank report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1981: 
126-128).  
11.2.2. The Importance of Context 
While foreign aid thus shapes domestic taxation through multiple channels, the impact of 
aid is also likely to be highly context specific.  While this is a much broader issue than can 
be adequately captured here, it is helpful to flag three general contextual factors that shape 
outcomes: donor motives and coordination, domestic priorities and perceptions of aid 
among recipients. 
 
With respect to the objectives of donors, for conditionality to be effective donors must be 
coordinated in their demands on governments, and be willing to cut aid funds if conditions 
are not met.  In practice, these requirements for conditionality to be effective are frequently 
not met, in part due to high levels of donor fragmentation, and the effectiveness of 
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conditionality has varied accordingly (van de Walle 2005, Frot and Santiso 2010).  This has 
particularly been an issue in recipient countries that are considered geo-politically 
important, as donors have been unable to gain leverage in making demands on governments 
due to their unwillingness to cut aid flows in the case that conditions are not met.   
 
Historically this primarily applied to countries that were strategically important in the 
context of the Cold War (Dunning 2004).  This was true of Kenya, and helps to explain 
why the Kenyan government faced limited pressure for increased taxation in the 1980s, but 
felt much greater pressure to generate domestic revenue (as well as for economic and 
political reform more generally) after the end of the Cold War (Throup and Hornsby 1998).  
More recently countries that are strategically important in the so-called Global War on 
Terror appear to be having a similar experience, with donor countries reluctant to cut aid 
flows for fear of losing strategic allies (Moss, Roodman and Standley 2005)31.  This appears 
to be true to at least some extent in Ethiopia, which helps to explain the ability of the 
government to allow a sharp fall in tax collection after 2005 despite donor protestations.  
These are, again, complicated questions, but the basic message is that the impact of aid on 
domestic incentives for tax collection is heavily dependent on donor coordination and 
motives. 
 
Domestic political dynamics also shape the impact of aid.  It is well accepted that 
conditionality and technical assistance are both highly dependent on the existence of a base 
of domestic support.  Put another way, conditionality and technical assistance can make a 
particular outcome more likely, but domestic priorities are generally the determining factor 
in shaping actual outcomes.  This basic observation has spawned widespread critiques of 
conditionality, and to a lesser extent of technical assistance, on the basis of significant 
evidence that external pressure is a highly imperfect substitute for domestic political will 
                                                
31 Moss, Roodman and Standley (2005) find that the allocation of U.S. aid funds in sub-Saharan Africa does 
not appear to have been altered significantly by such strategic interests.  However, the argument here is not 
that aid flows have necessarily increased in Ethiopia, but that donors are reluctant to reduce aid flows because 
of the strategic importance of Ethiopia given its proximity to Somalia.  This contention is supported by those 
involved at the country level and by the relatively modest impact that well documented electoral fraud and 
subsequent repression around the 2005 elections has had on aid (Lyons 2006). 
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and public pressure for bringing about genuine and sustained reform (Collier et al. 1997, 
Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). 
 
This reality is so well accepted that a single example from the case studies is sufficient.  In 
Ghana during the 1990s donors sought to advance four tax related issues through a 
combination of technical assistance and conditionality: the introduction of the VAT, 
computerization of the Internal Revenue Service, creation of a single revenue agency and 
the liberalization of government controlled fuel prices.  Yet, despite significant pressure 
from donors on all four fronts, actual outcomes reflected government priorities.  The 
government pursued the VAT aggressively, despite public resistance, showed little 
enthusiasm for computerization and the creation of a single revenue agency, and actively 
resisted demands for the liberalization of fuel prices, despite being offered HIPC debt relief 
in return.  In simplest terms, what actually occurred reflected what was politically feasible 
domestically, and in that sense it was the interaction between foreign aid and domestic 
politics that shaped tax outcomes.  
 
The final question relating to context is whether, and to what extent, governments view aid 
as a genuine substitute for tax revenue.  The contention that aid will reduce domestic tax 
effort rests on the implicit assumption that governments perceive the two as substitutes.  
Yet, if aid is being allocated to programs that are not government priorities, or if 
governments simply dislike external conditionality, they may prefer to replace aid revenue 
with tax revenue, despite the costs.  This appears to have been a factor in Kenya, where the 
Kibaki government explicitly linked efforts to increase tax collection to the desire to reduce 
aid-dependence.  While this stance was partially rhetorical, and designed to garner public 
support for tax collection, there is little doubt that the government’s desire to reduce its 
reliance on aid was genuine, and grounded in a desire to avoid external conditionality.32  
 
                                                
3232 In fact, during the violence that followed the 2007 election the government repeatedly, and very publicly, 
insisted that it would not bow to international pressure, as it was not financially dependent on aid revenue.  
Some observers informally go so far as to suggest that aid independence was consciously sought by the 
government at least in part to weaken the potential for external actors to constrain its political activities, 
including electoral fraud. 
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Much more could be said about the importance of international and domestic context in 
shaping the relationship between aid and domestic tax collection, but it is beyond the scope 
of this study.  The goal here is simply to highlight the fact that the aid-taxation relationship 
is extremely complex, and that simple, linear, conclusions are inadequate. 
11.3. Foreign Aid and Dependence on Taxation 
The basic conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the relationship between aid and 
taxation is variable.  There is a genuine risk that access to foreign aid may reduce incentives 
for domestic tax collection, and thus limit the potential for tax bargaining to catalyze the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  At the same time, there is no persuasive 
evidence that aid consistently leads to reduced tax collection.  The reality in any individual 
country is much more complex, as aid frequently makes important positive contributions to 
levels of tax collection, both through targeted technical assistance and the conditionality 
associated with broader aid flows.  Increased attention to the potential unintended political 
consequences of aid dependence is appropriate, but a blanket condemnation of aid is 
certainly not.   
 
There remains a need to highlight two additional elements of the relationship between 
foreign aid, tax reliance and tax bargaining.  The first is the impact foreign aid has on the 
dependence of governments on tax revenue, as a share of total revenue; second is the effect 
of how tax revenue is collected on the potential for tax bargaining.   
 
Turning to the first, there has been a tendency in recent studies, and in discussion of these 
issues in policy circles, to equate tests of the impact of aid on levels of tax collection with 
the broader question of whether aid may reduce tax-related demands for the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006).  However, 
the two questions are not equivalent.  While there is now evidence that foreign aid does not 
consistently lead to lower levels of tax collection, it nonetheless, by definition, leads to 
reduced levels of tax dependence, as a share of total government revenue.  This reduced tax 
dependence, even in the presence of constant levels of tax collection, may reduce the 
likelihood of tax bargaining. 
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As was noted in the previous chapter, there are two reasons for this.  The first is that access 
to non-tax revenue is likely to result in government being less willing to make concessions 
to taxpayers, as it is likely to face lower levels of revenue pressure.  The threat posed by tax 
resistance, through either evasion or collective action, is diminished, as any given loss of 
revenue to the government constitutes a smaller share of total revenue.  The government is 
thus more able to forego the additional tax revenue, by simply relying on non-tax revenue 
sources, rather than making concessions to taxpayers.  
 
Second, the presence of significant foreign aid may reduce the likelihood that taxpayers will 
engage in collective action to bargain with government.  One reasons is that when the 
government has access to significant foreign aid the apparent ‘price’ of public services, 
defined by the level of services relative to the taxes paid, is likely to decline, potentially 
reducing incentives for political mobilization (Ross 2004).  In addition, governments that 
are heavily reliant on foreign aid may sometimes be responsive to donor demands rather 
than the demands of citizens.  Coupled with the frequent lack of local level transparency 
about donor funding, this may contribute to a sense of disempowerment among citizen 
groups, with long-term consequences for levels of public engagement (Moss, Pettersson 
and van de Walle 2006, van de Walle 2005).  
 
Taken together, these arguments provide a strong a priori case for believing that while 
foreign aid does not consistently lead to lower levels of tax collection, it may nonetheless 
reduce the potential for tax bargaining through its impact on levels of dependence on tax 
revenue.  Unfortunately, while the logic of this argument is compelling, testing it is much 
more challenging, as it requires comparing actual outcomes to what the government and 
taxpayers would have done had dependence on taxation been higher or lower.  This 
counterfactual is, of course, unobservable.  The research challenge is thus to focus on 
episodes that can provide convincing, though still indirect, evidence of how tax dependence 
has shaped government and taxpayer behaviour.  Unfortunately there is virtually no existing 
research on this specific question.  What follows presents evidence of the likely impact of 
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aid, and its absence, on the potential for tax bargaining in Somaliland and in the case 
studies presented here, but conclusions are necessarily very preliminary. 
 
Interesting evidence comes from Eubank’s (2010) recent study of Somaliland, which is 
unique within the modern state system in that it has had a functioning and independent 
government since its founding in 1991 but has never received official development 
assistance to the national government.33  This is due to the fact that Somaliland has never 
been recognized by the international community, which officially still considers it a part of 
Somalia.  The absence of foreign aid makes Somaliland a sort of natural experiment for 
asking whether the absence of foreign aid does, in fact, make tax bargaining more likely. 
 
Eubank (2010) argues that the absence of foreign aid has, indeed, made constructive tax 
bargaining more likely, with benefits for levels of public accountability.  He focuses on the 
early years of the new government in 1992-93, at which point a dominant governing faction 
had emerged but lacked access to substantial tax revenue.  The most obvious source of tax 
revenue was the taxation of trade, but the major port was controlled by a rival faction, and 
thus not accessible to the new government.  This initially led to armed conflict, but this 
conflict eventually gave way to negotiation, out of which the government gained control of 
the port in exchange for extending a greater governing role to the rival faction.  This 
compromise was foundational to the consolidation of democratic government in 
Somaliland, which has remained largely intact since.  Eubank persuasively contends that if 
the new government had had access to foreign aid it would have been much less likely to 
enter into this tax bargain.  While the revenue available from the port was indispensable to 
the government under the circumstances that prevailed, the amount of revenue would have 
paled in comparison to the levels of aid that are generally available to similarly low-income 
nations. 
 
While these conclusions are necessarily speculative, and many factors contributed to the 
unique outcomes in Somaliland, the narrative provides evidence that access to foreign aid 
                                                
33 Somaliland does receive low levels of aid, sometimes unofficially, to local authorities and through civil 
society organizations, but this has few implications for the argument made here. 
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would likely have reduced the impetus for tax bargaining and compromise by reducing the 
revenue pressure facing government.  The case studies presented here provide further 
support for this proposition, though, again, conclusions can only be speculative.  What the 
case studies suggest is that, consistent with the causal model presented in chapter 2, tax 
resistance and collective action have been more likely to yield gains in responsiveness and 
accountability when governments have faced significant revenue pressure.  The anti-VAT 
protests in Ghana, and the subsequent compromises made by the government, were 
motivated by a looming fiscal crisis and threats of aid reductions by donors.  Had the 
government not faced the threat of reduced aid it is likely that it would not have introduced 
the VAT as quickly as it did, or at such a high rate, and that it consequently would not have 
been forced to make equally significant political concessions to taxpayers.  Similarly, the 
tax resistance that contributed to changes in government in both Kenya and Ghana arose in 
part because those governments already faced significant revenue pressure owing to 
stagnant growth, escalating global fuel prices and, in Kenya’s case, historically low levels 
of foreign aid.  Again, greater access to aid could have reduced the revenue pressure facing 
government, and thus the role of tax resistance in creating incentives for a change of 
government and subsequent reform. 
 
The evidence presented here is by no means sufficient to establish beyond doubt that 
foreign aid has reduced the potential for tax bargaining by reducing the revenue pressure 
facing governments.  The preceding discussion is, instead, aimed at the more modest goal 
of highlighting an aspect of the relationship between aid, tax reliance and tax bargaining 
that has frequently been overlooked, while presenting preliminary evidence to suggest that 
this aspect of the relationship is empirically important.   
11.4. A Governance Focused Tax Reform Agenda 
The discussion so far has advanced existing research by highlighting the complexity of the 
relationship between aid and tax reliance.  This has involved capturing the multiple 
channels through which foreign aid affects levels of tax collection and the importance of the 
impact of aid on the extent to which governments are dependent on tax revenue.  From a 
policy perspective these findings make clear that donors should seek to mitigate the 
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potentially adverse consequences of aid for levels of tax reliance.  Moreover, they argue 
that donors need to pay greater attention to the ways that aid is likely to shape domestic 
political dynamics through its inescapable impact on the dependence of recipient 
governments on tax revenue.  This final section adds an additional element to understanding 
the impact of foreign aid on the potential for tax bargaining, highlighting the importance of 
the impact of aid not only on levels of tax reliance but also on how tax revenue is raised.   
 
One of the central contributions of this research has been to highlight specific processes of 
tax bargaining in contemporary developing countries and, correspondingly, to identify 
specific contextual factors that have the potential to strengthen connections between 
taxation and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  The case study evidence 
has made clear that these contextual factors have been essential to explaining particular 
outcomes.  While the contextual factors laid out in the previous chapter include broad 
questions of political context and the structure of economies, they also include more 
specific considerations, including the importance of unified interests among taxpayers, of 
awareness and the political salience of taxes, and of trust between taxpayers and 
governments.  These latter factors have many roots, but are likely to be shaped to an 
important degree by the nature of tax systems themselves, including the types of taxes that 
are collected, the character of tax administration and the way that governments pursue tax 
reform. 
 
The message for policy makers, including donors, is that changes in how tax revenue is 
raised can make an important contribution to strengthening links between tax reliance and 
the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  At the same time, foreign aid donors 
need to guard against encouraging changes in tax policy and administration that may have 
negative implications for the potential for tax bargaining.  The latter possibility has been 
raised by Fjeldstad (2001), who has argued that revenue conditionality in rural Tanzania has 
led to increased levels of tax collection, but has also encouraged the use of increasingly 
coercive methods of tax collection, reducing the potential for tax bargaining. 
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Donors have played a very important role in shaping both tax policy and administration 
across the developing world, as reflected in the remarkable similarity of many tax systems.  
While much could be said about the benefits and limitations of this “global tax reform 
agenda,” the issue here is that those setting this agenda have almost certainly not been 
focused on the potential role of tax reform in encouraging or discouraging tax bargaining 
and broader governance gains (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008: 255).  The intention here is not 
to attempt to propose the specific elements of such a governance focused tax reform 
agenda, as existing evidence remains limited and proposals are thus necessarily speculative 
(Prichard 2010).  However, the evidence in this thesis has made clear that the character of 
tax systems shapes the strength of links between tax reliance, responsiveness and 
accountability.  It follows that such considerations should be a more central feature of 
future tax reform efforts.  The discussion on contextual factors in chapter 10 provides very 
broad guidance as to the types of tax reforms that are likely to encourage tax bargaining. 
These include reforms that increase popular awareness and understanding of taxes, 
encourage public engagement in tax debates, build trust between taxpayers and 
governments and improve the transparency of tax systems.  There are important 
opportunities for future research to explore these possibilities in greater detail. 
11.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the relationship between foreign aid, taxation and domestic 
responsiveness and accountability, addressing the argument that foreign aid, by reducing 
the tax reliance of recipient governments, may contribute to weakening domestic pressure 
for responsiveness and accountability.  The goal of this chapter has been to draw on the 
conclusions presented by this thesis to introduce a nuanced framework for systematically 
analyzing the relationship between aid, taxation and tax bargaining.  While the case studies 
have provided distinct new insights into certain elements of this relationship, the framework 
outlined here has also raised important additional questions for both researchers and policy 
makers. 
 
This chapter has argued that, contrary to many earlier findings, foreign aid does not 
consistently lead to lower levels of tax collection in recipient countries.  Instead, the impact 
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of aid on domestic tax collection is likely to reflect the combined impact of revenue 
incentives, technical assistance and conditionality, as well as the importance of both 
domestic political context and donor priorities.  The impact of aid on levels of tax collection 
is thus ambiguous.  Equally important is the fact that aid can lower the dependence of 
recipient governments on taxation, thus running the risk of reducing the revenue pressure 
facing recipient governments and of diminishing incentives for taxpayers to engage in 
collective action, with negative implications for levels of responsiveness and accountability.   
 
Finally, this chapter has argued that how taxes are collected is likely to have important 
implications for the likelihood of tax bargaining, and that governments and donors have an 
opportunity to focus on tax reform priorities that are likely to encourage domestic 
responsiveness and accountability.  While the findings from the case studies provide some 
general guidelines as to the potential content of those reforms, this is a subject that warrants 
significant future research. 
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12. Conclusions:  Key Messages and Opportunities for 
Further Research 
 
This thesis began with a simple observation: there is extensive evidence that conflict and 
bargaining over taxation figured centrally in processes of state building in early modern 
Europe and the United States, but these same political processes have remained largely 
unexplored in sub-Saharan Africa.  Against this background, a small group of scholars have 
persuasively argued that the study of taxation holds the potential to yield important new 
insights into the foundations of responsive and accountable government in the developing 
world.    
 
Earlier scholars have thus paved the way for this study.  However, their work has remained 
largely historical and theoretical, leaving a pressing need for empirically driven studies.  
While a number of isolated econometric studies have emerged in recent years, 
complemented by a group of case studies that have captured individual examples of tax 
bargaining, this study has been the first extended effort to systematically explore the 
relationship between tax reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in 
the developing world.  This has dictated the adoption of an ambitious and exploratory 
research design, which has drawn on both econometric and case study evidence in order to 
capture the extent, and limits, of the relationship between taxation, responsiveness and 
accountability in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
12.1. The Research Contribution 
The breadth of the research agenda has allowed this thesis to make a series of research 
contributions.  At the broadest level, it has provided evidence that the need for taxation has, 
in fact, contributed to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability in Ghana, Kenya 
and Ethiopia, though with significant differences across the three cases.  More specifically, 
this thesis has made five particular contributions. 
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First, it has drawn on a rich and complex historical and theoretical literature in order to 
present a novel causal model and framework for empirical research in this area.  This causal 
model undoubtedly obscures a certain amount of complexity, as the three causal processes 
that have been the focus of the case study analysis do not capture all of the pathways that 
may link tax reliance to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  However, 
despite these necessary compromises, the model presented here provides the first systematic 
basis for empirically exploring the relevance of taxation to changes in responsiveness and 
accountability at the country level, and has the potential to be an important starting point for 
future research. 
 
Second, the thesis revisited existing cross-country empirical tests of the connection between 
tax reliance and the expansion of accountability, and provided new results and an improved 
understanding of the complexity of the relationship.  While earlier studies had reported a 
positive and causal relationship, the results reported here relied on improved data and 
methods and found that there is, in fact, no significant evidence of the existence of such a 
positive relationship.  More importantly, the econometric analysis concluded by arguing 
that the ambiguous results can be explained the fact that standard cross-country 
econometric tests cannot capture the complexity of the underlying causal processes.  Thus 
the econometric analysis provided an important argument in favour of more detailed and 
nuanced case study and quantitative evidence. 
 
Third, the bulk of the thesis has presented detailed case study evidence that has both 
confirmed the importance of taxation to the expansion of responsiveness and accountability 
in the case study countries and provided detailed new insights into the particular 
characteristics of processes of tax bargaining.  By relying on extended historical narratives 
of the political economy of taxation in three very different contexts, the case studies have 
been able to capture detailed evidence of tax bargaining that has included both highly 
explicit cases of direct tax bargaining and longer-term, more easily overlooked, processes.  
These longer-term processes have captured the role of tax resistance in creating pressure for 
political reform as well as the importance of conflict over taxation to strengthening the 
political capabilities of taxpayers.  These narratives provide the most detailed existing 
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accounts of the broader politics of taxation and state building in the contemporary 
developing world. 
 
Fourth, by virtue of relying on extended historical accounts this is the first study to provide 
detailed evidence of the contextual factors that have shaped the potential for tax bargaining 
in individual countries.  The case study narratives have offered empirical support for 
existing propositions from the historical and theoretical literature about the importance of 
political and economic contexts in shaping outcomes.  They have also highlighted the 
importance of a series of more specific contextual factors, including shared interests among 
taxpayers, trust between taxpayers and governments, the involvement of elites, the 
characteristics of different tax types and the ways that tax reform and administration are 
carried out.  These factors have not only expanded our understanding of tax bargaining, but 
have important policy implications. 
 
Fifth, this thesis has provided new insights into the impact of foreign aid on domestic 
taxation, and the possible unintended consequences for domestic responsiveness and 
accountability.  Chapter 11 described in detail the complexity of this relationship and 
proposed a detailed framework for addressing it more systematically.  The case study 
evidence has also provided important initial lessons, demonstrating the need for increased 
attention to the impact of foreign aid on the potential for tax bargaining.  
12.2. Policy Implications 
While this study has largely avoided detailed discussion of policy issues in favour of 
maintaining a strict focus on the research question, the policy implications of the findings 
reported here are significant, particularly with respect to foreign aid.  Aid donors have 
frequently had an important impact on the tax reliance of recipient governments and on the 
character of tax systems in developing countries, but the broader governance implications 
of this impact have often been overlooked.  On a positive note, the past two decades have 
seen aid donors pay increasing attention to the need to ensure that aid does not lead to 
reduced levels of tax collection in recipient countries.  While this has been primarily 
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motivated by fiscal, rather than governance, concerns, the evidence here suggests that these 
efforts are likely to have important governance benefits. 
 
The impact of aid on domestic tax collection is therefore an important policy issue.  But 
equally important are issues related to tax reliance.  Even where levels of tax collection are 
sustained, foreign aid still inevitably reduces the dependence of recipient governments on 
tax revenue and consequently runs the risk of eroding domestic incentives for the expansion 
of responsiveness and accountability.  This is not a condemnation of aid, but argues that 
donors need to be more aware of the impact that aid can have on political outcomes.  In 
broad terms this means making efforts to ensure that in relieving the revenue pressure 
facing governments aid does not also undermine domestic demands for reform.  It also 
means delivering aid in a way that is not likely to discourage public engagement in revenue 
and budgeting processes.  Beyond these generalities more research is needed and holds the 
potential to yield significant benefits. 
 
The final policy message relevant to both donors and national governments is that the way 
that tax is collected is likely to be important for fostering strong linkages between tax 
reliance and the expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  Thus there is a need for 
future tax reform efforts to take into account the implications of different options for 
broader governance outcomes.  This idea was captured in a recent presentation by the 
Commissioner General of the Uganda Revenue Authority, who argued to her colleagues 
that, “We should elevate ourselves from being just tax collectors and tax administrators to 
being state builders.”34   This thesis has suggested that the types of measures that are 
needed are likely to be those that increase popular awareness and understanding of taxes, 
encourage public engagement in tax debates, build trust between taxpayers and 
governments and improve the transparency of tax systems.  However, there is a need for 
much more research in order to develop more specific policy recommendations (Prichard 
2010). 
                                                
34 Presentation to the inaugural conference of the African Tax Administration Forum, Kampala, Uganda, 
November 20, 2009. 
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12.3. Limitations and Future Research 
The need for additional research extends well beyond these relatively specific policy 
questions.  This thesis has made clear that conflicts and bargaining over taxation have 
played an important role in shaping political outcomes in the case study countries, but in 
doing so it has also raised a range of additional questions.  At a general level, research in 
this field derives from a rich and detailed historical literature that has explored the diverse 
connections between taxation and state building across a large number of countries and 
over several centuries.  While this research has provided a similar set of narratives from 
sub-Saharan Africa, the breadth and detail of these narratives remains comparatively 
modest.  Similarly, the arguments in this thesis have drawn on an impressive historical and 
theoretical literature, but it is beyond the scope of any individual study to capture all of the 
complexity raised by those earlier works.   
 
Of necessity, this thesis has focused on some questions to the exclusion of others, capturing 
relatively observable processes, at the central and regional government levels, in a 
particular group of countries, using a methodology that has focused on the political 
implications of changes in levels of taxation.  Much remains to be done.  This final section 
of the thesis is committed to highlighting five of the most important issues that have not 
been addressed, in order to point towards likely avenues for future research. 
 
First, this thesis has focused on the role of tax bargaining in linking taxation to the 
expansion of responsiveness and accountability.  It has correspondingly not focused on the 
importance of tax reliance to the strengthening of broader state capacity, which has been the 
focus of important research elsewhere (Brautigam 2008a, Brautigam and Knack 2004, 
Prichard and Leonard 2010).  It similarly has not focused on the possibility that 
governments that are reliant on tax revenue may be more likely to adopt growth-promoting 
policies owing to their common interest in promoting the prosperity of taxpayers and 
subsequently increased tax receipts.  Both issues are centrally important to broader 
scholarship dealing with the importance of taxation to state building in the developing 
world. 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, this thesis has focused on a subset of relatively 
observable causal processes that have linked tax reliance to the expansion of responsiveness 
and accountability.  This is likely to capture only some of the ways in which taxation is 
linked to broader changes in governance in practice, as there are good reasons to believe 
that some relevant processes may be difficult to observe (Moore 2008:38).  For example, 
the need for tax revenue may quietly shape government behaviour, providing modest, but 
constant, incentives for responsiveness and accountability.  These small, relatively 
invisible, changes in government behaviour over time may amount to significantly 
improved outcomes over the long-term.  Another possibility is that tax reliance may have 
subtle, long-term, impacts on the political engagement of taxpayers as they come to feel 
increased ownership over government activities.  These subtle processes, while 
unobservable by looking solely at visible tax conflicts, may nonetheless be a profoundly 
important way in which tax reliance creates long-term pressure for public responsiveness 
and accountability.  The observable processes captured in this thesis provide a significant 
indication that these less observable are also likely to operate in practice.  That said, there is 
a clear opportunity for future research that seeks to capture such processes more explicitly, 
perhaps beginning with continued efforts to study the impact of taxation on public 
perceptions and simple forms of political engagement (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001). 
 
Third, while tax bargaining is likely to depend on the overall tax reliance of governments, 
the case studies have focused more narrowly on changes in levels of tax collection.  This 
has been a pragmatic choice motivated by the potential for observing the political 
implications of such changes.  Observing the implications of changes in dependence on 
taxation, brought on by changes in access to non-tax revenue, is likely to be comparatively 
difficult, but there is nonetheless a need for such research.  This is particularly true in the 
case of foreign aid, as the discussion in chapter 11 has highlighted the potentially important 
political implications of reduced dependence on tax revenue, even where levels of tax 
collection are unaffected. 
 
Fourth, this research has focused on a particular set of countries, with certain characteristics 
in common, to the exclusion of others.  While the causal processes identified in the case 
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studies seem likely to be generally relevant beyond the case study countries, there is 
nonetheless a strong case for exploring the specifics of tax bargaining in quite different 
contexts.  Perhaps the most important opportunity lies in conducting similar research in 
countries that have access to significant non-tax revenue.  Such research could address the 
question of whether changes in tax collection, even where levels of tax collection are 
comparatively low, have the potential to yield similarly important processes of tax 
bargaining.  In resource dependent countries falling levels of non-tax revenue often force 
governments to increase taxation, and research has an opportunity to gain a deeper 
understanding of the likely political implications.35  Equally of interest is the potential to 
study the role of tax bargaining in post-conflict settings.  The need for many post-conflict 
states to rebuild tax collection from very low levels would seem to offer important 
opportunities to make revenue raising processes an entry point for broader governance 
gains, including strengthening engagement and trust between taxpayers and the state 
(Boyce and O’Donnell 2007). 
 
Finally, this research has focused exclusively on taxation at the national and regional 
government levels, to the exclusion of local government taxation.  This choice is justified 
by the heavy centralization of revenue collection in sub-Saharan Africa, but this does not 
minimize the potential importance of local government taxation to the expansion of 
responsiveness and accountability.  While most revenue is collected at the national and 
regional levels, the majority of taxpayers in sub-Saharan Africa experience taxation most 
directly at the local government level, owing to an array of taxes, fees and levies involving 
comparative small sums.  These taxes and fees result in high levels of taxpayer awareness 
and direct interaction between taxpayers and tax collectors, while the connection between 
revenue and public expenditure is likely to be more apparent at the local government level.  
As a consequence, local government taxation appears intuitively likely to encourage tax 
bargaining and public engagement.  While a number of existing studies have noted that 
local government tax systems in sub-Saharan Africa are frequently highly coercive, thus 
restricting the scope for direct tax bargaining, there remains a strong possibility that tax 
                                                
35 This has, for example, recently been the case in Nigeria in the wake of declining oil prices, according to 
data from the Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance. 
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reliance may nonetheless shape government behaviour and public engagement in more 
subtle ways (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001, Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008, Hoffman and 
Gibson 2005). 
12.4. Final Thoughts 
This thesis has made important new contributions to our understanding of the foundations 
of responsive and accountable government in sub-Saharan Africa, but research in this field 
remains in its infancy and there are enormous opportunities for further work.  Research of 
this kind has been extremely limited in sub-Saharan Africa, where scholarship has tended to 
focus on the role of particular political institutions and on the colonial origins of these 
institutions, and of development outcomes more generally.  Research focused on the 
political dynamics surrounding revenue raising provides a valuable complement to this 
existing body of work, not only because of the specific insights that emerge but because 
such research turns our attention toward the broad forces that shape state-society relations 
and bargaining between citizens and their governments.  As such, an important goal of this 
thesis is to contribute to sparking the continued expansion of research in this field. 
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List of Key Interviews 
 
Ghana 
Joe Abbey, Director, Centre for Policy Analysis 
Maj. Daniel Ablorh-Quarcoo, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
Janet Acheampong, Former Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
Nicholas Adamtey, Acting Coordinator, Centre fro Budget Advocacy, ISODEC 
David Addo, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
David Adom, Former Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
Vivien Adusei, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
Christian Agbeyegah, Youth Employment Scheme, Ministry of Manpower, Youth and 
Employment 
Moses Agyemang, Senior Economist, Private Enterprise Foundation 
Hon. Ato Ahwoi, Former Minister of Revenue 
Michael Akonnor, Assistant Budget Analyst, Ministry of Finance 
Hon. Kwesi Amissah-Arthur, Former Deputy Minister of Finance 
Marilyn Aniwa, In-Country Program Coordinator, Parliamentary Centre 
Samuel Anokye, Policy Research Specialist, Association of Ghana Industries 
Isaac Bentum, Internal Revenue Service 
Antwi Bosiako-Sekyere, Chief of Staff to President Atta-Mills 
Ernest Awoosah, Director Finance and Administration, ISODEC 
Joseph Ayee, Dean, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Ghana 
Benjamin Ayesu-Kwafo, Tax Policy Unit, Ministry of Finance 
Vitus Azeem, Directot, Ghana Integrity Initiative 
Mahamudu Bawumia, Deputy Governor, Bank of Ghana 
Ken Bentsi-Enchill, Deputy Commissioner, VAT Service 
Daniel Boakye, Country Officer, World Bank 
Archie Book, Country Representative, Canadian International Development Agency 
Samuel Brew, Economic Policy Management Program, University of Ghana 
Ato Dadzie, Journalist 
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Dan Doe, VAT Service 
Anthony Doku, Director of Research, Planning and Monitoring, Revenue Agencies 
Governing Board 
Sam Gaba, NDC Political Advisor 
Yao Graham, Director, Third World Network 
Sal Hammond, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
Cletus Kosiba, Executive Director, Associations of Ghana Industries 
Hon. Benjamin Kunbour, Member of Parliament Finance Committee 
Smile Kwawukume, Coordinator of PUFMARP Project, World Bank 
Nii Adu Daku Mante, Member of Parliament, Chair of Finance Committee 
Steve Manteaw, Program Director, ISODEC 
Prize McApreko, Deputy Director, Amnesty International 
Arnold McIntyre, International Monetary Fund 
Eva Mends, Head of Budget Development Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning 
Hon. Betty Mould Idrissu, Attorney General and Minster for Justice 
David Nguyen-Thanh,, Director of GTZ Tax Program 
Paul Nkansah, Deputy Director, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service 
Emmanuel Nti, Tax Policy Unit, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
Charles Ntiri, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
G.K. Ofori, President, Ghana Union of Traders Association 
Robert Osei, ISSER, University of Ghana 
Kodjo Owusu, Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service 
Issac Owusu-Mensah, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
David Pedley, Head of Governance, DFID 
Kwesi Pratt, Committee for Joint Action 
Seth Terkper, Deputy Minister of Finance 
Anthony Tsekpo, Senior Budget Expert, Parliamentary Centre 
Richard Yawutse, Chief Collector, IT Division, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service 
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Kenya 
Graham Alder, Chairman, Karen and Langata District Association 
Hon. Ochilo Ayacko, Former Minister of Energy 
Jonathan Caseley, Consultant to National Taxpayers’ Association 
Sachen Chandaria, Business Person 
Julius Gikonyo, Matatu conductor 
Graham Glenday, Former Advisor to Ministry of Finance and Kenya Revenue Agency 
Andy Harris, Research, Harvard University 
Sheila Kamunyori, Researcher 
Vincent Kimosop, Transparency International 
Njeru Kirira, Former Director of Tax Policy, Ministry of Finance 
Charles Kiura, University of Nairobi 
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